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"What man would be wise, let him drink from the river
That bears on its waters the record of time."

No. 1083 July 9 1884

Founded by Rev. A. A. LAMBING, A. M., April 17, 1884; that being the one hundred and thirtieth anniversary of the first Mass and first public act of religious service ever performed on the spot where Pittsburg now stands.

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OF THE
CATHOLIC DIOCESE
OF
HOLY GHOST FATHERS
SCHOLASTICATE

VOLUME X.

CONTAINING THE FIRST PART OF THE WRITINGS ON CHRISTIANITY AND HEATHENISM IN POLITICS AND IN SOCIETY.

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1884.

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CATHOLICITY NECESSARY TO SUSTAIN POPULAR LIBERTY.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1845.]

By popular liberty, we mean democracy; by democracy, we mean the democratic form of government; by the democratic form of government, we mean that form of government which vests the sovereignty in the people as population, and which is administered by the people, either in person or by their delegates. By sustaining popular liberty, we mean, not the introduction or institution of democracy, but preserving it when and where it is already introduced, and securing its free, orderly, and wholesome action. By Catholicity, we mean the Roman Catholic Church, faith, morals, and worship. The thesis we propose to maintain is, therefore, that without the Roman Catholic religion it is impossible to preserve a democratic government, and secure its free, orderly, and wholesome action. Infidelity, Protestantism, heathenism may institute a democracy, but only Catholicity can sustain it.

Our own government, in its origin and constitutional form, is not a democracy, but, if we may use the expression, a limited *elective* aristocracy. In its theory, the representative, within the limits prescribed by the constitution, when once elected, and during the time for which he is elected, is, in his official action, independent of his constituents, and not responsible to them for his acts. For this reason, we call the government an elective aristocracy. But, practically, the government framed by our fathers no longer exists, save in name. Its original character has disappeared, or is rapidly disappearing. The constitution is a dead letter, except so far as it serves to prescribe the modes of election, the rule of the majority, the distribution and tenure of offices, and the union and separation of the functions of government. Since 1828, it has been becoming in practice, and is now, substantially, a pure democracy, with no effective constitution but the will of the majority for the time being. Whether the change has been for the better or the worse, we need not stop to inquire. The change was in-

evitable, because men are more willing to advance themselves by flattering the people and perverting the constitution, than they are by self-denial to serve their country. The change has been effected, and there is no return to the original theory of the government. Any man who should plant himself on the constitution, and attempt to arrest the democratic tendency,—no matter what his character, ability, virtues, services,—would be crushed and ground to powder. Your Calhouns must give way for your Polks and Van Burens, your Websters for your Harrisons and Tylers. No man, who is not prepared to play the demagogue, to stoop to flatter the people, and, in one direction or another, to exaggerate the democratic tendency, can receive the nomination for an important office, or have influence in public affairs. The reign of great men, of distinguished statesmen and firm patriots, is over, and that of the demagogues has begun. Your most important offices are hereafter to be filled by third and fourth-rate men,—men too insignificant to excite strong opposition, and too flexible in their principles not to be willing to take any direction the caprices of the mob—or the interests of the wire-pullers of the mob—may demand. Evil or no evil, such is the fact, and we must conform to it.

Such being the fact, the question comes up, How are we to sustain popular liberty, to secure the free, orderly, and wholesome action of our practical democracy? The question is an important one, and cannot be blinked with impunity.

The theory of democracy is, Construct your government and commit it to the people to be taken care of. Democracy is not properly a government; but what is called the government is a huge machine contrived to be wielded by the people as they shall think proper. In relation to it the people are assumed to be what Almighty God is to the universe, the first cause, the medial cause, the final cause. It emanates from them; it is administered by them, and for them; and, moreover, they are to keep watch and provide for its right administration.

It is a beautiful theory, and would work admirably, if it were not for one little difficulty, namely,—*the people are fallible, both individually and collectively, and governed by their passions and interests, which not unfrequently lead them far astray, and produce much mischief.* The government must necessarily follow their will; and whenever

that will happens to be blinded by passion, or misled by ignorance or interest, the government must inevitably go wrong; and government can never go wrong without doing injustice. The government may be provided for; the people may take care of that; but who or what is to take care of the people, and assure us that they will always wield the government so as to promote justice and equality, or maintain order, and the equal rights of all, of all classes and interests?

Do not answer by referring us to the virtue and intelligence of the people. We are writing seriously, and have no leisure to enjoy a joke, even if it be a good one. We have too much principle, we hope, to seek to humbug, and have had too much experience to be humbugged. We are Americans, American born, American bred, and we love our country, and will, when called upon, defend it, against any and every enemy, to the best of our feeble ability; but, though we by no means rate American virtue and intelligence so low as do those who will abuse us for not rating it higher, we cannot consent to hoodwink ourselves, or to claim for our countrymen a degree of virtue and intelligence they do not possess. We are acquainted with no salutary errors, and are forbidden to seek even a good end by any but honest means. The virtue and intelligence of the American people are not sufficient to secure the free, orderly, and wholesome action of the government; for they do not secure it. The government commits, every now and then, a sad blunder, and the general policy it adopts must prove, in the long run, suicidal. It has adopted a most iniquitous policy, and its most unjust measures are its most popular measures, such as it would be fatal to any man's political success directly and openly to oppose; and we think we hazard nothing in saying, our free institutions cannot be sustained without an augmentation of popular virtue and intelligence. We do not say the people are not capable of a sufficient degree of virtue and intelligence to sustain a democracy; all we say is, they cannot do it without virtue and intelligence, nor without a higher degree of virtue and intelligence than they have as yet attained to. We do not apprehend that many of our countrymen, and we are sure no one whose own virtue and intelligence entitle his opinion to any weight, will dispute this. Then the question of the means of sustaining our democracy resolves itself into the question of augmenting the virtue and intelligence of the people.

The press makes readers, but does little to make virtuous and intelligent readers. The newspaper press is, for the most part, under the control of men of very ordinary abilities, lax principles, and limited acquirements. It echoes and exaggerates popular errors, and does little or nothing to create a sound public opinion. Your popular literature caters to popular taste, passions, prejudices, ignorance, and errors; it is by no means above the average degree of virtue and intelligence which already obtains, and can do nothing to create a higher standard of virtue or tone of thought. On what, then, are we to rely?

"On Education," answer Frances Wright, Abner Kneeland, Horace Mann, and the educationists generally. But we must remember that we must have virtue *and* intelligence. Virtue without intelligence will only fit the mass to be duped by the artful and designing; and intelligence without virtue only makes one the abler and more successful villain. Education must be of the right sort, if it is to answer our purpose; for a bad education is worse than none. The Mahometans are great sticklers for education, and, if we recollect aright, it is laid down in the Koran, that every believer must at least be taught to read; but we do not find their education does much to advance them in virtue and intelligence. Education, moreover, demands educators, and educators of the right sort. Where are these to be obtained? Who is to select them, judge of their qualifications, sustain or dismiss them? The people? Then you place education in the same category with democracy. You make the people through their representatives the educators. The people will select and sustain only such educators as represent their own virtues, vices, intelligence, prejudices, and errors. Whether they educate mediately or immediately, they can impart only what they have and are. Consequently, with them for educators, we can, by means even of universal education, get no increase of virtue and intelligence to bear on the government. The people may educate, but where is that which takes care that they educate in a proper manner? Here is the very difficulty we began by pointing out. The people take care of the government and education; but who or what is to take care of the people, who need taking care of quite as much as either education or government?—for, rightly considered, neither government nor education has any other legitimate end than to take care of the people.

We know of but one solution of the difficulty, and that is in RELIGION. There is no foundation for virtue but in religion, and it is only religion that can command the degree of popular virtue and intelligence requisite to insure to popular government the right direction and a wise and just administration. A people without religion, however successful they may be in throwing off old institutions, or in introducing new ones, have no power to secure the free, orderly, and wholesome working of any institutions. For the people can bring to the support of institutions only the degree of virtue and intelligence they have; and we need not stop to prove that an infidel people can have very little either of virtue or intelligence, since, in this professedly Christian country, this will and must be conceded us. We shall, therefore, assume, without stopping to defend our assumption, that religion is the power or influence we need to take care of the people, and secure the degree of virtue and intelligence necessary to sustain popular liberty. We say, then, if democracy commits the government to the people to be taken care of, religion is to take care that they take proper care of the government, rightly direct and wisely administer it.

But what religion? It must be a religion which is above the people and controls them, or it will not answer the purpose. If it depends on the people, if the people are to take care of it, to say what it shall be, what it shall teach, what it shall command, what worship or discipline it shall insist on being observed, we are back in our old difficulty. The people take care of religion; but who or what is to take care of the people? We repeat, then, what religion? It cannot be Protestantism, in all or any of its forms; for Protestantism assumes as its point of departure that Almighty God has indeed given us a religion, but *has given it to us not to take care of us, but to be taken care of by us.* It makes religion the ward of the people; assumes it to be sent on earth a lone and helpless orphan, to be taken in by the people, who are to serve as its nurse.

We do not pretend that Protestants say this in just so many words; but this, under the present point of view, is their distinguishing characteristic. What was the assumption of the reformers? Was is not that Almighty God had failed to take care of his church, that he had suffered it to become exceedingly corrupt and corrupting, so much so as to have become a very Babylon, and to have ceased to be his

church? Was it not for this reason that they turned reformers, separated themselves from what had been the church, and attempted, with such materials as they could command, to reconstruct the church on its primitive foundation, and after the primitive model? Is not this what they tell us? But if they had believed the Son of Man came to minister and not to be ministered unto, that Almighty God had instituted his religion for the spiritual government of men, and charged himself with the care and maintenance of it, would they ever have dared to take upon themselves the work of reforming it? Would they ever have fancied that either religion or the church could ever need reforming, or, if so, that it could ever be done by human agency? Of course not. They would have taken religion as presented by the church as the standard, submitted to it as the law, and confined themselves to the duty of obedience. It is evident, therefore, from the fact of their assuming to be reformers, that they, consciously or unconsciously, regarded religion as committed to their care, or abandoned to their protection. They were, at least, its guardians, and were to govern it, instead of being governed by it.

The first stage of Protestantism was to place religion under the charge of the civil government. The church was condemned, among other reasons, for the control it exercised over princes and nobles, that is, over the temporal power: and the first effect of Protestantism was to emancipate the government from this control, or, in other words, to free the government from the restraints of religion, and to bring religion in subjection to the temporal authority. The prince, by rejecting the authority of the church, won for himself the power to determine the faith of his subjects, to appoint its teachers, and to remove them whenever they should teach what he disapproved, or whenever they should cross his ambition, defeat his oppressive policy, or interfere with his pleasures. Thus was it and still is it with the Protestant princes in Germany, with the temporal authority in Denmark, Sweden, England, Russia,—in this respect also Protestant,—and originally was it the same in this country. The supreme civil magistrate makes himself sovereign pontiff, and religion and the church, if disobedient to his will, are to be turned out of house and home, or dragooned into submission. Now, if we adopt this view, and subject religion to the civil government, it will not answer our pur-

pose. We want religion, as we have seen, to control the people, and through its spiritual governance to cause them to give the temporal government always a wise and just direction. But, if the government control the religion, it can exercise no control over the sovereign people, for they control the government. Through the government the people take care of religion, but who or what takes care of the people? This would leave the people ultimate, and we have no security unless we have something more ultimate than they, something which they cannot control, but which they must obey.

The second stage in Protestantism is to reject, in matters of religion, the authority of the temporal government, and to subject religion to the control of the faithful. This is the full recognition in matters of religion of the democratic principle. The people determine their faith and worship, select, sustain, or dismiss their own religious teachers. They who are to be taught judge him who is to teach, and say whether he teaches them truth or falsehood, wholesome doctrine or unwholesome. The patient directs the physician what to prescribe. This is the theory adopted by Protestants generally in this country. The congregation select their own teacher, unless it be among the Methodists, and to them the pastor is responsible. If he teaches to suit them, well and good; if he crosses none of their wishes, enlarges their numbers, and thus lightens their taxes and gratifies their pride of sect, also well and good; if not, he must seek a flock to feed somewhere else.

But this view will no more answer our purpose than the former; for it places religion under the control of the people, and therefore in the same category with the government itself. The people take care of religion, but who takes care of the people?

The third and last stage of Protestantism is individualism. This leaves religion entirely to the control of the individual, who selects his own creed, or makes a creed to suit himself, devises his own worship and discipline, and submits to no restraints but such as are self-imposed. This makes a man's religion the effect of his virtue and intelligence, and denies it all power to augment or to direct them. So this will not answer. The individual takes care of his religion, but who or what takes care of the individual? The state? But who takes care of the state? The people? But who takes care of the people? Our old difficulty again.

It is evident, from these considerations, that Protestantism is not and cannot be the religion to sustain democracy; because, take it in which stage you will, it, like democracy itself, is subject to the control of the people, and must command and teach what they say, and of course must follow, instead of controlling, their passions, interests, and caprices.

Nor do we obtain this conclusion merely by reasoning. It is sustained by facts. The Protestant religion is everywhere either an expression of the government or of the people, and must obey either the government or public opinion. The grand reform, if reform it was, effected by the Protestant chiefs, consisted in bringing religious questions before the public, and subjecting faith and worship to the decision of public opinion,—public on a larger or smaller scale, that is, of the nation, the province, or the sect. Protestant faith and worship tremble as readily before the slightest breath of public sentiment, as the aspen leaf before the gentle zephyr. The faith and discipline of a sect take any and every direction the public opinion of that sect demands. All is loose, floating,—is here to-day, is there to-morrow, and, next day, may be nowhere. The holding of slaves is compatible with Christian character south of a geographical line, and incompatible north; and Christian morals change according to the prejudices, interests, or habits of the people, —as evinced by the recent divisions in our own country among the Baptists and Methodists. The Unitarians of Savannah refuse to hear a preacher accredited by Unitarians of Boston.

The great danger in our country is from the predominance of material interests. Democracy has a direct tendency to favor inequality and injustice. The government must obey the people; that is, it must follow the passions and interests of the people, and of course the stronger passions and interests. These with us are material, such as pertain solely to this life and this world. What our people demand of government is, that it adopt and sustain such measures as tend most directly to facilitate the acquisition of wealth. It must, then, follow the passion for wealth, and labor especially to promote worldly interests.

But among these worldly interests, some are stronger than others, and can command the government. These will take possession of the government, and wield it for their own especial advantage. They will make it the instrument of taxing all the other interests of the country for the special

advancement of themselves. This leads to inequality and injustice, which are incompatible with the free, orderly, and wholesome working of the government.

Now, what is wanted is some power to prevent this, to moderate the passion for wealth, and to inspire the people with such a true and firm sense of justice, as will prevent any one interest from struggling to advance itself at the expense of another. Without this the stronger material interests predominate, make the government the means of securing their predominance, and of extending it by the burdens which, through the government, they are able to impose on the weaker interests of the country.

The framers of our government foresaw this evil, and thought to guard against it by a written constitution. But they intrusted the preservation of the constitution to the care of the people, which was as wise as to lock up your culprit in prison and intrust him with the key. The constitution, as a restraint on the will of the people or the governing majority, is already a dead letter. It answers to talk about, to declaim about, in electioneering speeches, and even as a theme of newspaper leaders, and political essays in reviews; but its effective power is a morning vapor after the sun is well up.

Even Mr. Calhoun's theory of the constitution, which regards it not simply as the written instrument, but as the disposition or the constitution of the people into sovereign states united in a federal league or compact, for certain purposes which concern all the states alike, and from which it follows that any measure unequal in its bearing, or oppressive upon any portion of the confederacy, is *ipso facto* null and void, and may be vetoed by the aggrieved state,—this theory, if true, is yet insufficient; because, 1. It has no application within the state governments themselves; and because, 2. It does not, as a matter of fact, arrest what are regarded as the unequal, unjust, and oppressive measures of the federal government. South Carolina, in 1833, forced a compromise, but in 1842, the obnoxious policy was revived, is pursued now successfully, and there is no state to attempt again the virtue of state interposition. Not even South Carolina can be brought to do so again. The meshes of trade and commerce are so spread over the whole land, the controlling influences of all sections have become so united and interwoven, by means of banks, other moneyed corporations, and the credit system, that henceforth state interposition be-

comes practically impossible. The constitution is practically abolished, and our government is virtually, to all intents and purposes, as we have said, a pure democracy, with nothing to prevent it from obeying the interest or interests which for the time being can succeed in commanding it. This, as Mr. Caleb Cushing would say, is a "fixed fact." There is no restraint of predominating passions and interests but in religion. This is another "fixed fact."

Protestantism is insufficient to restrain these, for it does not do it, and is itself carried away by them. The Protestant sect governs its religion, instead of being governed by it. If one sect pursues, by the influence of its chiefs, a policy in opposition to the passions and interests of its members, or any portion of them, the disaffected, if a majority, change its policy; if too few or too weak to do that, they leave it and join some other sect, or form a new sect. If the minister attempts to do his duty, reproves a practice by which his parishioners "get gain," or insists on their practising some real self-denial not compensated by some self-indulgence, a few leading members will tell him very gravely, that they hired him to preach and pray for them, not to interfere with their business concerns and relations; and if he does not mind his own business, they will no longer need his services. The minister feels, perhaps, the insult; he would be faithful; but he looks at his lovely wife, at his little ones. These to be reduced to poverty, perhaps to beggary,—no, it must not be; one struggle, one pang, and it is over. He will do the bidding of his masters. A zealous minister in Boston ventured, one Sunday, to denounce the modern spirit of trade. The next day, he was waited on by a committee of wealthy merchants belonging to his parish, who told him he was wrong. The Sunday following, the meek and humble minister publicly retracted, and made the *amende honorable.*

Here, then, is the reason why Protestantism, though it may institute, cannot sustain popular liberty. It is itself subject to popular control, and must follow in all things the popular will, passion, interest, ignorance, prejudice, or caprice. This, in reality, is its boasted virtue, and we find it commended because under it the people have a voice in its management. Nay, we ourselves shall be denounced, not for saying Protestantism subjects religion to popular control, but for intimating that religion ought not to be so subjected. A terrible cry will be raised against us. "See, here is Mr.

Brownson," it will be said, "he would bring the people under the control of the Pope of Rome. Just as we told you. These Papists have no respect for the people. They sneer at the people, mock at their wisdom and virtue. Here is this unfledged Papistling, not yet a year old, boldly contending that the control of their religious faith and worship should be taken from the people, and that they must believe and do just what the emissaries of Rome are pleased to command; and all in the name of liberty too." If we only had room, we would write out and publish what the anti-Catholic press will say against us, and save the candid, the learned, intellectual, and patriotic editors the trouble of doing it themselves; and we would do it with the proper quantity of italics, small capitals, capitals, and exclamation points. Verily, we think we could do the thing up nearly as well as the best of them. But we have no room. Yet it is easy to foresee what they will say. The burden of their accusation will be, that we labor to withdraw religion from the control of the people, and to free it from the necessity of following their will; that we seek to make it the master, and not the slave, of the people. And this is good proof of our position, that Protestantism cannot govern the people,—for they govern it,—and therefore that Protestantism is not the religion wanted; for it is precisely a religion that can and will govern the people, be their master, that we need.

If Protestantism will not answer the purpose, what religion will? The Roman Catholic or none. The Roman Catholic religion assumes, as its point of departure, that it is instituted not to be taken care of by the people, but to take care of the people; not to be governed by them, but to govern them. The word is harsh in democratic ears, we admit; but it is not the office of religion to say soft or pleasing words. It must speak the truth even in unwilling ears, and it has few truths that are not harsh and grating to the worldly mind or the depraved heart. The people need governing, and must be governed, or nothing but anarchy and destruction await them. They must have a master. The word must be spoken. But it is not our word. We have demonstrated its necessity in showing that we have no security for popular government, unless we have some security that the people will administer it wisely and justly; and we have no security that they will do this, unless we have some security that their passions will be restrained, and their attachments to worldly interests so mod-

erated that they will never seek, through the government, to support them at the expense of justice; and this security we can have only in a religion that is above the people, exempt from their control, which they cannot command, but must, on peril of condemnation, OBEY. Declaim as you will; quote our expression,—THE PEOPLE MUST HAVE A MASTER,—as you doubtless will; hold it up in glaring capitals, to excite the unthinking and unreasoning multitude, and doubly to fortify their prejudices against Catholicity; be mortally scandalized at the assertion that religion ought to govern the people, and then go to work and seek to bring the people into subjection to your banks or moneyed corporations through their passions, ignorance, and worldly interests, and in doing so, prove what candid men, what lovers of truth, what noble defenders of liberty, and what ardent patriots you are. We care not. You see we understand you, and, understanding you, we repeat, the religion which is to answer our purpose must be *above* the people, and able to COMMAND them. We know the force of the word, and we mean it. The first lesson to the child is, *obey*; the first and last lesson to the people, individually or collectively, is, OBEY; —and there is no obedience where there is no authority to enjoin it.

The Roman Catholic religion, then, is necessary to sustain popular liberty, because popular liberty can be sustained only by a religion free from popular control, above the people, speaking from above and able to command them,—and such a religion is the Roman Catholic. It acknowledges no master but God, and depends only on the divine will in respect to what it shall teach, what it shall ordain, what it shall insist upon as truth, piety, moral and social virtue. It was made not by the people, but for them; is administered not by the people, but for them; is accountable not to the people, but to God. Not dependent on the people, it will not follow their passions; not subject to their control, it will not be their accomplice in iniquity; and speaking from God, it will teach them the truth, and command them to practise justice. To this end the very constitution of the church contributes. It is catholic, universal; it teaches all nations, and has its centre in no one. If it was a mere national church, like the Anglican, the Russian, the Greek, or as Louis XIV. in his pride sought to make the Gallican, it would follow the caprice or interest of that nation, and become but a tool of its government or of its predominating

passion. The government, if anti-popular, would use it to oppress the people, to favor its ambitious projects, or its unjust and ruinous policy. Under a popular government, it would become the slave of the people, and could place no restraint on the ruling interest or on the majority; but would be made to sanction and consolidate its power. But having its centre in no one nation, extending over all, it becomes independent of all, and in all can speak with the same voice and in the same tone of authority. This the church has always understood, and hence the noble struggles of the many calumniated popes to sustain the unity, catholicity, and independence of the ecclesiastical power. This, too, the temporal powers have always seen and felt, and hence their readiness, even while professing the Catholic faith, to break the unity of Catholic authority, for, in so doing, they could subject the church in their own dominions, as did Henry VIII., and as does the Emperor of Russia, to themselves.

But we pray our readers to understand us well. We unquestionably assert the *adequacy* of Catholicity to sustain popular liberty, on the ground of its being exempted from popular control and able to govern the people; and its *necessity*, on the ground that it is the only religion, which, in a popular government, is or can be exempted from popular control, and able to govern the people. We say distinctly, that this is the ground on which, reasoning as the statesman, not as the theologian, we assert the adequacy and necessity of Catholicity; and we object to Protestantism, *in our present argument*, solely on the ground that it has no authority over the people, is subject to them, must follow the direction they give it, and therefore cannot restrain their passions, or so control them as to prevent them from abusing their government. This we assert, distinctly and intentionally, and so plainly, that what we say cannot be mistaken.

But in what sense do we assert Catholicity to be the master of the people? Here we demand justice. The authority of Catholicity is spiritual, and the only sense in which we have here urged or do urge its necessity is as the means of augmenting the virtue and intelligence of the people. We demand it as a religious, not as a political power. We began by defining democracy to be that form of government which vests the sovereignty in the people. If, then, we recognize the sovereignty of the people in matters of government, we must recognize their political right to do what they will. The only restriction on their will we contend for

is a *moral* restriction; and the master we contend for is not a master that prevents them from doing politically what they will, but who, by his moral and spiritual influence, prevents them from willing what they ought not to will. The only influence on the political or governmental action of the people which we ask from Catholicity, is that which it exerts on the mind, the heart, and the conscience:—an influence which it exerts by enlightening the mind to see the true end of man, the relative value of all worldly pursuits, by moderating the passions, by weaning the affections from the world, inflaming the heart with true charity, and by making each act in all things seriously, honestly, conscientiously. The people will thus come to see and to will what is equitable and right, and will give to the government a wise and just direction, and never use it to effect any unwise or unjust measures. This is the kind of master we demand for the people, and this is the bugbear of "Romanism" with which miserable panders to prejudice seek to frighten old women and children. Is there any thing alarming in this? In this sense, we wish this country to come under the Pope of Rome. As the visible head of the church, the spiritual authority which Almighty God has instituted to teach and govern the nations, we assert his supremacy, and tell our countrymen that we would have them submit to him. They may flare up at this as much as they please, and write as many alarming and abusive editorials as they choose or can find time or space to do,—they will not move us, or relieve themselves of the obligation Almighty God has placed them under of obeying the authority of the Catholic Church, pope and all.

If we were discussing the question before us as a theologian, we should assign many other reasons why Catholicity is necessary to sustain popular liberty. Where the passions are unrestrained, there is license, but not liberty; the passions are not restrained without divine grace; and divine grace comes ordinarily only through the sacraments of the church. But from the point of view we are discussing the question, we are not at liberty to press this argument, which, in itself, would be conclusive. The Protestants have foolishly raised the question of the influence of Catholicity on democracy, and have sought to frighten our countrymen from embracing it by appealing to their democratic prejudices, or, if you will, convictions. We have chosen to meet them on this question, and to prove that democracy without Catholicity cannot

be sustained. Yet in our own minds the question is really unimportant. We have proved the insufficiency of Protestantism to sustain democracy. What then? Have we in so doing proved that Protestantism is not the true religion? Not at all; for we have no infallible evidence that democracy is the true or even the best form of government. It may be so, and the great majority of the American people believe it is so; but they may be mistaken, and Protestantism be true, notwithstanding its incompatibility with republican institutions. So we have proved that Catholicity is necessary to sustain such institutions. But what then? Have we proved it to be the true religion? Not at all. For such institutions may themselves be false and mischievous. Nothing in this way is settled in favor of one religion or another, because no system of politics can ever constitute a standard by which to try a religious system. Religion is more ultimate than politics, and you must conform your politics to your religion, and not your religion to your politics. You must be the veriest infidels to deny this.

This conceded, the question the Protestants raise is exceedingly insignificant. The real question is, Which religion is from God? If it be Protestantism, they should refuse to subject it to any human test, and should blush to think of compelling it to conform to any thing human; for when God speaks, man has nothing to do but to listen and obey. So, having decided that Catholicity is from God, save in condescension to the weakness of our Protestant brethren, we must refuse to consider it in its political bearings. It speaks from God, and its speech overrides every other speech, its authority every other authority. It is the sovereign of sovereigns. He who could question this, admitting it to be from God, has yet to obtain his first religious conception, and to take his first lesson in religious liberty; for we are to hear God, rather than hearken unto men. But we have met the Protestants on their own ground, because, though in doing so we surrendered the vantage-ground we might occupy, we know the strength of Catholicity and the weakness of Protestantism. We know what Protestantism has done for liberty, and what it can do. It can take off restraints, and introduce license, but it can do nothing to sustain true liberty. Catholicity depends on no form of government; it leaves the people to adopt such forms of government as they please, because under any or all forms of government it can fulfil its mission of training up souls for heaven; and the eternal

salvation of one single soul is worth more than, is a good far outweighing, the most perfect civil liberty, nay, all the worldly prosperity and enjoyment ever obtained or to be obtained by the whole human race.

It is, after all, in this fact, which Catholicity constantly brings to our minds, and impresses upon our hearts, that consists its chief power, aside from the grace of the sacraments, to sustain popular liberty. The danger to that liberty comes from love of the world,—the ambition for power or place, the greediness of gain or distinction. It comes from lawless passions, from inordinate love of the goods of time and sense. Catholicity, by showing us the vanity of all these, by pointing us to the eternal reward that awaits the just, moderates this inordinate love, these lawless passions, and checks the rivalries and struggles in which popular liberty receives her death blow. Once learn that all these things are vanity, that even civil liberty itself is no great good, that even bodily slavery is no great evil, that the one thing needful is a mind and heart conformed to the will of God, and you have a disposition which will sustain a democracy wherever introduced, though doubtless a disposition that would not lead you to introduce it where it is not.

But this last is no objection, for the revolutionary spirit is as fatal to democracy as to any other form of government. It is the spirit of insubordination and of disorder. It is opposed to all fixed rule, to all permanent order. It loosens every thing, and sets all afloat. Where all is floating, where nothing is fixed, where nothing can be counted on to be to-morrow what it is to-day there is no liberty, no solid good. The universal restlessness of Protestant nations, the universal disposition to change, the constant movements of the populations, so much admired by shortsighted philosophers, are a sad spectacle to the sober-minded Christian, who would, as far as possible, find in all things a type of that eternal fixedness and repose he looks forward to as the blessed reward of his trials and labors here. Catholicity comes here to our relief. All else may change, but it changes not. All else may pass away, but it remains where and what it was, a type of the immobility and immutability of the eternal God.

NATIVE AMERICANISM.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1845.]

We have read this pamphlet with pleasure and instruction. It is written in good temper, and with a good share of ability. It triumphantly refutes the oft repeated slander, that the Roman Catholic Church is incompatible with republican institutions and popular freedom; and though it contains expressions, and, if by a Catholic, concessions, which we do not approve or believe warranted, we commend it to the American Protestant Society, and especially to the so-called Native American party. Either can hardly fail to profit by its careful and diligent perusal.

We have introduced this pamphlet simply as the text of some few remarks on the subject of Native Americanism. We are ourselves native-born, and we hope not deficient in true love of country. Though not blind to the faults of our countrymen, and endeavoring on all occasions to place the love of God before the love of country, we believe we possess some share of genuine patriotic feeling. We know we have loved American institutions; and we are ready to vindicate them, with what little ability we may have, on any occasion, and against any and every sort of enemies. But we confess that we have and have had, from the first, no sympathy, with what is called Native Americanism. We have seen no necessity for a movement against foreigners who choose to make this land their home; and we have felt that such a movement, while it could lead to no good, might lead to results truly deplorable.

We have been accustomed to trace the hand of a merciful Providence in reserving this New World to so late a day for Christian civilization; we have been in the habit of believing that it was not without a providential design, that here was reserved an open field in which that civilization, disengaging itself from the vices and corruptions of the Old World, might display itself in all its purity, strength, and glory. We have regarded it as a chosen land, not for

**Catholicism compatible with Republican Government, and in full Accordance with Popular Institutions.* By Fenelon. New York: 1844.

one race, or one people, but for the wronged and downtrodden of all nations, tongues, and kindreds, where they might come as to a holy asylum of peace and charity. It has been a cause of gratulation, of ardent thankfulness to Almighty God, that here was founded, as it were, a city of refuge, to which men might flee from oppression, be free from the trammels of tyranny, regain their rights as men, and dwell in security. Here all partition walls which make enemies of different races and nations were to be broken down; all senseless and mischievous distinctions of rank and caste were to be discarded; and every man, no matter where born, in what language trained, was to be regarded as man, —as nothing more, as nothing less. Here we were to found, not a republic of Englishmen, of Frenchmen, of Dutchmen, of Irishmen, but of men; and to make the word *American* mean, not a man born on this soil or on that, but a free and accepted member of the grand republic of men. Such is what has been boasted as the principle and the destiny of this New World; and with this, we need not say, Native Americanism is directly at war.

The great principle of true *Americanism*, if we may use the word, is, that merit makes the man. It discards all distinctions which are purely accidental, and recognizes only such as are personal. It places every man on his own two feet, and says to him, Be a man, and you shall be esteemed according to your worth as a man; you shall be commended only for your personal merits; you shall be made to suffer only for your personal demerits. To each one according to his capacity, to each capacity according to its works. This is Americanism. It is this which has been our boast, which has constituted our country's true glory. It is this which we have inherited from our fathers; it is this which we hold as a sacred trust, and must preserve in all its purity, strength, and activity, if we would not prove "degenerate sons of noble sires;" and it is this, which *Native* Americanism, so-called, opposes,—and because it opposes this, no true American can support it.

There is something grateful to all our better feelings in the thought, that here is a home to which the oppressed can come, and find the rights, the respect, and the well-being denied them in the land of their birth. The emigrant's condition is not a little improved by touching upon our shores; and the condition of his brother-laborers, whom he leaves behind, is also not a little ameliorated, and the general sum

of well-being is greatly augmented. On the simple score of philanthropy, then, who would not struggle to keep our country open to the emigrant, and be prepared to welcome him as a brother, and to rejoice that another is added to the family of freemen?

But even as a question of our own interest as a people, we should welcome the foreigner. If we would sit down and reckon up what we lose and what we gain by foreigners coming to settle among us, we should find the gain greatly overbalances the loss. Naturalized citizens constitute no inconsiderable portion of our population, and by no means the least important portion. Without these, what would have been our condition now? Whose labor has cleared away many of our western forests, dug our canals and railroads? and by whose labor and practical skill have we introduced our manufactures, and brought them to their present high state of perfection? In all the branches of manufactures, in nearly all branches of mechanical industry, the head workmen, if we have been rightly informed, are foreigners. And why foreigners, rather than native-born? Surely, not because there is any partiality for foreigners over native Americans, but because they are more thorough masters of their business. Then, who man our navy, of which we are so justly proud? and who constitute, in time of war, the rank and file of our army? Not all foreigners, truly; but not a few who were not born on American soil. No small portion of our hardy seamen are of alien birth; but they are none the less true to our flag on that account, nor any the less freely do they spill their blood for our national defence or national glory. We do not agree with the assertion said to have been made by a foreigner residing amongst us, that native Americans are *cowards*, and if we did, we have still too much of the old Adam, and of the narrow feeling of former times, to suffer him, without rebuke, to tell us so. Americans are not deficient in courage, and will, when necessary, face the enemy as boldly as any other people on the globe. Nevertheless, our ranks are not dishonored by foreigners, and no native-born citizens have ever done our country's flag more honor or fought more valiantly in its defence, than the brave and warm-hearted Irish; and none would do us more efficient service again, were we so unhappy as to be involved in a war. In the Revolution, we found men not born in America could fight manfully for us, and then they were not considered as in

the way of the native-born. It was no loss to us to reckon in our army a Montgomery, a Gates, a De Kalb, a Steuben, a Pulaski, a Lafayette. No; man is man, wherever born; and every freeman is our brother, and we should clasp him to our bosom.

As a party movement, the Native American party is contemptible. As a movement of Native American citizens against foreigners who come amongst us to claim the rights and to perform the duties of citizens, it is founded on low and ungenerous prejudices,—prejudices of birth, which we, as a people, profess to discard. We, as a people, recognize no nobility founded on birth; for our principle is, that all who are born at all are well-born. But what is the effort to confine the political functions incident to citizenship to native-born Americans, but the attempt to found an aristocracy of birth, even a political aristocracy, making the accident of birth the condition of political rights? Is this Americanism? The American who pretends it is false to his American creed, and has no American heart.

We, of course, do not oppose *Native* Americanism on the untenable ground, that every man has a *natural* right to be a citizen, and to take part in the administration of the government. The right of suffrage is a *municipal* right, not a natural right. But we, as a people, have adopted, with slight restrictions, the principle of universal suffrage. We, as a people, hold that the government is safest where all the people have a voice in saying what it shall be and who shall be its administrators. We adopt universal suffrage, not indeed as a right, but as a dictate of prudence. We hold that we select better men to rule us, and enact wiser and more equitable laws, by admitting the great body of the people to a participation of political sovereignty, than we should by confining the sovereignty to one man or to a few men. We hold that the people are best governed, when they constitute and manage the government themselves. This is the political creed of the country; and he is false to his country, who would abolish it, or defeat its practical application. Foreigners, who come here, have, then, in view of the acknowledged principles of the country, a right to be admitted to citizenship, to the rank and dignity of freemen; and could rightly complain of injustice, if not so admitted.

But we are told that the Native American party does not propose to exclude foreigners from the country, nor from citizenship. It only wishes to prevent them from

coming here and exercising the rights of citizens before being properly instructed in the duties of citizens. This plea is specious, but not solid. It is the public, ostensible plea; but not the private, real one. The real design is, to exclude foreigners, to prevent them from coming here, by denying them the right to become citizens. We have never conversed with an advocate of the party who did not avow this But take the plea as publicly offered. It is contended that foreigners, brought up under monarchical or aristocratical governments, cannot be expected, on arriving on our shores, to understand the nature of our peculiar form of government, and that it is necessary for them to serve a long novitiate before they can be prepared to enter upon the duties of freemen. The necessity of intelligence, of understanding well our peculiar institutions, on the part of every man who is to exercise the rights and to discharge the duties of a citizen, we certainly shall not dispute, whether the man was born at home or abroad. But the ignorance of the foreigners who come here is greatly exaggerated. Brought up under monarchical or aristocratical governments, one would naturally expect them to be averse to our democracy, and in favor of institutions similar to those with which they had been accustomed. But no complaint of this kind is ever made against them. Foreigners who come here and condemn our institutions, show contempt for them, and wish to exchange them for institutions similar to those they have left behind, are in general cordially welcomed, and treated with great consideration. The complaint is the reverse of this, their offence is in being too democratic, and in wishing the government to be administered on strictly democratic principles. It is not their ignorance of the real nature of democracy, but their intelligence of it, that constitutes their disqualification.

But pass over this. The naturalization laws, as they now are, require a foreigner to reside in the country five years before he can become a citizen, or be legally naturalized. This is, in general, five years after the man has become of full age. Now, it is fair to presume that an emigrant to this country, intending to come here and to make this his home, has before coming made some inquiries respecting the country, the character of its people, its government, and laws; and he may be judged to know as much of them as in general one of our own boys at the age of sixteen. In most cases he knows much more, but assume that

he knows as much. Then he and the native-born are placed on the same footing. Each must wait five years before entering upon the discharge of his duties as a citizen; and who will pretend to say that a man from the age of twenty-one to twenty-six cannot learn as much of what those duties are, as the boy from sixteen to twenty-one? The law, as it now stands, exacts in reality as long a novitiate of the foreign-born as of the native-born; and even on the ground of time to be instructed in one's duties, no more needs to be altered in the case of the one than of the other.

But, politically speaking, this objection is not the real one. The *political* leaders, of the Native American party, are opposed to naturalized citizens solely on the ground that these citizens do not uniformly vote on their side. We do not discover that our politicians of either party object to the votes of naturalized citizens when given for them, nor to naturalizing them, if they feel sure of their suffrages. Why not say so, then, and let the honest truth come out? Surely, honest men, high-minded men, the true nobility of the earth, as all our political leaders are, can have no objections to avowing their real intentions, and the real motives from which they act. Such men will never show false colors!

But the objection to foreigners is not exclusively political, nor mainly political. Below this is another objection, which operates chiefly amongst the laboring classes. The mass of the people, especially of those who live on from father to son in the same position and pursuit, retain almost forever their primitive prejudices. These in this country are of English descent,—for we are all of foreign extraction; and they have inherited from their ancestors, and still retain, two strong prejudices,—contempt of the Irish and hatred of the French. There is no use in disguising the fact. The assistance the French rendered us in the Revolution has mollified our feelings somewhat towards them, but we still bear them no real good-will. But the national English contempt for the Irish has been reinforced in America. The Yankee hod-carrier, or Yankee wood-sawyer, looks down with ineffable contempt upon his brother Irish hod-carrier or Irish wood-sawyer. In his estimation, "Paddy" hardly belongs to the human family. Add to this that the influx of foreign laborers, chiefly Irish, increases the supply of labor, and therefore apparently lessens the demand, and consequently the wages of labor, and you have the elements of a wide, deep, and inveterate hostility

on the part of your Yankee laborer against your Irish laborer, which manifests itself naturally in your Native American party. But this contempt of the Irish, which we have inherited from our English ancestors, is wrong and ungenerous. The Irish do not deserve it, and it does not become us to feel it. It is a prejudice disgraceful only to those who are governed by it, and no words of condemnation are sufficiently severe for the political aspirant who would appeal to it. Every friend to his country, every right-minded man, must frown upon it, and brand as an incendiary, as a public enemy, the demagogue, whether in a caucus speech in old Faneuil Hall or elsewhere, whether admired by the whole nation for his transcendent abilities or not, who should seek to deepen it, or even to keep it alive.

But, after all, the competition, which our native American laborers so much dread, is far less than they imagine. The foreign laborers do not, in general, come directly into competition with them. A great part of the labor they perform is labor which native Americans could not or would not perform themselves. Then, the increased demand for labor in other branches of industry, caused by the works carried on mainly by the labor of foreigners, fully compensates, perhaps more than compensates, the native American laborers for any loss they may sustain in the few cases of competition which there really may be. Viewed in all its bearings, the influx of foreign laborers has very little, if any, injurious effect on our own native laborers. The immense internal improvements completed or in process of completion would never have been attempted, if the reliance had been solely on native labor, and, consequently, none of the additional labor employed in the various branches of industry, which these improvements have stimulated, would have been in demand. The laboring class, as a class, has really gained in the amount of employment by the increase of laborers, and of course, in the price of labor. Labor begets the demand for labor. Individuals may have suffered somewhat, in some particular branches, but upon the whole the laboring class has been benefited.

But the real objection lies deeper yet. The Native American party is not a party against admitting foreigners to the rights of citizenship, but simply against admitting a certain class of foreigners. It does not oppose Protestant Germans, Protestant Englishmen, Protestant Scotchmen, nor even

Protestant Irishmen. It is really opposed only to *Catholic* foreigners. The party is truly an anti-Catholic party, and is opposed chiefly to the Irish, because a majority of the emigrants to this country are probably from Ireland, and the greater part of these are Catholics. If they were Protestants, if they could mingle with the native population and lose themselves in our Protestant sects, very little opposition would be manifested to their immigration or to their naturalization. But this they cannot do. They are Catholics. They adhere to the faith of their fathers, for which they have suffered these three hundred years more than any other people on earth. Being Catholics, they hold religion to be man's primary concern, and the public worship of God an imperative duty. They accordingly seek to settle near together, in a neighborhood, where the church may rise in their midst, within reach of the altar where the "clean sacrifice" is offered up daily for the living and the dead, and where they can receive the inestimable services of the minister of God. Hence, they seem, because in this respect their habits differ from those of our Protestant countrymen, to be a separate people, incapable even in their political and social duties of fraternizing, so to speak, with their Protestant fellow-citizens. Here is the first and immediate cause of the opposition they experience.

But deeper yet lies the old traditionary hatred of Catholicity. The majority of the American people have descended from ancestors who were accustomed to pray to be delivered from the flesh, the world, the devil, and the *Pope*; and though they have in a great degree rejected the remains of faith still cherished by their Protestant ancestors, they retain all their hatred of the church. If they believe nothing else, they believe the pope is Antichrist, and the Catholic Church the Scarlet Lady of Babylon. When the Catholic Church is in question, all the infidels and nothingarians are sure to sympathize with their Protestant brethren. Pilate and Herod are good friends, when it concerns crucifying the Redeemer of men. This is, perhaps, as it should be. Hence, the great mass of the American people, faithful to their traditions, are inveterately opposed to Catholicity, and it is this opposition that manifests itself in Native Americanism, and which renders it so inexcusable and so dangerous.

We presume there are few who will question this statement. The "Native Americans" with whom we have conversed, all, to a man, avow it, and the late disgraceful riots

and murder and sacrilege in Philadelphia prove it. There, no harm was done to Protestant foreigners. Hostility was directed solely against Catholics. They were Catholics, who were shot down in the streets,—Catholic churches, seminaries, and dwellings, that were rifled and burnt. Even the most active members of the Native American party, if we may be pardoned the Hibernianism, are in many cases foreigners. The notorious ex-priest Hogan, a foreigner and an Irishman, deposed for his immoral conduct, is, if we are rightly informed, a most zealous *Native*, and has been lecturing in this city and vicinity in favor of Native Americanism, and we have heard no Nativist object to having men like him exercise the rights of an American citizen. The Orangemen, foreigners as they are, did the *Natives* substantial service in Philadelphia, as it has been said, and they threaten to do the same here, if occasion serve. All this proves that the opposition is not to foreigners, as such, but simply to Catholics, and especially to *Irish* Catholics.

Now against this, we hardly need say, we protest in the name of the constitution, and the good faith of the country. The constitution of this country does not merely tolerate different religious denominations, but it recognizes and guaranties to all men the free exercise of their religion, whatever it may be. It places all denominations, however great or however small, on the same footing before the state, and recognizes the equal rights of all and of each. To this the faith of the country is pledged. We say to all, of all creeds, Come here and demean yourselves in civil matters as good citizens, and your respective faiths and modes of worship shall all alike be legally respected and protected. This is what we have professed; of this we make our boast; and this we consider our chief title to the admiration of the world. We have promised to all the fullest conceivable religious liberty. For this we have solemnly pledged our faith before the world and before heaven. Are we prepared to break our faith?

But in getting up a party against any one religious denomination, are we not breaking our faith, and perjuring ourselves in the sight of God and of men? What matters it to honest men, whether we do this directly or indirectly? What is the difference in principle between passing a law excluding, under severe penalties, the exercise of the Catholic religion in this country, and, by our political and other

combinations, rendering its exercise impossible? What is the difference between excluding Catholics directly, and treating them in such a manner that they will be forced to exclude themselves?

Then, again, the wisdom of the policy of combining for the expulsion or exclusion of Catholics may be gravely questioned. Where there is a multiplicity of denominations, there is safety for any one only so far as there is safety for all. Combine and suppress Catholicity to-day, and it may be some other one's turn to be suppressed to-morrow. The precedent established, the Catholics disposed of, a new combination may be formed against the Methodists, then against the Baptists, then against the Unitarians and Universalists, and then against the Episcopalians, or for the revival of the Classis of Amsterdam, or the Kirk of Scotland. Cannot all see that the safety of each is in protecting all, and suffering a combination to be formed against none?

Moreover, why should Protestants combine against Catholics? Have they not the Bible and private reason? and with these what has a Protestant to apprehend? Is he not abundantly able to meet and vanquish in the fair field of controversy the benighted and idolatrous Papist? Does he not believe that he has truth, reason, and revelation on his side? Does he not know that he has all the prejudices and nearly nineteen-twentieths of the whole population of the country on his side? Are there not here odds enough in his favor? What, then, does he fear? With all these advantages, does he tremble before the Papist, and fear the meeting-house may give place to the church, the table to the altar, the bread and wine to the Real Presence? A sorry compliment this to Protestantism! a sorry compliment to reason, to distrust its encounter with error in open field and fair combat! Were we Protestants, as we once were,—but, God be praised, are no longer,—we should blush to appeal against *Popery* to any other arguments than Scripture and reason. If with these we could not resist the spread of Catholicity, we should be led to distrust the sacredness of our cause, and to fear, that, after all, we had not the Lord on our side. These political combinations betray the weakness of Protestantism, not its strength; the doubts, not the faith, of its upholders. If they are right in their premises, they need not these combinations to suppress Catholicity; if they are wrong in their premises, they are warring, not against a superstition, an idolatry, as they pretend, but

against God, and we leave it to them to decide what is the proper name by which they should be designated.

But we are told that Catholics are opposed, not because they are Catholics simply, but because, being Catholics, they owe allegiance to a foreign power, and therefore cannot be good citizens. No Catholic, it is assumed, since he owes allegiance to the pope, can be bound by any obligation he may contract as a citizen. If we really supposed that any one among us could be so simple as to believe this, we should contradict it. But there are charges too absurd to need a reply. The Catholic does, indeed, owe allegiance to the pope as the visible head of the church, but not as visible head of the state. Whoever knows any thing at all of the obligation of the Catholic to the successor of St. Peter knows that it would be as absurd to conclude that the Christian, because he owes allegiance to God, cannot be a good citizen, nor true to the obligations he contracts as a citizen to the state, as to infer that a Catholic cannot be a good citizen because he owes allegiance to the visible head of his church. So far as this allegiance is a fact, and so far as it is operative on the heart and conscience of a Catholic, it binds him to be a peaceful and obedient subject to the state, a faithful and conscientious citizen.

But the Roman Catholic religion, we are further told, is incompatible with republicanism, hostile to popular institutions; from which it is to be inferred, we suppose, that Protestantism, as the negative of Catholicity, is compatible with republican institutions and friendly to popular freedom. It would, perhaps, be difficult to prove this. The most despotic states in Europe are the Protestant, and in Switzerland, for instance, the Catholic cantons are the most democratic. Despotism was hardly known in Europe prior to the reformation, save in that portion not in communion with the Church of Rome; and we very much doubt if there be at this moment as much popular freedom in the Protestant states of Europe as there was in the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries. There are really fewer checks on arbitrary power, and there is more heartless oppression.

In this country, the only republican government that Protestantism can pretend ever to have founded has been established, but it has not been founded solely by Protestantism. It owes its origin to the circumstances in which the first settlers came here, and to the impossibility, after independence of the crown of Great Britain was proclaimed,

of establishing any other than a republican form of government. We have existed as a republic between sixty and seventy years. But it needs no very sharp observation to perceive that our republic has virtually failed to accomplish the hopes of its founders, and that it is, without some notable change in the people, destined either to a speedy dissolution, or to sink into a miserable timocracy, infinitely worse than the most absolute despotism. Protestantism, if it could originate, has not proved itself able to sustain it.

We need but glance at our electioneering contests, becoming fiercer and fiercer, more and more demoralizing, with each succeeding election, to be convinced of this. The election of our presidents costs us more than the whole civil list of Great Britain. We have heard it suggested that the election of General Harrison cost the Whigs more than fifty millions of dollars; the expenditures of the opposite party in attempting to reëlect Mr. Van Buren were no trifle. Hardly less has been expended in the campaign just closed. This is a tax no people can bear for any great length of time, without ruin, and the complete prostration of public and private morality.

Protestantism, by its principle,—liberty of private judgment,—may undoubtedly seem to favor civil freedom; and that it often attempts to establish free popular institutions we do not deny; but it wants the virtue to sustain them. By this same principle, it multiplies sects without number, and virtually destroys, by dividing, the moral force of the nation. We see this with ourselves. Religion has little force in controlling our passions or pursuits. No one of the sects possesses a commanding influence over the people. The great mass of the people are left, therefore, to the corrupt passions of their own depraved nature. They cease to live for God, and live only for the world,—to live for eternity, and live only for time. They become wedded to things of this world, their hearts bent only on wealth and honors. In business the ruling passion is to get rich, in public life to rise to places of honor and emolument, in private life to gain ease and pleasure. Now, how long can a government, which rests for its existence on the virtue and intelligence of the people, exist, or, if exist, answer its end, in a community where the great mass of the people are carried away by the dominant passions, wealth, place, and pleasure?

We may be told that enlightened self-interest will suffice,

—that only instruct the people what is for their interest, and they will do it. This is plausible, but all experience proves to the contrary. Who does not know that it is for his real interest, both for time and eternity, to be a devout Christian? And yet are all devout Christians? The wisdom and prudence of men's conduct cannot be measured by their intelligence. A corrupt man uses his intelligence only as the minister of his corruption. The more you extend intelligence, unless you extend the moral restraints and influences of the gospel at the same time, the more do you sharpen the intellect for evil. The people of the United States are far more instructed than they were fifty years ago, and yet have not half so much of the virtue necessary to sustain a republican government. We are never to expect men to act virtuously, simply because their understandings are convinced that virtue is the best calculation. You must make them act from a higher motive. They must be governed by religion; act from the love and the fear of God,—from a deep sense of duty; be meek, humble, self-denying; morally brave and heroic; choosing rather to die a thousand deaths than swerve from right principle, or disobey the will of God; or they will not practise the virtues without which liberty is an empty name,—a mere illusion.

Now, Protestantism never has produced, and never can produce the virtues without which a republican government can have no solid foundation. It may have good words; it may say wise and even just things; but it wants the unction of the spirit. It does not reach and regenerate the heart, subdue the passions, and renew the spirit. It has never produced a single saint, and the virtues it calls forth are of the sort exhibited by the old heathen moralists. It praises the Bible, but studies the Greek and Roman classics; boasts of spirituality, but expires in a vain formalism. For the three hundred years it has existed, it has proved itself powerful to destroy, but impotent to found; ready to begin, but never able to complete. Whatever it claims that is positive, abiding, it has inherited or borrowed from the ages and the lands of faith. Its own creations rise and vanish as the soap-bubbles blown by our children in their sports. It has never yet shown itself able to command human nature or to say to the roused waves of passion, Peace, be still. It lulls the conscience with the forms of faith and piety; soothes vanity and fosters pride by its professions of freedom; but leaves the passions all their natural force, and permits the

man to remain a slave to all his natural lusts. It never subdues or regenerates nature. Hence, throughout all Protestantdom, the tendency is, to reproduce heathen antiquity, with all its cant, hollowness, hypocrisy, slavery, and wretchedness,—to narrow men's views down to this transitory life and the fleeting shows of sense, and to make them live and labor for the meat that perisheth. We appeal to England, Sweden, Denmark, Protestant Germany, Holland, and our own country, for the truth of what we say. They were Protestant traders who trampled on the cross of Christ to gain the lucrative trade of Japan. It is in no spirit of exultation we allude to Protestant worldly-mindedness and spiritual impotency. Would to God the sketch were from fancy, or our own diseased imagination!

We do not mean to deny, that, in words, Protestantism teaches many, perhaps most, of the Christian virtues. It has even some good books on morals and practical religion. Its clergy give good exhortations, and labor, no doubt, in good faith, for the spiritual culture of their flocks! No doubt, much truth, much valuable instruction, is given from Protestant pulpits. The Protestant clergy take no delight in the state of things they see around them. They would gladly see Christ reign in the hearts of men; they, no doubt, would joyfully dispense the bread of life to their famished people; and they do dispense the best they have. But alas! how can they dispense what they have not received? The living bread is not on their communion table. They communicate, according to their own confession, only a figure, a shadow; and how shall the divine life be nourished with shadows? What we mean to say is, not that Protestantism does not aim to bring men to Christ, to make them pure and holy, but that it has no power to do it. It does not control human nature, and produce the fruits of a supernatural faith, hope, and charity. Its faith is merely an opinion or persuasion, its hope a wish, and its charity natural philanthropy. It necessarily leaves human nature as it finds it, and no pruning of that corrupt tree can make it bring forth good fruit. It is of the earth,—earthy; and it will bear fruit only for the earth. With unregenerated nature in full activity, we can have only sensuality and mammon-worship.

Hundreds and thousands among us, who are by no means favorably disposed to Catholicity, see this and deplore it. They say the age has no faith. They see the impotency of Protestantism; that under it all the vices are sheltered; that,

in spite of it, all the dangerous passions rage unchecked; and they turn away in disgust from its empty forms and vain words. Witness the response the biting sarcasms and withering irony of Carlyle bring from thousands of hearts in this republic, the echoes which the chiselled words and marble sentences of Emerson also bring. Witness, also, the movements of the Come-outers, the Socialists, Fourierists, Communists. All these see that Protestantism has nothing but words, while they want life, realities, not vain *simulacra*. They err most egregiously, no doubt; they go from the dying to the dead; but their error proves the truth of what we advance.

Now, assuming our view of Protestantism to be correct, we demand how it is to sustain, or we, with it alone, are to sustain our republican government. Do we not see, in this growing love of place and plunder, with this growing devotion to wealth, luxury, and pleasure, with these fierce electioneering contests, one no sooner ended than another begins, each to be fiercer and more absorbing and more destructive than the last, and each drawing within its vortex nearly the whole industrial interest of the country, and touching almost every man in his honor and his purse, that we want the moral elements without which a republic cannot stand? A republic can stand only as it rests upon the virtues of the people; and these not the mere natural virtues of worldly prudence and social decency, but those loftier virtues which are possible to human nature only as elevated above itself by the infused habit of supernatural grace. This is a solemn fact to which it is in vain for us to close our eyes. Human nature left to itself tends to dissolution, to destruction, decay, death. So does every society that rests only on those virtues which have their origin, growth, and maturity in nature alone. This is the case with our own society. We have really no social bond; we have no true patriotism; none of that patience, that self-denial, that loyalty of soul, which is necessary to bind man to man, each to each, and each to all. Each is for himself. Save who can (*Sauve qui peut*), we exclaim. Hence a universal scramble. Man overthrows man, brother brother, the father the child, and the child the father, the demagogue all; while the devil stands at a distance, looks on, and enjoys the sport. Tell us, ye who boast of the glorious reformation, if a republican form of government is compatible with this moral state of the people?

Even in matters of education we can do little but sharpen the wit, and render brother more skilful and successful in plundering brother. With our multitude of sects, we may instruct, but not educate. Our children can have no moral training, for morality rests on theology, and theology on faith. But faith is expelled from our schools, because it is sectarian, and there is no one faith in the country which can be taught without exciting the jealousy of the followers of a rival faith. Cut up into such a multitude of sects, there is and can be no common moral culture in the country, no true religious training. We give a little instruction in reading, writing, arithmetic, grammar, geography, perhaps history, the Greek and Roman classics, and in the physical sciences; and send our children out into the world, to form their morals and their religion without other guide or assistant than their own short-sighted reason and perverted passions. How can we expect any thing from such a sowing, but what we reap? and how, under Protestantism, which broaches every thing, and settles nothing, raises all questions and answers none, and therefore necessarily giving birth to a perpetual succession of sects, each claiming with equal reason and justice to have the truth, and the claims of all equally respected, as they must be, by the government, is this terrible evil to be remedied? Protestantism is just a-going to remedy it; but, alas! it does not succeed. It reminds us of a remark by a lady eating vegetable oysters,—"I always seem, when I eat vegetable oysters, as if I was just a-going to taste of an oyster." So, when we examine Protestantism, hear its loud professions, witness its earnest strivings, and observe each new sect it gives birth to, we say it is the lady eating vegetable oysters. It seems to itself that it is just going to light upon the truth, and to hit upon some plan by which it can remove the terrible evils it sees and deplores, and call forth the virtues it owns to be necessary; but, alas! it is only just a-going to taste the oyster: *it never quite tastes it.*

These facts, which we mention, are seen and felt by large numbers in our midst. Quiet, peaceable, but observing and reflecting men look on and observe our doings, and say to themselves, "This republicanism, after all, is a mere delusion. It is all very fine, no doubt, in theory, but exceedingly hateful in practice. Washington, and Hamilton, and others, were wiser than Jefferson and Madison. So large a republic, with such frequency of elections, and so many thousands depending on the fate of an election for their very means

of subsistence, so many *ins* afraid of being turned out, so many *outs* anxious to be turned in, and the number each year increasing with the extent and population of the country,—well, let the republic stand if it can, but a change to a monarchy will soon be inevitable." There are men who so reason, and they are neither few nor despicable; nor are they fairly answered by our Fourth of July glorifications, or hurrahs for Democracy, *Vive la République! Vive la Démocratie! Vive la Liberté!* We do not agree with them;—far from it; but we should agree with them, if we saw nothing better for our republic than Protestantism. Protestants as they are, we say they reason correctly, and if the religion of the country remains Protestant for fifty years longer, facts will prove it.

But with Catholicity the republic may be sustained, not because the Catholic Church enjoins this form of government or that, but because she nourishes in the hearts of her children the virtues which render popular liberty both desirable and practicable. The Catholic Church meddles *directly* with no form of government. She leaves each people free to adopt such form of government as seems to themselves good, and to administer it in their own way. Her chief concern is to fit men for beatitude, and this she can do under any or all forms of government. But the spirit she breathes into men, the graces she communicates, the dispositions she cultivates, and the virtues she produces, are such, that, while they render even arbitrary forms of government tolerable, fit a people for asserting and maintaining freedom. In countries where there are no constitutional checks on power, she remedies the evil by imposing moral restraints on its exercise, by inspiring rulers with a sense of justice and the public good. Where such checks do exist, she hallows them and renders them inviolable. In a republic she restrains the passions of the people, teaches them obedience to the laws of God, moderates their desires, weans their affections from the world, frees them from the dominion of their own lusts, and, by the meekness, humility, loyalty of heart which she cherishes, disposes them to the practice of those public virtues which render a republic secure. She also creates by her divine charity a true equality. No republic can stand where the dominant feeling is pride, which finds its expression in the assertion "I am as good as you." It must be based on love; not on the determination to defend our own rights and interests, but on the

fear to encroach on the rights and interests of others. But this love must be more than the mere sentiment of philanthropy. This sentiment of philanthropy is a very unsubstantial affair. Talk as we will about its excellence, it never goes beyond love to those who love us. We love our friends and neighbors, but hate our enemies. This is all we do as philanthropists. All the fine speeches we make beyond—about the love of humanity, and all that—are fine speeches. Philanthropy must be exalted into the supernatural virtue of charity, before it can become that love which leads us to honor all men, and makes us shrink from encroaching upon the interests of any man, no matter how low or how vile. We must love our neighbor, not for his own sake, but for God's sake,—the child, for the sake of the Father; then we can love all, and joyfully make the most painful sacrifices for them. It is only in the bosom of the Catholic Church that this sublime charity has ever been found or can be found.

The Catholic Church also cherishes a spirit of independence, a loftiness and dignity of soul, favorable to the maintenance of popular freedom. It ennobles every one of its members. The lowest, the humblest Catholic is a member of that church which was founded by Jesus Christ himself; which has subsisted for eighteen hundred years; which has in every age been blessed with signal tokens of the Redeemer's love; which counts its saints by millions; and the blood of whose martyrs has made all earth hallowed ground. He is admitted into the goodly fellowship of the faithful of all ages and climes, and every day, throughout all the earth, the universal church sends up her prayers for him, and all the church above receives them, and, with her own, bears them as sweet incense up before the throne of the almighty and eternal God. He is a true nobleman, more than the peer of kings or Cæsars; for he is a child of the King of kings, and, if faithful unto death, heir of a crown of life, eternal in the heavens, that fadeth not away. Such a man is no slave. His soul is free; he looks into the perfect law of liberty. Can tyrants enslave him? No, indeed; not because he will turn on the tyrant and kill, but because he can die and reign for ever. What were a mere human tyrant before a nation of such men? Who could establish arbitrary government over them, or subject them to unwholesome or iniquitous laws?

Here is our hope for our republic. We look for our

safety to the spread of Catholicity. We render solid and imperishable our free institutions just in proportion as we extend the kingdom of God among our people, and establish in their hearts the reign of justice and charity. And here, then, is our answer to those who tell us Catholicity is incompatible with free institutions. *We tell them that they cannot maintain free institutions without it.* It is not a free government that makes a free people, but a free people that makes a free government; and we know no freedom but that wherewith the Son makes free. You must be free within, before you can be free without. They who war against the church, because they fancy it hostile to their civil freedom, are as mad as those wicked Jews who nailed their Redeemer to the cross. But even now, as then, God be thanked, from the cross ascends the prayer, not in vain, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do."

As to the effect this Native American party may have on the church, or the cause of Catholicity in this country, we have no fears. We know it is a party formed for the suppression of the Catholic Church in our land. Protestantism, afraid to meet the champions of the cross in fair and open debate, conscious of her weakness or unskilfulness in argument, true to her ancient instincts, resorts to the civil arm, and hopes by a series of indirect legislation—for she dare not attempt as yet any direct legislation—to maintain her predominance. But this gives us no uneasiness. We know in whom we believe, and are certain. We see these movements, we comprehend their aim, and we merely ask in the words of the Psalmist, "Why have the gentiles raged, and the people devised vain things? The kings of the earth stood up, and the princes met together, against the Lord, and against his Christ. Let us break their bands asunder, and let us cast their yoke from us. He that dwelleth in the heavens shall laugh at them, and the Lord shall deride them. Then shall he speak to them in his anger, and trouble them in his rage." Ps. ii. 1–5. They wage an unequal contest who wage war against the church of the living God, who hath said to its Head, "Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee. Ask of me and I will give thee the gentiles for thy inheritance, and the utmost parts of the earth for thy possession." Ib., 7, 8. These may combine to put down Catholicity, form leagues against it, enlist all the powers of the earth against it; but what then? Nero tried to crush it in its infancy. Diocletian tried it. And Nero

and Diocletian have passed away, and their mighty empire has crumbled to pieces and dissolved, leaving scarce "a wrack behind;" yet the church has lived on, and the successor of the fisherman of Galilee inherited a power before which that of Rome in her proudest day was merely the dust in the balance. Pagan and Saracen tried to crush it, but pagan and Saracen are scattered before its glory as the morning mist before the rising sun. Heretic and schismatic have tried to exterminate it,—Luther, and Calvin, and Henry of England, like the great dragon whose tail drew after it a third part of the stars of heaven; and their own children are rising up and cursing their memory. The powers of the earth have tried to do it,—Napoleon, the Colossus who bestrided Europe, and made and unmade kings in mere pastime; but Napoleon, from the moment he dared lay his hand on the Lord's anointed, loses his power, and goes to die at last of a broken heart in a barren isle of the ocean. Jew, pagan, Saracen, heretic, schismatic, infidel, and lawless power have all tried their hand against the church. The Lord has held them in derision. He has been a wall of fire round about her, and proved for eighteen hundred years that no weapon formed against her shall prosper; for he guards the honor of his spouse as his own. Let the ark appear to jostle, if it will; we reach forth no hand to steady it, and fear no harm that may come to it. The church has survived all storms; it is founded upon a rock, and the gates of hell are impotent against it. It is not for the friends of the church to fear, but for those who war against her, and seek her suppression. It is for them to tremble,—not before the arm of man, for no human arm will be raised against them; but before that God whose church they outrage, and whose cause they seek to crush. The Lord hath promised his Son the gentiles for his inheritance, and the utmost parts of the earth for his possession. He must and will have this nation. And throughout all the length and breadth of this glorious land shall his temples rise to catch the morning sun and reflect his evening rays, and holy altars shall be erected, and the "clean sacrifice" shall be offered daily, and a delighted people shall bow in humility before them, and pour out their hearts in joyous thanksgiving; for so hath the Lord spoken, and his word shall stand.

So far as the spread of Catholicity in this country is concerned, we look upon this anti-Catholic party with no apprehension. If we deprecate the formation of such a party, it

is for the sake of those misguided citizens who may unite to form it. It is because we see the terrible injustice of which they render themselves guilty, and the awful judgments they may provoke. We say to them, as St. Justin Martyr said to the Roman emperors, "Take heed how you hearken only to unjust accusations; fear lest an excessive complaisance for superstitious men, a haste as blind as rash, old prejudices which have no foundation but calumny, may cause you to pronounce a terrible sentence against yourselves. As for us, nobody can harm us, unless we harm ourselves, unless we ourselves become guilty of some injustice. You may indeed kill us, but you cannot injure us." It is for our countrymen, who will render themselves guilty of gross wrong, of terrible sin, that we fear. They are engaged in an unholy cause, and, if they persist, cannot fail to draw down the judgments of Almighty God upon their guilty heads. They can shoot us down in the streets; they may break up our schools and seminaries; they may desecrate and burn our churches. Such things have been, and may be again; but it becomes those who have been and may be the perpetrators of such things to pause and ask themselves what manner of spirit they are of; and how, in that day of solemn reckoning which must come to us all, they will answer the inexorable Judge for their abuse, their riots, their murder, and their sacrilege. As they love their own souls, and desire good, we entreat them to beware how they plunge deeper in sin, and rekindle the torch of persecution. For their sakes, not for ours, we pray them to pause before they go further, and to make their peace with the Son of God.

LABOR AND ASSOCIATION.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1848.]

Unless the estimable and accomplished translator has greatly improved upon his author, M. Briancourt is one of the most agreeable writers attached to the school of Association with whom we are acquainted. He appears to be sincere, earnest, gentle, and philanthropic; and he writes with ability, ease, vivacity, and grace. His pages have, comparatively, little of that barbarous terminology which renders the writers of the associationists, in general, so forbidding to all but adepts. If we had the least conceivable sympathy with his doctrines and schemes, we could read him with pleasure, and, at times, with admiration; and we cannot but regard his little work as the best summary of the plans and hopes of his school which has as yet appeared.

But the more able, skilful, and fascinating is a writer, the more dangerous and carefully to be eschewed are his writings, if devoted to the propagation of false and mischievous theories. Error, though reason be free to combat it, is never harmless, any more than poison, because its antidote may be known and at hand. It may, upon the whole, be more prudent to allow it free course, than, by attempting its suppression by force, to run the risk of also suppressing the truth; but however that may or may not be, the publication of error is always an evil which no freedom of its contradictory truth can ever wholly prevent or overcome. No man ever puts forth a system of unmixed falsehood; and the currency his error gains is always by virtue of the truth he mixes with it, and which he misinterprets and misapplies. To unravel his web of sophistry, to pick out his tangled yarn, or separate what is true from what is false, is a task of no small difficulty, and requires a patience of investigation, habits of nice discrimination and of close and rigid reasoning, which can be expected only from the gifted and thoroughly disciplined few, and rarely even from these. An error may be stated in a few words, in a popular form, and

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* *Organization of Labor and Association.* By Math. Briancourt. Translated by Francis Geo. Shaw. New York: 1847.

clothed with a brilliant and captivating dress, which, nevertheless, is not to be refuted, nor its truth, which gives it currency, separated from the falsehood which renders it mischievous, without long, elaborate, and abstruse reasoning, subtile distinctions, and exact definitions, beyond the capacity of the generality, usually held by them in detestation, and of which they are always impatient. But even if the refutation could be presented in a popular form, the majority of those who have embraced the error would not profit by it. Having adopted the error and committed themselves to it, they are unwilling to listen to any thing which may be urged against it, lest perchance it may disturb the tranquillity of their conviction, mortify their pride, or affect unfavorably their reputation. Hence it is that nothing is more difficult than to recall or repress an error once fairly in circulation. Hence it is that we can never allow ourselves to commend a work, however kindly disposed we may be towards its author, which, in our judgment, or according to the rule of judgment we are bound to follow, teaches a false doctrine or proposes a visionary scheme. The reading of such works, when not absolutely hurtful, is unprofitable, and no man can justify it, unless it be to refute them, and guard the public against their dangerous tendencies. The associationists, then, must not be surprised, if we notice M. Briancourt's work only to censure it.

That M. Briancourt's doctrine is unsound, no argument is needed to prove. No man, who proposes a doctrine which reverses all that has hitherto been regarded as settled, is ever entitled even to a hearing. He who, on his own authority, gives the lie to all men, of all ages and nations, gives to every man the best of all possible human reasons for giving the lie to him. If reason is to be trusted, the reason of all ages and nations overrides his; if it is not to be trusted, he has no authority for what he proposes. He places himself in an awkward position, who, asserting the authority of reason, yet opposes his own reason to the reason of all men. He must be a bold man, a man of unbounded self-confidence, the very sublime of egotism, who dares pretend, that, on his reason alone, the whole world may be rationally convicted of having blundered. They have all the attributes he can claim; why, then, assume that they have all blundered, and that he alone has hit upon the truth? Truth is revealed to the humble and childlike, not to the proud and arrogant; and who is prouder or more ar-

rogant than he who claims to be superior to all men, to be the only man of his race who has perceived what is true and good?

Discoveries, like the one Fourier professes to have made, are not in the order of human experience. There is nothing to be found in the experience of the race analogous to them. Discoveries, which reverse what the race had hitherto regarded as the settled order, have never yet, so far as history goes, been made in any department of life,—in religion, in morals, in politics, or in social and industrial arrangements. Every man, who has come forward with any such pretended discovery, has failed to gain a verdict in his favor, and in the judgment of mankind has been finally condemned either as deceiving or as deceived, or both at once. M. Charles Fourier, a man, if you will, of an extraordinary intellect, and of philanthropic aims,—although, we confess, we find in his writings only wild extravagance, and a pride, an egotism, which amount very nearly, if not quite, to insanity,—professes, not, indeed, to have *invented*, but to have *discovered*, the law of a new social and industrial world. This law he professes to have drawn out and scientifically established in all its ramifications; and he and his followers propose to reorganize society and industry according to its provisions. Similar pretensions have often been made, now in one department of life, now in another; but has one of them ever succeeded? Is there one of them that has not been finally adjudged, at best, to be only visionary? Is there on record a single instance of a fundamental reorganization of society, industry, or even of government, that has ever been effected? Have not all who have labored for such reorganization been opposed by their age and nation? And can the associationists name an instance in which posterity has reversed the judgment of contemporaries? They cannot do it. We are aware of the instances they will cite; but not one of them is to the purpose. Why, then, suppose the whole order of human experience is reversed, or departed from, in the case of M. Charles Fourier? The fact is, *fundamental* changes in the religious, moral, social, political, or industrial order of mankind—changes which throw off the old order, and establish a new *order* in their place—never have been, and, it requires no great depth of philosophy to be able to say, never can be, effected, unless by the intervention of a supernatural cause. When attempted, they may go so far as to break up

the old order, never so far as to introduce and establish a new order. Man can be a destroyer; he can never be a CREATOR.

But these considerations, however conclusive in themselves, will not, we are aware, have much weight with the associationists. The associationists are accustomed to other principles of reasoning; they have, underlying their speculations, a philosophy of man and society which creates in their minds a presumption in favor of Fourierism. With them, it is an argument in favor of a proposition, that it is novel; and an argument against it, that it is ancient. Nothing seems to them more reasonable beforehand, or more in accordance with what the order of human experience authorizes them to expect, than that such a discovery as Fourier's should be made, and that the changes he proposes should be practicable. It is useless, so far as they are concerned, to controvert them on this point,—and if we would reach them, with the hope of doing them any good, we must enter with them into an examination of their doctrine or scheme, upon its merits. This we willingly attempt; for several of the most distinguished associationists in this country have been our intimate personal friends, and we regard them as sincere, and as honestly desirous of doing all in their power for the benefit of their fellow-men. We believe they are men who have a certain loyalty; and who have no bigoted attachment to this or that method of serving mankind, but are willing to change the method they now insist upon for another, the moment they see a good reason for doing so. We do not believe them unwilling to look upon the question as still an open question, or that they have much of that foolish pride which binds persons to a cause simply for the reason that they stand committed to it before the public. We propose, therefore, in what follows, to enter somewhat into the merits of their doctrine and schemes; and, as what we shall say is said in good faith, we trust they will receive it in good faith, and frankly accept it, or show us good reasons for rejecting it.

We begin by asking, What is the end the associationists propose, or what is it they seek to effect? The means we understand very well; they are, the organization of labor and association, according to a given plan. But before we can decide on the means, we must understand the end proposed, so as to be able to determine whether the end is desirable, a good end. After that, we may proceed to deter-

mine whether the means are adequate, whether by adopting them we can, in all reasonable probability, secure the end. Unless we know what is the end proposed, and know whether it be good or not good, we walk by conjecture, not by science. But the associationists propose their doctrine, not as a theory, or as a system of belief, but as a *science*. They must, then, in the outset, show us clearly the end proposed, and establish, not conjecturally, not hypothetically, but *scientifically*, that the end is good, and therefore, one which it is lawful to seek.

1. What, then, is the specific end they propose? We do not find in their writings as clear, distinct, and specific an answer to this question as is desirable. They answer generally, not specifically. Their answer, as we collect it, is,— "The end we propose is, to remove the obstacles which now hinder its fulfilment, and to gather round man the circumstances which will enable him to fulfil his destiny on this globe; or, in a word, to enable man to fulfil the purpose of his present existence." Thus stated, we of course have no objection to the end proposed. The good of a being is its destiny, or the end for which it exists; and to seek to enable a being to fulfil its destiny, or gain that end, is to seek its good. So the end for which man exists in this world is his good in relation to his existence here; and to labor to enable him to gain that end is to labor for his good, and his only good here. Thus far, we have, and can have, no quarrel with the associationists.

But a general answer to a specific question is no answer at all; for the general has formal existence only in the special. We must, therefore, ask again, What is the *specific* end proposed? To answer, To remove evil, and to secure good, is not enough; for the question remains, What *is* evil? what *is* good? Evil, you say, is that which prevents, or in some way hinders or retards, the fulfilment of one's destiny. Very true; but what is it that does that? This is the question we want answered. We find in the writings of the associationists graphic descriptions of the actual state of society,— what they call *Civilization*,—and brilliant pictures of the life men will live in *Harmony*, or the new world they propose; and it is from these we must collect what, in their view, is evil, or opposed to man's destiny on this globe, and what they suppose is good, that is, its fulfilment, or favorable to its fulfilment. In regard to the latter, we find the chief place assigned to wealth and luxury, two things which

Fourier asserts positively, again and again, are absolutely indispensable to the fulfilment of our destiny; in regard to the former, we find enumerated, among the evils of civilization, the *poverty* of the great mass of the people, and *unattractive* labor. It is fair, then, to say, that poverty and unattractive labor are *evils*, in the judgment of the associationists. Labor itself they cannot regard as evil, because they propose to continue it in their new world. The evil, then, is in its unattractiveness,—that is, in our being bound or forced to labor against our inclinations, or to do that to which we are more or less averse. But this can be evil only on condition that it is an evil to be under the necessity of acting against our inclinations. If this be accepted, good is in being free to follow our inclinations; evil in being compelled or bound to act against them. On what authority does this principle rest?

Moreover, is it certain that poverty, in itself considered, is evil, or opposed to our destiny? Where is the proof? Wealth and poverty are both relative terms, unless the term poverty be restricted to those who have not even so much as their will which is their own, and then we should be obliged to predicate wealth of all who possess something, however little. But the associationists do not so restrict the sense of the word, for they include, in the number of the poor, people who have something of their own, at least their will and bodily activity. What, then, is the real distinction between wealth and poverty? Where draw the line, so that the rich shall all be on one side, and all the poor on the other? John Jacob Astor is said, when told of a man who had just retired from business with half a million, to have remarked, that he had no doubt but the poor man might be just as happy if he were rich! To John Jacob Astor, the man worth half a million was a poor man; to most men, he would be a rich man. One man counts himself poor, in the possession of thousands; another feels himself rich, if he have a coarse serge robe, a crust of bread, and water from the spring. Which of the two is the rich, which the poor man? If the Italian lazzaroni, the scandal of thrifty Englishmen and Yankees, have what contents them, or are contented with what suffices for the present moment, unsolicitous for the next, wherein are they poorer than our "merchant princes," who have a multitude of wants they cannot satisfy? and wherein would you enrich them, by increasing their possessions, if you increased their wants in the same ratio?

But pass over this difficulty. Suppose you have some invariable standard by which to determine who are the poor and who are the rich; whence does it follow that poverty is in itself an evil? Many emperors, kings, princes, nobles, and innumerable saints, have voluntarily abandoned wealth, and chosen poverty, even made a solemn vow never to have any thing to call their own. Is it certain that these have acted a foolish part, abandoned good, and inflicted evil on themselves? If not, how can you say poverty is in itself an evil? Do you say, poverty breeds discontent, and leads to vice and crime? Is that true? Does it do so in all men who are poor? Did it do so in St. Anthony, St. Francis of Assisi, St. John of God, St. Thomas of Villanova, St. Philip Neri, and thousands of others we could mention, who observed evangelical poverty to the letter? Are all the poor discontented, vicious, and criminal? No man dares say it. Then what you allege is not a necessary result of poverty, and must have its efficient cause elsewhere, in the person, or in some circumstance not dependent on wealth or poverty. In the world's history, poverty, vice, and misery are far from being inseparable companions; and so are wealth, virtue, and happiness. Was wealth a good to the rich man mentioned in the Gospel? Was poverty an evil to the poor man that lay at his gate full of sores, begging to be fed with the crumbs that fell from his table?

We might go through the whole list of physical evils drawn up by the associationists, and ask, in relation to each, so far as it is physical, the same or similar questions. Whence, then, the certainty that what they propose to remove, as evil, is evil? Whence, then, the proof that the end they propose is a good end? Suppose—and the case is supposable—that what are called physical evils are dispensed by a merciful Providence, designed to be invaluable blessings, and are such to all who receive and bear them with the proper dispositions; could we then pronounce them evils? Would it not follow that in themselves they may be indifferent, and that the good or the evil results from the disposition with which they are received and borne? Now this may be the fact. If it is, then the good or the evil depends on ourselves, and we may make them either blessings or curses, as we choose. Then to remove evil would not necessarily be to remove them, but to cure that moral state which makes a bad, instead of a good, use of them.

It is easy to declaim, but it is important that we declaim

wisely; and to be able to declaim wisely, we must know what to declaim against. It is easy to harrow up the feelings by eloquent descriptions of physical sufferings, and no doubt physical sufferings are often an evil of no small magnitude; but this is nothing to the purpose. Is the evil in the physical suffering itself, or in the moral state of him who causes or suffers it? Suppose we transport ourselves to the early ages of our era, and take our stand in proud, haughty, imperial, and pagan Rome; suppose we assist at the trial, tortures, and martyrdom of the persecuted Christians, behold them cast to the wild beasts in the amphitheatre, see them broiling slowly on gridirons, their flesh torn off with pincers, or their living bodies stuck full of splinters besmeared with pitch, lighted, and ranged along the streets of the city by night, as so many lamps. Here is physical pain. Ingenuity, aided by diabolical malice, has done its best to refine upon torture, to produce the greatest amount possible of physical suffering. Yet what is it that excites our horror? This pain beyond conception of the Christian martyrs? Not at all. We glory in it; we bless God for it; and so do the sufferers themselves. They *choose* it, voluntarily submit to it, and joy in the midst of it, and would not have it less for all the world. There is no joy on earth so sweet, so great, so ecstatic, as that of the martyr. The horror we feel is not at the physical suffering, but at the malice which inflicts it,—not at the fact that the martyrs are enabled heroically to win their crowns, but at the refined cruelty which delights to torture them. It is very possible, then, to conceive the most exquisite physical sufferings, the most excruciating tortures, and the most cruel death, as even a great and invaluable good to those who suffer them. Their presence, then, is not necessarily an evil to the sufferer, and consequently exemption from them not necessarily a good. For the same reason, it does not necessarily follow that the wealth, and luxury, and other things you propose, are necessarily in themselves at all desirable. You must go further; and before attempting to decide what is good or what is evil, tell us WHAT IS THE DESTINY OF MAN; for it is only in relation to his destiny, that we can pronounce this or that good or evil. "Am I not a happy man?" said Crœsus to Solon, after showing him his treasures. "Whether a man is happy or not," replied the Athenian sage, "is not to be known before his death."

What, then, according to the associationists, is the destiny

of man, his *final* cause, or the end for which he exists? They have much to say of man's destiny; but we do not find, in those of their writings which we have consulted, any very satisfactory or even intelligible answer to this question. We are told, at one time, that man's destiny is, to live in harmony,—that is, in association as they propose to organize it. But this is no answer; for it only asserts, in other words, that man is able or fitted by nature to adopt the means of fulfilling his destiny. Besides, it defines the destiny of the race rather than the destiny of the individuals, without which the race is only an abstraction. At other times, we are told that man's destiny is, to harmonize the globe which he inhabits with itself, to harmonize it with the sidereal heavens, and the sidereal heavens with the universe so that all discord shall cease, and there shall be universal harmony; that is, man's destiny is, to complete the works of the Creator, and give them their last finish! The final cause of man is, then, to assist the Creator in completing the work of creation, that is, that he may constitute a portion of the first cause! This, however, we understand to be only a fanciful speculation, for which the school, as it exists in this country, does not hold itself responsible.

The more modest of the members leave these lofty speculations by the way, and tell us that their object, and their sole object is, by the organization of labor and association, to enable man to fulfil his destiny on earth. But what is this destiny? We can find no specific answer. But they lay down, as their grand principle, Attractions proportional to destiny. According to them, we may, therefore, conclude man's destiny in this world is that towards which he is attracted by his nature, or which is indicated by his natural inclinations and tendencies. If we understand them, they undertake to give the law of attaining to our destiny, rather than any clear statement of what is that destiny itself. But as the attractions are natural, and as they are the index to the end, and the law of its attainment, the end must itself be natural. If, then, we assert that they hold, that, when man has developed and satisfied in harmony his primitive or fundamental passions, or *stimulants*, as M. Briancourt calls them, he has fulfilled his destiny in this world, we may presume that they will readily admit our assertion to be correct. Then the destiny of man in this world is, the harmonious or orderly development and satisfaction of his whole nature. We will strike

out from this "the development of his nature," because development can never be an end, since, by its nature, it is necessarily only the means or process of gaining the end. Then the answer will be, simply, Man's destiny on earth is, to satisfy his nature; that is, to obtain and possess, in all their variety and fulness, the natural objects indicated by his nature, and towards which he is naturally stimulated. This is nothing but our old acquaintance, the Epicurean philosophy, decked out in the latest Parisian mode. We can now *east* ourselves, and take a fresh departure.

But, to be just to the associationists, we must observe, that they understand by *nature*, not merely our sensual inclinations and tendencies, but also our intellectual, social, domestic, and æsthetic passions or tendencies. Moreover, they do not teach, that, in gaining the end to which we are attracted, we are to follow blindly our natural inclinations and tendencies, or that we are necessitated by them. They are the index and the law, and we have reason and free will, as instruments by which to follow the law and secure the end. Nor do they teach that it will do to follow without restraint all our inclinations and tendencies *as they are actually developed under Civilization*; for they are now developed disproportionately, in violation of harmony, and it may require several generations in association before it will do to give them all their full liberty; nevertheless, the end is in the natural order, and is the orderly satisfaction of nature by natural objects.

But on what authority rests this assumption, that our destiny as human beings in this world is the natural satisfaction of our nature? We do not find this proved in any of the writings of the associationists which have fallen under our notice. M. Briancourt asserts it, in asserting the central principle of the school,—"Attractions proportional to destiny;" and he no doubt supposes that he proves it, in proving this principle, the grand discovery of Fourier; but we do not find that this principle itself is proved, at least, in the case of human beings, the only order of beings concerned in the inquiry. The school may have proved it of minerals, vegetables, and the different orders of the animal kingdom; but that is nothing to their purpose; for we cannot conclude the attributes and destiny of one genus from those of another. Because this or that is true of a pig, for instance, we cannot say, it is *therefore* true of man; nor that the fact that it is true of the pig affords even a

presumption that it is true of man; for man is essentially different from the pig. To say, because it is true of other genera, that attractions are proportional to destiny, it must be true of human beings, is either a plain *non-sequitur*, or the denial that there is any essential difference between man and them. If there is no essential difference between man and a mineral, a vegetable, a pig, we concede your conclusion; if there is, we deny it. But the former we are loath to admit; and although our modern philosophers have done their best towards making it at least practically true, we must as yet hold on to the old doctrine that man is generically distinguished from all other orders of creatures, although he may have many attributes in common with them all.

If, as we presume it will be conceded, man is essentially distinguishable from the animal world, if he forms a genus of his own, nothing can be concluded of him, in so far as he is peculiarly man, from any other order; consequently, whatever is affirmed of him must be specifically proved of him. It may be, that all other orders of creatures on this globe have a natural destiny, and yet the Creator have appointed him to a supernatural destiny. It may be, as the church teaches, and the Christian believes, that the end for which God designed and made him is not that to which he is directed and drawn by his nature, even in its purity and integrity, but an end to which, since the fall, his nature is even averse, and which can be gained only by denying and crucifying his natural inclinations and tendencies. This may be—that is, it is conceivable; and if true, it will not do to say, *a priori*, of man, that attractions are proportional to destiny, or that they at all indicate either it or the law of its attainment. Now it is possible that this constitutes, in part, the essential difference between man and animals. If so, the whole doctrine of the associationists falls to the ground.

The associationists must not misapprehend the question we raise. We are travelling no more than they out of life in this world. We understand them to confine their view to man's destiny here on this globe; we are not, at this moment, extending ours beyond it. We agree perfectly with them, in what we presume to be their principle, namely, that there is no contradiction between our destiny here and our destiny hereafter, and that the surest method of gaining our end in the world to come is faithfully to ful-

fil our destiny in the world where we now are. We raise no question between our present good and our future good; for we suppose the principle of both to be the same. Nor do we raise a question as to foregoing our good in this life, for the sake of gaining a good hereafter; for we have never been taught that our true good here is at all incompatible with beatitude in heaven. The Christian who denies himself, chastises, mortifies the flesh with its deeds, crucifies his natural inclinations, is not supposed to deprive himself of any good here, and he perhaps enjoys, even in this life, a hundred-fold more than the associationists in their most brilliant and ravishing day-dreams even venture to promise. We suspect that the life they promise would have had very few attractions for St. Francis of Assisi, St. Anthony, St. Benedict, or St. Bernard, even as to this world. The question lies between *the life of nature*, as contended for by the associationists, and *the supernatural life*, which the Christian professes to live. The Christian lives his supernatural life even in this world, and its enjoyment is an enjoyment here, as well as hereafter. Both lives may therefore be considered as lived on this globe, yet, differing as to their principle and end. The Christian view is, that God made man, whether you speak of this world or of that which is to come, for a supernatural destiny; the associationist view is, that man is made, at least so far as this world is concerned, for a natural destiny. The question is between the two. If the Christian is right, the associationist is wrong, and his effort to provide for the gaining of a natural destiny, for a life in accordance with natural inclination and tendency, is directly at war with man's true destiny on this globe, and therefore with man's true good, not only his true good hereafter, but his true good here.

The associationists, of course, do not believe the church; but that is not the question. They profess to walk by sight, by science, and therefore they must demonstrate that she is wrong, or have no right to assert as science their doctrine, that man's destiny on this globe is a natural destiny, or that the end of our existence here is attained to by living a natural life. But they have not demonstrated this; they have, at best, only proved that this is or may be true of various animal tribes; but they have not proved at all that it is true of man. At best, then, their doctrine is but

an hypothesis, a belief, for which they do not, and cannot, even pretend to have infallible authority.

The associationists tell us that they have proved their doctrine by analysis of human nature, and that therefore it is science. But proved what? Conceding them all they can pretend to have proved by analysis, it is only that the primitive passions or stimulants they assert are psychologically true,—from which, at best, they can conclude only what *would be* man's destiny, in case his destiny were natural; but that it is natural, the precise point to be proved, they have not proved, for it can never be concluded from nature. Nature can guide us only on the assumption that the end is natural. When the question comes up, Is the purpose of our existence natural, or supernatural? nature has nothing to say one way or the other. This is a question which science can never answer; for science can never travel out of nature. It is idle, then, for the associationists to tell us their doctrine is scientifically established. Whether the end for which Almighty God placed us here is natural or supernatural it is impossible to know without a supernatural revelation, and to a supernatural revelation, declaring our destiny here to be natural, the associationists do not pretend.

These remarks show clearly enough that the associationists are unable to answer the first question in order, namely, What is man's destiny on this globe? Then they are unable to legitimate the end they propose; then unable to say, that what they call good is good, or what they call evil is evil; and then, finally, whether, even by complete success, they would or would not benefit their fellow-men. This deserves their serious consideration. If, as we have said, what the church teaches and the Christian believes is true, they are certainly wrong as to man's destiny here, as well as hereafter. It will not do for them to reply, that they do not believe the church, and that her authority is not sufficiently proved to them; because they must be able to assert their system as a science, or they have no right to assert it at all. They must, then, disprove the teaching of the church. So long as there is a possibility that the teaching of the church may turn out to be true, they cannot assert their own doctrine; for, in the nature of the case, they can conclude its truth only from the destruction of the negative.

2. This uncertainty as to man's destiny here, which the associationists do not and cannot remove, attaches of course to the means proposed to enable us to fulfil it. The school

adopts, as we have seen, as its fundamental principle, "Attractions proportional to destiny." Hence, by ascertaining and providing for the attractions, they determine and provide for the destiny. On this principle rests their whole fabric of Association. If this be true, their Association may or may not be adequate; but if not true, the whole scheme is evidently altogether inadequate, because natural attractions can be proportional only to a natural end, never to a supernatural end. This is conclusive against the scheme, till its advocates are able, by a supernatural authority, to prove that our destiny in this world is a natural destiny; for it requires no argument to prove that Association, organized with express reference to a *natural* destiny, must be unavailing—if nothing worse—for a *supernatural* destiny.

But even if the end of man in this world were the satisfaction of his nature, the means proposed would be inadequate. The assumption of the associationists is, that our nature can be satisfied by the possession of the natural objects to which it directs and draws us. But this is not true. The arguments on which the associationists rely to prove the contrary are inconclusive, because they are all arguments from one genus to another. When the premises and conclusion are not in the same genus, nothing is concluded. It may be true, as M. Briancourt proves, that, if a pig gets what his nature seeks, he will be satisfied, stop squealing, and lie down and sleep, till renewed appetite awakes him; and the same would, no doubt, be true of man, if man were a pig, and might become true of him, if he by some Circean art, could be transformed into a pig. But it so happens that man is not a pig, and cannot, if he is to retain his essential nature as man, be changed into one. We cannot predicate indifferently of the two. Man is never satisfied by the possession of the natural objects to which he is naturally drawn. All experience proves it; the experience of each particular man proves it; else wherefore this deep wail from the heart of every one who lives simply the life of nature, this outbreak of despair, *Vanitas vanitatum, et omnia vanitas?* Build man the most splendid palace; lavish on it all the decorations of the most perfect art; furnish it with the most exquisite and most expensive taste; lodge him in it on the soft, voluptuous couch; spread his table with the most delicate viands and the rarest fruits; refresh him with the most costly wines; regale him with the richest music; rain down upon him

the most fragrant odors; ravish him with beauty; gratify every sense, every taste, every wish, as soon as formed; and the poor wretch will sigh for he knows not what, and behold with envy even the ragged beggar feeding on offal. No variety, no change, no art, can satisfy him. All that nature or art can offer palls upon his senses and his heart,—is to him poor, mean, and despicable. There arise in him wants which are too vast for nature, which swell out beyond the bounds of the universe, and cannot, and will not, be satisfied with any thing less than the infinite and eternal God. Never yet did nature suffice for man, and it never will.

This great and solemn fact, which it is vain to attempt to deny,—a fact deep graven on all hearts that have experience, that have lived the natural life,—should lead thoughtful men to ask,—nay, it does lead thoughtful men to ask,—if, after all, it be not a mistake to attempt to satisfy ourselves with the vain and perishing things of this world; if the inability to find our satisfaction in nature be not a strong presumption that our Creator did not design us for a natural destiny; if, in fact, he did not intend us for an end above nature; and therefore, that our precise error is in seeking a natural destiny in opposition to his design, in neglecting our true destiny for a false destiny, that is, neglecting true good and pursuing real evil. We should suppose that this universal experience of all men would have created, at least, a doubt, in the minds of our friends, as to the soundness of their assumption of the natural as the true destiny of man on this globe.

The associationists, doubtless, will reply, that they do not mean to deny the supernatural destiny; that they leave to man all the satisfactions of religion; that there is no incompatibility between the supernatural life of the Christian and the natural life of *harmony*. But in this they are mistaken. The principle, the means, and the end of their life are natural; but the principle, the means, and the end of the other are supernatural, and no man can possibly live both lives at once. This is what our Lord meant, when he said "Ye cannot serve God and mammon. No man can serve two masters." When you propose nature as the end, and organize Association expressly in reference to it, you do not leave man free to propose God as his end, and to live solely the supernatural life. Moreover, you exclude religion from the Association. You recognize nothing that

has the least resemblance to religion. It has with you no substantive existence; for, as M. Briancourt defines it, it is nothing but the reflection in their harmonic relations of all the primitive stimulants, as light, which is itself no color, is the reflection of all the primitive colors in perfect harmony.

Furthermore, the associationists cannot admit the necessity of religion without abandoning their system. Their system is founded on the principle, that attractions are proportional to destiny; and if what pertains to the natural order is inadequate to satisfy nature, their system is false. The admission of the necessity of any thing transcending nature as a principle, a means, or an end, would be the denial of the sufficiency of nature; therefore that attractions are proportional to destiny; therefore, the denial of the whole scheme of Association. The associationists are not at liberty, when we have shown them from experience that nature does not suffice for nature, to defend themselves by saying, Then bring in the supernatural; for they are not at liberty to abandon the essential principle of their system, and still continue to assert it.

And, finally, if the system is insufficient in itself, if under it, as under civilization, our destiny is not attainable without the supernatural, the system is useless, for the supernatural alone is sufficient. The man who lives the supernatural life of the Christian has God, and therefore all. He despises the life your Association proposes. Your wealth and luxury, your palace and grounds, your flower-gardens and ball-rooms, your song and dance, your statues and pictures, your scientific reunions, and your "æsthetic teas," are to him vanity, yea, less than vanity, and nothing. He holds them in utter contempt, and tramples them beneath his feet, and weeps tears of pity and tender compassion over those poor creatures who can esteem them. The epicurean and the saint, though for different reasons, both exclaim of all the world can give, *Vanity of vanities, all is vanity!* The former, because he has grown weary of it, and found it impotent to fill up the vacuum in his heart; the latter, because he is full without it, because he has no need of it, because it can offer him nothing, and serves only to distract him from God, and hinder his divine life.

But we have objections to the adequacy of the means proposed, of a kind which will have more weight with our friends, the associationists. The means proposed are in-

tended, besides other things, to remove the evils of poverty, that is, the moral evils occasioned in the community by poverty; for of the physical evils we say nothing. There is no question but poverty occasions discontent, envy, and repining, and these again lead to crimes against both person and property. But it occasions these evils only when it is contrasted with wealth. There is no more discontent, envy, or repining, where all are alike poor, than where all are alike rich. The hovel is a hovel only as contrasted with the palace which rises by its side and overtops it. The remedy here is either internal or external. The internal is moral, religious, which raises the poor to the supernatural life, gives them all the most favored have or can have, and leads them to look upon all the distinctions of rank and wealth as of no value, and to trample the world beneath their feet. He who asks nothing from the world envies never those who possess it, and repines never that he is poor. This remedy is the one the church approves, and labors always to apply; and it checks alike the envy and repining of the poor, and the pride and insolence of the rich, enabling both to live together in mutual peace and charity,—in harmony. But this remedy the associationists reject, even with scorn. They propose an external remedy. But the external remedy can be a remedy only so far as it removes the occasion; and to do that it must establish an equality of fortunes, or at least, so arrange matters that wealth and poverty shall never be in juxtaposition, or seen in contrast.

But if we consult the plan of the associationists, we shall see that they propose nothing of the kind. They recognize property and inequality of property in like manner as they are recognized in our present social order; and, what is still more to the purpose, they bring together the extremes of wealth and poverty in the same phalanx, and lodge them in the same phalanstery, so that one cannot go in or go out, rise up or sit down, without having the violent contrast forced upon his attention, to exalt his pride or madden his envy. That is, they propose to cure the evil by increasing what they regard as its cause!

It is of no avail to allege that none in Association will be very poor, that there will be none who cannot by their own labor procure all the necessaries and chief comforts of life; for the evil in question does not arise from the consideration that one has *little*, but that his neighbor has *more*. So long as in your Association one has *more* than another, you

have not removed the occasion of the evil you deplore. No matter, if his plain apartments are sufficient for his protection, when only a little lathing and plaster divide them from the gay and elegant and luxuriously furnished apartments of his neighbors; no matter that his dish suffices for his physical necessities, so long as, in the room next to his, his neighbor—a stupid fellow, he may think, not half so good as he—sits down to his dinner of twenty dishes. Since all these violent contrasts, all the distinctions of wealth, exist in the Association, and are perpetually under the eye, in the face and nose, of every one, meeting him at every turn he takes, the occasion of the evils exists there in even a greater and a more offensive degree than it does in the present social state; and as long as you do not by the Association remove the occasion, how can you say that by it you can cure the evil? Do not refer us to moral influences which may be operative, for that is to abandon your system, and fall back on that which you condemn and anathematize. Your system is, to correct the internal by the judicious organization of the external; and if you are obliged to appeal from the external to the internal, to supply the defects of the organization, you acknowledge what we are endeavoring to prove, namely, the inadequacy of your means.

Again; the mother evil of our present industrial system, according to the associationists, is COMPETITION. Indeed, to read their writings, one is inclined to believe that they regard competition in business as the cause of nearly all the ills that flesh is heir to. Their grand argument for Association is, that it will entirely do away with competition and its attendant evils. Whether their view of competition is correct or the reverse is not now the question. The question is, Does Association, on their plan, remove it, or, what is the same thing, afford no motive or scope for it? If not, their means are inadequate. Competition results from the inequality of fortune, the freedom and the desire to accumulate. When these three causes coexist, competition is possible and inevitable. Association, then, to remove competition, must take away these causes, at least some one of them. The desire to accumulate can be suppressed by external means only by an organization in which wealth can secure, or aid in securing, to its possessor no personal or social advantage, or what is regarded as an advantage by him or by others. This can never be the case where wealth and luxury are held to be important, essential to the fulfilment

of one's destiny, and where the proprietor has the free use of his property. Grant, then, the desire, and allow the freedom to accumulate, and you have competition, because property is in its nature exclusive.

Now all these conditions of competition must coexist in Association, because the Association is based on individual and not common property. There is inequality of property, and of course the distinctions which always do and always must accompany it. There is freedom to possess and use, and there is freedom to acquire, to hoard, or to display. There are objects forbidden to the poor, and accessible only to the rich. There are, then, all the motives to accumulate, and the same opportunity to acquire individual property, and to purchase pleasure or distinctions by it, which are furnished by existing economical arrangements. What, then, is to hinder competition in the bosom of the phalanx itself?

But pass over this, and consider the phalanx as a copartnership, or a huge business firm. There must be buying and selling between it and other firms; for we do not understand the associationists to propose to stop all exchange, all trade and commerce. What, then, is to hinder competition between phalanx and phalanx, any more than now between one business firm and another? Is competition between firms less injurious than between individuals?—between large firms than between small ones? Indeed, is it not notorious that the rivalry of large bodies is more unprincipled, altogether less scrupulous, than that of individuals? Who needs to be told that a man, sheltering himself under the shield of a corporation, will do, without scruple, what he would recoil from doing in his individual capacity? What, then, under your system, is to prevent perhaps the most ruinous competition the world has ever witnessed? Phalanx may seek to circumvent phalanx in business, and every few days we may hear the crash of one or another, each burying eighteen hundred or two thousand people under its ruins! There is nothing in your system, so far as we can see, to prevent this disastrous result. Men in the Association have the same passions as out of it, and these passions will operate in the same way, if they have the liberty and the occasion.

We are aware that the associationists suppose that they will keep down the spirit of rivalry by the various intellectual, social, domestic and æsthetic influences which they

expect to be operative in Association. But they recognize the spirit of rivalry, or competition. Let this be remembered. True, they count on turning it into other channels. Thus, by making shoeblacks the Legion of Honor, they fancy that the ambition will be to be shoeblacks: just as if the cross of honor will not cease to be an object of ambition the moment it is conferred on the shoeblack! The cross of honor is valued because it is bestowed as the reward of honorable or heroic deeds. It does not confer the honor, it signalizes it; and never will men become shoeblacks for the sake of it. It is impossible, by any artificial methods, to raise menial arts to the rank of the liberal; or menial services to the rank of the heroic, by conferring on them the insignia of the heroic. If you want the liberal and refined to be willing to perform the most menial and disgusting duties, you must propose the cross of Christ, not the cross of the Legion of Honor; the crown of immortal life, not the crown of laurel.

The associationists, whatever influences or arrangements they may depend upon, must allow the individual the dominion of himself, and the freedom to follow the bent of his genius. They must allow the former, or they reduce man to complete slavery, and make the phalanx the grave of the individual; and the latter, or deny their grand principle of attractions proportional to destiny, and also their other principle of attractive labor, since no labor or employment against one's natural bent is or can be attractive. They do allow the first, otherwise individual property would be a mockery; they allow the second, otherwise their distribution of the phalanx into groups and series would be an absurdity. Allow a man freedom to follow his natural bent, that is, the passion or group of passions which are naturally predominant in him, and that passion or group will grow by indulgence, and soon gain the complete mastery over all the rest, and subordinate them to itself. Besides, the whole tendency of the Association is to this result. Its grand principle is, to follow the natural order and the natural attraction. The harmonious development our friends speak of is not a precisely similar development in every individual, but the harmonious development of each individual in accordance with his naturally predominant tendency or tendencies. To understand it in any other sense would be to make them inconsistent with themselves. Consequently, whatever influences they may bring to bear on the individual, they must

tend to harmonize all in him with his naturally predominant passion. If then, we suppose one whose strong natural tendency is to acquire property, his whole nature will be subordinated to this tendency, and he will follow it to the full extent of his freedom and capacity. If we suppose two such, we have competition.

As for social influences, these, in a community which starts with the assumption that wealth and luxury are absolutely indispensable to the fulfilment of our destiny, will not be likely to check or discourage the efforts without which wealth and luxury are not to be had. The domestic influences will be no less favorable to the accumulation of wealth than now; for the father bequeathes his property to his children, and where there are inequalities of fortune, wealth will confer distinction. The æsthetic influences are of no account for good. All the world are not artists, and it is by no means certain that every phalanx will be a school of art; and if it should be, it must be borne in mind that its art will be purely secular, and purely secular art leads to nothing better than effeminacy and licentiousness. It would, then, check the tendency to accumulate, if at all, only by producing no less an evil of another sort. It would be well for modern rhapsodists to recollect that the artistic epoch—we speak not of religious art—follows, but has never yet been known to precede or accompany, an heroic epoch. It marks a decline, and usually is or ushers in an age of corruption. The shrine of natural beauty stands always in the vestibule of the temple of Venus, when not in the temple itself. Avarice, again, is no unnatural pendant to voluptuousness. We place no confidence, therefore, in your æsthetic influences, even to restrain competition,—especially, since wealth will be needed as the minister of voluptuousness.

It is unnecessary to pursue further this branch of the subject. All our primitive tendencies are exclusive, and mutually repellant. They almost always exist in excess, and every one of them grows by indulgence. Philosophy and experience alike testify that their harmonious action is never possible, unless by their subjection to reason. But this subjection is contrary to the principles of the associationists; for they allow us reason and free will, not to control our passions and keep them in subjection to the law, but as their servants or instruments. The passions give the law; reason and free will provide for its fulfilment. Consequently, the harmony of the passions is impossible, on the principles of

the associationists; and without such harmony, their means are obviously inadequate.

3. Whoever reads the works of the associationists must perceive that they place great reliance for the success of their scheme on the mutual love and good-will of the members of the phalanx. There is to be there no pride of birth, no haughtiness of rank, no insolence of wealth. Gentlemen and simplemen, rich and poor, learned and unlearned, are all to meet as brothers; and no bickerings, no jars, no envyings, no jealousies, no aversions, rancors, or heartburnings, are ever to find admittance into the *harmonic* paradise. No serpent will ever find his way into the new garden of Eden. Every one will be courteous, affable, gentle, affectionate, forbearing, and eager to oblige; and men will say, "See how these phalansterians love one another!" Undoubtedly, without this, the association will be torn by internal dissensions, and soon prove only a monument to the folly of its founders.

But by what right do associationists count on this universal and never-failing mutual love and good-will? They propose no radical change and no supernatural elevation of human nature. Men enter Association with all the essential passions, and with all the diversity of character, taste, and temperament which they now have, and must exhibit in Association the same phenomena as out of it, so far as the occasion is not removed. There is no removal of the occasion; and there must be, as we have shown, just as much occasion for the exercise of all the bitter and mischievous passions of our nature in Association as in the present order. Whence, then, is to come this anticipated result, so widely different from our present experience? From the moral causes operative there? What are they? Nay, you cannot appeal to moral causes, for your system is to reach and modify the moral through the physical.

But pass over this. How is the degree of love necessary to set the machinery of Association in operation to be obtained prior to Association itself? It requires a greater degree of love to introduce than it does to preserve after introduction. If any thing is certain in philosophy, it is that the effect cannot exceed the cause. Hence, universal experience proves that the founders of human institutions are always superior to those who are formed under those institutions. The progress under human institutions is always downwards; the purest and noblest characters

formed under them are the earliest. Man is always superior to his productions, and these are superior to *their* productions. Reverberations grow fainter and fainter in the distance. Mark the difference between the men who made our Revolution and the men of to-day. Between George Washington and James K. Polk there is a distance; and there would have been a greater distance still, if it had not been for the continued operation of causes not introduced or essentially affected by our Revolution. Certainly, then, no more love can be in the Association than there is in the cause introducing Association. Then the associationists must get, under civilization, without Association, all the love they can have with and under it. But if we can have the love without Association, then there is no need of Association; if not, Association is impracticable. Here is a conclusive argument, not only against Association, but against every scheme for effecting the real progress of man or society *by virtue of a purely human principle.* Proceeding on a purely human principle, man, it is easy to demonstrate, can no more be a *reformer* than an *institutor*,—that is, he can neither by way of reform, nor by way of institution, introduce or establish any thing superior to what he finds existing, or which, in fact, does not fall below it. His boasted improvements are such only in relation to the order he introduces, and consist solely in getting more and more rid of the contradictions to it retained at first from the pre-existing order. The departure on a human principle from the existing order is always a step towards something inferior or less perfect. Man can fall from the civilized state to the savage; he never rises spontaneously from the savage state to the civilized; and for the very good reason, that in the moral, no more than in the physical world, can the stream rise higher than the fountain.

Moreover, the love itself, which our associationists rely upon, can never be adequate to their purpose. It is, at best, only human love, the natural *sentiment* of philanthropy. This answers very well, when the work to be done is simply to propose grand schemes, make brilliant and eloquent speeches, or when there are no disagreeable duties to be performed, no violent natural repugnances to be overcome; but it fails in the hour of severe trial. Your philanthropist starts with generous impulses, with a glowing enthusiasm; and so long as there are no great discouragements, no disgusting offices in his way, and he has even a small number

of admiring friends to stimulate his zeal, applaud his eloquence, flatter his pride, and soothe him for the rebuffs he meets from the world, he may keep on his course, and continue his task. But let him find himself entirely alone, let him have no little public of his own, which is all the world to him, let him be thwarted on every point, let him be obliged to work in secret, unseen by all but the all-seeing Eye, encounter from men nothing but contradiction, contempt, and ingratitude, and he will soon begin to say to himself, Why suffer and endure so much for the unworthy? He who loves man for man's sake loves only a creature, a being of imperfect worth, of no more worth than himself, perhaps not so much; and why shall he love him more than himself, and sacrifice himself for him? The highest stretch of human love is, to love our neighbors *as* we love ourselves; and we do injustice to ourselves, when we love them more than we do ourselves.

Nay, philanthropy itself is a sort of selfishness. It is a sentiment, not a principle. Its real motive is not another's good, but its own satisfaction according to its nature. It seeks the good of others, because the good of others is the means of its own satisfaction, and is as really selfish in its principle as any other of our sentiments; for there is a broad distinction between the *sentiment* of philanthropy, and the *duty* of doing good to others,—between seeking the good of others from sentiment, and seeking it in obedience to a law which binds the conscience. The measure of the capacity of philanthropy, as a sentiment, is the amount of satisfaction it can bring to the possessor. So long as, upon the whole, he finds it more delightful to play the philanthropist than the miser, for instance, he will do it, but no longer. Hence, philanthropy must always decrease just in proportion to the increase of the repugnances it must encounter, and fail us just at the moment when it is most needed, and always in proportion as it is needed. It follows the law so observable in all human society, and helps most when and where its help is least needed. Here is the condemnation of every scheme, however plausible it may look, that in any degree depends on philanthropy for its success.

The principle the associationists want for their success is not philanthropy,—the love of man for man's sake,—but divine charity, not to be had and preserved out of the Catholic Church. Charity is, in relation to its subject, a super-

naturally infused virtue; in relation to its object, the supreme and exclusive love of God for his own sake, and man for the sake of God. He who has it is proof against all trials; for his love does not depend on man, who so often proves himself totally unamiable and unworthy, but on God, who is always and everywhere infinitely amiable and deserving of all love. He visits the sick, the prisoner, the poor, for it is God whom he visits; he clasps with tenderness the leprous to his bosom, and kisses his sores, for it is God he embraces and whose dear wounds he kisses. The most painful and disgusting offices are sweet and easy because he performs them for God, who is love, and whose love inflames his heart. Whenever there is a service to be rendered to one of God's little ones, he runs with eagerness to do it; for it is a service to be rendered to God himself. "Charity never faileth." It is proof against all natural repugnances; it overcomes earth and hell; and brings God down to tabernacle with men. Dear to it is this poor beggar, for it sees in him only our Lord who had "not where to lay his head;" dear are the sorrowing and the afflicted, for it sees in them him who was "a man of sorrows and acquainted with infirmity;" dear are these poor outcasts, for in them it beholds him who was "scorned and rejected of men;" dear are the wronged, the oppressed, the downtrodden, for in them it beholds the Innocent One nailed to the cross, and dying to atone for human wickedness. And it joys to succour them all; for in so doing, it makes reparation to God for the poverty, sufferings, wrongs, contempt, and ignominious death which he endured for our sakes; or it is his poverty it relieves in relieving the poor, his hunger it feeds in feeding the hungry, his nakedness it clothes in throwing its robe over the naked, his afflictions it consoles in consoling the sorrowing, his wounds into which it pours oil and wine, and which it binds up. "Inasmuch as ye did it unto the least of these my brethren, ye did it unto me." All is done to and for God, whom it loves more than men, more than life, and more than heaven itself, if to love him and heaven were not one and the same thing. This is the principle you need; with this principle, you have God with you and for you, and failure is impossible. But with this principle, Association is, at best, a matter of indifference; for this is sufficient of itself at all times, under any and every form of political, social, or industrial organization. He who has God can have nothing more.

But our gravest objection to associationism is, that it implicates the justice of Almighty God. The associationists tell us that their plan is indispensable to the fulfilment of our destiny on this globe. By man they must mean men, or else they are talking of an abstraction. The species has actual existence only in individuals, and the question relates only to actual existences. It is absurd to suppose that God cares for species, and not for individuals,—for the ideal, and not for the actual,—for the abstract, and not for the concrete. When, therefore, the organization of Labor and Association is proposed as indispensable to the fulfilment of our destiny,—when its friends tell us, as they do, that all the past has been only a preamble to it, a necessary preparation for it, they tell us in effect that no human being has, as yet, had within his reach the means of fulfilling his destiny. But it will not do to say this. God can create no being and appoint him to a certain end, that is, make it his duty to gain that end, and not provide him with sufficient means of gaining it, if he chooses to avail himself of them, without contradicting his own justice, and thereby proving himself unjust. If there is a single individual of our race that fails to attain to his destiny, either here or hereafter, through defect of means, not through his own fault, the blame is chargeable upon the Creator. But God is infinitely just, and we cannot accuse him of injustice without blasphemy. Then the means of fulfilling his destiny, whether here or hereafter, must *always* be within the reach of every man; and if any one fails to fulfil it, he has no one to blame but himself. Then Association never has been, is not, and never can be, necessary for the fulfilment of our destiny on this globe, or elsewhere; for man, every man, can fulfil his destiny, if he chooses, without it.

These are some few of the objections which seem to us conclusive against the views and schemes of the associationists. They by no means exhaust our list of objections; but we stop with them, because we regard them as amply sufficient of themselves. But let not the associationists imagine, for a moment, because we refuse to go with them, that we are better satisfied with the present condition of our fellow-men than they are, or that we any more despair of its amelioration than they do. When we deserted the movement party and took refuge in the church, it was not because we had become indifferent to human suffering, or because we despaired of solacing it. Never did the young

enthusiast, the fierce declaimer, the bold radical, feel more alive to every form of human suffering, or entertain a stronger hope of relieving it, than we did, when our kind mother was pleased to receive us and own us as one of her children. It is true, we did not embrace the church for the reason that she is a social reformer, for the reason that we believed her capable of effecting the good we had attempted, or which our friends were attempting, without her. In view of what she promises her faithful and obedient children, all that we or they contemplated is not worth a moment's consideration. Nevertheless, she furnishes in abundance all the means necessary to remove all real evils, and to secure every possible good.

Let not the associationists misapprehend us. We do not ask them to embrace the church, because she is the proper agent for acquiring the good they seek for their fellowmen; for we wish them to embrace her from higher and worthier motives. For ourselves, we have been, and are even now, loath to dwell on what the church can do for us in this life, lest we should be interpreted as assigning false motives for yielding her the homage which is her due. We are unwilling to pursue a line of argument, which, however proper it may be in itself, ignorance or malice may torture even into the appearance of placing time before eternity, society before heaven, or man before or in competition with God. The church must be embraced for a heavenly motive, or no advantage inures to us from embracing her. She is here to prepare us for heaven, and heaven is the only end that we can legitimately seek. The good she effects for this world is incidental, and should never be made the motive for becoming or remaining a Catholic. But, bearing this always in mind, we may without impropriety show that she can do enough for us, even in this world, to satisfy all reasonable men.

Some of the associationists are already looking towards the church, apparently despairing of success in their enterprise without her; but they are looking to her, we fear, rather with the wish to obtain her sanction for their plan, and her assistance to carry it out, than with any sincere disposition to submit themselves to her direction and discipline. If she will accept Fourierism, they are ready to accept her. But she will make no such agreement with them. She will be all, or she will be nothing. They must accept her unconditionally, or she will not accept them.

She has her own method, and will not learn of them; they must learn of her.

But is her method adequate? Let us see. The men who have manifested, under their highest forms, the virtues which are required to remove all real evils and to procure every true good of which men in this world are capable, are undeniably to be found in the Catholic Church, and nowhere else. If all men were like, for instance, St. Raymond of Pennafort, St. John of God, St. Vincent de Paul, or even Fénelon, a great and good man, yet far below the standard of a Catholic saint, there could and would be no lack of the good desirable, and no real evil could exist. There is not a form of evil in society, a single ill that flesh is heir to, which some one or more of our saints have not made provision for removing or solacing, and which they would not have removed or solaced, if they had been duly seconded, as you must know, if you have made yourselves but passably acquainted with the charitable institutions of the church. Yet these saints did not go out of the church, and did but come up to that standard of perfection which she proposes to all, and exhorts all her children to aspire to, and to which all may attain, by the grace of God, and that, too, without any change of the existing political, social, or industrial order. All may have, in the bosom of the church, whatever the external order, all the means needed for attaining to the highest perfection of which they are capable; and by attaining to that perfection, all is secured that is or can be desired for society.

But you say, all are not saints. True; but whose is the fault? It is not the fault of the political, social, or industrial order, otherwise, these of whom we speak could not have become saints; not the fault of the church, for she proffers to all the same means and assistance she extended to these; nor precisely the fault of human nature, for these were no better by nature than others; and many of the saints have even been wild and disssolute in their youth. All may not be called by Almighty God to the same degree of heroic sanctity, nor is it necessary; but all are called to Christian perfection, and the means which have proved effectual in the case of those who have attained to it are extended to all, and must needs be, if adopted, equally effectual in the case of all. The fault, whenever any one falls below the standard of perfection, is his own, is in the fact that he refuses to comply with all the church commands

and counsels. The church cannot take away free will; and as long as men retain it, they will, to a greater or less extent, abuse it. Do the associationists propose to take it away, and reduce men to mere machines? We do not understand them to propose any such thing; and if they should, it would be an additional objection to their scheme. God himself respects our free will, and governs us only according to our *choice*. He gives us, naturally or supernaturally, the ability to will and to do as he wills, and motives sweet and attractive as heaven and terrible as hell to induce us to will as he wills; but he does not will for us; the will must be our own act. If the church proposes perfection to all, exhorts all to aspire to it, furnishes them all the assistance they need to gain it, and urges them by all the motives which can weigh with them to accept and use them, the fault, if they do not, is theirs, not hers, and she is not to be accused either of inefficiency or insufficiency; for she does all that, in the nature of the case, it is possible to do.

But even a far lower standard of Christian worth than we have been speaking of, and which is possible in the bosom of the church to all, will suffice for the purpose of the associationists. Suppose every one should do, not all the church counsels, but simply what she commands, enjoins, as of precept, and which every one must do, or fall under her censure, what real evil could remain, or what desirable social good would be wanting? There would be no wars, no internal disorders, no wrongs, no outrages, no frauds or deceptions, and no taking the advantage one of another. There would be no unrelieved poverty, no permanent want of the necessaries or even comforts of life; for the church makes almsgiving a precept, and commands all her children to remember the poor. There would remain no ruinous competition; for no one would set a high value upon the goods of this world. The real cause of all the social and industrial evils the associationists deplore, so far as evils they are, is covetousness, which is said to be the root of all evil; and covetousness the church condemns as a mortal sin. Eradicate covetousness from the heart, and your reform, so far as desirable, is effected; and it is eradicated, or held in subjection, by every obedient Catholic. Hence, all that is needed is in the church; let every one submit to her and follow her directions; nothing more will be wanting. All can submit to her; for God, in one way or another, gives to

every one sufficient grace for that, if it be not voluntarily resisted; and she herself is the medium through which is communicated all the strength any one needs to do all she commands. The way to destroy the tree of evil is, to lay the axe at the root; and this the church does. She seeks always to purify the heart, out of which are the issues of life, and she never fails to do it in the case of any one who submits himself to her discipline.

But, you reply, there are evils in Catholic countries, and the result promised is as far from being attained to there as elsewhere. This is too strongly expressed. There are evils in Catholic countries, but they are fewer and of a more mitigated character than in other countries, and, moreover, diminish always in proportion as the country is more truly Catholic and more exclusively under Catholic influence. This is evident by contrasting Italy with England, Protestant England with Catholic England, or Spain and Portugal, as they now are, with what they were, when thoroughly Catholic, before they were prostrated by the prevalence of revolutionary and infidel ideas. M. Briancourt virtually admits as much, when he contrasts the present state of things with that which formerly existed, before infidel governments, philosophers, and reformers had detached modern society from the control of the church. Besides, all in Catholic countries are not good Catholics; and the evils complained of undeniably spring from the acts of those who do not faithfully comply with the requirements of the church. If all complied, the evils would be removed. The church is to be tested, not by the effects of non-compliance, but by the effects of compliance. She is answerable only for those who comply with her demands and follow her directions. She cannot force men against their will to comply; and you would be among the first to cry out against her tyranny, were she even to attempt it. The objection implied in the existence of evils in Catholic countries is, therefore, of no weight. Men who reject the church, or refuse to obey her, must not complain that she does not make all men good Catholics.

The church, then, offers an easy and effectual method of removing all real evils, and of securing all that is really good in relation even to our present existence. She offers a feasible and an effectual way of serving our fellow-men,—of acquiring and of giving practical effect to the most unbounded charity. Submit to the church, follow her direc-

tions, and you will need nothing more. You can secure all you desire, so far as wise in your desires, whatever be the form of the government or the social or industrial order under which you live. The internal can be rectified in every state and condition of life; and when the internal is right, you need have no fears for the external. This is a speedy way, and within the power of each individual, without his being obliged to wait for the co-operation of his brethren; for each can individually submit himself at any moment he chooses. It is an effectual way; for the reliance is not on human weakness and instability, but on the infinite and unchangeable God.

Let not our friends scorn this way, because it is old, simple, and easy. God's ways are not ours. David, to slay the giant, chose a simple sling and a smooth stone from the brook, not the armor and sword of the king. The prophet bade the Syrian simply, "Go wash and be clean." God's ways are always foolishness to human pride and human prudence; but whoso enters them finds them leading to life. Let not our friends scorn this way through pride. Others as learned, as philosophic, as high in station, as proud as they, and who once looked upon it with as much distrust and contempt as they can, have, through grace, entered it; and they have found "hidden riches" which they did not look for, and which make all that is promised from Association, multiplied a thousand times into itself, appear poor, mean, and despicable.

VENTURA'S FUNERAL ORATION.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1848.]

Of the illustrious subject of Padre Ventura's Oration, which everybody has read, it cannot be necessary that we should speak. We could not say more than the learned and eloquent Theatine has said, were we to try; and we have no disposition to say less. Nor can it be necessary to speak of the general character and merits of the Oration itself,—a political manifesto addressed by an eminent tribune of the people to all Christendom, and intended to have an immediate bearing on the movements for political reforms in Rome and Italy. Padre Ventura is a distinguished man, and perhaps one of the most popular and effective pulpit orators of the day. With his general tone, doctrines, and aims we should be sorry not to sympathize. We go with him, heart and soul, in his love of liberty, his hatred of oppression, and his war against tyrants and tyranny.

But if he has been correctly translated,—of which we cannot judge, not having seen the original Italian,—he makes use of some expressions in his oration, and especially in the preface to his second edition, in which he defends its doctrines and makes his own eulogium, to which, as at present advised, we are far from being prepared to assent. As we understand him, he contends, that in the present posture of affairs in Europe, the true policy of the church is to abandon the governments, appeal to the people, and form an alliance between religion and liberty. Such a policy, he appears to maintain, is necessary to the preservation of the church, and will be to the advantage of both liberty and religion,—the former gaining sacredness, order, and stability, and the latter an infusion of popular energy, which will enable the church to bring once more under her influence the populations now disaffected with their rulers, and with her, because they believe her to be leagued with them to oppress. This seems to us to be his general doctrine, and we are unable to distinguish it from the policy contended for with so much zeal

Oraison Funèbre d'O'Connell, prononcée à Rome, par le R. P. Ventura, Théatin. New Orleans: 1847.

and eloquence by De La Mennais and his associates, after the French Revolution of July, 1830, in the brilliant columns of the *Avenir*.

We confess, in the outset, that any talk of an *alliance* of religion and therefore of the church with any thing outside of her, as necessary to her existence or her efficiency, scandalizes us not a little. The phrase itself offends us; for it is impossible to use it so that, to large numbers, at least, it shall not convey a false and mischievous meaning. We can readily believe, that, in Padre Ventura's mind, and in the minds of his Roman hearers and readers, it conveys, under existing circumstances, only a sense which is sound and worthy of all acceptation; but in France, in England, and in this country, it inevitably bears a meaning which it seems to us no good Catholic can accept, as may easily be gathered from the misconstructions which have almost universally been put upon the conduct of the Holy Father in the salutary reforms which he has introduced into his more immediate temporal dominions. The church we have been accustomed to regard as sufficient for herself, and as under no necessity, for her own preservation or efficiency, to make common cause with any power outside of her. Whatever is good and worthy to be sought she includes in herself; and we cannot understand what there is outside of her with which she can form an alliance, without proving herself in some measure unfaithful to her celestial Spouse. Her energy, the only energy she needs, which comes from him who said, *Ego vobiscum sum omnibus diebus*, appears to us to be fully equal to her necessities, and therefore the infusion of popular energy contended for we cannot but regard as quite superfluous.

Moreover, we are at some loss to understand what is meant by forming an *alliance* between religion and liberty. To call for the forming of such an alliance seems to us to imply, what is not true, that religion has heretofore been divorced from liberty, and has remained alone, or formed an adulterous union with tyranny and oppression. An alliance presupposes, also, that the allies are separate and independent powers; but we are not aware of any such power as liberty, separate from religion, and independent of it. Religion is the origin, ground, and condition of liberty. Where religion is, there is liberty; where religion is not, whatever of license there may be, there is not liberty, and cannot be. The two are in their nature inseparable, and

indistinguishable even, save as the effect is distinguishable from the cause, the property from the essence, the stream from the fountain. How, then, form an alliance between them, since they are already in their very nature so intimately united? How form an alliance between the sun and its rays, or the rainbow and its tints?

That there has been, and is, a party throughout most European nations clamoring for liberty as separated from religion, we are not ignorant; but they clamor for what has and can have no real existence, under that sacred name. That this party has made and still makes war on the church, that it has believed and still believes, or pretends to believe, that the church is the enemy of liberty, and that to become free it is necessary to overturn the altar as well as the throne, is lamentably true; but who that loves religion, and is imbued with the lessons of the Gospel, can advocate an alliance of the church with these, or pretend that to accept and support, not, indeed, their means, but the end they are really seeking, would be to accept and support the cause of liberty? That which the enemies of the church, the desecrators of all holy things, and the blasphemers of God clamor for, is not liberty, and can by no ecclesiastical alchemy be transmuted into liberty. There is with these not merely a mistake as to the means, agencies, or influences by which the end is to be gained, but a mistake as to the end itself. With what in them is religion to form an alliance? Or what energy have they from which she could profit?

Perhaps, however, we take the word *liberty* in too refined a sense, in a sense too metaphysical or too spiritual; perhaps Padre Ventura uses the word in a more outward sense, and means by it simply popular institutions. There is throughout the greater part of Europe a deep disaffection on the part of the people towards their civil rulers, a demand for change, and especially for the introduction and establishment of popular forms of government, as the only efficient means of protecting themselves against the oppressions of their governors, and of securing their social well-being. Does the eloquent and enthusiastic Theatine mean by the policy he contends for, that the church should refuse to sustain the actual governments in their measures of repression, often essential to their very existence, side with the populations, and encourage and direct the movements for the realization of the end they are seeking?

This, we own, has a specious appearance and a plausible

sound, but, republicans as we are, we are not prepared to accept it. We have here the same difficulty we began by suggesting. Where the end proposed is distinctly religious, and is sought from religious motives, the church may, undoubtedly, side with those who are seeking it, bless their efforts, and make common cause with them; for their cause is hers, and she does but use them for the accomplishment of her own purposes. But where the end is not itself distinctly religious, and is not referred to a distinctly religious end, —is not to secure the freedom and independence of the church, and to enable her to pursue freely, without let or hindrance, her divine mission of teaching, saving, succoring, and solacing mankind, but to procure a merely temporal or earthly good,—we see not how she can make common cause with those who are in pursuit of it, without implying that heaven makes a compact with earth. The church may, and assuredly does, promote men's earthly well-being, but never save as incidental to her promotion of their spiritual and eternal interests. The temporal follows the eternal, but does not precede it, and is not sought by it. "Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be *added* unto you," is the principle on which the church proceeds, and the invariable law which she prescribes to her children. The heavenly is gained only by being the direct and sole object of pursuit; but the earthly only by not being so sought, and, indeed, only by not being sought at all. "He that will save his life shall lose it, and he that will lose his life for my sake shall find it." We know no exceptions to this rule.

Now these European populations seeking popular forms of government are not seeking these as a religious end, nor, indeed, for a religious end; but solely with a view to their own social or temporal well-being. They have not in view the interests of religion; they are not disposed to struggle for the freedom and independence of the church, or to remove a single obstacle in the way of her fulfilling in them, or for them, her divine mission; they have in view only their own earthly interests. These they may,—in so far as they violate no law of God, omit no moral or religious duty,—no doubt, lawfully seek; but the church cannot, while they seek them only in reference to an earthly end, make common cause with them, without an abandonment of her own principle of action, and in some measure compromising her divine mission. Moreover, it is not a sound view to identify

even civil liberty with popular forms of government. Freedom is possible under any and every form of government; and so is tyranny. Republics can tyrannize and oppress as well as monarchies, and we see among ourselves, that, under the most democratic institutions on earth, three millions of the population out of twenty can be held in abject slavery. Wherever the government is wisely and justly administered, whatever its form, there is civil freedom, and wherever it is not so administered, there is not civil freedom; and the chances of a wise and just administration are not in proportion to the more or less popular form of the government, but to the more or less influence which religion has over the nation. Wherever the church is free, and is able to exert her legitimate influence, the government will be as wisely administered as with human frailty can be expected; but where she is not free, or where her influence is not exerted, there is and can be no guaranty of such administration, whatever the contrivances of statesmen, or in whose hands soever may be placed the reins of government.

As long as the European populations place their temporal well-being before their spiritual and eternal, not even the church can emancipate them, and secure them the blessings of civil liberty. Political changes will prove unavailing, and the evil which is now concentrated in the court would only be diffused through the mass, and for one tyrant give a hundred. No siding with the people, no consecration of their banner and blessing of their cause, will deliver them from oppression, unless they in themselves seek liberty, not for an earthly, but for a heavenly end,—unless they place the church first in their affections and obedience, and seek freedom for her sake, instead of their own.

Undoubtedly, if the church were to proclaim common cause with the movement for popular institutions, the great body of those who are seeking them would applaud her, and rally under her banner, because they could rally under hers without deserting their own. She and they would certainly come together; not by their going to her, but by her coming to them. They would, no doubt, hail her as a welcome ally, and drink many a toast to her health, so long as she claimed to be *only* an ally; but the moment she should seek to restrain their lawlessness, to compel them to observe discipline, or claim the right to command their forces, they would raise the cry, *À bas l'Église, vive la République!* and she would find herself under the disadvantage of seeming to them

to oppose the very cause she had sanctified and the very banner she had blessed. The alliance would secure her an infusion of popular energy, while she obeyed the popular passion, and exerted herself only to carry out the popular will; but no longer. For a moment, she would seem to be strengthened by the alliance; but having by it made a concession to the people, and told them that they were justifiable in their cause. she would in reality only be weakened by it.

But it is said, the populations have become hostile to the church in consequence of their belief that she is unfriendly to civil liberty, and unless she espouses the cause they have so much at heart, they will neither submit nor listen to her. There may be some truth in this, but we cannot accept the conclusion, that therefore she must disabuse them by espousing that cause. An astute politician in old pagan times might have reasoned with equal justice.—The bulk of the pagan people believe the church is opposed to what they hold to be religion, and will not submit or listen to her teaching; it is necessary, therefore, that she disabuse them by offering incense to the idols. No matter whether the idol be Jupiter, Venus, or civil liberty, an alliance with its worship is alike inadmissible. It is not for those without to propose conditions to the church, nor is it for her to make concessions to them. She proposes the conditions; if we abuse our free-will and reject them, and destroy our own souls, the responsibility rests on us, not on her.

It is, undoubtedly, desirable to disabuse the populations of their error; but it cannot be done in the way proposed. The church cannot, in order to disabuse them, consent to take the law from them. The policy recommended would procure, not their submission to her, but hers to them. They who submit to the church for the sake of any temporal good do not submit to her at all, nor do they become in reality any more or better Catholics than they were before. The European populations, to a considerable extent, no doubt, place the melioration of society and the establishment of political liberty before every other object. But this is a grave error on their part,—an error to be corrected, not sanctioned. For the church to make common cause with them were only to confirm them in it. Nay, this very error is one of the chief obstacles to the realization of the social improvement and civil liberty they demand. Their eagerness overleaps itself, and fails of its aim. The church can do nothing for them, save in proportion as she is able to

disabuse them of this error, and bring them to place God and heaven before all things else. As long as they entertain their present false view, the church cannot rely on them,—cannot work with them, without falling herself into error,—and they are out of the condition of either effecting or receiving their emancipation. The church can really aid only those who love and obey her,—submit themselves to her instructions and authority.

Padre Ventura appears to hold that the evil in the present dispositions of the European populations is, not in their overweening attachment to a merely temporal good, but in their mistake as to the methods of gaining it. He approves the end aimed at, and only dreads the attempt to obtain it without religion, and by violence. The error of Jacobinism was, then, it would seem, not inherent in itself, but in its attempt to gain its object under the banner of philosophism, and by war and bloodshed. But we are inclined to believe that Jacobinism could not march under any other banner, or reach its end by any other means. It would, we must believe, be the same thing, though divested of its red cap and sea-green coat, and decked out in the drab-colored suit and broad-brimmed hat of the Quaker. It is not alone the horrors of the revolution that are to be dreaded, but also the revolutionary spirit; for if the spirit itself be fostered, the horrors sooner or later will inevitably follow. We have never heard of a *peaceful* subversion of an old government, and institution of a new one in its place. "Peaceful agitation" may suffice to carry a specific measure, when nothing is necessary for carrying it but to collect and concentrate the scattered rays of opinion already existing; but it will prove impotent, where fundamental or organic changes are demanded, unless backed by a threat of force in the last resort; and even then rarely, if ever, without an actual collision of forces. A whole people, wrought up by agitators to the highest pitch of enthusiasm for political changes, will soon begin, let leaders and chiefs say what they will, to sharpen their pikes, if obliged to wait longer than their impatience judges to be necessary. It is too late to think of controlling a people when once so wrought up, and if so wrought up for an object which is merely temporal, in vain will you talk to them of God and religion. Not in the moment of passion or debauch does the voice of the preacher reach the heart, and startle the conscience from its slumber. None but a religious people can be controlled by religious motives; and

no truly religious people can be wrought up to a pitch of enthusiasm for a temporal object adequate to the purpose of the *peaceful*, any more than of the *violent*, revolutionist. Whenever, then, you agitate for civil liberty as such, prepare to fail, or prepare for the horrors of rebellion and bloodshed, the reign of terror, ay, and the military despotism which is to supplant it.

Finally, we cannot understand how the church can raise the banner of democracy, and call upon the faithful to rally under it. She prescribes no particular form of government; in her view, all forms of government, when and where legitimately established or legally existing, are alike sacred and obligatory. She commands the administrators of governments, whether they be kings, nobles, or the people, to administer the government wisely and justly, in subjection to the law of God, for the public good. This is as far as she ever goes. How, then, can she side with the people in their movements for popular forms of government? Is she to change her policy, pursued without deviation for eighteen hundred years, and at this late day propose a particular form of government as an article of faith? Or because kings now are tyrants, is she to preach up democracy, and when democracy becomes a tyrant, to be obliged to preach up monarchy? There is in the demand, it strikes us, quite too much of short-sighted human policy, pursuing a course to-day which it must retrace to-morrow, or which seeks to gain a temporary object at the expense of an eternal principle.

But if we oppose the policy which seems to us to be recommended in the oration before us, it is not because we oppose liberty, or are the friends and apologists of the crowned tyrants or imbeciles of Europe. We have no sympathy with the policy of the principal European courts. That policy is opposed to the freedom and independence of the church, without which no people can be free, and no government wisely and justly administered. We abhor and detest it, because it is hostile to freedom of conscience, and would enchain the word of God,—because it would subject the spiritual to the temporal, and rob Almighty God of his own. Let there be a crusade preached against them in behalf of the freedom and independence of the church—let the populations be summoned to break the cords with which these infidel governments bind the Lord's anointed, and we will be first among the foremost to bind on the cross, and march

to the battlefield, to victory or immortality. In securing this, the highest of all liberties, and the source and guaranty of all liberty worthy of the name, the people would be emancipated from their tyrants, to the full extent compatible with human infirmity. Civil freedom would be secured for all. "If the Son make you free, you shall be free indeed." It is, therefore, the freedom of the Son, the freedom wherewith he makes free, that we should first of all—nay, alone—seek, and all other freedom shall be added thereto. Seek God alone, and you find what you seek, and, over and above all, the good you did not seek. Give all to God, and he gives all back to you in a hundred fold.

We wish the church to go as far against the governments of Europe as Padre Ventura does; but for her own emancipation, which includes every other emancipation. We would have her go, as she always does, to the extent of her power, for her own liberty; but not for liberalism, whether conspiring in secret with free-masons and carbonari, marching openly with Swiss radicals to the destruction of states and the desecration of temples, or assuming the Quaker garb of peaceful agitation. Then the end proposed would be distinctively religious, and the church might well consecrate the banner and bless the armies of the warriors enlisted; for they would be her own soldiers, her own sons, not foreign allies or mercenaries. In a work of this kind every Catholic could sympathize, and would give at least his prayers for its success.

We admire our great and good father Pius IX. for the administrative reforms he has introduced into the immediate patrimony of St. Peter; but we admire him still more for the free, bold, and commanding attitude which he assumes before the lay lords of the earth,—recalling the sainted Hildebrand, the heroic third Alexander, and the third Innocent, who made crowned heads feel and acknowledge that the church is paramount to the state, and that, when she speaks, kings as well as the meanest of their servants must bare the head and listen. Thanks, devout thanks, be to Almighty God, who has sent us a successor of St. Peter, that brings back the heroic ages, and, in face of an infidel, and scoffing, and time-serving generation, renews the chivalry of the cross, and speaks in the tone that becomes the vicegerent of God on earth! Let the faithful rally at his bidding; let them glory in his reassertion of the independence of the spiritual power, that as pontiff, as well as prince, he spurns

the dictation of the Austrian, the wiles of the Gaul, and the cajoleries of the Briton; let them support him by their prayers, and, if need be, by their deeds; and be assured that the tyranny which now weighs so heavily upon the European populations will be lightened, the chains which bind the souls of the toiling and starving millions will be broken, Christian civilization, so fatally interrupted by the Protestant rebellion in behalf of heathenism, will resume its march, and effect for man as full a measure of earthly well-being as it can be for his interest to possess.

In conclusion, we say, though we have criticised with some severity, Padre Ventura's oration, we have done so only in the sense in which we think his language likely to be understood here among our own countrymen. We are far from supposing that he has put forth any thing really unsound, as he himself understands it. He looks, as we question not, solely to the glory of religion, to the freedom and prosperity of the church. He finds the governments everywhere seeking to render the spiritual power the slave of the temporal, and he would defeat their efforts; he sees, also, the people everywhere bent on political reforms, and reforms, he would tell them, they may have, should have, only they must seek them in a peaceful manner, and from religion, and under her direction; and he believes that the church, by aiding the people in effecting those reforms, in emancipating them from the tyranny under which they groan, may emancipate herself from the secular power, and secure her freedom and independence. Therefore he would urge upon all Catholics who are afraid of revolutions not to oppose the popular movements, but to seek to bring them under the influence and direction of religion. This we suppose is his real thought, and this in the main is sound and just. We wish, however, that for our sakes here, where our greatest danger is from radicalism, from an exaggerated democracy, he had been a little more careful to mark the place of religion as that of sovereign, and not have presented her in the character of an ally. The error, in this view of his meaning, into which Padre Ventura falls, if he errs at all, is in supposing that popular governments will be more favorable to the freedom and independence of the church than are the existing governments of Europe. For ourselves, we have full confidence in the church; but we have as little in the intelligence and virtue of a people bent only upon the acquisition of temporal goods, as we have in infidel and li-

centious kings, and half mad and imbecile emperors. The government in the hands of the people, unless they are profoundly religious, will be hardly less hostile to the real freedom and independence of the church, than in the hands of royal tyrants and their minions. We have seen enough of popular governments to be aware that the people, as well as the king, need a master, and a master, too, that is under the special protection of Almighty God, and able at all times and in all places to command with divine authority.

SOCIALISM AND THE CHURCH.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1849.]

This handsomely printed volume, has been sent us "from the author," and we can do no less than acknowledge its reception. It is filled with the wild speculations and demoralizing theories hardly to be expected from "a Woman." In a literary point of view, it is beneath criticism, but it bears the marks of some reading, and even of hard, though ill-directed, thinking. Nature has treated the author liberally, and she will have much to answer for. The work could have proceeded only from a strong mind and a corrupt heart.

The work itself pertains to the socialistic school, and, substantially, to the Fourieristic section of that school. According to it, the human race began its career in ignorance and weakness, and established a false system of civilization. Modern society, dating from the fall of the western Roman Empire, has been engaged in a continual struggle to throw off that system, and to establish a true system in its place. It has been engaged, thus far, in the work of demolition, which it has finally terminated. It has prepared the ground for true civilization, and the human race now stand waiting, or did stand waiting on the first of January, 1848, the signal to introduce it, and to put an end for ever to all evils, moral, social, and physical.

* *England the Civilizer; her History developed in its Principles; with Reference to the Civilizational History of Modern Europe (America inclusive), and with a View to the Dénouement of the Difficulties of the Hour.* By a Woman. London: 1848.

The old civilization, now effete, committed the capital error of recognizing religion,—in the language of the author, *superstition*,—government, property, and "the ascendency of the male sex," or family,—for the family cannot subsist without that ascendency;—the new civilization will correct this error, and for religion substitute science; for government, federation; for law, instinct; for property, communal wealth; for family, love; and for the ascendency of the male sex, the administration of women. Consequently, the new civilization is to be a petticoat civilization, in which we must include the human race in those genera which are named after the female, as cows, geese, ducks, hens, &c.

Into the details of this new civilization, or the means by which it is to be introduced and preserved, we need not enter. Some things may be assumed to be settled; if not, the human race can settle nothing, and it is idle to examine the claims of a new theory. If any thing can be settled, it is that the man is the head of the woman,—that she is for him, not he for her; and that religion, government, family, property, are essential elements of all civilization. Without them man must sink below the savage, for in the lowest savage state we find, at least, some reminiscences of them. Any system which proposes their abolition or essential modification is by that fact alone condemned, and proved to deserve no examination. We do the socialists too much honor when we consent to hear and refute their dreams. We have not at this late day to resettle the basis of society, to seek for unknown truth in religion or politics, in relation to public or domestic, private or social life; we have no new discoveries to make, no important changes to introduce; and all that we need attempt is to ascertain the truth which has been known from the beginning, and to conform ourselves to it.

Nevertheless, the work before us is a pregnant sign of the times, and may afford food for much useful reflection to those prepared to digest it. People who attend to their own business, tread the routine their fathers trod, and attempt to discharge in peace and quiet the practical duties of their state, little suspect what is fermenting in the heated brains of this nineteenth century. They know next to nothing of what is going on around them. They look upon the doctrines contained in works like the one before us as the speculations of a few insane dreamers, and are sure that the good sense of mankind will prevent them from spreading,

and confine their mischief to the misguided individuals who put them forth. They regard them as too ridiculous, as too absurd, to be believed. They can do no harm, and we need not trouble our heads about them. This is certainly a plausible view of the subject, but, unhappily, there is nothing too ridiculous or too absurd to be believed, if demanded by the dominant spirit or sentiment of an age or country; for what is seen to be demanded by that spirit or sentiment never appears ridiculous or absurd to those who are under its influence.

Nothing, to a rightly instructed mind, is more ridiculous or absurd than the infidelity which so extensively prevailed in the last century, and which under another form prevails equally in this. Yet when the philosophy which necessarily implied it first made its appearance, few comparatively took the alarm, and even learned and sound churchmen were unable to persuade themselves that there was any serious danger to be apprehended. When the philosophers and literary men went further, and, developing that philosophy, actually made free with the Scriptures, and even the mysteries of faith, the majority of those who should have seen what was coming paid little attention to them, jested at the incipient incredulity with great good humor, felt sure that no considerable number of persons would proceed so far as to deny not only the church, but the very existence of God, and flattered themselves that the infidelity which was manifest would prove only a temporary fashion, a momentary caprice, which would soon become weary of itself, and evaporate. Nevertheless, all the while, the age was virtually infidel, and thousands of those who had persisted in believing there was no danger were themselves but shortly after driven into exile, or brought to the guillotine by its representatives. The same thing occurs now in regard to socialism. The great body of those who have faith and sound principles look upon it as the dream of a few isolated individuals, as undeserving a moment's attention, and think it a waste of time and breath even to caution the public against it. Yet in one form or other it has already taken possession of the age, has armed itself for battle, made the streets of Paris, Berlin, Frankfort, Vienna, and other cities, run with blood, and convulsed nearly the whole civilized world. It is organized all through Europe and the United States; scarcely a book, a tract, or a newspaper is issued from a constantly teeming press, that does not favor it, and there is

scarcely any thing else going that can raise a shout of applause from the people; and yet we are told, even by grave men, that it is a matter which need excite no apprehension.

Nor is this the worst aspect of the case. Not a few of those who shrink with horror from socialism, as drawn out and set forth by its avowed advocates, do themselves, unconsciously, adopt and defend the very principles of which it is only the logical development; nay, not only adopt and defend those principles, but denounce, as behind their age, as the enemies of the people, those who call them in question. Have we not ourselves been so denounced? If you doubt it, read the criticisms of *The Boston Pilot* on our review of Padre Ventura's *Oration*, or *The New York Commercial Advertiser's* notice of our censure of the Italian Liberals for their persecution of the Jesuits. Of course, these papers have no authority of their own, but they echo public opinion, and tell, as well as straws, which way the wind blows. If the public condemned in no measured terms the "horrible doctrines" we a few years since put forth in an *Essay on the Laboring Classes*, it has not condemned, but through some of its leading organs commended, an article on *The Distribution of Property*, published in *The North American Review* for July, 1848, the most conservative periodical, except our own, in the country,—which defends at length, and with more ability than we ordinarily expect in that Journal, the very principles from which we logically derived them. We hold now in utter detestation the doctrines of the Essay referred to and which raised a terrible clamor against us throughout the country; but we proved, in our defence, and no one has yet, to our knowledge, ventured to maintain the contrary, that those doctrines were only legitimate conclusions from the Protestant and democratic premises held by the great body of our countrymen, and by what they do and must regard as the more enlightened portion of mankind. In fact, a very common objection to us was, that we were ahead of the age, that is, drew the conclusions before the people were ready to receive them. We did but reason logically from the principles we had imbibed from public opinion, from general literature, and the practical teachings of those we had been accustomed from our childhood to hear mentioned with honor, and had been required to revere,—principles, which we had never heard questioned, and never thought of questioning, till we undertook to explain to ourselves the universal outcry which

had been raised against us. As we found our countrymen saying two and two, we thought we might innocently add, two and two *make four*, and complete the proposition. We were wrong, not in our logic, but in our principles. We had trusted the age; we had confided in its maxims, and received them as axioms. As the mists cleared away, as the gloss of novelty wore off, and the excitement of self-defence subsided, we saw the horrible nature of the doctrines we had put forth, and recoiled, not only from them, but from the principles of which they were the necessary logical development. But the age has not followed our example. The great body of the people continue to adhere to those principles, and will not suffer them to be questioned.

No doubt, the majority of numbers are as yet unprepared to adopt socialism as developed by Owen, Fourier, Saint-Simon, Cabet, Proudhon, or by "A Woman" in the work before us; but no man who has studied the age can, if he have any tolerable powers of generalization, doubt that socialistic principles are those now all but universally adopted. They are at the bottom of nearly all hearts, and at work in nearly all minds; and just in proportion as men acquire courage enough to say not only two and two, two and two, but that two and two *make four*, the age rushes to their practical realization,—accepts their logical developments, however horrible, however impious. There is an invincible logic in society which pushes it to the realization of the last consequences of its principles. In vain do moderate men cry out against carrying matters to extremes; in vain do practical men appeal to common sense; in vain do brave men rush before the movement and with their bodies attempt to interpose a barrier to its onward progress. Society no more—nay, less—than individuals recoils from the conclusions which follow logically from premises it holds to be sound and well established. It draws practically those conclusions, with a terrible earnestness, and a despotism that scorns every limitation. On it moves, heedless of what or of whom it may crush beneath the wheels of its ponderous car. Woe to him who seeks to stay its movement! Social evils grow as it advances, and these it lays to the charge of those who would hold it back, and result, it maintains, only from the fact that it has not yet reached its goal. The reform is not carried far enough. Put on more steam, carry it further, carry it further, is the loud cry it raises.

We see this in the Protestant reformation. The reformers

did not fulfil their promises, did not secure to the people the good they had led them to expect. Everybody saw this, everybody felt it; for everybody found himself distracted and unsatisfied. What was the inference drawn? That the reformers had erred in principle, and that the reformation could not secure the good promised? By no means. The people had accepted its principle. The reform, said they, is good, is just and true; but it has not been carried far enough; the reformers were only half reformed; they stopped short of the mark. The reform must not stop with Luther and Calvin; we must carry it further. This is what the children of the reformation said, as we all know; and they have been from the first struggling to carry it further and further, and have at length carried it to the borders, if not into the regions, of nihility. The evils remain, nay, every day increase, and each day a new party rises up in the bosom of the most advanced sect, and demands a further advance.

In the political world we see the same thing. Revolution has followed revolution, and no political reform goes far enough to satisfy its friends. In the last century, revolutions were *political*, and had for their object the establishment of political equality, or democracy. It was soon seen that political equality answers no purpose where there is *social* inequality. A writer, who could speak with as much authority on this subject as any of our contemporaries, thus expressed himself in 1841:—

"But democracy as a form of government, *political* democracy, as we call it, could not be the term of popular aspiration. Regarded in itself, without reference to any thing ulterior, it is no better than the aristocratic form of government, or even the monarchical. Universal suffrage and eligibility, the expression of perfect equality before the state, and which with us are nearly realized, unless viewed as means to an end, are not worth contending for. What avails it, that all men are equal before the state, if they must stop there? If under a democracy, aside from mere politics, men may be as unequal in their social condition as under other forms of government, wherein consist the boasted advantages of your democracy? Is all possible good summed up in suffrage and eligibility? Is the millennium realized, when every man may vote and be voted for? Yet this is all that political democracy, reduced to its simplest elements, proposes. Political democracy, then, can never satisfy the popular mind. This democracy is only one step—a necessary step—in its progress. Having realized equality before the state, the popular mind passes naturally to equality before society. It seeks and accepts *political* democ-

racy only as a means to *social* democracy; and it cannot fail to attempt to realize equality in men's social condition, when it has once realized equality in their political condition."—*The Boston Quarterly Review*, January, 1841, pp. 113, 114.

Political democracy leaves the principal social evils unredressed, and the causes which led the reform thus far remain in all their force to carry it still further. Hence we see in the present century the same party which in the last demanded political democracy attempting throughout nearly the whole civilized world a series of revolutions in favor of social democracy. The leaders in the late French revolution tell you that it was a social revolution they sought, and that it was this fact which distinguished it from the revolution of 1789. In Italy and Germany two revolutions are going on at once, a political revolution and a social revolution. Young Italy is socialistic; so is Young Germany; and it was its socialistic character that gave to the movement of Ronge and his associates its significance and its moderate success. The race, modern philosophers tell us, is progressive, and in a certain sense we concede it. It tends invariably to reach the end implied in the principles it adopts or the impulse it has received, and that tendency is never self-arrested. Its progress towards that end is irresistible; and when it happens to be downward, as at present, it is fearfully rapid, and becomes more fearfully rapid in proportion to the distance it descends.

The only possible remedy is, not declamation against the horrible results, the pernicious conclusions, at which the popular mind arrives,—the resource of weak men,—but the correction of the popular premises and recalling the people to sound first principles. Once concede that even political equality is a good, an object worth seeking, you must concede that social equality is also a good; and social equality is necessarily the annihilation of religion, government, property, and family. The same principle which would justify the Moderate Republicans of France in dethroning the king would justify M. Proudhon in making war on property, declaring every rich man a robber, and seeking to exterminate the *bourgeoisie*, as these have already exterminated the nobility. There is no stopping-place between legitimacy—whether monarchical or republican legitimacy—and the most ultra socialism. Once in the career of political reform,—we say *political*, not *administrative*, reform,—we are pledged to pursue it to its last results. We are miserable cowards,

or worse, if we shrink from the legitimate deductions from our own premises. There is not a meaner sin than the sin of inconsequence.—a sin against our own rational nature which distinguishes us from the mere animal world. If we adopt the socialistic premises, we must go on with the socialists in their career of destruction; nay, we shall be compelled to do so, or strew the battle-field with our dead bodies. If we recoil from the socialistic conclusions, we must re-examine our own premises, and reject distinctly, unreservedly, and heroically every socialistic principle we may have unwittingly adopted, every socialistic tendency we may have unintentionally cherished.

The people, it is well known, do not discriminate, do not perceive, until it is too late, the real nature and tendency of their principles. They mix up truth and falsehood, and can hardly ever be made to distinguish the one from the other. They adopt principles which appear to them sound and wholesome, and which under a certain aspect are so, and, unconscious of aiming at what is destructive, they place no confidence in any who tell them they expose themselves to danger. They see no connection between their principles and the conclusions against which we warn them, and which they at present, as well as we, perhaps view with horror; they therefore conclude that the connection we assert is purely imaginary, that we ourselves are deceived, or have some sinister purpose in asserting it; that we are wedded to the past, in love with old abuses, because, perhaps, we profit, or hope to profit, by them; that we do not understand our age, are narrow and contracted in our views, with no love or respect for the poorest and most numerous class. In a word, they set us down as rank conservatives or aristocrats. No age ever comprehends itself, and the people, following its dominant spirit, can never give an account of their own principles. They never trace them out to their last results, and are unable to follow the chain of reasoning by which horrible consequences are linked to premises which appear to them innocent. They never see whither they are going. Democratic philosophers themselves tell us as much, and defend their doctrine on the ground that the people are directed by divine instincts and obey a wisdom which is not their own. To this effect we may quote the writer already cited, and who, on this point, was among the more moderate of his class.

"Philosophy," he says, "is not needed by the masses; but they who

separate themselves from the masses, and who believe that the masses are entirely dependent on them for truth and virtue, need it, in order to bring them back and bind them again to universal Humanity. And they need it now, and in this country, perhaps, as much as ever. The world is filled with commotions. The masses are heaving and rolling, like a mighty river, swollen with recent rains, and snows dissolving on the mountains, onward to a distant and unknown ocean. There are those among us, who stand awe-struck, who stand amazed. What means this heaving and onward rolling? Whither tend these mighty masses of human beings? Will they sweep away every fixture, every house and barn, every mark of civilization? Where will they end? In what will they end? Shall we rush before them and attempt to stay their progress? Or shall we fall into their ranks and on with them to their goal? 'Fall into their ranks; be not afraid; be not startled; *a divine instinct guides and moves onward that heaving and rolling mass;* and lawless and destructive as it may seem to you, ye onlookers, it is normal and holy, pursuing a straight and harmless direction on to the union of Man with God.' So answers philosophy, and this is its glory. The friends of humanity need philosophy, as the means of legitimating the cause of the people, of proving that it is the right, and the duty, of every man to bind himself to that cause, and to maintain it in good report and in evil report, in life and in death. They need it, that they may prove to these conservatives, who are frightened almost out of their wits at the movements of the masses, and who are denouncing them in no measured terms, that these movements are from God, and that they who war against them are warring against truth, duty, God, and Humanity. They need it, that they may no longer be obliged to make apologies for their devotion to the masses, their democratic sympathies and tendencies. They who are persecuted for righteousness' sake, who are loaded with reproach for their fidelity to truth and duty, who are all but cast out of the pale of Humanity, because they see, love and pursue Humanity's true interests,—they need it, that they may comprehend the cause of the opposition they meet, forgive their enemies, silence the gainsayer and give to him that asks it a reason for the hope that is in them. The friends of progress, here and everywhere, need it, that, having vindicated, legitimated progress, as philosophers, they may go into the saloons, the universities, the halls of legislation, the pulpit, and abroad among the people, and preach it, with the dignity and the authority of the prophet."—*The Boston Quarterly Review*, January, 1838, pp. 104, 105.

It is necessary to take this ground, or give up democracy, which Mr. Bancroft defines "Eternal Justice ruling through the people," as wholly indefensible; for it cannot be denied that popular movements are blind, and that in them the people are borne onward whither they see not, and by

a force they comprehend not. Hence it is easy to understand, that, retaining in their memories traces of former instructions, they may recoil with horror from the last consequences of socialism, and yet be intent only on developing socialistic tendencies, and crushing all opposition to them.

Socialism is, moreover, presented in a form admirably adapted to deceive the people, and to secure their support. It comes in Christian guise, and seeks to express itself in the language of the Gospel. Men whom this age delights to honor have called our blessed Lord "the Father of Democracy," and not few or insignificant are those who tell us that he was "the first socialist." In this country, the late Dr. Channing took the lead in reducing the Gospel to socialism; and in France, the now fallen Abbé de La Mennais, condemned by Gregory XVI., of immortal memory, was the first, we believe, who labored to establish the identity of socialism and Christianity. We gave in another place, in 1840, a brief notice of his views on this point, which it may not be uninstructive to reproduce:

"The most remarkable feature in the Abbé de La Mennais's doctrine of liberty is its connection with religion. It is well known, that for some time the friends of freedom in Europe have been opposed to the church, and in general to all religion. The privileged orders have also taken great pains to make it widely believed, that religion requires the support of existing abuses, and that no one can contend for social meliorations without falling into infidelity. This has created a false issue, one which M. de La Mennais rejects. He has endeavored, and with signal success, to show that there is no discrepancy between religion and liberty; nay, more, that Christianity offers a solid foundation for the broadest freedom, and that, in order to be true to its spirit, its friends must labor with all their might to restore to the people their rights, and to correct all social abuses. He proves that all men are equal before God, and therefore equal one to another. All men have one Father, and are therefore brethren, and ought to treat one another as brothers. This is the Christian law. This law is violated, whenever distinction of races is recognized; whenever one man is clothed with authority over his equals; whenever one man, or a number of men, are invested with certain privileges, which are not shared equally by the whole. As this is the case everywhere, everywhere therefore is the Christian law violated. Everywhere therefore is there suffering, lamentation. The people everywhere groan and travail in pain, sighing to be delivered from their bondage into the glorious liberty of the sons of God. To this deliverance the people have a right. For it every Christian should con-

tend; and they wrong their brethren, deny Christianity, and blaspheme God, who oppose it.

"This is a new doctrine in France. It is something new since the days of the *philosophes*, to undertake to show that Christianity is the religion which favors not kings and privileged orders, but the people, the poor and needy, the wronged and downtrodden. Hitherto the few have made the many submit to the grievous burdens under which they groaned, by representing it as irreligious to attempt to remove them. They have enlisted the clergy on their side, and made religion, the very essence of which is justice and love, contribute to the support of oppression. They have deterred the pious from seeking to better their condition, by denouncing all who seek the melioration of society as infidels, But the abbé has put a stop to this unhallowed proceeding. He has nobly vindicated religion and the people. He has turned the tables upon the people's masters, and denounced their masters, not the people, as infidels. He has enlisted religion on the side of freedom; recalled that long-forgotten Gospel, which was glad tidings to the poor, and dared follow the example of Jesus, whom the common people heard gladly, and whom the people's masters crucified between two thieves. He speaks out for freedom, the broadest freedom, not in the tones of the infidel scoffer, but in the name of God, Christ, and man, and with the authority of a prophet. His 'Words of a Believer' has had no parallel since the days of Jeremiah. It is at once a prophecy, a curse, a hymn, fraught with deep, terrible, and joyful meaning. It is the doom of the tyrant, and the jubilee-shout of the oppressed. We know of no work in which the true spirit of Christianity is more faithfully represented. It proclaims, 'Blessed are the poor, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven;' and woe unto the rich oppressor, the royal spoiler, the Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites, who bind heavy burdens and lay them on men's shoulders, while they themselves will not move them with one of their fingers.'"—*The Boston Quarterly Review*, January, 1840, pp. 117–119.

It may not be amiss to place by the side of this bold commendation of the *Words of a Believer*, the judgment pronounced upon that book and its doctrines by the sovereign pontiff, in his encyclical Letter, dated June, 1834, which we find in the *Pièces Justificatives*, published by M. de La Mennais at the end of his volume entitled, *Affaires de Rome*, Bruxelles, 1837:

"Horruimus sane VV. FF., vel ex primo oculorum obtutu, auctorisque cæcitatem miserati intelleximus, quonam scientia prorumpat, quæ non secundum Deum sit, sed secundum mundi elementa. Enimvero contra fidem sua illa declaratione solemniter datam, captiosissimis ipse ut plurimum verborum, fictionumque involucris oppugnandam, evertendamque suscepit catholicam doctrinam, quam memoratis nostris lit-

teris,* tum de debita erga potestates subjectione, tum de arcenda a populis exitiosa *indifferentismi* contagione, deque frenis injiciendis evaganti opinionum sermonumque licentiæ, tum demum de damnanda omnimodo conscientiæ libertate, teterrimaque societatum, vel ex cujuscumque falsæ religionis cultoribus, in sacræ et publicæ rei perniciem conflatarum conspiratione, pro auctoritate humilitati nostræ tradita definivimus.

"Refugit sane animus ea perlegere, quibus ibidem auctor vinculum quodlibet fidelitatis subjectionisque erga principes disrumpere conatur, face undequaque perduellionis immissa qua publici ordinis clades, magistratuum contemptus, legum infractio grassetur, omniaque, et sacræ, et civilis potestatis elementa convellantur. Hinc novo et iniquo commento potestatem principum, veluti divinæ legi infestam, imo *opus peccati* et *Satanæ potestatem* in calumniæ portentum traducit, præsidibusque sacrorum easdem, ac imperantibus turpitudinis notas inurit ob criminum molitionumque fœdus, quo eos somniat inter se adversus populorum jura conjunctos. Neque tanto hoc ausu contentus omnigenam insuper opinionum, sermonum, conscientiæque libertatem obtrudit militibusque ad eam *a tyrannide*, ut ait, liberandam dimicaturis fausta omnia ac felicia comprecatur, cœtus ac consociationes furiali æstu ex universo qua patet Orbe advocat, et in tam nefaria consilia urgens atque instans compellit, ut eo etiam ex capite monita præscriptaque nostra proculcata ab ipso sentiamus.

"Piget cuncta hic recensere, quæ pessimo hoc impietatis et audaciæ fœtu ad divina humanaque omnia perturbanda congeruntur. Sed illud præsertim indignationem excitat, religionique plane intolerandum est, divinas præscriptiones tantis erroribus adserendis ab auctore afferri, et incautis venditari, eumque ad populos lege obedientiæ solvendos, perinde ac si a Deo missus et inspiratus esset, postquam in sacratissimo Trinitatis augustæ nomine præfatus est, Sacras Scripturas ubique obtendere, ipsarumque verba, quæ verba Dei sunt, ad prava hujusce modi deliramenta inculcanda callide audacterque detorquere, quo fidentius, uti inquiebat S. Bernardus, *pro luce tenebras offundat, et pro melle vel potius in melle venenum propinet, novum cudens populis Evangelium, aliudque ponens fundamentum præter id quod positum est.*

"Verum tantam hanc sanæ doctrinæ illatam perniciem silentio dissimulare ab eo vetamur, qui speculatores nos posuit in Israel, ut de errore illos moneamus, quos Auctor et consummator fidei Jesus nostræ curæ concredidit.

"Quare auditis nonnullis ex venerabilibus fratribus nostris S. R. E. cardinalibus, motu proprio, et ex certa scientia, deque Apostolicæ potestatis plenitudine memoratum librum, cui titulus: *Paroles d'un Croyant*, quo per impium Verbi Dei abusum populi corrumpuntur ad omnis ordinis publici vincula dissolvenda, ad utramque auctoritatem labefactandam, ad seditiones in imperiis, tumultus, rebellionesque excitandas,

* *Epistola Encyclica*, August. 15, 1832.

fovendas, roborandas, librum ideo propositiones respective falsas, calumniosas, temerarias, inducentes in anarchiam, contrarias Verbo Dei, impias, scandalosas, erroneas jam ab Ecclesia præsertim in Valdensibus, Wiclefitis, Hussitis, aliisque id generis hæreticis damnatas continentem, reprobamus, damnamus, ac pro reprobato et damnato in perpetuum haberi volumus, atque decernimus.

"Vestrum nunc erit, venerabiles Fratres, nostris hisce mandatis, quæ rei et sacræ et civilis salus et incolumitas, necessario efflagitat, omni contentioni obsecundare, ne scriptum istius modi e latebris ad exitium emissum eo fiat perniciosius, quo magis vesanæ novitatis libidini velificatur, et late ut cancer serpit in populis. Muneris vestri sit, urgere sanam de tanto hoc negotio doctrinam, vafritiamque novatorum patefacere, acriusque pro Christiani Gregis custodia vigilare, ut studium religionis, pietas actionum, pax publica floreant et augeantur feliciter. Id sane a vestra fide, et ab impensa vestra pro communi bono instantia fidenter sperimus, ut, eo juvante qui pater est luminum, gratulemur (dicimus cum S. Cypriano) *fuisse intellectum errorem, et retusum, et ideo prostratum, quia agnitum, atque detectum.*"

We hope the judgment of the Holy Father will weigh as much with our readers as that of the editor of *The Boston Quarterly Review*. We had for a time the unenviable honor of being ranked ourselves among those who attempted here and elsewhere to translate Christianity into socialism. There are, perhaps, yet living, persons who remember the zeal and perseverance with which we preached, in the name of the Gospel, the most damnable radicalism.

The general doctrine we asserted was not peculiar to us. We were never remarkable for our originality. We were remarkable, if for any thing, only for the care with which we studied the movement party of our times, seized its great principles, and abandoned ourselves to their direction. We accepted that party, and followed it, with a courage and perseverance worthy of a better cause. The views we put forth were those of our party. They were not peculiar to us then, and they are far less so now. During the last ten or twelve years they have made fearful progress, both at home and abroad. Affecting to be Christian, their advocates invoke the name of Jesus and appeal to the holy Scriptures, the texts of which, with a perverse ingenuity, they accommodate to their socialistic purpose. May Almighty God forgive us the share we had in propagating what we called the *Democracy of Christianity!* We have nothing to palliate our offence or to hide our shame; for, if we knew no better at the time, we might have known better, and our ignorance

was culpable. All we can say is, we followed the dominant sentiment of the age, which is a poor excuse for one who professed to be a preacher of the Gospel.

Veiling itself under Christian forms, attempting to distinguish between Christianity and the church, claiming for itself the authority and immense popularity of the Gospel, denouncing Christianity in the name of Christianity, discarding the Bible in the name of the Bible, and defying God in the name of God, socialism conceals from the undiscriminating multitude its true character, and, appealing to the dominant sentiment of the age and to some of our strongest natural inclinations and passions, it asserts itself with terrific power, and rolls on in its career of devastation and death with a force that human beings, in themselves, are impotent to resist. Men are assimilated to it by all the power of their own nature, and by all their reverence for religion. Their very faith and charity are perverted, and their noblest sympathies and their sublimest hopes are made subservient to their basest passions and their most grovelling propensities. Here is the secret of the strength of socialism, and here, is the principal source of its danger.

The open denial of Christianity is not now to be dreaded; the incredulity of the last century is now in bad taste, and can work only under disguise. All the particular heresies which human pride or human perversity could invent are now effete or unfashionable. Every article in the creed has been successively denied, and the work of denial can go no further. The attempt to found a new sect on the denial of any particular article of faith would now only cover its authors with ridicule. The age laughs at Protestantism, and scorns sectarism. The spirit that works in the children of disobedience must, therefore, affect to be Christian, more Christian than Christianity itself, and not only Christian, but *Catholic*. It can manifest itself now, and gain friends, only by acknowledging the church and all Catholic symbols, and substituting for the divine and heavenly sense in which they have hitherto been understood a human and earthly sense. Hence the religious character which socialism attempts to wear. It rejects in name no Catholic symbol; it only rejects the Catholic sense. If it finds fault with the actual church, it is because she is not truly Catholic, does not understand herself, does not comprehend the profound sense of her own doctrines, fails to seize and expound the true Christian idea as it lay in the mind of Jesus, and as this enlightened age is

prepared to receive it. The Christian symbol needs a new and a more Catholic interpretation, adapted to our stage in universal progress. Where the old interpretation uses the words God, church, and heaven, you must understand humanity, society, and earth; you will then have the true Christian idea, and bring the Gospel down to the order of nature and within the scope of human reason. But while you put the human and earthly sense upon the old Catholic words, be careful and retain the words themselves. By taking care to do this, you can secure the support of the adherents of Christianity, who, if they meet their old familiar terms, will not miss their old, familiar ideas; and thus you will be able to reconcile the old Catholic world and the new, and to go on with humanity in her triumphant progress through the ages.

Since it professes to be Christian, and really denies the faith, socialism is a heresy; and since by its interpretation it eviscerates the Catholic system of its entire meaning, it is the *résumé* of all the particular heresies which ever have been or can be. The ingenuity of men, aided by the great enemy of souls, can invent no further heresy. All possible heresies are here summed up and actualized in one universal heresy, on which the age is proceeding with all possible haste to erect a counterfeit Catholicity for the reception and worship of Antichrist as soon as he shall appear in person.

"Descend," says La Mennais, "to the bottom of things, and disengage from the wavering thoughts, vain and fleeting opinions, accidentally mingled with it, the powerful principle which, without interruption, ferments in the bosom of society, and what find you but Christianity itself? What is it the people wish, what is it they claim, with a perseverance that never tires, and an ardor that nothing can damp? Is it not the abolition of the reign of force, in order to substitute that of intelligence and right? Is it not the effective recognition and social realization of equality, inseparable from liberty, the necessary condition and essential form of which, in the organization of the state, is election, the first basis of the Christian community?

"What, again, do the people wish? What do they demand? The amelioration of the lot of the masses, everywhere so full of suffering; laws for the protection of labor, whence may result a more equitable distribution of the general wealth; that the few shall no longer exercise an exclusive influence for their own profit in the administration of the interests of all; that a legislation which has no bounds, the everlasting refuge of privilege, which it in vain attempts to disguise under lying names, shall no longer, on every side, drive the poor back into their misery; that the goods, destined by the Heavenly Father for all his children, shall become accessible to all; that human fraternity shall cease to be a

mockery, and a word without meaning. In short, suscitated by God to pronounce the final judgment upon the old social order, they have summoned it to appear, and recalling the ages which have crumbled away, they have said to it, 'I was hungry, and ye gave me not to eat; I was thirsty, and ye gave me not to drink; I was a stranger, and ye took me not in; naked, and ye clothed me not; sick and in prison, and ye did not visit me.' I interrogate you on the law. Respond. And the old social order is silent, for it has nothing to answer; and it raises its hand against the people whom God has appointed to judge it. But what can it do against the people, and against God? Its doom is registered on high, and it will not be able to efface it with the blood which, for a brief period, it is permitted to shed.

"We cannot, then, but recognize in what is passing under our eyes the action of *the Christian principle*, which, having for long ages presided almost exclusively over individual life, seeks now to produce itself under a more general and perfect form, to incarnate itself, so to speak, in social institutions,—the second phase of its development, of which only the first labor as yet appears. *Something instinctive and irresistible pushes the people in this direction.* The few have taken possession of the earth; they have taken possession of it by wresting from all others even the smallest part of the common heritage; and the people will that men live as brothers according to the divine commandment. They battle for justice and charity; they battle for the doctrine which Jesus Christ came to preach to the world, and which will save it in spite of the powers of the world."—*Affaires de Rome,* pp. 319-321.

This is as artful as it is bold. It wears a pious aspect, it has divine words on its lips, and almost unction in its speech. It is not easy for the unlearned to detect its fallacy, and the great body of the people are prepared to receive it as Christian truth. We cannot deny it without seeming to them to be warring against the true interests of society, and also against the Gospel of our Lord. Never was heresy more subtle, more adroit, better fitted for success. How skilfully it flatters the people! It is said, the saints shall judge the world. By the change of a word, the people are transformed into saints, and invested with the saintly character and office. How adroitly, too, it appeals to the people's envy and hatred of their superiors, and to their love of the world, without shocking their orthodoxy or wounding their piety! Surely Satan has here, in socialism, done his best, almost outdone himself, and would, if it were possible, deceive the very elect, so that no flesh should be saved.

What we have said will suffice to show the subtle and dangerous character of socialism, and how, although the

majority may recoil from it at present, if logically drawn out by its bolder and more consistent advocates, the age may nevertheless be really and thoroughly socialistic. We know that the age seeks with all its energy, as the greatest want of mankind, political and social reforms. Of this there is and can be no doubt. Analyze these reforms and the principles and motives which lead to them, which induce the people in our days to struggle for them, and you will find at the bottom of them all the assumption, that *our good lies in the natural order, and is not attainable by individual effort.* All we see, all we hear, all we read, from whatever quarter it comes, serves to prove that this is the deep and settled conviction of the age. If it were not, these revolutions in France, Italy, Germany, and elsewhere, would have no meaning, no principle, no aim, and would be as insignificant as drunken rows in the streets of our cities.

But the essence of socialism is in this very assumption, that our good lies in the natural order, and is unattainable by individual effort. Socialism bids us follow nature, instead of saying with the Gospel, Resist nature. Placing our good in the natural order, it necessarily restricts it to temporal goods, the only good the order of nature can give. For it, then, evil is to want temporal goods, and good is to possess them. But, in this sense, evil is not remediable or good attainable by individual effort. We depend on nature, which may resist us, and on the conduct of others, which escapes our control. Hence the necessity of social organization, in order to harmonize the interests of all with the interest of each, and to enable each by the union of all to compel nature to yield him up the good she has in store for him. But all men are equal before God, and, since he is just, he is equal in regard to all. Then all have equal rights,—an equal right to exemption from evil, and an equal right to the possession of good. Hence the social organization must be such as to avert equal evil from all, and to secure to each an equal share of temporal goods. Here is socialism in a nut-shell, following as a strictly logical consequence from the principles or assumptions which the age adopts, and on which it everywhere acts. The systems drawn out by Owen, Fourier, Saint-Simon, Cabet, Proudhon, or others, are mere attempts to realize socialism, and may or may not be ridiculous and absurd; but that is nothing to the purpose, if you concede their principle. These men have done the best they could, and you have no right to censure them, as long as you agree with them in principle, unless you propose something better.

Now we agree with La Mennais, that Christianity has a political and social character, and with the editor of *The Boston Quarterly Review*, that Christianity seeks the good of man in this life as well as in the life to come. We say with all our heart, "On the earth was he [our Lord] to found a new order of things, to bring round the blissful ages, and to give to renovated man a foretaste of heaven. It was here the millions were to be blessed with a heaven, as well as hereafter." No doubt of it. But *in* the new order and *by* it,—not out of it and independently of it. Out of the new order and independently of it, the millions are, to say the least, no better off than if it did not exist, and have no right to any portion of its blessings. The socialists, when they attempt to press Christianity into their service, are bad logicians. They are right when they tell us that our Lord came to found a new order of things, for he certainly did come for that purpose; they are right when they tell us that it is Christian to seek a heaven on earth for the millions, for there is a Christian heaven here for all men, if they choose to accept it; but when they say this, they are bound to add that this heaven is in the new order established, and is to be sought in it, and by obedience to its principles. It is Christian to seek that order of happiness which Christianity proposes, by the means which it prescribes; but to seek another order of happiness, and by other means, is not *therefore* necessarily Christian, and may even be antichristian. Here is the point they overlook, and which vitiates all their reasoning.

Let no one say that we allege that man must forego any good while in this world in order to gain heaven hereafter. It would be no great hardship, even if it were so; but our God deals much more liberally with us, and requires us to give up, in order to secure heaven hereafter, only what makes our misery here. The socialist is right in saying that there is good for us even in this world; his error lies in placing that good in the natural order, and in making it unattainable by individual effort. Our good lies not in the natural order, but in the supernatural order,—in that new order which our Lord came to establish. In that order there is all the good we can conceive, and attainable by simple voluntary efforts. Out of that order there is no good attainable either by the efforts of individuals or by association, because out of it there is no good at all. Temporal goods, giving to the term the fullest possible sense, are not good, and, sought for themselves, are productive only of evil. Here is the

first error of the socialists. No evil is removable, no good is attainable, as long as any earthly or merely natural end is held to be, for its own sake, a legitimate object of pursuit. There is and can be good for no one, here or hereafter, save in seeking, *exclusively*, the end for which Almighty God has intended us, and by the means and in the way he himself has appointed. Now this end is neither in this world nor of this world, neither in nature nor of nature, and therefore can be gained, can be promoted, by no natural effort, by no natural means,—neither by political changes nor by social changes, neither by political democracy nor by social democracy. These things have and can have no necessary connection with it. It is a mistake, then, to regard them, in themselves, as ever in any degree desirable.

The socialists are right when they say that the Christian law is the law of liberty, but not therefore necessarily right when they term the movements of the people for what they call liberty Christian movements, originating in Christian principle. Undoubtedly, the Christian law is the law of liberty. Our Saviour came to free us from bondage, and whom he makes free is free indeed. In the order he establishes, our highest good, our only good, whether for time or eternity, is entirely independent of the world. Nothing in the universe can hinder us, against our will, from attaining to it. We have only to will it and it is ours, and we are always and everywhere free to will. No one depends on nature or other men for the power to fulfil his destiny,—to gain the end for which he was intended. Here is the Christian doctrine of liberty, the glorious liberty which our religion reveals, and which we know by divine faith is no deception. But the liberty the socialists commend, and which the people are seeking, is not Christian liberty, for it is not liberty at all. Socialism, by its very principle, enslaves us to nature and society, and subjects us to all the fluctuations of time and sense. According to it, man can attain to true good, can gain the end for which he was made, only in a certain political and social order, which it depends on the millions, whom the individual cannot control, to construct, and which, when constructed, may prove to be inconvenient and inadequate, and require to be pulled down and built up again. The individual, it teaches us, can make no advance towards his destiny but in proportion as he secures the coöperation of his race. All men must be brought down or brought up to the same level before he can go to the end for which his

God made him; each man's true good is unattainable, till all men are prepared to take "a pull, a strong pull, a long pull, and a pull altogether," to attain theirs! This is slavery, not liberty. Nay, it denies the possibility of liberty, and makes slavery the necessary condition of all men. Is not he a slave who is chained to nature for his good, or to a social organization which does not exist, and which depends on the wisdom, the folly, the passions or instincts, the whims or caprices of other men to create or to destroy? Who can deny it? He only is free, he only knows what freedom is, who tramples the world beneath his feet, who is independent of all the accidents of time and space, of all created beings, and who has but to will and all heaven is his, and remains his, though the entire universe fall in ruins around him.

Undoubtedly Christianity requires us to remove all evil, and in seeking to remove evil we follow the Christian principle; but what the socialists call evil, and the people in revolt are seeking to remove, is not evil. Nothing is evil but that which turns a man away from his end, or interposes a barrier to his advance towards it. Nothing but one's own sin can do that. Nothing, then, but sin is or can be evil, and that is evil only to him who commits it. Take all these things which socialists declaim against,—monarchy, aristocracy, inequalities of rank, inequalities of riches, poverty, want, distress, hunger, starvation even,—not one of them, in itself considered, is necessarily evil; not one of them, nor all of them combined, can harm the just man, or prevent, except by his own will, any one from the fulfilment of his destiny. If one is prepared to die, he may as well die in a hovel as a palace, of hunger as a fever. Nothing can harm us, that does not separate or tend to separate us from God. Nothing but our own internal malice can so separate us, and it is always in our power, through grace, which is never withheld, to remove that at will.

Undoubtedly, also, Christianity requires us to seek not only to remove evil, but to promote good, and good in this world. Good is the object of the will, and we are always to propose it. But the things the people in their insurrectionary movements are seeking after, and which socialists commend, are not necessarily good. As there is no evil to the just, so is there no good to the sinner, while he continues in his sinful state. If the socialists could secure to all men every thing they promise or dream of, they would secure them nothing to their advantage. Place every man at the

highest social level that you can conceive; give him the most finished education you can devise; lavish on him in profusion this world's goods; lodge him in the most splendid palace that genius can construct, furnished in the most tasteful and luxurious manner; let him be surrounded by the most beautiful scenes of nature and the choicest specimens of art; and let him have ample leisure and opportunity for travel, for social intercourse, and for the fullest and most harmonious development of all his natural faculties;—you advance him not the millionth part of a hair's-breadth towards his destiny, avert from him no evil, secure him no conceivable good. It will be no consolation to the damned to recollect, that, while here, they were clothed in purple and fine linen, and fared sumptuously every day; and your rich men, your great and renowned men, your fine gentlemen and ladies, with their polished manners and fashionable dresses, their soft complexions and gentle speech, your accomplished artists, your brilliant poets, your eloquent orators, your learned scholars, your profound and subtile philosophers, as well as coarse artisans, ragged beggars, cross-grained old hags, and country bumpkins, will be damned, eternally damned, if they die without the grace of God; and that grace is as likely to find its way to the hovel as to the palace, to dwell beneath the beggar's gabardine as the embroidered mantle of the rich and refined. The bulk of the strong-minded and thrifty citizens of this republic, with all their political franchises, social advantages, universities, academies, common schools, meeting-houses, external decorum, and material prosperity, are infinitely more destitute than those Neapolitan lazzaroni whose lot they deplore, and are in no rational sense one whit better off than the miserable miners and degraded populace of Great Britain. Their possessions will add nothing to the fulness of their joy, if, by a miracle of mercy, they gain heaven, and will only render fiercer the flames of their torment, if they are doomed to hell, as they have every reason to fear will be the case.

The socialists fall into the fallacy of passing, in their reasoning, from one species to another. Nothing they call evil is evil; nothing they call good is good; and hence, because Christianity commands us to remove evil and seek good, it does not follow that we must associate with the disaffected populations to bring about political and social reforms. All that is in any sense good or worth having the individual can always, under any political or social order, secure by a sim-

ple effort of his will. Forms of government and forms of social organization, then, are at best indifferent; socialism a folly, and socialists fools. The Creator is good, and Providence is wise and just. All external events take place by the express appointment of God. If, then, a single event were evil or the occasion of evil to a single individual, save through that individual's own fault, the goodness of the Creator would be denied, and the wisdom and justice of Providence could not be asserted. No doubt, there is evil in the world, far more heart-rending, far more terrific, than socialists depict, or even conceive; but to no man is there or can there be evil, but his own sin, which is purely his own creation. Since no man is obliged or compelled to sin, since sufficient grace is given unto every man to enable him to break off from sin and to become just, every man can, as far as himself is concerned, put an end to all evil, and secure all good, even the supreme good itself, at any moment he pleases. Nothing, then, is more idle than to pretend that political and social reforms,—touching the organization of the state or of society, we mean, not those which touch administration,—are or ever can be necessary as the condition of averting any evil or procuring any good.

We agree, as we have said, that our Lord came to found a new order of things,—new in relation to that which obtained among the heathen,—and that he contemplated the good of the millions here as well as hereafter; we agree, nay, we hold, that he did propose the amelioration of the lot of man even while in this world,—and not of one class only, but of all classes. But how? By his new order, or, irrespective of it, by merely calling upon the people themselves to do it through political and social organization? If you say the latter, you place him in the old order, and class him with the old heathen philosophers. If he asserts simply man's dependence on nature and social organization, he founds no new order, for this dependence was the precise basis of the old order. Mankind always had nature and social organization, and to tell them to look to these for their good was to tell them nothing new; for this was precisely what they had done, and were doing. The evil which oppressed the millions was in this very dependence, and what was needed was deliverance from it,—some method, so to speak, of attaining to our true good in spite of nature and of social organization. If, then, he retains that dependence, and does not provide this method, what has he done, or what can he do, which a hea-

then philosopher might not have done? and wherein is what you call the Christian order different from heathenism? You say, he came to found a new order for the amelioration of mankind; but how can you say this, if you are to look for the amelioration, which you say he authorizes you to seek, not from any new order, but from nature and social organization, which is precisely what the heathen themselves did?

If you say, on the other hand, as you must, if you assert the new order at all, that our Lord ameliorates the lot of mankind *by* his new order, then you must concede that it is only in and through that order that the amelioration is to be effected. Then you are to look for it only as you come into and conform to that order. Now, according to that order, the millions are to be blessed, are to find their true happiness, not in following nature, but in resisting it,—not in possessing temporal goods, but in renouncing them,—not in pride and luxury, but in humility, poverty, and mortification,—not in being solicitous for what we shall eat, or what we shall drink, or wherewith we shall be clothed, "for after all these things do the heathen seek" (St. Matt. vi. 31–34),—in a word, not in seeking any of these things, but in seeking first, that is, as the end of all seeking, the kingdom of God, and his justice, and then "all these things shall be added unto us." This is the order which our Lord has established. He gives us all needed grace to come into this order and to comply with all its demands, and, if we come in and so comply, he promises us all good, a hundred fold in this world, and everlasting life in the world to come.

Now, as you concede that our Lord came to establish a new order of things, and must concede, that if he blesses the millions at all, it must be in and by this new order, you are bound to admit that it is only by complying with its requisitions and placing ourselves under its influence, that our good in this world, as well as in the next, is attainable. Then all your efforts by political and social changes, which imply a recurrence to the old order, a reliance on the principles of the heathen world, can only remove you further and further from your true good. The only way to attain that good must be to begin by an act of renunciation, the renunciation of heathenism, of the world, of self, or, what is the same thing, an act of unconditional surrender of ourselves to God. This, if you admit Christianity at all, is the indispensable condition of all good. The heathen sought their good from nature and social organization, and found only evil. We are to seek

not even our own good, that is, for the simple reason that it is *our* good, but God himself, and God alone, and then we shall find our good in him who is the sovereign good itself. No doubt, this complete renunciation of self is any thing but pleasing to self; but we are never required to do it in our own strength. God always gives us grace to make it easy, if we will accept it. Moreover, we are required, in this, to do, at least, no more for God than he has done for us. We are required to give up all for him. But he gave up all for us. He made himself man, took upon himself the form of a servant, became poor, and obedient unto death, even unto the death of the cross for us; and can we not, therefore, give up ourselves for him, especially when what we give up it were an injury to us to hold back! If we give ourselves to him, he gives himself to us. He can give no more than himself, and can we ask or expect more than an infinite God can give? Here is the condition, and it is only, under the order God has established, by complying with this condition that there is good for us here or hereafter; and we know, also, that, by complying, all evil is removed, and all conceivable and more than all conceivable good is obtained. The true course to be taken, then, is perfectly plain, and may be taken without hesitation; for he who has promised is able to fulfil, and will keep his word.

Of course we do not pretend, that, by conforming to the Christian order, the political and social equality contended for will be obtained; we do not pretend that there will be no more pain, no more sorrow, no more poverty, no more hunger or thirst. These things will remain, no doubt, as facts; but we have shown that they are not necessarily evils, and that their removal is not necessarily a good. These things have their uses in this world, or they would not be suffered to exist. To the just they are mercies, salutary penance, or occasions of merit,—purging the soul from the stains of past transgressions, or giving it an occasion to rise to higher sanctity and a higher reward. To the sinner they may be the occasion of evil; but, if so, only because he does not receive them in a proper disposition, and because by his malice he refuses to profit by them. But even to him they are no more hurtful than their opposites,—often not so hurtful. By conforming to the Christian order, all so-called temporal evils, in so far as evil, are removed, and all so-called temporal goods, in so far as good, are secured; and this is all that can be asked.

But we are told, this is all, no doubt, very well, very true, very pious; but the age does not believe it, the people will not receive it. The people demand political and social reforms; and we must conform ourselves to their state of mind, or we can have no influence with them. Let the church sanction them in their movements for liberty, equality, and brotherhood, and then they will listen to her teaching, and profit by it.

If there is any truth in this, it proves what we have all along been endeavoring to establish,—that the age is socialistic, and that socialism is unchristian, nay, antichristian. Those, then, who urge the church to make an alliance with the people in their movements, to baptize socialism, and even give it Holy Communion, or who suppose they can without detriment to religion sympathize with these movements, we leave to defend themselves, as best they may. We have no skill to frame an apology for them, unless it be that they cherish the spirit of the age instead of the spirit of the church, which is only a condemnation.

But suppose the sanction involved no violation of principle, and suppose the church should make common cause with the so-called movement party, and enable it to effect the reforms it attempts,—what would be gained? These reforms, if effected, would content nobody, and a new series of reforms would be attempted, in their turn to be found equally unsatisfactory, and thus on *in infinitum*,—reforms giving birth to new reforms, bringing no relief, producing and perpetuating endless confusion, to the contentment, the satisfaction of nobody, but the archenemy of mankind.

The church is not of this world, and her principles are not those which govern the princes or the people of this world. She is the spouse of God in this world, the mother of the faithful, the teacher of truth, and the dispenser of the Bread of Life to all who will receive it. They who are nursed with the milk from her bosom, who receive the Bread of Life from her hands and eat thereof, shall never hunger or thirst, shall never die, but shall live for ever. All she asks of governments and social institutions is that they leave her free, that is, violate in their administration no law of God. If the people grow discontented with the material order they find existing, she expounds to them the law; if in violation of the law, as she expounds it, they still persevere, and introduce a new order, be it what it may, she does not desert them; she continues to present herself

in her divine character before them, and to discharge for them her sacred mission. She has truly a maternal heart, and seeks always and everywhere the true good of the people for time and for eternity; but she knows that Almighty God has made their good possible only on one condition, and therefore on that one condition she must insist. She explains it to the people, she exhorts and entreats them with divine tenderness to comply with it; but if they regard themselves as wiser than she, refuse to comply with the indispensable condition proposed, and will return to the old heathen order and seek their good from nature and human society, instead of seeking it from God and his church, she grieves over them as our Lord grieved over Jerusalem devoted to destruction, but she can do no more. Their sin is on their own head, and they must reap the fruit of their own sowing. Themselves they may destroy,—her they cannot harm.

Here the discussion of our subject properly closes; but we fear that without additional remarks we may be misapprehended. These are times of jealousy, suspicion, and great uncharitableness, when men's passions are inflamed, and their heads more than ordinarily confused. What we say on one subject we are in danger of having understood of another; and because we oppose certain popular tendencies, they who cherish them will allege that we are the enemies of the people, opposed to political and social amelioration, and solicitous only to maintain the reign of injustice and brute force,—than which nothing is or can be further from the truth. Because we assert that our good lies solely in the Christian order and is always and everywhere attainable at will, and therefore deny the necessity or the utility of political and social changes as a means of bettering our condition, the same persons will endeavor to bring us into conflict with the Holy Father, who, according to them, is a *liberal* pontiff, a sort of socialistic pope, opposed to monarchy, in favor of popular institutions, taking the side of the people against their rulers, and sanctioning the principle of their movements, by granting a constitutional government to his immediate temporal subjects. A few words to clear up this matter will not be unnecessary.

We have no occasion to make a profession of our respect for the papal authority; for our doctrine on that subject is well known. If that authority is in any instance against us, it is sufficient to convince us that we are wrong, and it is

against us in the present instance, if the view given of Pius IX. be the just one. But that view has no authority, except the childish fears of one party and the unhallowed wishes of another. Pius IX. is a noble-minded and generous-hearted man, an enlightened prince, an humble and devout Christian, an uncompromising Catholic, a tender and vigilant shepherd, the spiritual father of Christendom, the visible head of the church, the vicegerent of God on earth; and he can be no liberal, no socialist, no political and social reformer, in the sense of this age,—no prince to deserve the sympathy of a La Mennais or a Horace Greeley, any more than of a Ledru Rollin or a Proudhon. We know beforehand that he cannot sanction what we have presented as the principles and motives of the popular movements of the day; for the church in general council and through her sovereign pontiffs has repeatedly and unequivocally condemned them; and he himself has condemned them, in condemning *communism*, only another name for socialism, and in enjoining respect and obedience to princes,—as any one may see who will read the several Allocutions in which he has explained his policy.

No man has been more grossly misrepresented by pretended friends and real enemies than Pius IX. The admirers of the old order,—few in number, however,—alarmed at the magnitude of his proposed changes in the government and administration of his temporal dominions, perhaps offended because he did not ask or follow their advice, very naturally opposed him and sought to make him appear to be carried away by the spirit of the age, and pursuing a policy which must hurry the world into the abyss of radicalism; on the other hand, radicals, socialists, freemasons, and carbonari claimed him as one of themselves, because they wished to use the authority of his name and position to stir up the Catholic populations to rebellion, and to cover their own revolutionary and anarchical purposes. We share neither in the alarm of the former nor in the wish of the latter. We form our judgment of Pius IX. neither from Greeley's *Tribune*, nor from the Roman correspondence of the London *Morning News;* but from well-known Catholic principles, his obvious position, and his own official documents. Interpreted by these, he has only followed, with singular fidelity and firmness, the policy uniformly pursued by his predecessors.

As to his having sanctioned the principles and motives of

the popular movements of the day, there is nothing in it. The thing, *in hac providentia*, is simply impossible. The church, it is certain and undeniable, is wedded to no particular form of government, or of social organization. She stakes her existence neither on imperialism nor on feudalism, neither on monarchy nor on democracy. To no one or other of them does she commit herself, and she declares each of them to be a legitimate form of government when and where it exists with no legal claimant against it. But the principle of these movements is exclusive democracy ;— not that democracy is a legitimate form of government, which is true ; not that in these times, the views of the age being what they are, it is, with some restrictions, the best form of government, which may not be false ; but that the democratic is the *only* legitimate form of government, that all other forms are illegitimate, usurpations, tyrannies, to which the people owe no allegiance, and which they may, when they please, or believe it will be for their interest, conspire to overthrow. This is the principle implied in these movements, and which the liberals pretend that Pius IX. has sanctioned. But he has done no such thing. The church cannot accept this principle, because it would bind her to democracy, as her enemies a few years ago alleged that she was bound to monarchy, and compel her to declare all other forms of government illegal, and their acts null and void from the beginning. It would erect democracy into a dogma of faith. If the people now establishing democracies should hereafter become tired of them, and wish to re-establish monarchy,—not an impossible supposition,—they would be obliged to renounce their religion before they could do it. The church could make no concession to them, and would be compelled by the invariable nature of faith, to command them to return to democracy, on pain of losing their souls. She would then not only be herself enslaved to democracy, but would be obliged to enslave the people to it also, and to prohibit them under any circumstances and in every country from ever adopting any other form, how much soever they might desire it. Forms of government, like all things human, are changeable, and it is impossible to keep the people always and everywhere satisfied with any one form. What more unreasonable and more impolitic, then, than to bind them by religion always and everywhere to one and the same specific form ?

We are opposing, we are advocating, no particular form

of government. In themselves considered, forms of government are matters of indifference. The wise and just administration of government is always a matter of moment, —the form, abstractly considered, never. Man's true good is as attainable under one form of government or social organization as another; for it is obtained, if obtained at all, from a source wholly independent of the temporal order. That good the church does and must seek, and its necessary condition is true liberty. To assume, as these social movements do, that this liberty is possible only under a given form of government and social organization would be to maintain that the church can discharge her mission only where that particular form of government and social organization exists. The first thing her missionaries to a country where that form does not exist must attempt would then be to revolutionize the state and reorganize society. The American people, to a very considerable extent, suppose this to be the fact; and, supposing monarchy to be the favorite form, maintain that the spread of Catholicity here must essentially destroy our popular form of government, and introduce forms similar to those which the people in the Old World are now laboring to throw off. Substitute democracy for monarchy, and the doctrine we oppose is precisely that which our adversaries allege against us. Are we to adopt it? Are we to believe that Pius IX. adopts it, and requires us to understand that all but democratic nations are out of the way of salvation, placed out of the condition of attaining to any good here or hereafter?

Since we hold that forms of government are indifferent, that there is evil only in sin, and that our good comes exclusively from the Christian order, we deny the necessity of political and social changes; and since to seek our good from them is to seek it from the temporal order instead of the spiritual, which is in principle a rejection of Christianity and a return to heathenism, we censure them. But the minds of the people may be perverted and their hearts corrupted, and we, in consequence, unable to make them see where their true good lies, or to induce them even to give us their attention while we point it out to them. They may be intent on certain political changes, mad for them, and have ears, eyes, hearts, and hands, for nothing else. We may condemn their state of mind, the moral disposition in which we find them, but it is a fact we have to meet and deal with as a fact. In such cases, if the concession of the

changes demanded involves no departure from faith or morals, it is wise to make it; in some sense, necessary, as a means of removing the *prohibens*, as we use logic with an unbeliever in order to remove the obstacles he finds in his mind to the reception of the faith. When political or social changes for this purpose become necessary, it is never the part of wisdom to resist them; authority should always be free to concede them; and that it may be is one reason why it cannot and should not be bound to any particular form of government or social organization.

Pius IX. has evidently acted on the principle we here commend. He found, on his accession to the pontifical throne, his own immediate temporal subjects and the European populations generally mad for popular institutions, and not to be satisfied with any thing else. They were ripe for revolt, and prepared to attempt the acquisition of popular government in some form, at all hazard,—if necessary, by insurrection, violent and bloody revolution. They had lost all respect for their rulers, and would listen no longer to the voice of their pastors,—would listen to nothing, in fact, that was opposed to their dominant passion. What was to be done? There were but two alternatives possible. Authority must either repress them by the strong arm of physical force, or attempt to tranquillize them and save them from civil war and anarchy by the concession of popular institutions. The former had been adopted, had been tried, was in actual operation, and it alienated still more and more the hearts of the people from their sovereigns, and from the church, in consequence of her supposed sympathy with monarchy. Nothing was left that could be tried with much hope of a favorable issue, but the latter alternative. Pius IX. saw this,—indeed, most statesmen saw it, and, anxious for the peace and order of his dominions, and to remove from the minds of all whatever accidental obstacles there might be to their listening to the lessons of religion, he resolved to adopt it; and accordingly proceeded to give his subjects a constitutional government, and, by his example at least, recommended to the European sovereigns to do as much for theirs, and to do it cheerfully, ungrudgingly, and in good faith. The policy came, indeed, too late to effect all the good that was hoped, and to avert all the evil that was threatened; yet that, under the circumstances, it was wise and prudent, nay, even necessary, there really seems to us no room to doubt. We may have regretted the circum-

stances which called for it, but we have never for a moment doubted, or thought of doubting, its wisdom or its necessity, although from the first we apprehended the consequences which have followed, and that it would hasten the outbreak of the European populations, which we knew the ill-disposed were preparing; and we have never believed its effect in pacifying the excited multitudes would be as great as some of our friends, whose confidence in the people is greater than ours, expected it would be.

The adoption of this policy, the policy of concession to the exigencies of the times, implies no sanction by the Holy Father of the principles and motives of those popular movements and demands which made it necessary or advisable, nor of the political and social changes we have spoken against. We have been addressing the people and endeavoring to show them what is proper for them to seek, not attempting to point out to authority what it should do; for we have no vocation to instruct authority in its duties. We are of the people, and we only point out what our religion enjoins upon them and us. It may be very just, very wise, nay, very necessary, at times, for authority to concede what it is very wrong, very foolish, on the part of the people to demand. The children of Israel, in the time of Samuel, afford us a case in point. They demanded of the Lord a king, that they might be like other nations. The Lord rebuked them, told them they knew not what they asked, and unrolled before them the oppressions to which a compliance with their request would subject them. Nevertheless, he complied with it, and gave them a king. The question before Pius IX. was not the question we have been discussing. The movements existed, the people demanded popular institutions, and were resolved, come what might, to attempt them. The simple question for him was, How shall this state of things be treated? He said to the princes in answer, "Give the people what they ask." This he was free to do, because the church is wedded to no political or social order, to monarchy no more than to democracy, is as independent of the throne as of the tribune, and can be as much at home in a republic as anywhere else.

What is to be the result of the movements of the day we know not. The old monarchies may be swept away, or they may partially recover, and linger on for ages to come; but that does not disturb us. Old imperial Rome and old Roman civilization were broken down by the irruption of the

northern barbarians, and the world was deluged with barbarism, but the church remained standing, and did not become barbarian; the feudalism of the middle ages, a system, as somebody has said, too perfect for its time, fell beneath the combined attacks of kings and people, but the church survived, and beheld undismayed its funeral pile; modern monarchy may follow, and all the world become democratic, still the church will survive, and remain in all her integrity, shorn of none of her glory, and deprived of none of her resources. Over no changes of this sort do we weep. We have no fears for the church; we fear only for men. If we saw the people making war on the old political system in consequence of its wars on religion, and struggling for popular institutions in order to rescue the church from her bondage, and to secure her an open field and fair play for the future, we should hear the volleys of musketry and the roar of cannon, and witness the charge, the siege and sack of cities, with tolerable composure; for then the war would be one of vengeance on the old governments for the insults they have offered to the immaculate spouse of God, and for the freedom of worship, the only war in which real glory ever is or can be acquired. But, alas! we see nothing of all this. These enraged populations are moved by no regard for religion, they are to a fearful extent the bitter enemies of religious freedom, and governed by a malignant hatred of the church. They are seeking only an earthly end, and they loathe the Christian order. Here is the source of our anxiety, the ground of our fears,—not for the church, not for ourselves, but for them. They threaten to be more violent enemies to religion than any kings have been since the persecuting emperors of pagan Rome; and the conduct of the Swiss radicals, the imprisonment of the noble bishop of Lausanne and Geneva in the Castle of Chillon, and the persecution of the children of St. Alphonsus by the people of Vienna, reveal but too plainly the spirit which animates them, and tell us but too distinctly what, at least for a time, we are to expect from the triumph of the popular party. Nevertheless, a wise and just Providence rules, and these things are permitted only as mercies or judgments upon the nations. It is ours to humble ourselves and adore; and always have we this consolation, that no evil can befall us against our will, and that always and everywhere may we secure every good by unreserved submission to God in his church.

HISTORICAL LIBRARY OF THE CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF PITTSBURG, PA.

AUTHORITY AND LIBERTY. *

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1849.]

A CRITIC in this city expresses surprise that this book could have been written by a young man born and brought up in Kentucky; but we see no reason why it could not have been written by a young man as well as by an old man, and in Kentucky as well as in any other part of the Union. We suppose they read and think in Kentucky as well as in Massachusetts; and it is not more strange that a young Kentuckian than that a Bostonian should expend a good deal of thought in elaborating a system compounded of truth and falsehood, common-place and crude speculation. The book certainly indicates some natural and acquired ability, but no ability peculiar to either side of the Alleghanies. The substance of it may be read any day in Schlegel, Carlyle, Macaulay, Guizot, Bancroft, and *The Boston Quarterly Review*. We have discovered nothing new or striking in the views it sets forth, or if now and then something we never met with before, it is usually something we have no desire to meet with again.

The author tells us, in his brief *advertisement*, "that it may seem presumptuous for a young backwoodsman . . . . to enter the lists with Schlegel, Guizot, and Macaulay." We think it not only may *seem* so, but that it actually *is* so; for Schlegel and Guizot—to say nothing of Macaulay—are at least men of varied and profound erudition. They are scholars, and have not derived their learning at second or third hand. Mr. Nourse may rival, nay, surpass them, in his ambition and self-confidence; but he must live long, and enjoy advantages of study which neither Kentucky nor Massachusetts affords, before he rivals them in any thing else, or can do much else than travesty them. Not that we regard either of them as a safe guide. Guizot is eclectic and humanitarian; and Schlegel is too mystical, and too ambitious to reduce within a theory matters which by their very nature transcend any theory the human mind can form or comprehend. Mr. Nourse has, if you will, extraordinary natural

* *Remarks on the Past, and its Legacies to American Society.* By J. D. NOURSE, Louisville (Ky.): 1847.

abilities, an honest and ingenuous disposition; but he has not yet begun to master the present, far less the whole past. He has a vague recognition of religion, concedes some influence to Christianity in civilizing the world; but he is without faith, and has yet to learn the very rudiments of the Christian creed. We doubt, also, whether he is able to give even the outlines of a single historical period, or of a single people or institution, with sufficient accuracy to enable them to serve as the basis of a single sound induction. One should know the *facts* of history before proceeding to construct its *philosophy*. He will forgive us, therefore, if we tell him that we do regard him as not a little presumptuous in attempting a work for which he has in reality not a single qualification. He writes, indeed, with earnestness; his style, though somewhat cramped, and deficient in freedom and ease, is dignified, simple, clear, and terse, occasionally rich and beautiful; but this cannot atone for the general incorrectness of his statements, or the crudeness and unsoundness of his speculations.

With sound premises and freed from the prejudices of his education, we doubt not, Mr. Nourse might arrive at passable conclusions; but he is ruined by his love of theorizing, his false philosophy, and his unsound theology. He may have philanthropic impulses and generous sentiments; he may mean to be a Christian, and actually believe that he is a Christian believer; but, whether he knows it or not, the order of thought which he seeks to develop and propagate is neither more nor less than the old Alexandrian syncretism, as obtained through German mysticism, French eclecticism, and Boston transcendentalism. Radically considered, his system, if system it can be called, is the old Alexandrian system, which sprang up in the third century of our era, as the rival of the Christian Church, ascended the throne of the Cæsars with Julian the Apostate, and fled to Persia in the sixth century, when Justinian closed the last schools of philosophy at Athens. This system was an attempted fusion of all the particular forms of gentilism, moulded into a shape as nearly like Christianity as it might be, and intended to dispute with it the empire of the world. It borrowed largely from Christianity,—copied the forms of its hierarchy, and many of its dogmas; which has led some in more recent times, who never consult chronology, to charge the church with having herself copied her hierarchy, her ritual, and her principal doctrines from it. It made no direct war

on the Christian symbol; it simply denied or derided the source whence it was obtained, and the authority which Christian faith always presupposes. It called itself *Philosophy*, and its pretension was to raise philosophy to the dignity of religion, and to do by it what Christianity professes to do by faith and an external and supernaturally accredited revelation. It was, therefore, gentile rationalism, and, in fact, gentile rationalism carried to its last degree of perfection. It is this rationalism, met and refuted by the great fathers of the third, fourth, and fifth centuries, that lies at the bottom of our author's thought, and which he labors to reproduce with a zeal—we cannot say ability—not unworthy of a disciple of Plotinus, Proclus, and Porphyrius.

This should not surprise us. There is nothing new under the sun. The old gentile world exhausted human reason; and it is not possible, even with a full knowledge of all the church teaches, taking human reason alone as the basis of our system, to surpass the old Alexandrian syncretism, or Neoplatonism, as it is sometimes called. In constructing it, the human mind had present to it, as materials, all the labors and traditions of gentilism in all ages and nations, and also all the teachings and traditions of Jews and Christians, as well as of the Jewish and early Christian sects; and it was, from the point of view of rationalism, the *résumé* of the whole. It was the last word of heathendom. In it gentilism, collecting and combining all that was not the Christian Church, exerted all her forces and all her energies for a last desperate battle against the Nazarene, against the triumph of the cross. Catholicity or rationalism is, as every one knows or may know, the only alternative that remains to us since the preaching of the Gospel. Impossible, then, is it to depart from Catholicity without falling back on rationalism, and, if a little profound and consistent, upon Neoplatonism, as rationalism in its fulness and integrity. All heresies are simply attempts to return to this rationalism, and in it they find their complement, as may be historically as well as logically established. All your modern philosophies are regarded as profound and complete only as they approach it. Kant, Schelling, Hegel, Cousin, Leroux, De La Mennais, Hermes, Schleiermacher, Carlyle, Emerson, Parker, all belong to the Alexandrian school, and only reproduce, more or less successfully, its teachings, and to the best of their ability renew the war it waged against the Christian Church.

It is no objection to what we assert, that the sects and many of the modern philosophies retain some or even the greater part of the Christian dogmas. Neoplatonism did as much. We must not forget that Neoplatonism is subsequent to the Christian Church; that it took its rise in the school of Ammonius Saccas, in the beginning of the third century of our era; that it received its form and development from Plotinus, who flourished about the year of our Lord 260; and that it proposed itself as the rival rather than the antagonist of Christianity. Its aim was to satisfy the ever-recurring and indestructible religious wants of the human soul, without recognizing the Christian Church, or bowing to the authority of the Nazarene. It was not the Christian doctrines, abstracted from the Christian Church, and received as philosophy on the authority of reason or even private inspirations, instead of the authority of our Lord and his supernaturally commissioned teachers, that it opposed. It was willing to accept Christianity as a philosophy, or a part of philosophy; but not as a religion, far less as a religion complete in itself and excluding all others. Hence, it, as well as the church, taught one supreme God existing as a trinity in unity, the immortality of the soul, the fall of man and the corruption of human nature, the necessity of redemption, self-denial and the practice of austere virtue; that we are bound to worship God, must live for him, and can attain to supreme felicity only in attaining to ineffable union with him. In the simple province of philosophy it was often profound and just. In many things it and Christianity ran parallel one with the other. Not unfrequently do the Alexandrian philosophers talk like Christian fathers, and Christian fathers talk like Alexandrian philosophers. There is Neoplatonism in St. Gregory Nazianzen, in St. Basil, and St. Augustine. The most renowned of the fathers studied in its schools, as distinguished doctors now study in the schools of the philosophers of France and Germany. But Neoplatonism was at bottom a philosophy, and whatever it held from Christianity, it held as philosophy, as resting on a human, not a divine basis. The philosophers transformed Christianity, so far as they accepted it, into a philosophy; while the fathers made Neoplatonism, so far as they did not reject it, subservient to Christianity, to the statement and explication of Christian theology to the human understanding, keeping it always within the province of reason, and never allowing it to be-

come the arbiter of the dogmas of faith, or to supersede or interfere with the divine authority on which alone they were to be meekly and submissively received. The fathers, therefore, were not less Christian for the philosophy they did not reject, nor the Alexandrians the less gentile rationalists for the Christian doctrines they borrowed. One may embrace, avowedly, all Christian doctrine, without approaching the Christian order, if, as Hermes proposed, he embraces it as philosophy, or on the authority of reason; for the Christian, to be a Christian believer, must believe God, and therefore Christianity, because it is his supernatural word, not because it is the word of human reason or human sentiment, as contend our modern liberal Christians.

It would be interesting to show historically the resemblance of the whole modern un-Catholic world to the old Alexandrian world represented by Plotinus, Jamblicus, Porphyrius, Proclus, and Julian the Apostate;—how each heresiarch and each modern philosopher only reproduces what the old Christian fathers fought against and defeated, —how every progress in this boasted age of progress only tends to bring us back to the system which the Gregories, the Basils, and their associates combated from the Christian pulpit and the episcopal chair; but we have neither the space nor the learning to do it as it should be done. Yet no one who has studied with tolerable care the learned gentilism of the third, fourth, and fifth centuries of our era, and is passably well acquainted with the modern rationalism of France and Germany, and the movements of the various heretical sects in our day, can doubt that our own nineteenth century is distinguished for its return to gentilism, and has nearly reproduced it under its most perfect form. The separate forms of heathenism had become effete; no one of them any longer satisfied the minds or the hearts of its adherents. An age of scepticism and indifference had intervened, attended by a licentiousness of manners and public and private corruption which threatened the universal dissolution of society. Individuals rose who saw it, and felt the necessity of a general reform, and that a general reform was impossible without religion. But they would not, on the one hand, accept the church, and could not, on the other, hope any thing from any of the old forms of heathenism. The world must have a religion, and could not get on without it. But how get a religion, when all religions were discarded, when all forms of religion were treated with general neglect or contempt?

The reformers saw that they must have a religion, and, since none existed which was satisfactory, none which was powerful enough to meet the exigency of the times, they must make one for themselves;—that is, form one to their purpose out of the old particular religions no longer heeded. Alexandria was their proper workshop, for there were collected or lying about in glorious confusion all the necessary materials. They began with the assumption, that all religions are at bottom equally true, and that the error of each is in its exclusiveness, in its claiming to be the whole of religion, and the only true religion. Take, then, the elements of each, mould them together into a complete and harmonious whole, and you will have the true religion, a religion which will meet the wants of all minds and hearts, rally the human race around it, and be "the church of the future." Hence arose the Alexandrian syncretism, combining in one systematic whole, as far as reason could combine them, all the known religions of the world, which, under the name of philosophy, but which became a veritable superstition, disputed the empire of the world with Christianity for full three hundred years.

What is the movement of our day, but an attempt of the same sort? By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the various forms of heresy, in which the Protestant spirit had developed itself, and which had attempted to reproduce gentilism without forfeiting their title to Christianity, had exhausted their moral force, and the age began to lapse again into the old license and corruption. Never in its worst days was there grosser immorality and corruption in the Roman Empire than prevailed in England during the earlier half of the last century, under the reigns of George I. and George II. Deism was rife in the court, in the schools, in the church, among the nobility and the people. Germany was hardly better, if so good; and of France under the regency of the profligate Duke of Orleans, or under Louis XV. with his *parc aux cerfs*, we need not speak. Literature was infidel throughout, and atheism became fashionable. To the rabid infidel propagandism, begun by the English deists, and carried on by Voltaire and his associates, under the motto *Écrasez l'infâme*, soon succeeded, as of old, profound scepticism and indifference. Neither false religion nor no religion could rouse the mind from the torpidity into which it sank. Exclusive heresy, or, as we may say, sectarianism, born from the Protestant reformation, though producing its

effects far beyond the limits of the so-called Protestant world, had caused all forms of religion, about the beginning of this century, to be treated as equally false and contemptible.

But, once more, individuals started up frightened at the prospect they beheld. They felt and owned the eternal truth, *Man cannot be an atheist.* They saw the necessity of a general reform, and that a general reform could be effected only by religion. But, disdaining the church as did the old Alexandrians, and seeing clearly that all the particular forms of Protestantism were worn out, they felt that they must have a new religion, and to have it they must either make it for themselves, or reconstruct it out of such materials as the old religions supplied. The principle on which they proceed is precisely the Alexandrian. To them all religions are equally true or equally false,—true as parts of a whole, false when regarded each as a whole in itself. Take, then, the several religions which have been and are, mould them into a complete, uniform, and systematic whole, and you will have what the editor of *The Boston Quarterly Review*, and Chevalier Bunsen after him, call "the church of the future," and Dr. Bushnell and his friends call "Comprehensive Christianity,"—what Saint-Simon denominated *Nouveau Christianisme*, and M. Victor Cousin brilliantly advocates under the name of eclecticism, borrowed avowedly from the Neoplatonists.

In perfect harmony with this, you see everywhere attempts to amalgamate sects, to form the un-Catholic world into one body, with a common creed, a common worship, and a common purpose. While the philosophers elaborate the basis of the union, statesmen and ministers attempt its practical realization. This is what we see in "Evangelical Alliances" and "World's Conventions," in the formation of "The Evangelical Church" in Prussia, and the union of Prussia and England in establishing the bishopric of Jerusalem. The aim is everywhere the same that it was with the Alexandrians, the principles of proceeding are the same, and the result, if obtained, must be similar. The movement of the un-Catholic world now, how much soever it may borrow from Christianity, however near it may approach the Catholic model, can be regarded, by those who understand it, only as a conscious or unconscious effort to reproduce the gentile rationalism of the old Alexandrian school.

The identity of the two movements might be established

even down to minute details. The most fanciful dreams of our transcendentalists may be found among the Alexandrians,—either with those who disavowed Christianity, or the sects, professing to retain it, allied to them. The very principle of transcendentalism, namely, an element or activity in the human soul above reason, by which man is placed in immediate communion with the divine mind, is nothing but the *Ecstasy* or *Trance* of the Neoplatonists, or their *fifth* source of science; and the Alexandrian theurgy and magic are reproduced in your Swedenborgianism and mesmerism. Moreover, the Protestant reformation itself not only involved as its legitimate consequence a return to the Alexandrian rationalism, but was in some measure the effect of such return. To be satisfied of this, we need but study the history of the revival of letters and the controversies of the schools in the fifteenth century. We say nothing of the revival in so far as it was simply a revival of classical antiquity under the relation of art, or beauty of form,—under which relation it was not censurable, but, relatively, perhaps a progress. Christian piety and learning can coexist with barbarism in taste, and want of elegance and polish of manners, but do not demand them. The revival, however, was, in fact, something more than this, and something far different from it. Those Greek scholars who escaped from Constantinople when it was taken by the Turks, and who spread themselves over western Europe, did not bring with them merely the poets, orators, and historians of ancient Greece, nor merely more complete editions of Plato and Aristotle; they brought with them Proclus and Plotinus, and the old Alexandrian rationalism, with its oriental comprehensiveness and its Greek subtilty. They made no attacks on the church,—they professed profound respect for Catholicity, and with eastern suppleness readily submitted to her authority; but they deposited in the minds and hearts of their disciples the germs of a system the rival of hers, which weakened their attachment to her doctrines, disgusted them with the barbarous Latin and *un-Greek* taste of her monks, and the rigid, sometimes frigid, scholasticism of her doctors. These germs were not slow in developing, and very soon gave us the Neoplatonists in philosophy, and the humanists in literature, of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The former destroyed the authority of the schoolmen; the latter, at the head of whom stood Erasmus, the Voltaire of his time, covered the clergy, especially the

monks, with ridicule, and sowed the seeds of practical, as the others had of speculative, infidelity. Combined or operating to the same end, they prepared, and, favored by the politics of the period, produced, the Protestant reformation. Not accidentally, then, has Protestantism from its birth manifested a gentile spirit, misrepresented and ridiculed every thing distinctively Christian, or that it is now undeniably developing in pure Alexandrian syncretism, gathering itself up as a grand and well-organized superstition to wage war once more on the old Alexandrian battle-ground, with the old Alexandrian forces and arms, against the Nazarene, or Galilean, as Julian the Apostate always terms our Lord. Was it by accident that Protestantism, wherever permitted to follow its instincts, began by pulling down, breaking, or defacing the CROSS, the sacred symbol of Christianity?

The identity of the modern movement with that which resulted in Alexandrian syncretism may be traced also in the pantheistic tendencies of the day. The Alexandrian school rejected none of the popular gods; it placed Apis and Jove, Isis and Hercules, and sometimes even Christ himself, in the same temple; but all under the shadow of the god Serapis, the symbol of unity, or rather of THE WHOLE, THE ALL, that is, of pure pantheism, in which all pure rationalism is sure to end. To what does all modern philosophy tend, but to pantheism? Have we not seen Spinoza in our own day rehabilitated, and commented upon as the greatest of modern philosophers? Cousin's eclecticism is undeniably pantheistic, and less cannot be said of Schellingism or Hegelism. Socialism, now so rife, is simply pantheism adapted to the apprehensions of the vulgar,—refined and voluptuous with the Fourierists and Saint-Simonians, coarse and revolting with the chartists and red-republicans.

But we are pursuing this line of remark beyond our original purpose. We may return to it hereafter. In the meantime we invite those who have the requisite leisure and learning to take up the subject, and consider the relation of all the ancient and modern sects to gentilism, the persistence of gentilism in Christian nations down to our own times, in spite of the anathemas of the church and the unwearied efforts of the Catholic clergy to exterminate it, and its all but avowed revival in our own day under the most comprehensive, scientific, erudite, subtile, and dangerous

form it has ever assumed. In doing this, great attention should be paid to chronology; for *the* gentilism with which it is the fashion among Protestants and unbelievers to compare Christianity, and from which it is pretended the church has largely borrowed, will be found to have been formed two centuries and a half after the birth of our Lord. The stupendous fabric, that systematic organization of gentilism, which we find in the time of Julian the Apostate, and which fell with him, was not the model copied by the church, but was itself modelled after the Christian hierarchy, and it is heathenism that has *Christianized*, not the church that has *heathenized*. The Platonism of modern times, whether on the Continent or in England, is not the Platonism of Plato, but of the Alexandrians, as every one knows who has studied Plato himself in his own inimitable Dialogues, not merely in the speculations of Plotinus, or the commentaries of Proclus.

That our author, born and brought up in the Protestant world, and formed by its gentile spirit and tendencies, should even unconsciously fall into the Alexandrian order of thought, and labor to reconstruct a system intended to rival the Christian, is nothing strange. In doing so, he only yields to the spirit of the age, and follows the lead of those whom the age owns and reverences as its chiefs. That his system is not Christian, although he would have us receive it as Christian, is evident enough from his *dictum* with regard to miracles. "The miracles ascribed to Christ and his Apostles," he says (p. 61,) "however conclusive to those who witnessed them, are no evidence to us, until *by other means* we have established the truth of the writings which record them,—that is to say, *until we have proved all that we wish to prove.*" There is a sophism in this, which, probably, the author does not perceive. If the writings are the *only* authority for the miracles as historical facts, that we must establish their historical *authenticity* before the miracles can be evidence to us, we concede; but not their *truth*, that is, the truth of the mysteries they teach, the material object of faith,—therefore the matter we want proved. The miracles are not proofs of the mysteries, but simply motives of credibility. "Rabbi, we know that thou art come a teacher from God; for no man could do these miracles which thou doest, unless God were with him." Ordinary historical testimony, though wholly inadequate to prove the mysteries, is sufficient to prove the miracles as

facts, and, when so proved, they are evidence to us in the same manner and in the same degree that they were to those who witnessed them. It does not, therefore, follow that we must prove, without them, all we want proved, before they can be evidence to us.

But this by the way. The author in his *dictum* asserts either that Christianity is not provable at all, or that it is provable without miracles; but no Christian can assert either the one or the other. The former is absurd, if Christianity came from God and is intended for reasonable beings. God, as the author of reason, cannot require us to believe, and we as reasonable beings cannot believe, without reason, or authority sufficient to satisfy reason. The latter cannot be said without reducing Christianity to the mere order of nature; for a supernatural religion is, in the nature of things, provable only by supernaturally accredited witnesses, and witnesses cannot be supernaturally accredited without miracles of some sort. To deny the necessity of miracles as motives of credibility, or to assert the provability of Christianity without them, is to deny the supernatural character of Christianity, and therefore to deny Christianity itself; for Christianity is essentially and distinctively supernatural. Without the miracles, Christianity is provable only as a philosophy, and as a philosophy it must lie wholly within the order of nature; since philosophy, by its very definition, is the science of principles cognizable by the light of natural reason. Rationalism turns for ever within the limits of nature, and, do its best, it can never overleap them. It can never rise to Christianity; all it can do is, by rejecting or explaining away the mysteries, discarding all that transcends reason, to bring Christianity down to itself,—a fact we commend to the serious consideration of all who pretend that our religion, even to its loftiest mysteries, is rationally or philosophically demonstrable. The Christianity they can prove as a philosophy is no more the Christianity of the Gospel than the Neoplatonism of Proclus and Plotinus was the Christianity of the Gregories, the Basils, and the Augustines.

The author also betrays the unchristian character of his order of thought in his third discourse, entitled *Spiritual Despotism and the Reformation.* He says, indeed, in this part of his work, some very handsome things—in his own estimation—of the church; but, as he says them from the humanitarian point of view, on the hypothesis that she is a

purely human institution, and therefore a gigantic imposition upon mankind, we cannot take them as evidences of his Christian mode of thinking. If the church is what we hold her to be, these humanitarian compliments and apologies are impertinent; and if what he holds her to be, they betray on his part a very unchristian laxity of moral principle. An infallible church, the church of God, needs no apologies; man's church, or the synagogue of Satan, deserves none. But, although the author maintains that the church was very necessary from the fifth to the fifteenth century,—that she preserved our holy religion, and without her Christian faith and piety would have been lost, Christianity would have been unable to fulfil her mission, and the European nations would have remained uncivilized, ignorant, illiterate, ruthless barbarians,—he yet holds that she was a spiritual despotism, and the Protestant reformation was inevitable and necessary to emancipate the human mind from her thraldom, and to prepare the way for mental and civil freedom.

According to the author, the spiritual despotism of the church consisted in her claiming and exercising authority over faith and morals,—over the minds, the hearts, and the consciences of the faithful. If we catch his meaning, which does not appear to lie very clear or distinct even in his own mind, the despotism is in the authority itself, not simply in the fact that the church claims and exercises it. It would be equally despotism, if claimed and exercised by any one else, because it is intrinsically hostile to the rights of the mind and to the principles of civil liberty. Consequently, he objects not merely to the *claimant*, but to the thing *claimed*, and rejects the authority, let who will claim it, or let it be vested where or in whom it may.

But this is obviously unchristian. If we suppose Christianity at all, we must suppose it as an external revelation from God, a definite and authoritative religion, given by the supreme Lawgiver to all men as the supreme law, binding upon the whole man, against which no one has the right to think, speak, or act, and to which every one is bound to conform in thought, word, and deed. All this is implied in the very conception of Christianity, and must be admitted, if we admit the Christian religion at all. The authority objected to is therefore included in the fundamental conception of the Christian revelation, and consequently we cannot denominate it a spiritual despotism without denominating

Christianity itself a spiritual despotism, which, we need not say, would be any thing but Christian.

The author's order of thought would carry him even further. If the authority of the church is a spiritual despotism for the reason he assigns, the authority of God is also a spiritual despotism. The principle on which he objects to the church is, that the mind and the state are free, and that any authority over either is unjust. The essence of despotism is not that it is authority, but that it is authority without right, will without reason, power without justice. We cannot suppose the existence of God without supposing the precise authority over the mind and the state objected to. If this authority, claimed and exercised in his name by the church, is despotism, it must be, then, because he has no right to it; if no right to it, he is not sovereign; if not sovereign, he does not exist. If God does not exist, there is no conscience, no law, no accountability, moral or civil. To this conclusion the author's notions of mental freedom and civil liberty, pushed to their logical consequences, necessarily lead.

Every Christian is obliged to recognize, in the abstract, to say the least, the precise authority claimed and exercised by the church over faith and morals, over the intellect and the conscience, in spirituals and in temporals; and it is a well-known fact, that all Christian sects, as long as they retain any thing distinctively Christian, do claim, and, as far as able, exercise it, and never practically abandon it, till they lapse into pure rationalism, from which all that is distinctively Christian disappears. It cannot be otherwise; because Christianity is essentially law, and the supreme law, for the reason, the will, and the conscience, for individuals and nations, for the subject and for the prince. If our author's order of thought were Christian, he could not object to authority in itself; he would feel himself obliged to assert and vindicate it somewhere for some one; and if he objected to the church at all, he would do so, not because of the authority, but because it is not rightfully hers, but another's, —which would be a legitimate objection, and conclusive, if sustained, as of course it cannot be, by the facts in the case. His failure to object on this ground is a proof that his thought is not Christian.

The author's notions of authority and liberty are not only unchristian, but exceedingly unphilosophical and confused. He has no just conception of either, and is evident-

ly unable to draw any intelligible distinction between authority and despotism on the one hand, or between liberty and license on the other. He can conceive of authority and liberty only as each is the antagonist or the limitation of the other; he ingenuously confesses that he is unable to reconcile them, and presents their reconciliation as a problem that Protestantism has yet to solve. "To adjust the respective limits of these antagonists,—liberty of thought and ecclesiastical authority,—and bring about a lasting treaty of peace between them, is the yet unsolved problem of the reformation. The reformers attempted to solve it, and strove in vain to confine the torrent they had set in motion, within certain dikes of their own construction. The spring-tide of free inquiry, not yet perhaps at its flood, is sweeping away their barriers, and ages may elapse before it subsides into its proper channel, after cleansing the earth of a thousand follies and abuses." (p. 160.) All this proves that his order of thought is unchristian, and that his conceptions of authority and of liberty are not taken from the Gospel. No intelligent Christian, no sound philosopher even, ever conceives of authority and liberty as antagonists, as limiting one the other, or admits that their conciliation is an unsolved problem, or even a problem at all.

The Christian, even the philosopher, derives all from God, and nothing from man, and therefore escapes the difficulty felt by our author and the reformers. He knows that authority is not authority, if limited, and liberty is not liberty, if bounded. Consequently, he never conceives of the two in the same sphere, but distributes them in separate spheres, where each may be supreme. God is the absolute, underived, and unlimited sovereign and proprietor of the universe. Here is the foundation of all authority, and also of all liberty. Before God we have no liberty. We are his, and not our own. We are what he creates us, have only what he gives us, and lie completely at his mercy. We hold all from him, even to the breath in our nostrils, and he has the sovereign right to dispose of us according to his own will and pleasure. In his presence, and in presence of his law, we have duties, but no rights, and our duty and his right is the full, entire, and unconditional submission of ourselves, soul and body, to his will. Here is authority, absolute, full, entire, and unbounded,—as must be all authority, in order to be authority.

In the presence of authority there is no liberty; where, then, is liberty? It is not before God, but it is between man and man, between man and society, and between society and society. The absolute and plenary sovereignty of God excludes all other sovereignty, and our absolute and unconditional subjection to him excludes all other subjection. Hence no liberty before God, and no subjection before man; and therefore liberty is rightly defined, full and entire freedom from all authority but the authority of God. Here is liberty, liberty in the human sphere, and liberty full and entire, without restraint or limit in the sphere to which it pertains. Man is subjected to God, but to God only. No man, in his own right, has any, the least, authority over man; no body or community of men, as such, has any rightful authority either in spirituals or temporals. All merely human authorities are usurpations, and their acts are without obligation, null and void from the beginning. If the parent, the pastor, the prince has any right to command, it is as the vicar of God, and in that character alone; if I am bound to obey my parents, my pastor, or my prince, it is because my God commands me to obey them, and because in obeying them I am obeying him. Here is the law of liberty, and here, too, is the law of authority. Understand now why religion must found the state, why it is nonsense or blasphemy to talk of an alliance between religion and liberty, a reconciliation between authority and freedom. Both proceed from the same fountain, the absolute, underived, unlimited sovereignty of God, and can be no more opposed one to the other than God can be opposed to himself. Hence, absolute and unconditional subjection to God is absolute and unlimited freedom. Therefore says our Lord, "If the Son makes you free, you shall be free indeed."

The sovereignty of God does not oppose liberty; it founds and guarantees it. Authority is not the antagonist of freedom; it is its support, its vindicator. It is not religion, it is not Christianity, but infidelity, that places authority and liberty one over against the other, in battle array. It is not God who crushes our liberty, robs us of our rights, and binds heavy burdens upon our shoulders, too grievous to be borne; it is man, who at the same time that he robs us of our rights robs God of his. He who attacks our freedom attacks his sovereignty; he who vindicates his sovereignty, the rights of God, vindicates the rights of

man; for all human rights are summed up in the one right to be governed by God and by him alone, in the duty of absolute subjection to him, and absolute freedom from all subjection to any other. Maintain, therefore, the rights of God, the supremacy in all departments of the divine law, and you need not trouble your heads about the rights of man, freedom of thought, or civil liberty; for they are secured with all the guaranty of the divine sovereignty. The divine sovereignty is, therefore, as indispensable to liberty as to authority.

We need not stop to show that the divine sovereignty is not itself a despotism. The essence of despotism, as we have said, is not that it is authority, but that it is authority without right, will without reason, power without justice, which can never be said of God; for his right to universal dominion is unquestionable, and in him will and reason, power and justice, are never disjoined, are identical, are one and the same, and are indistinguishable save in our manner of conceiving them. His sovereignty is rightful, his will is intrinsically, eternally, and immutably just will, his power just power. Absolute subjection to him is absolute subjection to eternal, immutable, and absolute justice. Hence, subjection to him alone is, on the one hand, subjection to absolute justice, and, on the other, freedom to be and to do all that absolute justice permits. Here is just authority as great as can be conceived, and true liberty as large as is possible this side of license; and between the two there is and can be in the nature of things no clashing, no conflict, no antagonism. How mean and shallow is infidel philosophy!

Taking this view along with us, a view which is alike that of Christianity and of sound philosophy, we cannot fail to perceive that the objection urged against the church is exceedingly ill-chosen. The church, if what she professes to be,—and we have the right here to reason on the supposition that she is,—represents the divine sovereignty, and is commissioned by God to teach and to govern in his name. Her authority, then, is his authority, and it is he that teaches and governs in her and through her; so far, then, from being hostile to liberty in one department or another, she must be its support and safeguard in every department. The ground and condition of liberty is the presence of the divine sovereignty, for in its presence there is no other sovereignty, no other authority, consequently no

slavery. The objection, that the church is a spiritual despotism, is grounded on the supposition that all authority is despotism and all liberty license,—that is, that liberty and authority are antagonist forces,—which would require us to deny both, for neither despotism nor license is defensible. Authority and liberty are only the two phases of one and the same principle; suppose the absence of authority, you suppose the presence of license or despotism, which, again, are only the two phases of one and the same thing. To remove license or despotism, you must suppose the presence of legitimate authority. The church being the representative of the divine sovereignty on the earth, introduces legitimate authority, and by her presence necessarily displaces both despotism and license, that is, establishes both order and liberty.

The difficulty which Protestants and unbelievers suppose must exist in conforming reason, which is not always obedient to will, to the commands of authority, arises from their overlooking the nature of authority. The authority is not only an order to believe, but it is authority *for* believing. The authority of reason in the natural order is derived from God, not from man; and the obligation to believe the axioms of mathematics or the definitions of geometry arises solely from the fact, that reason, which declares them, does, thus far, speak by divine authority. If it did not, reason would be no reason for believing or asserting them. The same divine authority in a higher order, speaking through the church, cannot be less authoritative, or a less authority for believing what the church teaches. Hence the command of the church is at once authority for the will and for the reason, an injunction to believe and a reason for believing. The absolute submission of reason to her commands is not, as some fancy, the abnegation of reason. Reason does not, in submitting, fold her hands, shut her eyes, and take a doze, like a fat alderman after dinner, but keeps wide awake, and exercises her highest powers, her most sacred rights, according to her own nature. What more reasonable reason for believing than the command of God?—since, in the order of truth, his sovereignty is identically his veracity. To suppose a Catholic mind can have any difficulty in bringing reason to assent to the teachings of the church, believed to be God's church, is as absurd as to suppose that an American who has never been abroad can have any difficulty in believing that there is such

a city as Paris, or that Louis Napoleon Bonaparte has recently been elected president of the French Republic; or as to suppose that the logician finds a difficulty in bringing his reason to assent to the proposition that the same is the same, that the same thing cannot both be and not be at the same time, or that two and two make four.

It is not the church that establishes spiritual despotism; it is she who saves us from it. Spiritual despotism is that which subjects us, in spiritual matters, to a human authority, whether our own or that of others,—for our own is as human as another's; and the only redemption from it is in having in them a divine authority. Protestants themselves acknowledge this, when they call out for the pure word of God. The church teaches by divine authority; in submitting to her, we submit to God, and are freed from all human authority. She teaches infallibly; therefore, in believing what she teaches, we believe the truth, which frees us from falsehood and error, to which all men without an infallible guide are subject, and subjection to which is the elemental principle of all spiritual despotism. Her authority admitted excludes all other authority, and therefore frees us from heresiarchs and sects, the very embodiment of spiritual despotism in its most odious forms. Sectarianism is spiritual despotism itself; and to know how far spiritual despotism and spiritual slavery may go, you have only to study the history of the various sects and false religions which now exist, or have heretofore existed.

In the temporal order, again, the authority claimed and exercised by the church is nothing but the assertion over the state of the divine sovereignty, which she represents, or the subjection of the prince to the law of God, in his character of prince as well as in his character of man. That the prince or civil power is subject to the law of God, no man who admits Christianity at all dares question; and, if the church be the divinely commissioned teacher and guardian of that law, as she certainly is, the same subjection to her must be conceded. But this, instead of being opposed to civil liberty, is its only possible condition. Civil liberty, like all liberty, is in being held to no obedience but obedience to God; and obedience to the state can be compatible with liberty only on the condition that God commands it, or on the condition that he governs in the state, which he does not and cannot do, unless the state holds from his law and is subject to it. To deny, then, the

supremacy of the church in temporals is only to release the temporal order from its subjection to the divine sovereignty, which, so far as regards the state, is to deny its authority, or its right to govern, and, so far as regards the subject, is to assert pure, unmitigated civil despotism. All authority divested of the divine sanction is despotic, because it is authority without right, will unregulated by reason, power disjoined from justice. Withdraw the supremacy of the church from the temporal order, and you deprive the state of that sanction, by asserting that it does not hold from God and is not amenable to his law; you give the state simply a human basis, and have in it only a human authority, which has no right to govern, which we are not bound to obey, and which it is intolerable tyranny to compel us to obey. "Let every soul," says the blessed apostle Paul, the doctor of the gentiles, "be subject to the higher powers; for there is no power but from God; and those that are, are ordained of God. Therefore he that resisteth power resisteth the ordinance of God. . . . . Wherefore be subject of necessity, not only for wrath, but for conscience' sake." (Rom. xiii. 1–5.) Here the obligation of obedience is grounded on the fact that the civil power is the ordinance of God, that is, as we say, holds from God. But, obviously, this, while it subjects the subject to the state, equally subjects the state to the divine sovereignty. Take away the subjection of the state to God, and you take away the reason of the subjection of the subject to the state; and we need not tell you that to subject us to an authority which we are not bound to obey is tyranny. See, then, what you get by denying the supremacy of the church in temporals!

The church and the state, as administrations, are distinct bodies; but they are not, as some modern politicians would persuade us, two coördinate and mutually independent authorities. The state holds under the law of nature, and has authority only within the limits of that law. As long as it confines itself within that law, and faithfully executes its provisions, it acts freely, without ecclesiastical restraint or interference. But the church holds from God under the supernatural or revealed law, which includes, as integral in itself, the law of nature, and is therefore the teacher and guardian of the natural as well as of the revealed law. She is, under God, the supreme judge of both laws, which for her are but one law; and hence she takes cognizance, in her tribunals, of the breaches of the natural law as well as

of the revealed, and has the right to take cognizance of its breaches by nations as well as of its breaches by individuals, by the prince as well as by the subject, for it is the supreme law for both. The state is, therefore, only an inferior court, bound to receive the law from the supreme court, and liable to have its decisions reversed on appeal.

This must be asserted, if we assert the supremacy of the Christian law, and hold the church to be its teacher and judge; for no man will deny that Christianity includes the natural as well as the supernatural law. Who, with any just conceptions, or any conceptions at all, of the Christian religion, will pretend that one can fulfil the Christian law and yet violate the natural law?—that one is a good Christian, if he keeps the precepts of the church, though he break every precept of the decalogue?—or that Christianity remits the catechumen to the state to learn the law of nature, or what we term natural morality? Grace presupposes nature. The supernatural ordinances of God's law presuppose the natural, and the church, which is the teacher and guardian of faith and morals, can no more be so without plenary authority with regard to the latter than the former. Who, again, dares pretend that the moral law is not as obligatory on emperors, kings, princes, commonwealths, as upon private individuals?—upon politicians, as upon priests or simple believers? Unless, then, you exempt the state from all obligation even to the law of nature, you must make it amenable to the moral law as expounded by the church, divinely commissioned to teach and declare it.

Deny this, and assert the independence of the political order, and declare the state in its own right, without accountability to the Christian law, of which it is not the teacher or guardian, supreme in temporals, and you gain, instead of civil liberty, simply, in principle at least, civil despotism. If you deny that the church is the teacher and guardian of the law of God, you must either claim the authority you deny her for the state, or you must deny it altogether. If you claim it for the state, you, on your own principles, make the state a spiritual despotism, and on ours also; for the state obviously has not received that authority, is incompetent in spirituals, is no teacher of morals, or director of consciences. If you deny it altogether, you make the state independent of the moral order, independent of the divine sovereignty, the only real sovereignty, and establish pure, unmitigated *civil* despotism.

There is no escaping this conclusion ; and hence we see the folly and madness of those who assert in the name of liberty the independence of the political order, and exclaim, in a tone of mock heroism, " Neither priest nor bishop shall interfere with my political opinions as long as I am able to resist him ! " Bravo ! my young Liberal ; but did you know what you are doing, you would see that you are laying the foundation, not of liberty, but of despotism. Hence, too, we see that our author must be mistaken, when he asserts that the Protestant reformation, in its essential principle, was "a revolt of free spirits against profligate despotism." It was no such thing. Its objections to the church, reduced to their substance, were simply, the church is a spiritual despotism because she claims supremacy over reason, conscience, and the state ; and it objected to her, not because it was she who claimed that supremacy, but because it rejected the supremacy itself, let it be claimed by whom it might. This our author himself concedes, contends, and proves. Its argument was, the church of God cannot claim supremacy over reason, conscience, and the state. But the church does claim this supremacy, therefore she cannot be the church of God. The principle of the argument is, that God could not delegate the authority to any church. But if he could not, it must have been because he himself did not possess it. Therefore the essential principle of the reformation, in the last analysis, was the denial, on the one hand, of the sovereignty of God over reason, conscience, and the state, and on the other, the assertion of the absolute independence of man and the temporal order, which is either pure license or pure despotism, according to the light in which you choose to consider it. The real character of the reformation was the substitution of human sovereignty for the divine ; and hence, in its developments, wherever it is free to follow its own law, we see it result either in pure humanism or pure pantheism, as it does or does not combine with religious sentiment. And either is the denial of both authority and liberty ; for all authority is in the divine sovereignty, and all liberty in being bound to it alone, that is, in freedom from all human government resting merely on a human basis, whether ourselves, the one, the few, or the many, as every one would see, if it were understood that authority over myself, emanating from myself, is as human, and therefore as illegitimate, as much of the essence of despotism, as authority

over me emanating from other men. Is it not said in all languages that a man may be the slave of himself, of his own passions, his own ignorance, or his own prejudices? Under Protestantism we may have civil and spiritual despotism, or civil and spiritual license, the only two things that man can found, without a divine commission and subjection to the divine law; but authority and liberty are possible and can be practically secured only under the divine order represented by the church, or an institution precisely similar to what she professes to be, the divinely commissioned teacher and guardian of both the natural and the revealed law.

That this conclusion will be acceptable to our politicians, young or old, we are not quite so simple as to suppose; but we are not aware that it is necessary to consult their pleasure. They have in these, as they had in other times, the physical power to do with us as seems to them good. They can decry us, they can pull out our tongue, cut off our right hand, and at need burn our body, or cast it to the wild beasts; but this will not alter the nature of things, make wrong right, or right wrong. Civil and spiritual despotism is not the less despotism because practised by them, and in the name of humanity and the people. We desire to have all due respect for them; but we must confess that we have not yet seen their title-deeds, the papers which prove them to have a chartered right from Almighty God to be the sole governors of mankind. We have no authority for pronouncing them infallible or impeccable; we have seen no reason for supposing their ascendency, freed from the restraints of the divine law, is either honorable to God or serviceable to man; we have not found them always exempt from the common infirmities of our nature; and we think we have seen, at least heard of, politicians who were ambitious, selfish, intriguing, greedy of power, place, emolument even. In a word, we have no reason to believe that they monopolize all the wisdom, the virtue, the generosity and disinterestedness of the community, or that they never need looking after, and therefore never need a power above them, under the immediate and supernatural protection of Almighty God, to look after them, and to compel them to keep within their own province, to respect religion, and to refrain from inflicting irreparable injuries upon society. Even should they, then, clamor against us, or do worse, it would not greatly move us, and would tend to

confirm us in the truth of our doctrine, rather than lead us to distrust its soundness or its necessity.

We need hardly say that we advocate no amalgamation of the civil and ecclesiastical administrations. They are in their nature, as we have said, distinct, and the supremacy of the church which we assert is by no means the supremacy of the clergy as politicians. We have no more respect for clergymen turned politicians than we have for any other class of politicians of equal worth, perhaps not quite so much; for we cannot forget that they, in becoming politicians, descend from their sacerdotal rank, as a judge does in descending from the bench to play the part of an advocate. We have had political priests ever since there was a Christian state, and many of them have made sad work of both politics and religion. We have nothing to say of them, but that they were politicians, and their censurable acts were not performed in their character of priests. The principle we assert does not exact that the church should turn politician, and thus from the church become the state, or that the clergy should turn politicians; it exacts that both she and they should not. The clergy as politicians fall into the category of all politicians, and their supremacy as politicians would still be the supremacy of the state, not of the church. The state is supreme, if politicians as such be supreme, let them be selected from what class of the community they may. The principle exacts, indeed, the supremacy of the clergy, but solely as the church, in their sacerdotal and pastoral character as teachers, guardians, and judges of the law of God, natural and revealed, supreme for individuals and nations, for prince and subject, king and commonwealth, noble and plebeian, rich and poor, great and small, wise and simple; not as politicians, in which character they have and can have no preëminence over politicians selected from the laity, and must stand on the same level with them. We do not advocate—far from it—the notion that the church must administer the civil government; what we advocate is her supremacy as the teacher and guardian of the law of God,—as the supreme court, which must be recognized and submitted to as such by the state, and whose decisions cannot be disregarded, whose prerogatives cannot be abridged or usurped by any power on earth, without rebellion against the divine majesty, and robbing man of his rights. As Christians, we must insist on this supremacy; as Catholics, it is not only our duty, but our glorious privi-

lege, to assert it, and to understand and practise our religion as God himself, through his own chosen organ, promulgates and expounds it.

We know how hateful this doctrine is to politicians, to the world, and to the devil, who seek always to find a rival in the state to the kingdom of God. We know that the representatives of the state in nearly all ages of Christendom, and in nearly all nations, have resisted it, and been encouraged, sustained, in their resistance, by ambitious priests and courtly prelates. We know that it is now resisted by every civil government on earth, that the kings of the earth stand up, the princes conspire together, the nations rage, and the people imagine vain things, against the Lord and against his Christ, saying, Let us break their bonds asunder, let us cast away their yoke from us; but we cannot help that. We know the truth, and dare assert it;—we know the rights of God, and dare not betray them. We cannot be false, because others are,—shrink from proclaiming the supremacy of the moral order, because now more than ever it is necessary to proclaim it. We do not understand the heroism that goes always with the popular party, or the loyalty that deserts to the enemy the moment that his forces appear to be the most numerous. We know the moral order is supreme, and shall we fear to say it, lest sinners tremble, the wicked gnash their teeth, and the multitude threaten? We know our church is God's church; that she is the judge of God's law, and has the right to denounce, as from the judgment-seat of the Almighty, whoever violates it, and to place king or peasant under her anathema, if he refuses to obey it. She has the right, the divine right, to denounce moral wrong, spiritual wrong, political wrong, tyranny and oppression, wheresoever or by whomsoever they are practised, and to vindicate the rights of God, and, in so doing, the rights of man, let who will dare threaten or invade them. We are subject to God, but to him only; and are we afraid to assert the fact? Are we not free before all men?

The church is the divinely appointed guardian of truth, virtue, liberty, because she is the representative of the divine sovereignty on earth. Kings and potentates, commonwealths and mobs, may rise up, as they have often risen up, against her; politicians may murmur or denounce, the timid may quake, the faint-hearted may fail, the cowardly shrink away, and the disloyal join her persecutors; but that can

neither justify them, nor unmake her rights, nor depose her from her sovereignty under God,—cannot make it not true that she represents the moral order, and that the moral order is supreme. That supremacy is a fact in God's universe, an eternal and primal truth; and let no man dare deny it, who would not be branded on his forehead traitor to God, and therefore to man; and let him who fears to assert it in the hour of thickest danger be branded poltroon. It is the glory of the church that she has always asserted it. She asserted it in that noble answer of her inspired apostles to the magistrates,—"We must obey God rather than men;" she asserted it in her glorious army of martyrs, who chose rather to die at the stake, in the amphitheatre, under the most cruel and lingering tortures, than to offer incense to Jupiter or to the statue of Cæsar; she asserted it by the mouth of holy Ambrose, Archbishop of Milan, when he forbade the Emperor Theodosius the Great to enter the church till he had done public penance for his tyrannical treatment of his subjects, and drove him from the sanctuary, and bade him take his place with the laity, where he belonged; she asserted it in the person of her sovereign pontiff, St. Gregory VII., when he made the tyrant and brutal Henry IV. of Germany wait for three days shivering with cold and hunger at his door, before he would grant him absolution, and when he finally smote him with the sword of Peter and Paul for his violation of his oaths, his wars against religion, and his oppression of his subjects; and she asserted it, again, in the person of her glorious pontiff, Gregory XVI., who, standing with one foot in the grave, confronted the tyrant of the North, and made the Autocrat of all the Russias tremble and weep as a child. Never for one moment has she ceased to assert it in face of crowned and uncrowned heads,—Jew, Pagan, Arian, Barbarian, Saracen, Protestant, Infidel, Monarchist, Aristocrat, Democrat; and gloriously is she asserting it now in her noble confessor, the Bishop of Lausanne and Geneva, and in her exiled Pontiff, Pius IX.

You talk of religious liberty. Know you what the word means? Know ye that religious liberty is all and entire in the supremacy of the moral order? The church is a spiritual despotism, is she? Bold blasphemer, miserable apologist for tyrants and tyranny, go trace her track through eighteen hundred years, and behold it marked with the blood of her free and noble-hearted children, whom God loves and honors, shed in defence of religious liberty. From the first

moment of her existence has she fought, ay, fought as no other power can fight, for liberty of religion. Every land has been reddened with the blood and whitened with the bones of her martyrs, in that sacred cause; and now, rash upstart, you dare in the face of day proclaim her the friend of despotism! Alas! my brother, may God forgive you, for you know not what you do.

But we have said enough to show the unchristian as well as the unphilosophical character of our author's thought, which we are willing to believe he does not fully comprehend, and from the logical consequences of which, were he to see them, we are anxious to believe he is prepared to recoil with horror. His thought is unphilosophical, because it conceives authority and liberty as antagonists; it is unchristian, because it reduces Christianity to mere rationalism, and revives Alexandrian gentilism; because it denies the divine sovereignty, and the supremacy in all things of the spiritual or moral order; because it denies moral accountability, and involves unmitigated despotism or unbounded license as the inevitable doom of the human race. As a philosopher, we hold his work in contempt; as an historian, we deny its authenticity; as a Christian, we abhor it; as a friend of liberty, civil and religious, we denounce its principles, as fit only for despots or libertines.

There are matters of detail in the work to which we seriously object, but, as we have shown the unsoundness of the book in its principles, it is not worth while to waste time or argument in exposing them. The author has expended no inconsiderable thought and labor in constructing his work, but, like all the works which rank under the head of *philosophy of history*, it is shallow, vague, confused, worthless. The writers of philosophy of history may have great natural talents, they may have varied and extensive learning, but they start wrong, they attempt what is impossible, and never go to the bottom of things or rise to their first principles. They never reach the ultimate; they never attain to science; and only amuse or bewilder us with vague generalities, crude speculations, or unmeaning verbiage. There is an order of thought of which they have no conception, infinitely more profound than theirs, which, when once attained to, makes all their views appear heterogeneous, confused, weak, and childish.

We have no disposition to treat our young Kentuckian rudely, or to discourage him by an unkind reception. We

know him only through his book. His book is bad, but we every day receive works which are far worse. We do not believe that he means to be a pagan; we do not believe that he even means to be a rationalist; we are sure that he does not mean to deny the moral order; and this is much for him personally, but it is nothing for his book. In judging the man, we look to his intention; in judging the author, we look only to the principles he inculcates. If these are unsound or dangerous, we have no mercy for the author, though we may abound in charity for the man. Mr. Nourse does not understand his own principles; he has not seen them in all their relations, and does not suspect their logical consequences. He has undertaken, without other guide than a few books which, themselves unsafe guides, he has read, but not digested, to do, after the study of a few months, what no mortal man could accomplish with all the libraries in the world, were he to live longer than the world has stood. How could he expect to succeed? We hold him accountable for his rashness in undertaking such a task, not for having failed in its accomplishment.

CHANNING ON SOCIAL REFORM.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for 1849.]

ARTICLE I.

THERE are few men outside of the church for whom we have a warmer personal affection, or a more sincere esteem, than we have for the author of this Discourse,—a nephew of the well-known and lamented William Ellery Channing, the warm-hearted philanthropist, and eloquent Unitarian minister. He is a man of singular purity of mind and sweetness of disposition,—earnest, self-denying, brave,—with more than his celebrated uncle's learning, and occasionally with more than that uncle's eloquence. We have known him for

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* *The Christian Church and Social Reform. A Discourse delivered before the Religious Union of Associationists.* By WILLIAM HENRY CHANNING. Boston: 1848.

years ; and, before our conversion, we loved him as we loved few men, and hoped more from him, with a single exception, than from any other man with whom we were associated, or whom we were permitted to include in the number of our personal friends. We love him not less now, though our personal intercourse with him has been nearly interrupted, and we have ceased to have any sympathy with his views, plans, or movements.

We have great confidence in Mr. Channing's integrity, as well as in his ingenuousness and candor; we believe him not unwilling to receive the truth ; and we are sure he would shrink from no sacrifices obedience to it might demand, were he once, through the grace of God, clearly and distinctly to behold it. He is a socialist, avowedly a socialist, and a socialist with as extreme and as utterly objectionable views as any one of the socialistic sect we are acquainted with ; but he really possesses much *religiosity*, so to speak, and wishes to retain and practise the Christian religion. Doubtless he has, as all men of his class have, a secret pride, which revolts at the humility of the cross, and obscures the spiritual vision ; but his errors, we must believe, spring rather from his intellect than his will, and are in no small degree due to the prejudices of his education, and the unfavorable influences to which for the most of his life he has been exposed. Educated in that negation of the Christian symbol called Unitarianism,—brought up, as are all Unitarian youth, without any real knowledge of Christianity, without imbibing any thing of the distinctively Christian spirit, and with his mind, his affections, and his hopes turned away from the Gospel,—it is not strange that he was early led into the mazes of wild theories and vain philosophy. Unable to satisfy either the wants of his mind or of his heart with the negations of his sect, he early became unsettled and restless, asking in vain for something to believe, and still more earnestly for something to do ; careless of the salvation of his own soul, because without any belief in a future judgment, or in God as a remunerator, and confounding the human sentiment of philanthropy with the Christian virtue of charity, nothing in the world was more natural than that he should turn socialist, and seek to find food for his intellect, his affections, and his activity, in efforts at social reform, or the realization of an earthly paradise.

With no infallible church to direct him, with no external criterion of truth or of good, and recognizing no revelation

but the subjective inspirations of the affections, or the Divinity manifesting itself in human instincts and tendencies, he was forced to take humanity, or human nature, as his authority, and the satisfaction of its cravings in time as his end. In a word, he has been obliged, in the absence of the religion of God, to supply its place with "the religion of humanity," as he expressly calls it. But in this he shows two things which we respect, and which give us hope. Even his religion of humanity,—a religion which puts man in the place of God, as beginning, motive, and end,—though a veritable idolatry, and excusable in no one, bears witness to his religiosity, and also to his logical consistency. It is a tribute to religion not without its value, and a proof that he does not shrink from pushing the Protestant movement which he accepts to its last consequences. May we not hope that he will soon see that the worship of humanity is as sad superstition as the worship of wood and stone, and that man falls as far below his dignity as below his duty whenever he worships any other than the infinite and eternal God?

We have read Mr. Channing's Discourse with great attention, and with an earnest endeavour to ascertain and appreciate its meaning. Abler socialistic discourses we may have read, but a more genuine or truthful statement of modern socialism, under its least irreligious aspect, we have not read. It presents a synopsis of the whole teaching of the socialistic school or sect, on God, nature, religion, the church, man, society, association, reform, progress, economy, social and domestic. With a hope, not presumptuous we persuade ourselves, that our words may reach the author and receive from him respectful consideration, we venture to take it up somewhat in detail, and subject it to a close and even minute criticism. If, in doing so, we prove ourselves severe, Mr. Channing, we are sure, will understand that our severity is for the author, not for the man, for whom we have begun by expressing our affection and esteem. In order not to give occasion to the author and his friends to accuse us of misapprehension and misstatement, and to enable our readers to judge of the bearing and appropriateness of our remarks, we shall copy, in its separate divisions, the entire Discourse, as far as we make it the subject of our comments. We begin with the beginning.

"In opening this winter's course of meetings, let us at once turn our attention to the problem which this age has most at heart to solve; and, in order to do so, let us consider THE RELATIONS OF THE CHURCH AND

Socialism. For that the Christian Church is now the centre of spiritual life in humanity there can be no reasonable doubt, and as little that social reform is the characteristic political movement of this generation. "*Make religion practical, and practice religious,*" is the command of the divine Spirit more clearly than ever before; and the *Law of harmonious coöperation* between these two extremes of man's existence is the thought which is shaping itself in all enlightened minds.

"I. Realism.—But, in attempting to survey the tendencies of the society into which we have been born, let us be sure, in the outset, that we occupy the firm ground of realism. By this it is meant, that we should start in our inquiry from the *life* amid which we consciously exist, rather than from absolute *principles* assumed by idealism, or from partial *experiments* to which empiricism trusts. If man could ascend to dwell at the fountain-head of truth, he would be reabsorbed in God; and, by becoming immersed in the flood of transient circumstances, he loses himself in nature. His appropriate sphere is mediate, between the infinite one and the finite many. He lives by receiving and diffusing life, and grows by assimilating into his own person inspiration from above and experience from beneath. Motives are communicated which he must study to manifest in deeds; by reflection on ends fulfilled, he gains capacity for larger impulses; and the medium by which, in him and through him, love and beauty are married and made fruitful, is wisdom. We move and have our being amidst a divine reality, whose perfections are progressively revealed in societies, races, and heavens, as solar systems are evolved from parent-suns; and in proportion to our full communion with him who is at once the centre and circumference of existence, is our real life. *This life we interchange with fellow-men; and we live well, just in degree as we conspire with our age, our nation, our neighbours, to embody in acts the ideas through which good evermore flows in to reanimate mankind.* The fatalist gazing on the vast sweeping forces of the universe, the enthusiast awaiting the accomplishment of the Almighty's plans, may be tempted to apathy or presumption. But the realist, who recognizes the exact order of events, and yet hears himself summoned to coöperate with an unfolding creation, becomes a hero. He is at once pious, self-relying, and brave. His energies expand amidst the mighty powers which call him to be their peer. Serene and constant, neither exaggerating nor slighting his special function, assured of the guidance of one sovereign Will, he bears the cross, he wears his crown, emulous only to discharge the duty which humanity intrusts to his fidelity, and aspiring to be a pure medium of divine disinterestedness. His aim is to be made a minister of Providence in his own time and land; calmly confiding, that thus he will be each day regenerate, and that the future will welcome him to ever-enlarging usefulness and joy."—pp. 3–5.

The problem, it will be seen from this, is the relation of the church to socialism, or to determine the law of harmoni-

ous coöperation between the Christian church and social reform, "the two extremes of man's existence." The author should have defined his terms in the outset, and told us in what sense he uses the words *Christian*, *church*, *social*, and *reform*; but let that pass; we shall find his definition of some of them at least, as we proceed. The first step is to fix the method of inquiry, or to determine the point of departure. This the author fixes in realism, as distinguished, on the one hand, from idealism, and, on the other, from empiricism.

But what is this realism? We really wish the author had been more clear and precise in his definition. He obviously does not mean by it the philosophical doctrine of a school well known in the history of philosophy, for that school asserted the reality of ideas, which he denies, since he distinguishes realism from idealism. The real as distinguished from the ideal is precisely what is meant by the actual. His realism, then, is actualism; and that it is, we conclude from the fact that he identifies it, not with pure being, but with *life*, "the life amid which we consciously exist;" for life is pure being reduced to act,—or being actualized, existing, and performing its several functions.

But what is the meaning of starting with the actual as our point of departure? It must be the assumption of the justness and sufficiency of the actual; for if we declare the actual faulty or insufficient, we must draw either upon past experiments, and seek to complete it by reproducing what has been, or upon the absolute principles of idealism, and seek to complete it by embodying new ideas in acts,—both of which the author expressly excludes. But if the actual is just, is complete, satisfactory, what need of reform, social or individual? It strikes us that the author suppresses, in the very beginning, one of the two extremes between which he was to find, or establish, "the law of harmonious coöperation."

According to the author, man must remain below the absolute principles of idealism and above the partial experiments of empiricism,—that is, if we understand it, in the actual,—or lose his identity, that is, cease to exist. For, if he "could ascend to dwell at the fountain-head of truth, he would be reabsorbed in God, and, by becoming immersed in the flood of transient circumstances, he loses himself in nature." *Re*absorb is to absorb again; for, in this word, *re* is iterative, not simply intensive. Consequently, the au-

thor must hold that man was originally absorbed in God, and has been evolved from him. Evolution denies creation. The author, therefore, denies the creative Deity, and, therefore, God himself; for the radical and fundamental conception of God is that of creator, since we recognize his being only in the category of cause, as we apprehend the cause in the effect. What, then, can the author mean, when he talks of God, of the Divinity? and on what authority does he presume to deny God, and the fact of creation? Authority is as necessary to enable us to deny as to affirm. By absorption in God, the author must mean the loss of identity; for he makes it the opposite extreme from losing ourselves in nature. Hence, the saints will be unable to enjoy the beatific vision,—for in that they are supposed to "ascend to dwell at the fountain-head of truth,"—without losing their identity, and ceasing to exist. Hence, again, the author denies even the possibility of the immortality and heaven which our Lord and his apostles taught, and which all Christians hope for. On what authority does he do this? How does he prove that man cannot dwell *at* the fountain-head of truth, without being absorbed in it, that is, becoming identically it?

Man's "appropriate sphere is mediate, between the infinite one, and the finite many." Will the author tell us what that is which is mediate between God and nature, between one and many, between infinite and finite,—that is, which is neither the one nor the other, neither infinite nor finite? Is there any proportion between infinite and finite? If not, as there is not, will he explain to us how something can be mediate between them, below the one and above the other? We had supposed that all which is not infinite is finite, and all which is not finite is infinite.

Man "grows by assimilating into"—we should say *to*, not *into*—"his own person inspiration from above and experience from beneath." Does this mean that the inspiration is from God, and the experience from the devil? That would be no forced interpretation. If the inspiration is actually received, is it not experience? Why, then, may not experience be from above as well as from beneath? Does the author use the word *inspiration* in its ordinary theological sense? Then he teaches that all men are divinely inspired. But what proof has he of this? How can there be divine inspiration, if God is not? and if all men are divinely inspired, what need of the university—for which,

we shall soon see, the author contends—to instruct them, to mediate by intelligence between the church and the state, the divine element in man and the human? If he uses the word in a different sense, by what right does he do so, without defining expressly in what sense? Suppose man does grow by the means asserted,—how are we to know whether he grows good or bad, unless we know the character of the inspiration and experience which he assimilates? By what criterion determine that character? "By reflection on ends fulfilled, he gains capacity for larger impulses." Why on ends fulfilled, rather than on ends to be fulfilled? And what business has the author to recur to ends fulfilled, since they can have been only partial experiments, which his realism excludes? What sort of impulses do we by reflection acquire a capacity for,—good or bad? Are we rendered impulsive by reflection? and are they, who reflect the most, the most impulsive in their character? Impulsive actions are not virtuous actions; for virtuous actions are voluntary, and performed with foresight of the end. The more subject to impulse we are, the less of virtue we have. Is it desirable to enlarge our impulses and diminish our virtues?

"The medium by which . . . . . love and beauty are married, and made fruitful, is wisdom." What sort of love and beauty, spiritual or sensual, does wisdom unite in wedlock? What children are born to the wedded pair? What is the fruit of the union? Whence comes the wisdom which is its medium?

"We move and have our being amidst a divine reality." The author evidently means here, by "divine reality," what he has just called "the life amid which we consciously exist." Is the *life*, which we found to be the actual, the divine reality? or is the divine reality simply actuality,—the actual life we live,—the actual universe? Which is the author's meaning? If the former, we live true life, life according to the divine reality; and then what need of reform? If the latter, all actuality is divine reality: how, then, is reform possible? Who ever dreamed of reforming the divine reality?

"Whose perfections are progressively revealed in societies, races, and heavens, as solar systems are evolved from parent-suns." How know we that there are any *solar* systems but our own? or if there are, that they are *evolved* from suns? How know we that our earth, for instance, has

been evolved from our sun? Are the conjectures of cosmogonists and astronomers a solid basis for *science?* What is the author's authority for saying that societies, races, heavens are evolved from the Divinity, instead of being created by him? How knows he that the divine reality is *progressively* evolving societies, races, heavens? We have great respect for the author, but we cannot believe matters of such vast moment as these on his word alone.

"In proportion to our full communion with him"—God, the divine reality—"is our real life." Full communion with God, with divine reality, is the same as "to dwell at the fountain-head of truth." So our real life is in ceasing to live; and in proportion as we attain to it, we lose it, by losing our identity! We have read that "he who will lose his life for Christ's sake shall find it;" but we do not recollect having before read, that he who shall find his real life in God shall lose it. Our real life is, we agree, in full communion with God; but what right the author has to say this, after having virtually affirmed that such communion would be the loss of our existence, and denied its possibility by virtually denying the existence of God, we are unable to comprehend. Of contraries, one must be false.

"We live *well*, just in degree as we conspire with our age, our nation, our neighbours, to embody in acts the ideas through which good evermore flows in to reanimate mankind." Which ideas are those? and what right has the author to recur to the ideal? The plain English of this is, we live well, when we conspire with our age, our nation, and our neighbours, to do good. Is the *well-living* in the conspiring or striving to do good, or in conspiring with our age, or nation, and our neighbours? If the former, the author merely utters a truism; if the latter, he assumes that our age, our nation, our neighbours, that is, all men actually living,—for *neighbours*, as here used, must be taken universally,—are right, conspire to the right end, and live well. If so, what is the necessity for reform, social or individual? All are right as they are, as already implied in your realism; and what more can you ask? Surely, you would not reform right, truth, sanctity?

"But the realist, who recognizes the exact order of events." Who is he? Who, less than omniscient, can recognize the exact order of events, or even that there is an exact order of events? Who is able to say that the order of nature has never been or never can be interrupted by

miracles,—miracles, whether of mercy or of judgment? "And yet hears himself summoned." By whom? On what authority? "To coöperate with an unfolding creation." To do what? How can one coöperate with creation, if there is no creation? If there is a creation, the author's doctrine of evolution is false. But to coöperate with an unfolding creation in doing what? In unfolding creation? But to unfold creation, if it is unfolded, is the part of the Creator, a portion of his work necessary to complete creation. Is man summoned to aid the Creator to create? Or shall we say the creation develops itself, and man is summoned to take his share in the work of development? But self-development is inconceivable, and certainly inadmissible by the realist, who excludes the ideal; for development is the actualization of the ideal, the fulfilment of the primitive type or idea. The development necessarily depends on the power on which its subject itself depends. If creation depends on God, he is the developer. If it develops itself, it depends on itself, that is, is independent, self-existent. But an independent, self-existent *creation* is a contradiction in terms. God is independent, self-existent, and therefore is, as the schoolmen say, *actus purissimus*, and incapable of development. "Becomes a hero." If the first requisite is insisted on, no man can be a hero. If only the last,—since, if it means any thing, it can mean only coöperating with the actual in what the actual is actually doing,—any man can be a hero who swims with the current, and does not resist his age, country, or neighbours. Cheap heroism that!

"Emulous only to discharge the duty which humanity intrusts to his fidelity." So man receives his duty from man, and not from God! Man, then, is the subject of man! Is this what Mr. Channing calls Liberty? "His aim is to be made a minister of Providence in his own time and land." Does the author use *Providence* and *Humanity* as convertible terms? If not, here is a mistake. The man is the minister of him to whom he owes his duty,—from whom he receives his ministry. The author, then, unless for him God and man are identical, should say, in order to be consistent with himself, "his aim is to be made a minister of" *man* "in his own time and land."

But we pass to consider "CHRISTENDOM," the second division of the Discourse.

"II. CHRISTENDOM.—Planted firmly on this ground of realism, we at once recognize that we are members of the fraternity of nations pervaded by one spiritual life, which is so rightly called Christendom. Let him who is prompted, from the basis of natural science or of arbitrary speculation, to break up, fuse anew, and remould modern civilization after his own image, attempt it. The race will gain good, alike from his truths and his errors; and he will learn self-forgetfulness from seeing how easily the growing Tree of Life absorbs into its mighty trunk the litter of his theories and the soil of his good sense. The realist will strive only to aid the *development* of Christendom, by blending with it his best life. There is no question now as to the quality or mode of the peculiar inspiration which makes a collective unity out of nations so various in blood, language, tendency. It is enough for our present purpose, to acknowledge that the LIFE of Jesus has been the fertilizing germ of the institutions and manners, of the literature, philosophy, and art, of the worship and conscience, of our progenitors; enough to own, that the idea of a DIVINE HUMANITY, manifested through Jesus, is yet vital,—elevating the mind of this generation to an ever higher thought of that image of God, which man, collective and individual, was designed to be, and prompting classes and nations to brotherhood by an ever warmer consciousness of the unity of mankind; enough to believe, that the promise of a HEAVEN UPON EARTH, which was the first and last word of Jesus, is in time to be realized, by the inward exaltation of these nations to a piety and humanity like his own, and an extension of their refining sway over the entire globe through the instrumentality of peace. We are assured—are we not?—that some portion of a DIVINE CHRISM anoints us to the work of redeeming man universal from brutality by the miraculous power of good-will. Manifest tokens abound, that providential agency impels Christendom, as a whole, and in its several communities, to Integral Culture and Unlimited Diffusion of good. Shall we hesitate with grateful reverence to give ourselves up to this heavenly leading?"—pp. 5, 6.

Christendom is here rather vaguely defined "the fraternity of nations," though what nations we are left to conjecture. The author's realism, we here see, enables him to assert that the life these nations are living is the "one spiritual life," and of course the true life, real life, the life they ought to live. This it can enable him to do only on the condition that it accepts as right and just all actual life. All actual life is right and just. But these nations live an actual life. Therefore, their life is right and just. We must take *life* here in the concrete, as including the facts as well as the principles of life; for the author's realism, we have seen, excludes the ideal, and therefore the abstract. The

author then plants himself firmly on the actual right and justice of the whole actual life of his fraternity of nations, and really asserts a universal optimism. Whence, then, we repeat, the necessity of reform? If the actual is right and just, and may, as the author evidently maintains, be taken as the criterion of what is right and just, therefore true and good, we cannot understand his ceaseless and most urgent demand for social reform, and we wish he would explain it.

"The race will gain good, alike from his truths and his errors." What advantage, then, of truth over error? and wherefore labor to correct error and disseminate truth? How long is it since error became profitable to the human race? The author holds that "to break up, fuse anew, and remould modern civilization" is an error, is uncalled for, and yet he says, let those undertake it who will; and although it cannot be seriously attempted, as everybody knows, without infinite confusion and disorder, fierce wars, terrible crimes, and inconceivable suffering, it will be only a useful experiment! Modern philanthropists have queer hearts, and can contemplate crime and misery with a wonderfully serene brow and marvellously quiet nerves.

"The realist will strive only to aid the *development* of Christendom, by blending with it his best life." Here the author plainly tells us, that all that can be rightly demanded is development, and yet he demands reform. Reform and development are not the same, nor are they compatible one with the other. Development preserves the primitive type or idea, and seeks to fulfil or actualize it; reform seeks to restore the primitive type, which has been lost, or to impress a new and different one. It re-*forms*, and necessarily presupposes the destruction of the old form; for the *materia formata* must be reduced to *materia informis* before it can receive a new form or a new impression of the primitive form, since there is no intercommunication of *species*. You must melt your wax anew, before you can give it a new impression of your old seal, or an impression of a new one. If, then, you demand reform, you oppose development; if you demand development, you oppose reform. If you are a reformer, you must "break up, fuse anew, and remould modern civilization," and your place is with those who you say are in error; if you are a developmentist, you must stand opposed to them, and your success must be their defeat, and their success must be your defeat. How, then, can you

regard their movements with indifference,—say, let them go on,—and pretend that the race will gain by their errors as well as by your truths? Have you really no opposition to their erroneous method,—really no confidence in your own true method?

We are not indulging in mere verbal criticism. Mr. Channing and his friends avowedly demand social reform; and it is evident from their declamations against the past, from their condemnation of the whole present, and their untiring efforts to substitute a new order of society for the existing one, that, when they say reform, they mean reform. Yet when they philosophize, when they undertake to defend their movements, and fix the bases of their operations, they confound reform with development, and assert the continuous progressiveness and progress of man and society. But their logic is no better than their doctrine; for it refutes itself. If there has been the progress asserted, if man and society have been continually growing better and better, reform is uncalled for; if reform is called for, the doctrine of progress asserted is false, and the progress alleged has never taken place.

"The realist will strive only to aid the development of Christendom, by *blending with it his best life*." But the life, we have seen, is already the true spiritual life, and "the fraternity of nations" is actually all we can ask. What need, then, of further development? They live the true life; what more can you ask of them? And by what right do you, a realist, planting yourself firmly on the actual, and excluding the absolute principles of idealism, go to the ideal and demand its actualization? And, furthermore, have you considered that to actualize the ideal is the province of the actual that is above it, and not of the actual that is below it? The painter is above his picture, whether the picture in his idea, or the picture on his canvas. If there is a higher ideal for man and society than that already actualized, it is God, not we, who must actualize it. No man—as we often say—can lift himself by his own waistband.

We will not affect not to understand what the author means by blending his best life with that of the fraternity of nations; for he has told us that man interchanges his real life with his fellow-men,—which, with some important qualifications, we accept. But, if the life blended is not better than the life it is blended with, it cannot aid the development contended for. My life must be better than the act-

ual life of these nations, or I cannot improve the quality of theirs by blending mine with it. Now will the author tell us where he gets a life better than the actual life he wishes to develop? We know he has said that our real life is just in degree to our full communion with the divine reality, and "this life we interchange with fellow-men." But his doctrine is, that we commune with this divine reality only in its evolutions. This reality is in the centre of our race, and it is, if not only, yet principally, with God in man that we commune,—through the divine humanity that we reach him and receive life from him. That this is his doctrine, he will not deny. Consequently, we can receive no more divine life than is in the life of the race, that is, than the race is actually living. The highest degree of this life actualized—and he is confined by his own principles to the actual—is the actual life of Christendom, or "the fraternity of nations," of which we are assumed to be members. Now we demand how the realist, by communion with this life, which is for him the divine reality itself, can get a life better than that life now is? If he can get no better life, what aid can he give to its development by blending with it his own best life? *Nemo dat, quod non habet.* If he has no better life, he can communicate no better life. If he can communicate no better life, he cannot improve the actual life of the fraternity of nations.

The author has been deceived by his silent assumption that the doctrines of the church all symbolize great philosophic truths, or principles of the natural order. We, as members of the church, are said to live a divine life by communion with the church, and by that communion only. This, Mr. Channing supposes, is merely a symbolical way of expressing a great natural fact, or truth of philosophy. The church here symbolizes humanity in its relations to God, and life by communion with her means, when translated from the symbolical language of faith into the language of science, life by communion with God in man, or the communion of man with his race. When it is said the Christian derives divine life from God through association with the church, the scientific meaning is, that man derives divine life from God through association with humanity. Hence the necessity of association as the mode or medium of divine life. But were we to concede all this, it would avail the author nothing, *because no Christian ever dreams of deriving from his association with the church a higher*

life than that which she has, or which she herself actually lives. If we profess to derive from communion with her a supernatural life, it is because we believe her to be actually living a supernatural life. Grant, then, the symbolical character of the church, grant that the interpretation of the symbol given is the true one, the author could on the strength of the concession, only assert that by communion with our race we can derive such life as it is actually living, that is, its natural life; not by any means a higher life, nor that the life we derive from it can react, and exalt its actual life.

Here is the mistake. The author evidently supposes that by communion with his race he can derive a life above the actual life of humanity, and that he can react on humanity, blend this higher life with hers, and thus assist her in actualizing a higher life for herself. But the symbolism on which he relies, even conceding it, does not bear him out. By communion with the church we receive a higher than our natural life; but she receives no life from us in return. We receive all from her, we return her nothing. Hence she remains without development. The life she lives was as perfect at first as it is now, and she had as high a life to impart to her children in the apostolic age as she has in the nineteenth century. She is susceptible of no development from the recipients of her life, and can be developed, if at all, only by the direct and supernatural agency of her Founder. So if she symbolizes, as you pretend, the natural communion of humanity, you must concede, that, though individuals may receive from humanity through that communion such life as humanity has, they can give her back no life in exchange.

We beg Mr. Channing to meditate this point, for, to use a term which he will understand, it is *pivotal* in his system. He evidently supposes that the divine reality actualizes or perfects itself by its evolutions, and that the evolutions, by a sort of reaction, perform a part in perfecting the evolver; which is to suppose that the effect reacts on its cause, and develops it. But this is very bad philosophy; for one might as well say the effect produces its own cause. But it is precisely in this supposition that lies the whole foundation of the modern doctrine of progress. It presupposes a mutual action and reaction of cause and effect, and that both, by this action and reaction, are developed and enlarged. The individual life is derived from humanity, and then reacts on

and enlarges hers, which again reacts on and enlarges his; and thus on *ad infinitum*. Hence, universal and eternal progress is the necessary law of all beings and of all being.

Mr. Channing speaks of "the idea of a divine humanity manifested through Jesus," and assumes it to be yet vital in "the fraternity of nations" which he calls Christendom. But is it correct to speak of ideas as *vital*, that is, living? Living ideas are ideas actualized, therefore no longer ideas. By the idea of a divine humanity manifested through Jesus, he intends us to understand that the mystery of the Incarnation simply symbolizes the divinity of humanity, or the fact, as he holds it, that humanity, that is, man,—that is, again, human nature,—is divine. But what proof has he that man is divine,—that is, that the human and divine are identical? What is his authority for asserting that the doctrine of the Incarnation implies any such thing? Who made him the interpreter of the Christian mysteries? Suppose man even to be divine, whence follows it that that is the sense of the mystery? The Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, as understood by Christians,—and they are, unquestionably, the proper judges of what it is that they believe,—is the reverse of what Mr. Channing supposes; for it asserts the distinction of the two natures in our Lord. The divine nature is not mingled with or absorbed in the human, nor the human mingled with or absorbed in the divine; and he only generalizes the doctrines condemned in the Eutychian and monothelite heresies. He has, therefore, no right to set forth his doctrine under the name of Jesus, or as the hidden sense of the Christian mysteries. If he would avail himself of Christian authority, he must accept it in the Christian sense.

Mr. Channing asserts that "a heaven upon earth was the first and last word of Jesus." Suppose it was; what then? Does he admit the authority of Jesus? If he does, he should remember that Jesus said, "The poor ye have always with you." Yet Mr. Channing considers it perfectly practicable to remove all poverty. Jesus said, "It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven." Yet Mr. Channing is busy with schemes for augmenting the wealth of the world, and for making all men rich. Jesus said, "Seek first the kingdom of God, and his justice, and all these things shall be added unto you." Mr. Channing says, seek these things first, and then the kingdom of God and his justice will follow. We do not, therefore, see what it can avail Mr. Channing, even if our Lord did say what is alleged.

"A heaven upon earth was the first and last word of Jesus." Be it so. Yet never did Jesus propose a heaven upon earth as the end of man. It was not on the earth, and in time, that he went to prepare mansions in his Father's house for his followers. But let that pass. "My kingdom," he said, "is not of this world;" and therefore, even if he proposed a heaven *on* earth, he proposed not a heaven *of* the earth, or a heaven derived from the world, consisting in the happiness which comes from it,—the precise order of happiness Mr. Channing and his friends are avowedly laboring to secure to all men. If our author admits the authority of Jesus at all, he must admit it throughout. Our Lord either was what he professed to be, or he was an impostor. If an impostor, his authority is good for nothing; if what he professed to be, his authority is sufficient for all he said, and we are then bound to believe all he said, for he was God himself. The practice which our socialists have of referring to his authority, when it suits their purpose, and taking his words in a sense of their own,—a sense which even they will not pretend was his sense, but at most only what would have been his sense, if he had thought like them,—is by no means logical, and is utterly unworthy of such a man as Mr. Channing.

"Some portion of a DIVINE CHRISM anoints us to the work of redeeming man universal from brutality by the miraculous power of good-will." How does Mr. Channing reconcile the idea of *redemption* with his doctrine of progress? A moment ago we had presented to us the divine humanity, and Mr. Channing, as is evident from a subsequent part of his Discourse, maintains that it is only in humanity that we commune with God; now we have this same humanity, "man universal," reduced below his nature, degraded to the category of brutes, and needing redemption from brutality. If man universal is divine and progressive, how can he become brutalized, and in need of redemption? Need we tell the author that the idea of redemption negatives the idea of progress? Why, again, does the author call *good-will* miraculous? Nothing is miraculous that is natural. *Will* is certainly natural, for man is inconceivable without it. Is it the *good*, then, that is wanting in human nature, and that can be supplied only by a miracle? If man's nature is destitute of good, by what authority do you call him divine, or speak of "divine humanity?" Or is it that the author means not that good-will itself is miraculous, but that it works miracles, is thaumaturgic? But if the will is natural, in the

order of man's nature, how can it work miracles, since a miracle, by its very definition, is an effect produced in the natural order by a *supernatural* cause? Will Mr. Channing maintain that natural causes can produce supernatural effects? If not, why, then, we ask again, does he call the power of good-will miraculous? If miraculous, it is more than human, and the *good* does not belong to man, and then can be his only through a supernatural medium of communication. But Mr. Channing admits no such *medium*, for the only medium he admits is man, or humanity.

When Mr. Channing speaks of the *divine chrism*, he makes allusion to the Christian sacrament of Holy Orders. If he takes that sacrament in the sense of the church, even he himself will not pretend that he has received it; if he takes it in some other sense, it is another thing, and does not answer to that sacrament at all. His notion, that the sacrament symbolizes a great natural fact, and that he has the thing symbolized, is not authorized, for the sacrament is not symbolical at all. It is either an empty form, a vain ceremony, or it is a divinely instituted medium through which a peculiar grace is really and supernaturally communicated to the recipient, and which can, *in hac providentia*, be communicated through no other medium. It is this, or it is nothing, just as the authority of the church herself is all, or is nothing, or worse than nothing. Mr. Channing has no right to give the sacrament of orders any other interpretation than the church gives it. To suppose a hidden sense to the sacrament, which was not apprehended by the church, nay, was denied by her, yet was implied in what she taught, will not be allowable, if you accept, and can avail you nothing, if you reject, her authority; for if you reject her authority, you reject it for what she teaches implicitly as well as for what she teaches explicitly. If you reject her authority, why do you wish to make it appear that what you teach is only the hidden sense of her teaching,—is the real sense of her sacred mysteries? Suppose it to be so, is that, on your principles, any proof that it is true? You have, undoubtedly, as every man has, the right from Almighty God to engage, mind, heart, soul, and body, in the work of redeeming man, universal and individual, from brutality. There is no question of that. But, recollect you, only by the means, and in the way and manner, which he who gives you the right ordains; for it is never lawful to do good by unlawful means. We may not do evil that good may come.

The end does not justify the means,—a principle in morals, which we commend to the serious consideration and daily meditation of all non-Catholics in general, and of all modern philanthropists and reformers in particular. But we proceed to the author's third division.

"III. The Present Period.—Now, to take our part efficiently in the special work allotted to Christendom to-day, we need to form a comprehensive judgment as to the present period of its development. This alone will give us conviction, wisdom, zeal. We must not trust to the piety of earlier times to enliven us, or to the opinions of even the wisest of by-gone ages to point out our path. Other men labored, and we have entered into their labors. True loyalty is to perfect what they planned, to fulfil and more than fulfil their highest longings. A brief historical review will show us where we stand, and what humanity expects of us.

"Before proceeding, however, to the rapid survey which we must take of the development of Christendom, let us define three terms which will frequently recur in the subsequent remarks. These terms are, The Church, The University, The State.

"Every man, every community, every nation, humanity as a whole, is constituted of three elements, which may be variously designated as love, truth, power,—or affection, intellect, energy, &c. These elements stand related as inmost, mediate, outmost; and mutually influence each other as motive, means, and end. Once again, by their instrumentality, communion is maintained with God, with spirits, with nature; so that they may with propriety be named the divine, the spiritual, the natural elements.

"The Church is the Divine element in man, the sphere of will. Opening from the central spring of feeling,—Love, one and universal,—through which the inspiration of God for ever flows in, it widens into the four grand humanitary affections by which man is made one with his kind. These are Friendship, Conjugal Love, the Family Sentiment, Honor.

"The State is the natural element in man, the sphere of use. Commencing from the supply of the lowest necessities of sensitive creatures, —food, clothing, shelter,—it aspires to form substantial conditions of comfort, refinement, and beauty, whereon the social affections may find materials of growth and symbolic manifestation, and whence happiness may raise the religious affection in thankfulness to the Author of good.

"The University is the spiritual element in man, the sphere of wisdom. Its function is harmonious distribution,—law,—order. It is the bond of reconciliation, the mediator between the Church and State. It determines the relations which should interlink the different departments of existence; it reveals the method of a truly human life.

"From these definitions it is obvious that the church and state are to

each other as spirit and body, and that the university serves as connecting soul. The church gives inspirations, which the university translates into ideas, that the state may embody them in deeds. Again, from the want or wealth, the success or failure, of the state, the university receives lessons, and thence deduces forms of law, which it presents to the church, that it may animate them with moral life. In every man, individual and collective, these three elements exist with different degrees of vitality; and sanity, integrity, blessedness, depend upon their equilibrium and harmonious action."—pp. 6-8.

These three constituent elements "stand related as inmost, mediate, outmost; and mutually influence each other as motive, means, and end." The inmost, love, supplies the motive, truth or intellect furnishes the means, power or energy is the end. Here we observe that these are all three constituent elements of man, humanity, and therefore man has his motive, means, and end in himself! This is very convenient, and saves him from the necessity of going out of himself. Why, then, does the author insist on association, assert the *solidarity* of the race, and tell us man "lives by receiving and diffusing life,"—that is, receiving life from, and imparting it to, other men? Love, or the inmost, is the motive, the outmost is the end. But love, or the inmost, is, again, the divine element, or God, in man. The end we are to seek, then, since it is the outmost, is the end furthest removed from God. We are continuously progressive; progress consists in going towards our end. Consequently, we are continually removing further and further from God, and our progress is in proportion to the distance we remove from him. Is this the reason why modern society is asserted to have made such remarkable progress, and why our own age is supposed to have so far outstripped all its predecessors?

"By their instrumentality communion is maintained with God, with spirits, with nature." A moment ago, these three elements were presented as motive, means, and end; now they are all three presented as means. But as means to what end? By love we commune with God, by intelligence with spirits, by power or energy with nature. Love is the motive power, intellect is the means, power the end; that is, love moves us, intelligence enables us, to exercise power over nature. So man is constituted, and is bound to exert himself, to acquire power over nature, or the outward! But the intellect is mediate between the two, and simply furnishes the means. So the motive and the end are both blind, and the man acts from darkness to darkness,—which we doubt not is the case with our modern socialists.

We commune with God, according to the author, by love; that is, God is the object of love, as spirits of intellect, nature of power; whence we conclude that God is not the object of the intellect, or, in other words, that, though we may love God, we do not know or intellectually apprehend him. If we could intellectually apprehend him, we could commune with him intellectually, and intellect would be as rightfully termed divine, on the author's own principles, as the element of love itself. But how is it possible to commune with God by love without communing with him by intellect? To commune with God by love must imply loving him as well as receiving love from him,—unless the author uses language in a non-natural sense, like the Puseyites. But can we love what we do not intellectually apprehend? Can love act before the intellect acts and presents the object to be loved? Has Mr. Channing forgotten his philosophy?

Is the author correct in making the motive proceed from love, that is, will, instead of being addressed to it? Motive, if we understand it, is supplied by intellect, and is that which moves the will to act. It is the ground or reason of the act. The author identifies love and will, to which we do not object; but we never before heard will and motive identified. We have always supposed that the *power* to act and the *motive* to act were very distinguishable, —as much so as the belief of a proposition and the reason or evidence for believing it. Will, we have always been taught, is the power or faculty which we possess of acting from rational motives, or motives presented by intelligence, and hence of acting freely, without physical compulsion,— in which respect the action of will is distinguished from physical action, as the action of the lungs, the circulation of the blood, the contraction of the muscles, or the lightning rending the oak. The action of will is *for* an end,—*propter finem;* physical action, or even instinctive action, is simply *to* an end,—*ad finem.* The reason presents the end and the motive for seeking it, and the will chooses or rejects it, determines to gain or not to gain it. Mr. Channing, therefore, cannot be correct in making the will the motive. By doing so, he destroys the essential character of will, and reduces all human activity to simple impulsive or instinctive activity. Indeed, it is the characteristic of Mr. Channing's school to place instinctive action, which they call spontaneity, above will or voluntary action. But is Mr. Channing aware, that, in doing this, in reducing will to

instinct, he is destroying the very condition of all moral action, of all ethics, of all merit or demerit, and placing the goodness of a man in the same category with the goodness of the dog, the horse, or the pig? If he is, we ask him if he expects to reform society, and to realize an earthly paradise, by denying all moral distinctions, all moral accountability, that is, by striking out the whole moral order? Can it be that Fourierism has entirely obliterated that fine moral sense, that rare conscientiousness, that intense, almost morbid, feeling of accountability, which we so admired and loved and reverenced years ago in our young friend, and which made him so dear to us, and to all who knew how to appreciate him?

"The church is the divine element in man, the sphere of will." The church, then, is in man, a constituent element of man's nature; then not an outward institution, a visible organization, or congregation. As it is restricted to the sphere of will, it can have no authority to teach or to govern, and therefore nothing to do with faith, morals, or discipline. These belong respectively to the university and the state. Have we here the Christian conception? Is such a church the Christian church? Does it bear any analogy to any thing called the church in any speech or tongue of men? Assuredly not. By what right, then, does Mr. Channing call it the church? He is an honest man and a brave, and therefore cannot wish to make people believe that he holds to what he does not, or does not hold what he does. How can he justify himself in using a common and well-known term in a sense purely arbitrary, and unauthorized by any analogy in the ordinary sense? Language is not his or ours; it is *common* property, and not even socialists have the right to enter upon and appropriate it as private property,—communists as many of them are.

"Opening from the central spring of feeling,—Love, one and universal,—through which the inspiration of God for ever flows in, it [the church, love, the divine element in man] widens into the four grand humanitary affections by which man is made one with his kind." Here it is to be remarked, that the divine element is identified with love, one and universal. This love, one and universal, we take it, is what the author means by God, or the divine being himself. So God, at least in his essence, is one of the constituent elements of man, that is, of human nature! We do not understand this, or, if we do, we have some difficulty

in accepting it. We are made after the image and likeness of God, and we live and move and have our being in him, but not as God. If this is the author's meaning, why does he make the divinity merely *one* of the three constituent elements of man? In this sense, he constitutes our whole being, is the being of our being, under the aspects of intellect and power or energy, as under that of love. But if he means something else, what can he mean, but that man, in so far as he is love, or loves, is God, and in all other respects is to be distinguished from God, so that man is at once man, a creature, and God, the Creator? Is this his meaning, and what he means by "divine humanity," that is, a humanity constituted by a blending or confusion of the human and divine natures? By restricting the divine to a single element, and asserting two elements not divine, he recognizes a proper human nature as distinct from God, at least an imperfect or inchoate human nature; and by making the other element, necessary to the constitution of man, identically God, he compounds man of both natures, and regards the human, on one side, as the complement of the divine, and the divine, on the other, as the complement of the human. This is the only meaning we can extract from his several statements. If this is his meaning, it has all the difficulties to contend with, which the Spinozists allege lie in the way of creation from nothing, and all the unanswerable objections to which pantheism is itself exposed. Mr. Channing seems to have devised it expressly for the purpose of harmonizing the conception of a creative Deity, on the one hand, with the patheistic conception on the other; the assertion of created beings distinct from God, with the assertion that all is God, and nothing can be distinguished from him,—two assertions, which, being eternally irreconcilable, can give birth only to a monstrous syncretism.

If the author had given man complete as man, having his being in God, yet distinct from God, as the effect from the cause, the creature from the Creator, and merely supposed, over and above, a supernaturally divine element operative in him, we could easily have understood and accepted his view. If he had, then, defined the church to be the divinely constituted medium through which this divine element, or divine life, is communicated to man and kept alive and active in him, we should have recognized with pleasure the Christian doctrine, and have had little fault to find with his fundamental principle. And, after all, this is

precisely the doctrine which he needs, and to which he must come in order to meet the demands of his own system. But this is not his meaning, as is evident from the fact that this divine element itself only "widens into the *humanitary* affections, friendship, conjugal love, the family sentiment, honor." With all his influx of the divinity, therefore, he does not elevate our life above the human. Evidently, then, the divinity he recognizes in man is the divinity in our nature, not the Divinity above it.

Taking our author's definition of the church, what is his problem? "The Christian church and social reform," he says, are "the two extremes of man's existence," and "the law of harmonious coöperation between them is the thought which is shaping itself in all enlightened minds." But the Christian church is love, one of the three constituent elements of human nature, and in its expansion gives us the humanitary affections of friendship, conjugal love, family sentiment, and honor. Here is one extreme. The other is social reform. What means a law of harmonious coöperation between them? Is it the reconciliation of social reform with friendship and honor, marriage, parental and filial love and duty? that is, to show how social reform can be carried on without wounding these? That is a problem, indeed, but hardly Mr. Channing's. Is it by social reform to provide freer and fuller scope for these humanitary affections? No; for that would make them the end, and they are the inmost, and not the end, since, as the author expressly tells us, the outmost, the other extreme, is the end.

The author says the church is love, opening from the central feeling, love, one and universal; and that the church is one extreme, and social reform the other. The other extreme from love is hatred. If, then, the church opens from love, social reform must open from hatred. The law of harmonious coöperation between love and hatred must, then, be "the thought which is shaping itself in all enlightened minds." We shall be curious to see that thought when it has fairly shaped itself.

"It [the state] aspires to form substantial conditions of comfort, refinement, and beauty, whereon the social affections may find materials of growth and symbolic manifestation, and whence *happiness may raise the religious affection* in thankfulness to the Author of good." There is much here not easily reconcilable with some other things which

have been said, but we let it pass, for we are growing somewhat weary. We remark simply that the author makes the happiness derived from the world, from nature, represented by the state, the condition of religious activity. Happiness produces religion. Men are devout in proportion as they are filled with this world's goods, and "their eyes stand out with fatness"! This is evidently a new discovery; at least, it does not appear to have been known by St. Paul, or by our Lord. We have been accustomed to expect happiness from religion, not religion from happiness. So far as we have observed, prosperity is a far greater enemy to religion than adversity; and the poor and suffering, the wronged and afflicted, we have generally found more ready to raise their hearts in devout thanksgiving to God, than those who want for nothing, and "have more than heart can wish."

"It [the university] determines the relations which should interlink the different departments of existence; it reveals the method of a truly *human* life." But what guaranties the university? On one side you have a blind church, through which streams of generous and noble feelings are pouring themselves in, and on the other the state, equally blind, wielding the whole might of physical power; between these two blind forces you place the university, and make the truth and sanctity of the one and the wisdom and utility of the other depend on it alone. It is under no regimen, subject to no law, has no divine revelations, and, even on your own principles, no divine guidance. Whence is it to derive its own light, and what surety have you that it will not be made the tool of blind zeal, or of equally blind sensuality, and, in either case, precipitate you into the bottomless pit of error and corruption?

"The church gives inspirations, which the university translates into ideas, that the state may embody them in deeds." These inspirations are blind sentimental impulses; nothing more, nothing less. What certainty is there that the university, which is uninspired,—which has, at best, only simple human intelligence,—will render them faithfully, and form them into sane ideas? Is human intelligence infallible? has it never been known to err? Again, what certainty is there, that, even in case it should faithfully render the inspirations, the state will properly embody them? The state represents the physical element, what modern psychologists call sensibility, or the principle of sensation, as distinguished from intellection and volition. It will be pushed by a con-

trary set of impulses, those of the senses; and why may it not yield to these, instead of laboring to embody in deeds the ideas the university translates from the sentimental impulses? Does it never happen in actual life that both understanding and will are led captive by the senses? May it not, then, happen, as it has often happened, and, indeed, has become a characteristic of most modern states, that the state will lead captive the church and the university, and thus establish the absolute despotism of the senses over both thought and conscience? Mr. Channing himself tells us that "sanity, integrity, blessedness, depend upon the equilibrium of the three elements, and their harmonious action." What is the guaranty of that equilibrium? It has been disturbed, and the author makes the evils of Christendom in the mediæval ages flow from the predominance of the religious sentiment, the divine element in man, that is, from the fact that man and society were too religious, too full of God, too subject to divine inspiration. May not men run to the opposite extreme, and come to have too little of God, and too much of the senses, to answer to Mr. Channing's *beau ideal?* We grant that he is disposed to "give the devil his due," and even to treat him generously; but we do not understand that he wishes to give him exclusive dominion. What guaranty has he, that, in the struggle not to have too much of God, we may not get quite too much of the devil?

But these three elements, the church, the state, the university, are, in each man, constitutive of his nature. Now, as they exist in man, they are harmonized, are in equilibrium, or they are not. If they are, pray tell us how they can be otherwise in their manifestations? If not, pray tell us how, without something superior to them, you can contrive to reduce their manifestations to harmony? You tell us, here is the church, as an element of human nature, pouring in a perennial stream of inspirations; here is the university to translate them into ideas; and here is the state to embody them in deeds. All admirable, no doubt; but they are too much or too little. Suppose them to be enough they are too much, for then no disruption of harmony could ever have occurred; and we know, and you admit, the equilibrium, the harmony, has been and may be disturbed. If they are not psychologically in equilibrium, they cannot be in equilibrium in their manifestations, and are too little for your purpose. You cannot have in the effect what you have not

in the cause, and the effect cannot react on its cause, and develop, perfect, or complete its causality, as we have already shown, and as is evident of itself.

It is, perhaps, but fair to the author to say, that, when he speaks of the church, the state, and the university, as constituent elements of human nature, he probably means only that they are the products, or outward expressions, of those elements. He recognizes in man three elements, which he calls love, intellect, power, but which we may name, more intelligibly, sentiment, intellect, sensibility, or the principle of sensation. Out of sentiment springs the church; out of sensibility, or sensation, the state; and out of intellect the university, the mediator between the other two. He does not wish these three institutions to be separated, to exist as separate or distinct organizations, but wishes them to be all harmoniously blended in one association, which shall be at once and indissolubly church-state-university,—*sentiment-sensation-connaissance*, in the language of Pierre Leroux. But as all proceeds from man, and is nothing but the outward expression of the inward, there can be nothing in such association not previously in man himself. But since it is undeniable that the elements expressed do not exist in man in harmony, in equilibrium, it follows inevitably, that there cannot be the harmony, the equilibrium, between the three constituent elements of the association, which is desired or contemplated.

Here is the difficulty. Some method must be devised by which the harmony or equilibrium may be restored or established in the interior of man. How is this to be done? One class of socialists boldly assert the *natura integra*, which Christians believe was lost together with original justice by the fall; that is, they deny that there is any want of harmony or equilibrium in the interior of man, and maintain that all the elements or forces of man's nature are, interiorly considered, nicely balanced and properly adjusted. The apparent disorder does not originate from within, but proceeds from obstructions without, in the outmost, which prevent the inmost from acting itself out according to its own laws. Remove, then, obstructions raised by ignorance or craft, and all will proceed harmoniously.

But Mr. Channing cannot take this view, because he sees that it is false, knows that the interior harmony asserted is a dream, and no reality; and because he begins by assuming that all action is from within outward, and that the *without*

is only the evolution of the *within*. This is clear from his definitions which we have quoted, and from his whole system of philosophy, which supposes the universe itself to be only the evolution of the Divinity in progressive series. Since, then, there is undeniable disorder and disproportion out of man, he must admit disorder and disproportion in man. Hence he says, "In every man, individual and collective, these three elements exist with *different* degrees of vitality; and sanity, integrity, blessedness, depend upon their equilibrium and harmonious action."

To restore, establish, or maintain this equilibrium, which is wanting even in the interior of man, there are only two methods within the reach of those who reject the supernatural. One, to organize the outward; but that will not do, because it will be only the image of the inward. The other is to draw upon the interior itself; but that will not do, because from man's interior you can get only his interior, and that is disordered and out of proportion. Then it is obviously necessary to look beyond man's actual nature, as we say,—beyond man's actual interior life, as Mr. Channing says,—to God, who is harmony itself, and an inexhaustible supply of harmonious life. Hence the necessity of communion with God, religion, which Mr. Channing feels, and strongly asserts. In this he is more clear-sighted than most of his associates, and here we recognize the action of his religiosity.

But how to establish this communion, by means of which we may obtain from God this higher life, is now the problem. It is a difficult one for Mr. Channing, because he feels that he must confine himself to a natural communion, or, to be more strictly exact, to a natural *medium* of communion. He thinks, however, that he has a natural medium of supernatural communion, and therefore of supernatural life. The church is the outward expression of inward sentiment, that is, the sentiment of love. This sentiment, he assumes, is the medium through which we commune with God, or through which his inspirations flow in to reanimate us. But this inward sentiment, which is a constituent element of our nature, without which we should want a portion of our nature, and should not be men, he next assumes, is identically the one universal love, the principle and life of all things, the infinite and eternal God. God being thus in our nature, we have in ourselves the infinite Source of life, to which we may recur, and replenish and enlarge our lives at will.

Through the four humanitary affections named, we may constantly receive fresh supplies of a higher and better life. We met this same view, substantially, some time ago, when we were reviewing Mr. Parker's *Discourse of Matters Pertaining to Religion*, and it is common to all our modern transcendentalists. But this doctrine, which rests on two unproved assumptions, does not relieve the difficulty; for *the* God supposed is not the God out of man and above him, but the God in him, and constitutive of his nature. Communion with him is only communion with our own nature, and, by simple communion with our nature, we can derive no life above it. Whatever be your meaning in making God one of the constituent elements of man's nature, you undoubtedly mean to assert it in a sense which leaves man distinguishable from God; otherwise you make man God, and then God only man, which of course gives you nothing to your purpose; for from man we can get only man. In order that there may be a higher life than man's, God must be conceived above man, and then man must be distinguished from God, and have a fixed and determinate nature, which is human nature. Grant, then, that the divine in man is in some sense one with the divine out of man, one as to *essence*, but not one as to *existence*,—grant that the human does not exhaust the divine, that God in us, as the being of our being, infinitely transcends us, and contains in himself exhaustless supplies of life, infinitely higher than the life man actually lives,—still, through human nature as your medium of communion, you can derive no higher life from him than your natural life. The quantity and the quality of the life to be derived from him is determined, not by the life he contains or is, but by the nature and capacity of the medium through which it is to be communicated. To deny this would be to deny all distinction of natures, species, and even of individuals, and would be to assert that all species and individuals are one, for they all live, and move, and have their being in God,—all derive their life, whatever it is, and such as it is, from God, who is the only source of life; and it would, furthermore, be to assert, that man, that all men, brutes, and even inanimate things, are God, at least *in potentia*. The medium of communication must, then, determine both the quantity and the quality of life communicated, for God gives to each being life after its kind, and in proportion to its capacity. Then through a natural medium man can receive from God only his natural life. Can nature be a medium of any thing larger than itself? Of course not.

We here pass over the author's doctrine of divine humanity. Be it that our natural life is divine, still, to obtain more than we already have by nature, we must have a higher than a natural medium of communion. Here is the grand defect in Mr. Channing's system. He gains nothing by asserting the identity of one element of man's nature with the divine, for the assertion either represents man as God, or it does not. If it does, it asserts that God is man, and then he contains no more than man, and man can have no higher life than he has; if it does not, the divine element in man is not the infinite God, but determinate human existence, and therefore precisely what we mean by human nature,—man existing,—and can be the medium of only the proper determinate life of humanity. What the author wants is a superhuman life for man,—God supernaturally present in man, elevating him above his nature, and enabling him to live, intellectually and morally, a life above his natural life. This is what he wants, —what, day and night, he is seeking with untiring perseverance, with a zeal which we honor, with a singleness of purpose which we reverence, and with an earnestness which is worthy of all praise. He wants to live in a higher and more intimate communion with God. Unhappily, his rationalistic education has led him to suppose that the medium of this communion must be natural. We say *medium*, for we do not doubt that he recognizes the necessity of a supernatural life. It is not the need of supernatural life he denies, but the need of a supernatural medium of its communication. He supposes that God must have made man's nature the adequate medium of all the good man can need or receive. Hence, instead of asking whether God has provided a supernatural medium for the communication of supernatural life, he wastes his fine feelings, his noble intellect, and his great energies, in the vain endeavour to obtain that life through association or the communion of humanity, which compels him to turn forever within the sphere of that very nature above which it is his earnest endeavour to rise. He is unwilling to admit any *extra* or *super*-human medium of life. Thus it is, he makes the church, the state, and the university open from elements of human nature, the simple expression of man's interior life. Doubtless he holds that they have a divine origin, and would regard us as misapprehending or misrepresenting him, if we should assert that he makes them purely human creations; but they are from God only mediately, through the medium of man's nature, which

makes them pure human creations, in the only sense in which any thing can be a purely human creation. Here is the source of his difficulty.

That these institutions—or leaving out the university as a separate institution, for it is integral in the church—are for man, and respond to deep and indestructible wants of his soul, and of his body, we of course do not question. But that they open from our nature, are simply the expression of these wants, is a mere assumption,—an assumption which cannot be proved, and which, if it could be, would entirely destroy their value; for, with all deference to Mr. Channing, *the end of man is not to express himself*,—to give *outness* to his thoughts, sentiments, and sensations, or to embody them in institutions. The expression can never be the end, because, if the being is reasonable, it must be for something, —there must be a *propter quem* of the expression. To deny this would be to deny reason itself. Man cannot, *in hac providentia*, live his normal, natural life without the state, or his supernatural, divine life without the church; but what proves that both have not been instituted for man by his Creator and his Redeemer, instead of having sprung out of man's own nature? Christians assert this; only a few men assert the contrary, and they are in general more remarkable for their bold theorizing than for their science or practical wisdom. Assertion for assertion, the assertion of the former, even at the very lowest, is worth as much as the assertion of the latter. May we ask Mr. Channing to reflect on this?

It is no part of our purpose in these remarks to throw the church in Mr. Channing's face, for our design has been to test his system by principles which he himself admits or must admit as a philosopher. To us, who occupy the high standpoint of Catholicity, it is easy to see that his only recourse for the higher life he wants, and which he feels that he must have, is the church, the supernaturally constituted medium of supernatural life,—that is, in Christian language, grace. He wishes to secure the supernatural life, and without superseding the necessity of human effort. God doubtless could—we certainly know no reason why he could not—communicate a supernatural life, immediately, without the church; but if he communicated it immediately, he would not communicate it through nature; for to communicate it through nature, even if that were possible, would be to communicate it mediately. Moreover, if he communicated it

immediately, there would be no sphere of human activity in attaining it. We could only long for it, and wait passively for its communication. If it is to be obtained by us, and we are to have any part in obtaining it, any merit in living it, there must be a medium to which we can apply, and through which we can regularly obtain it,—that is, there must be the church. The church is not needed by God to enable him to communicate the life, but by us, as a regular medium of obtaining it.

The church lives a supernaturally divine life, for she is the body of him who is "the way, the truth, and the life," —who has life in himself, and giveth life to all who come unto him. By communion with her we commune supernaturally with God, the exhaustless Source of life, and from him, through her, derive supernatural life. This is precisely what Mr. Channing wants. This meets and removes every difficulty he feels, and gives him all, and more than all, he seeks. Let it be, that, by what Leroux calls "the communion of humanity," he can obtain a divine life; this does not diminish that life, but gives a superabundant life,—opens to him a life still more divine, a truly supernatural life, by which man is raised to a higher participation of the divine nature here, with the promise of a still higher participation of that nature in the *lumen gloriæ*, or beatific vision hereafter. God, in giving us his church as the supernatural medium of supernatural life, does not make the life we receive by natural communion less divine, but provides for us a life diviner still, and without which the natural life wants a purpose, is inadequate to our good, and can never conduce to the glory for which our God in his superabundant goodness destined us. In nature, God is a beneficent Creator, a just Sovereign, an inflexible Judge; in the church, he is our loving Father, our compassionate Redeemer, our warm personal Friend, who is touched with our infirmities, who pleads our cause as his own, and holds us ever in the arms of his infinite tenderness and love.

There are other things in the extracts we have made on which we should like to comment, but we have exhausted our space, and must reserve them, with the remainder of the Discourse, for a future occasion. We have commented freely, not with asperity, on Mr. Channing's statements,—not, we assure him, for the purpose of giving him pain, but for the purpose of pointing out to him and his socialistic friends, how vague and confused is the thought, how loose and un-

certain the expression, of modern socialism. This Discourse is a fair specimen. He has written it with care, and has weighed with more than ordinary attention the words he has used. The contradictions and confusion we have pointed out, whether in the thought or the expression, belong to the system, not to the writer. We are aware that his friends accuse him of being loose and illogical; but we are equally well aware, that, if, in this respect, he appears to disadvantage by their side, it is only because he is really more logical and consistent than they, and because his vision is clearer and more comprehensive than theirs. He is more faithful to the system, and better aware than they of its defects without religion. He has tried to harmonize their conceptions with the Christian, and to give some sort of completeness to them. It is his endeavour to render socialism religious and systematic, that has involved him in the inextricable mazes of contradiction and absurdity. If his mind had not been in some sense religious, and more than ordinarily logical, he could never have made socialism appear so utterly irreligious and absurd. If his statement is, throughout, irreligious, illogical, and absurd, it is because such was the intrinsic character of what he had to state. A less ingenuous writer, a more sophistical mind, would have glossed over some things, and suppressed others, and made his statement appear more consistent to the superficial; but he would have been less faithful, and been more wanting in that higher logic which shrinks from no conclusions that follow from its premises. Let no man charge the absurdity to Mr. Channing's statement, and let every one know that he is just to the system. Mr. Channing is no every-day man, and no man of his school has clearer or more comprehensive views, though some may be more adroit sophists. He is inferior in learning to few of them, perhaps to none of them, unless it be Mr. Parker, to whom he is far superior in candor, ingenuousness, and innate reverence for truth and sanctity. Indeed, his views are so clear and comprehensive, and his sense of religion so strong, that we have little doubt that he will soon leave his school behind him, and seek what his heart craves and his mind needs, where alone it can be found, in the church of God.

ARTICLE II.

We perhaps said all that is really necessary for the refutation of the principles of this Discourse in our first article; but as we set out with the intention of giving them a somewhat thorough examination, we shall resume our comments, although in continuing them we may be obliged to repeat many things which, in substance, we have already said.

Our readers, we trust, will recollect that Mr. Channing supposes man to be composed of three elements,—love, intellect, power,—which give birth, respectively, in their outward expression, to the church, the university, and the state; and that his aim is to harmonize these three institutions in society, so as through them to harmonize in the interior of man the three elements from which they spring. He assumes that there has been a development of Christendom, that is, of the nations professing the Christian religion, and that, by ascertaining the law of this development, we can arrive at the principles and methods of effecting the harmony proposed. We let him now speak for himself.

"Now the development of Christendom may be best understood by tracing the formation, union, division, of its church, university, state,—or its religious, scientific, and political organizations,—in successive eras. Let us pass in review four of these, already gone, which will lead us to a fifth, in the unfolding of which our lot is cast.

"1. In the *first* era, the constituent elements of Christendom existed in a condition of relative *Independence*. Amidst the breaking up of once stately institutions and the incursions of fresh barbaric tribes, amidst desolating wars and corrupting courts,—amidst societies dissolving from decrepitude, or dying by suicide,—the life of love, the law of brotherhood, the hope of heaven, which from the divine benignity of Jesus had passed into the hearts of his followers, lay hid, like a vital germ in the decaying seed. Oriental philosophy, Greek and Roman mythology, the guesses of Alexandrian or Gnostic mysticism, the lawlessness and rude traditions of savage minds, offered no reconciling bond between small, persecuted congregations united by the fluent power of charity, and distracted nations jostled together in violent destruction. Who, in that feeble embryo, foresaw a Godlike humanity slowly maturing? Yet, formless as were then the church, the university, the state, and at first glance seemingly hostile, convergent tendencies gradually appear; till at length the faith of a Galilean sect becomes the religion of the Roman empire,—and sages, summoned to council from distant regions, announce a Creed.

"2. And so we enter the *second* era of Christendom. This era is characterized by its pervading spirit of *Authority*, its aspiration after order, its determination at any cost and by any means to establish relations of intercommunion and of hierarchy among the yet incongruous elements. A vast confederacy of archbishops, bishops, and inferior clergy, ranked in grades around a common head, constitutes the aristocracy of the church. Nobles, surrounded by loyal vassals, stand grouped in haughty circles about their kings, who strive by craft or war to establish one central monarchy which may hold the balance of power among the allied though rival nations; and thus is organized the aristocracy of the state. Meantime, theology formed into a system, and ancient philosophy recast in modern moulds, and subtile metaphysics and stern logic, establish the dynasty of the schoolmen, the aristocracy of the university; while the spiritual power threatening excommunication upon heretics, and the temporal power punishing as magic the discoveries and inventions of genius, uphold dictatorship in the realm of thought. The unity of *Force* fulfils its end, when pope and emperor and council conspire to cramp elastic Europe with the leading-strings of a monotonous despotism.

"3. But crosier and sceptre wielded by tyrants lose their claim to reverence; and a creed that makes believe is mentally abjured, while the lips profess it. The church, claiming to use the purse and sword, the prison and fagot, becomes a corrupt politician; the state, arrogating to itself control over conscience belonging to God alone, and turning religion into a prop of power, convicts itself of blasphemous usurpation; while youthful thought, under the mentorship of classic antiquity, and cheered to adventure in the wide world which science discloses, laughs the censorship of the university to scorn. The time for protest has come. This is the *third* era of Christendom; its characteristic is *Individual Freedom*. The reform is at first incomplete, its progress slow; its very authors establish petty popedoms of their own, hold tenaciously to the shattered fragments of feudalism, and strive to fence in the new soil wherewith the freshet has overspread old landmarks. But it is all in vain. The thought of the inviolability of the individual has taken form in men's consciousness. In simple yet saintly souls, spiritualism abides like an angel of the Lord, suggesting the freest flights of piety; to thousands of earnest seekers, truth comes, and, putting aside the masks of tradition, smiles out in original beauty; and the instincts of multitudes feel afar the gathering earthquake, which is to swallow up caste, privilege, and unjust distinctions. The variety, latent in the formal unity, buds forth and branches and blooms. The church and university and state divide again for freer, fuller growth. Sect rises from sect, and system from system, and party from party; restless aspiration, controversy, enterprise, stimulate the nations to gigantic exertions; there is a prophetic yearning for a good not yet accomplished, a reaching forward to a new world.

"4. Liberty of conscience, of thought, and of action, acknowledged in principle and partially exercised, cannot but thoroughly embody themselves in deeds. Asserting the direct communion of every spirit with God, through his appointed mediations, the reformer must carry out his doctrine of personal sacredness through all departments, intellectual and physical. An unconscious logic pervades nations and ages, and rigidly determines their conduct. And thus opens upon us the *fourth* era of Christendom, whose characteristic is *Practical Equality*. The unity of the church is broken, and with the loss of its prestige has gone much of its sanctifying power; by unavoidable reaction, the senses, long curbed or constrained to deceptive indulgence, demand the rights which asceticism has denied; priests, proved guilty of outside morality, sink into objects of contempt; and goodness, manifested in kindly acts, becomes the only tolerable worship. Thus all are equals before God. Again, the authority of the university once shaken off, minds follow impetuously the lead of wild speculation; seated on the temporary judgment-bench of common sense, they call up for trial every time-hallowed rite, dogma, law, and custom; or, driven on by the mob spirit of iconoclasts, blacken with flaring torches of scepticism the temples of faith, and deface with careless ridicule the shrines of once-honored sages. It is the sans-culottism of free inquiry, where learned and ignorant are 'hail, fellow, well met'; and every one, in his claim to hold and declare opinions, ranks as his neighbour's peer. Above all, as specially marking this epoch, is the desire for a practical test of principles manifested in the sphere of the state. The form of political institutions which it naturally seeks to organize is democracy, the establishment of equal rights. But—whether hindered from realizing this ultimate manifestation, or successful, as it has been in this nation, and will soon be elsewhere—it bursts on all sides resistlessly forth in utilitarianism; and, seizing control of industry, finance, commerce, social usages, the press, the pulpit,—under pretence of equal protection to property,—and in the name and authority of political economy, makes money the ruler alike over priests and scholars, over nobles and people. Intense individual selfishness, *laissez-faire*, competition, exaggerated estimate of outward good, expediency as the habitual rule, wealth as chief title to honor and power, are the final consummation of this fourth era of Christendom,—which is passing,—has passed.

"5. When this last described era is thus spoken of—like those which have preceded it—as already gone, let the assertion be understood to mean, that a *new principle* is working to-day throughout Christendom. Slowly, very slowly indeed, to one whose span is threescore years, sweeps by the procession of the ages,—each under its special banner, clothed with its own insignia, and bearing the emblems of its appropriate work. In the marching and countermarching of the mighty host, principles and tendencies may seem to approximate, and even to walk in parallel columns, which really are separated by the lapse of centuries;

and laggards there are, too, behind their times, who, limping after their own divisions, block up the path which of right belongs to the new-comers. Still, ever onward moves mankind ; and the Tricolor banner of this generation is greeted with cheer on cheer of 'Fraternity' from the hearts of millions, while hands long sundered by selfish jealousies are clasped in pledge of mutual service. We have entered a *fifth* era of Christendom, whose watchword is *Coöperation*. As in the first era, he was the truest Christian who bore his glimmering light into the forests of barbarism, and translated from parchment manuscript the Gospel of peace to armed hordes camped around their watchfires; as, in the second era, he was the truest Christian who, in loyal consciousness of the unity of Christendom, took his station, high or low, with the magnanimous intent to sacrifice life, wealth, affection, conscience, all for the collective good of the kingdom of God,—now immersing himself in the cells of monasteries, now with dying breath upon the battle-field praying his fellow-crusader to bear his heart to the holy sepulchre ; as in the third era, he was the truest Christian who confronted prelatic bigotry, corruption in high places, and vulgar prejudices,—who bore unmoved the ridicule of the courtier at his puritan primness, grew prematurely gray with study, or led out bands of stern and godly pilgrims, to plant colonies in savage lands ; as in the last age, he was the truest Christian who, firmly centred in a pure conscience, trusted reason boldly in every field of investigation, followed out principles fearlessly to their extreme consequences in action, demanded the widest diffusion of learning, the freest exercise of speech, the most active charity, the strictest justice, and who unscrupulously brought his battery of reform to bear against every bastile of oppression and palace of exclusiveness;—so in *this* generation, he is the truest Christian who most unreservedly yields up mind, heart, and energy to the grand impulse of RECONCILIATION.

"What humanity commands to-day is not destruction, but construction; not revolution, but reform; not dissolution, but resurrection. It would keep all it has gained in past eras of divergence, and multiply each partial good by prolific interchange. It wishes independence for the church and university and state, not as unrelated, but as correlated in concentric spheres,—the THREE ESTATES, whose functions are diverse, though complementary to each other; whose boundaries should be mutually inviolate, while their forces are allied. It wishes unity throughout the divine,—the spiritual,—the natural department of life, collective and individual, not by constraint or sacrifice, but by fulness of development and harmonious counterpoise. It sanctions individual Freedom without bounds, in religion, science, and politics; but it teaches that the only liberty in the universe is love,—that finite creatures live in and for one another, and that their common destiny is compassed by an Infinite original and end. Finally, it demands practical equality,—the only equality, that is to say, which, in a universe of graduated relations, whereon as a ladder the angels of God's mercy are for ever descending

and ascending, is *practical*,—unchecked opportunity for every being to develop its powers symmetrically, and to use them for the common good. The privileges and responsibilities, the temptations and encouragements, the trials and the joys, of such an age are as many as the results which it aims to realize are magnificent. And the devotedness, the reverence, the heroism, the energy of earlier times, like silver-headed ancestors, are gathered around the baptismal font of this New Era, to anoint it with their benedictions."--pp. 8-15.

It strikes us, with our very limited knowledge of history, that these five eras or epochs are purely arbitrary, and, if modern history is really divisible into distinct periods, Mr. Channing has failed to characterize them. We must complain, moreover, of the absence of chronology. We can guess at the date of the commencement of the series, but where the author ends his first era, and begins and ends his second, his third, or his fourth, it is impossible to determine with any tolerable degree of certainty. This is a serious defect, and gives him a chance to evade, if he chooses, many of the criticisms we might be disposed to offer, by replying that they are applicable only to an earlier or later period of time than is included in the given era. This is not fair. A man who writes to instruct, to communicate truth, and not merely to confuse the reader, to support a theory, or to escape conviction, should study to be definite and exact. In reasoning on history, facts and dates are of considerable importance.

Mr. Channing assumes that there has been a development of Christendom, and supposes it capable of a scientific exposition. He aims at what is called philosophy of history, and, in creating it, attends only to what are called principles. Facts and dates, as nations and individuals, he counts for nothing. All he looks for is the ideas which the race is engaged in realizing, and he determines the idea of a given era, *a priori*,—deduces it from the psychological or ontological principles recognized by his theory, not from the actual facts and events in space and time which history records. It is necessary to his purpose, or the purposes of his theory, that history should have been so and so, therefore it was so and so, and may be written without any reference to the chronicles or annals of nations. This is convenient for the system-monger, or the philosopher who fancies that he can spin the world, spider-like, from his own bowels; but it can hardly satisfy the man who seeks truth, and would build his castle on solid ground, not in the air.

It presupposes, also, a system of fatalism, which is unsupported by any authority, and is contradicted by all the laws, usages, and common sense of mankind. History can be written *a priori*, reduced to a science, or logically deduced from either psychological or ontological principles, as Hegel and Cousin would have us believe, only on condition that there is nothing contingent in the universe, that there is nothing in history but these principles themselves, and that they are developed by a law of stern and invincible necessity. But this is not true; for in human affairs we must always recognize the freedom of God on the one hand, and the free agency of man on the other, which no philosopher can measure, and the influence of which on the events of history no science can determine, either beforehand or afterwards. History is simply a record of facts, and can be ascertained, without special divine inspiration, only in the study of the facts themselves. Hence your philosophies of history are and must be all arbitrary, illusory, chimerical, unworthy of the least confidence. You must measure the infinite freedom of the infinite and eternal God, and calculate the free agency of man, as elements in the production of historical events, before you can reasonably aspire to the creation of a philosophy of history, in the sense of modern philosophers.

Assuming a regular development of Christendom, the author supposes that this development has been in four successive eras, which have passed, and is now entering the fifth era;—yet not because he finds this number of eras distinctly marked in history, but because his theory of development requires that there should be that number to give an era to each of the principles he wishes to find successively developed. The principle on which he writes is not the old one of bending theory to facts, but the modern one of bending facts to theory. Why should not facts bend to theory? Theory is deduced from principles intuitively apprehended by reason; facts rest on the authority of ignorant chroniclers, stupid annalists, and uncertain tradition. Is not theory, then, superior to facts, and ought it not to govern facts? If the facts were as they ought to have been, will they not harmonize with theory? And if they do not, is it not a proof that they were not what they ought to have been, and therefore wicked or rebellious facts, with which the less we have to do the better? Well, having determined that there ought to be the number of successive

eras mentioned, the author concludes that there has been. Having determined, again, what, according to his theory, should have been their several characteristics, he concludes what they actually were, and proceeds to state his conclusion. The first epoch was characterized by the "relative independence" of the church, university, state, or the religious, scientifical, and political organizations of Christendom; the second, by the "pervading spirit of authority"; the third, by the predominance of "individual freedom"; the fourth, by "practical equality"; and the fifth is to be characterized by the principle of "coöperation," or association, *à la* Fourier, or *à la* somebody else. Let us examine the question for the moment, and see if history really bears out the author in his statements.

1. The limits of the first era are not given, but we shall assume it to extend from the time of our Lord and his apostles to the accession of Constantine the Great. We are not certain but the author means to extend it even from the birth of our Saviour to the downfall of Rome, say from the beginning of the first to the close of the fifth century; but we take the shorter period as the more favorable to his view. But during this period there was no Christendom in the sense in which the author uses the term; for the state was pagan, and Christians had no political organization, except the church herself. How, then, can he say that the three institutions were relatively independent? If he object, and insist on including the pagan state as one of the elements of Christendom, he can with still less propriety, if possible, say the three elements were relatively independent; for the pagan state claimed supreme authority in spirituals over the religion of all its subjects, and promulgated its edicts against Christians, and sought by the most cruel persecutions to suppress the church. The political order occasionally tolerated the church, we grant, but in no respect acknowledged her independence. Nor was the university, that is, education, independent of both church and state. The church claimed authority over the education of her own children, and required it to be Christian and orthodox. The state maintained a system of public schools, had the supreme control of them, could open and close them at its pleasure, and determined what should or should not be taught in them. We cannot understand, then, in what sense the university, that is, education, was independent, or how scientific institutions were independent of both civil and ec-

clesiastical control. It seems to us somewhat singular that the author should have selected the period known in history as the martyr age—which is specially characterized by its fierce and unrelenting persecution, when the political authority exerted its whole power to suppress, to exterminate, the Christian religion, and also many of the forms of oriental paganism—as the era of freedom of thought and conscience, the only meaning of the independence of church and university. Does the author find the characteristic of an era in what it has, or in what it has not?

The author, it will be seen, still further asserts, that, during his first era, the church, the university, and the state were "formless,"—that is, were unconstituted, and therefore no institutions at all. These institutions, according to the author, are the constituent elements of Christendom and therefore without them there can be no Christendom. But in the first era they were "formless," that is, had no actual existence. The author must therefore suppose that there passed an entire era of Christendom before there was a Christendom! Again, nothing exists without form; how, then, during the era when church, university, state, were formless, that is, non-existent, can the author say that they "*existed* in a condition of relative independence"? Would the author teach us that there is no difference between existence and non-existence?

Then, on what authority does the author assert, that, during his first period, church, university, and state *were* "formless"? Surely, the state was formed, was constituted, under Augustus, Tiberius, Trajan, the Antonines, and Diocletian,—thoroughly formed, whether well formed or not, —as it was under Constantine, Theodosius the Great, and Justinian, if the author chooses to bring his first era down to a later date than we have supposed. Of the particular constitution of what the author calls the university, that is, of public education, we are only imperfectly informed; but we know that public provision was made for education, and that celebrated schools flourished in most, if not in all, of the great cities of the empire. As to the church, she certainly was not "formless" in the third century, but was constituted with a hierarchy, as at present. We know, also, that she was not "formless" in the first century; for St. Paul, at least good historical authority, writing to the Corinthians, tells them, that "God hath set some in the church, first, apostles, secondly, prophets, thirdly teachers," &c.,

which implies that the church then had a constitution, and, if it had a constitution, it was not "formless." That she had a constitution in the *second* century, we may learn from Irenæus and Tertullian, and various other sources. During the first three centuries, then, the church had a constitution, though what constitution she had is foreign to our present purpose to inquire. Since the third century, nobody pretends that the church has been formless, for we see her constitution as complete at the Council of Nicæa as at the Council of Trent. The author, then, drew upon his imagination or his theory, instead of history, when he asserted, that, during the first era, church, university, and state were "formless."

2. The second era, according to the author, was characterized by the "pervading spirit of authority." Of the extent of this era we are not informed; but we judge, from the author's incidental remarks, that he extends it from the downfall of Rome to the rise of Protestantism, and intends to include the whole period commonly called the middle ages. Now, according to our historical reading, this period is characterized, so far as in its endless variety it can be characterized by any one element, by the spirit of lawlessness, barbarity, tyranny, and contempt of authority. It opens, for all western, central, and northern Europe, with the destruction of the political order, and long ages passed away in the effort to restore it; and at no period do we find authority as all-pervading, as well established, and as peacefully discharging its functions, as it was under imperial Rome, pagan or Christian. The university, during the first half of the period, hardly existed; and when it was reëstablished in the twelfth century, it was with a freedom and independence it never before enjoyed. The academic bodies were almost independent polities, well-nigh able to resist both the civil and the ecclesiastical authorities. The church claimed, as always, her spiritual supremacy; but she was restricted in its exercise by the civil powers and the barbarity and turbulence of the times. The lay society were perpetually questioning her authority, and were less submissive to it than they had been in the first era, or than they were in the third. It strikes us that an age marked by the struggle to preserve the wrecks of civilization, and to establish order, to check despotism, and to vindicate the freedom of religion and consciences, the independence of the spiritual society, can hardly be said to be characterized

by a "pervading spirit of authority," which is, as every one knows, or ought to know, the basis of all order and all real freedom.

"A vast confederacy of archbishops, bishops, and inferior clergy, ranked in grades around a common head, constitutes the aristocracy of the church." But this confederacy, if the author chooses so to call it,—although "a confederacy ranked around a common head" is rather unintelligible to us,—whether good or bad, is no peculiarity of the author's second era. In the only sense in which it exists in one of his eras, it exists in them all; nay, it had, apparently, more the character of a confederacy in the first era than in the second, for the power of the patriarchs, primates, and archbishops was then greater than in subsequent times; that is, while the great patriarchates of the East remained steadfast in the apostolic communion, fewer cases were carried to Rome for decision, and the monarchical or papal element of the church was less apparent. Yet, a confederacy there never was, for a confederacy supposes a union by the will of the parts, whereas, in all the eras enumerated, the union of the parts of the hierarchy has been held to derive from the head, the centre of unity, which makes the hierarchy not merely a union or confederacy of independent bodies, but one body, dependent for its unity on the head, the pope, who is, so to speak, the personality of the church. For this reason, the author makes a gross mistake when he states that the archbishops, bishops, and inferior clergy constitute an aristocracy. In an aristocracy, as in a confederacy, the unity derives from the parts, and therefore is never, properly speaking, unity, but merely a union; whereas in the hierarchy it derives from the common centre, from the head, which is one, and not from the members, which are many.

"Meantime, theology formed into a system, and ancient philosophy recast in modern moulds, and subtile metaphysics and stern logic, established the dynasty of the schoolmen, the aristocracy of the university." We are at a loss to understand what the author means. His thesis is, that the church, the university, and the state, during his second era, were subjected to authority, that is, were not free. But in what does he place their freedom? The church is free when she is not controlled by any power foreign to herself, and can teach, govern, discipline, worship, according to her own constitution and laws. The state is free when no for-

eign or extraneous element interferes with its discharge of its legitimate functions. So, also, must be the university. How, then, the university is pervaded by a spirit of authority, is controlled in the discharge of its functions, when it is free to govern itself, and is subject only to its own laws, we do not and cannot understand. Perhaps the author means less by the church, university, and state than we suppose. He uses these words to designate both the interior elements, love, intellect, power, and the outward institutions which spring from them; or rather, he confounds the interior elements and the outward institutions, and means one or the other, both together, or not exactly one or the other, as he finds it most convenient. The interior element, love, is the church, in its principle; and when he complains of authority exercised over the church, perhaps he means merely that the interior element, which founds the outward church, is not free to push itself out at will, to overthrow existing, and to found new church organizations at pleasure. The grand defect, then, of the middle ages would be, under the point of view of church, that they attempted to preserve the church they received, and to maintain ecclesiastical order, or, in other words, that they labored to maintain for the inward element its outward organization. Under the point of view of state, the defect would be, that they labored to restore political order, and preserve society from dissolution or anarchy, and thus interfered with the liberty of revolutions. So the defect of the university would be, that it sought to give to the inward conception an outward expression, and to satisfy the intellect by clear, distinct, and well-established truths. The doctrine of the author would seem to be, since he is severe upon all revolutionists and destructives, that nothing should be fixed or established in church, state, or university, and that every organization, every institution, every law, every formal statement, is repugnant to the interior freedom of man, and contrary to the true liberty. He would cure all the vices, crimes, and errors of society, as Lycurgus cured adultery, by abolishing the law which enjoined conjugal fidelity. But be this as it may, the dynasty of the schoolmen, in so far as dynasty it could be called, and as distinguished from the political authority, on the one hand, and from the ecclesiastical, on the other, was the result of the free intellectual development the author contends for, and proves, not the presence, but the absence of the authority to which he objects.

"While the spiritual power threatening excommunication upon heretics, and the temporal power punishing as magic the discoveries and inventions of genius, uphold dictatorship in the realm of thought." That the spiritual power not only threatened excommunication upon heretics, but actually excommunicated them, during the middle ages, is no doubt true; but so it did in the primitive age, and so does it even now; it therefore is nothing peculiar to the author's second era, and cannot be adduced to prove its peculiar character. That the temporal power punished magic in the middle ages is possible; it did so under the pagan emperors, and has done so almost within our own day; but we shall be obliged to Mr. Channing to name to us one well-authenticated discovery of genius, or scientific discovery, that was punished as magic in the middle ages, or in any other age. We are aware of no instance of the sort. The dictatorship in the realm of thought was no greater in the author's second than in his first or his third era. "The unity of *force* fulfils its end, when pope and emperor and council conspire to cramp elastic Europe with the leading-strings of a monotonous despotism." The author here uses *force* as the synonyme of *authority*, or he changes, without notice, his subject, neither of which is allowable. If force fulfils its end, it does what is legitimate; what, then, is there to complain of? But when and where did "pope and emperor and council conspire to cramp elastic Europe *with the leading-strings of a monotonous despotism*"? Popes and councils have not seldom labored to check despotism, and to secure the freedom of conscience and worship; but we recollect no instance in which they conspired to establish a despotism. If the author does, we wish he would name it,—the place where, and the time when. It is easy to make loose assertions if one is unscrupulous, but an honest man is cautious how he makes assertions for which he has no authority, to the prejudice of his neighbour. That there was despotism in the middle ages we do not dispute, for there is always despotism where there is barbarism; but that there was in them a *monotonous* despotism we have yet to learn. So far as we have studied those ages, monotony was by no means one of their characteristics. The only monotony we have detected in them is the monotony of the ocean in a storm,—the monotony of the mountain torrent, swollen by recent floods,—the monotony of movement, change, and variety. But this may be owing to the

fact that we have not read them, lately, through the spectacles of a world-reformer, by which one sees much that is not to be seen.

3. The third era is characterized by "individual freedom," and therefore, negatively, we suppose, by the absence of authority in church, state, and university. This era, like the others, is left indefinite; but we shall assume that the author means to extend it from the breaking out of Protestantism to the peace of Utrecht, in 1713. We cannot commence it earlier without running back into his second, nor extend it later without running forward into what is obviously his fourth era. This period of two hundred years is, we had supposed, remarkable for the absence of individual freedom. It is the period of the rise, progress, and decline of Protestantism, the destruction in favor of monarchy of the old feudal nobility throughout the principal states of Europe, the suppression of the estates in Sweden and Denmark, of the states general in France, the comuneros in Spain, and, virtually, the parliament in England under the Tudors and the Stuarts, the centralization of government, and the consolidation of the power of the monarch. It is the golden age of absolute monarchy, as we see in the Austrian House of Habsburg and the Prussian House of Hohenzollern; in Henry VIII., Elizabeth, and James I. and his son Charles, in England; Richelieu and Louis XIV. in France; and Charles V. and Philip II. in Spain. Indeed, the principle outward effect of Protestantism for these two hundred years, aside from the destructive and protracted wars to which it gave rise, and which threatened to replunge Europe into barbarism, from which the church, by a thousand years of unremitting labor, had in a measure rescued it, was the establishment of absolute monarchy in nearly all Protestant, and, indirectly, in nearly all Catholic, Europe. It did this by its resistance to the papal authority, and by the centralization of the powers and administration of government it rendered necessary on both sides to carry on the wars it engendered.

In the university, there was very little of what Mr. Channing calls individual freedom. Indeed, in Protestant countries, during the whole period, very little is done for education; the great mass of the people are suffered to grow up in utter ignorance, and the universities that flourish are entirely under the control either of the sect or of the state. As to Catholic countries, it is enough to say that it is the

glorious era of the Jesuits, who are the masters, under the church, of education, and the principal educators; and Mr. Channing will hardly contend that the most striking feature of Jesuitism is individual freedom in his sense of the term, although, we grant, it may be in ours; for no man is or can be more free than he who has no will but that of his legitimate superior.

The Protestant nations, we grant, threw off the authority of the pope, but they fell under the civil despot; they discarded the authority of the church, but only to become slaves of the sect,—to say the least, as hostile to individual freedom as the authority discarded, Mr. Channing himself being judge. Under a religious point of view, in the Protestant world, there may have been a struggle for individual freedom, but there was no individual freedom obtained. It was, we must remember, the period when Protestants not only persecuted Catholics, fined, imprisoned, massacred them without mercy,—which we do not expect a Protestant to regard otherwise than as praiseworthy,—but when they persecuted one another,—Calvinists, Socinians; Gomerites, Arminians; Lutherans, Anabaptists and Sacramentarians; Anglicans, Puritans; and Puritans, Anglicans; and both Puritans and Anglicans, Quakers and Unitarians. It is the period, we must also remember, of Cavaliers and Roundheads in England, of Irish and English penal laws, of Episcopalian intolerance in Virginia and Maryland, and of Congregational exclusiveness in New England, where the law even forbade, as it is said, the making of mince-pies or plum-puddings on Christmas, lest some countenance might be shown to prelacy and papacy. Surely, in the Protestant world, there was, in church, state, university, any thing but individual freedom.

In Catholic countries, the church relaxed nothing of her claims, and perhaps in no previous period of her history was the papal authority more resplendent, or more fully recognized, or more cheerfully submitted to, by the great body of the faithful, than in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In no previous period had the church been more vigilant in detecting and condemning heresy, or more rigid in her control over the doctrines held by the faithful. It was in this period that was celebrated the great Council of Trent, in which the Christian doctrine was defined to a far greater extent than it had ever been in any previous council. If the church lost the northern nations of Europe,

which became Protestant, she was compensated by her conquests in the East, and in the newly discovered continent of America; and perhaps the number of her children had never been, for any previous two hundred years, greater, or more worthy of her name of Catholic. Indeed, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, so calamitous to Protestants, may almost be called, for Catholics, the Age of Saints. Whatever else the author may say of this period of history, he cannot with the least truth represent it as characterized by the presence of individualism and the absence of authority, ecclesiastical or civil. Indeed, if he had reversed his statement, and represented his second era, the middle ages, as characterized by individual freedom, and his third by the "pervading spirit of authority," he would have been, though still incorrect, less far from the truth.

4. The author's *fourth* era is characterized by *practical equality*, by which we understand him to mean equality in the material order, the material interests of life. This period, like the others, is left undefined; we presume, however, that we shall meet the author's views, as far as he has any, if we consider it as extending from the peace of Utrecht, the commencement of the modern industrial system, of which Great Britain may be considered as the chief, to the publication of Fourier's *Theory of Unity*, in 1822,—what, in a loose way, is termed the eighteenth century. In some respects, the author's outlines of this epoch are just, though his tone and coloring are false; and he proves that he has at least glanced at its history, or rather, that the masters he follows, for the most part educated in the eighteenth century, were better acquainted with its facts than they were with the preceding centuries. Nevertheless, to name it the age of *practical equality* is wholly inaccurate. Of all known ages, it was the least practical. It was carried away in pursuit of Utopias, even more than the present. The wildest, the maddest schemes were imagined, and pursued as realities. Was it not the age of Law's Mississippi Scheme,—of Mesmer, Cagliostro, and the Republic of all the Virtues,—of atheism, *L'Homme-plante*, *L'Homme-machine*, Voltaire, Condorcet, Hume, Hartley, Price, Thomas Paine, Jacobinism, the perfectibility of human nature, and dreams of man's immortality on earth? It should be called the age of impracticable dreams, and fancies,—and yet not wholly, for it was also the age of Vico, Reid, William Pitt, Edmund Burke, Napoleon Bonaparte, and George Washington. As to equality, never

was there less approach to it, nor was there ever set in operation a series of causes more hostile to it. Political equality was established here, but it operates chiefly in favor of material inequality, in covering the land over with industrial corporations which defy individual competition. Labor-saving machinery has been invented and introduced to an incalculable extent, but it results in throwing out of employment millions of laborers, in concentrating the business of production in the hands of capitalists or soulless corporations, in destroying the class of small manufacturers, and compelling the operatives to toil for the mere minimum of human subsistence. It is to get rid of the effects produced by it and other kindred causes, the hopeless inequalities and the terrible physical degradation of the laboring classes resulting, that socialism is preaching up reform, and effecting its anarchical revolutions in Europe, if we may believe Mr. Channing and his friends. The only sense in which the author can say the last century was marked by practical equality is in the sense that it had it not, and made wholly ineffectual efforts to gain it.

The author says the unity of the church was broken, and its prestige lost. But this is a mistake. The unity of the church has never been broken, and never can be broken as long as there is a successor of St. Peter, the centre of unity; for where Peter is, there is the church,—*Ubi Petrus, ibi ecclesia.* Individuals and nations may lose the unity of the church by breaking from her communion, and thus losing the church herself; but, if they do, it is they, not she, that lose unity. The unity of the church was never more perfect than during the last century, when all the powers of earth and hell seemed to be let loose against her, and when Jansenism, Protestantism, infidelism, and Jacobinism, strengthened by gross impurity and unbounded license, made their combined assaults upon her, and in their madness shouted a triumph which proved to be illusory. And it was in the very moment of their intoxication and frantic excesses, when the Holy Father was stripped of his temporal dominions, and was dying in exile or languishing in prison, that the reaction in favor of Catholicity began in the heart of Protestant Europe; a reaction which still continues throughout the world, —nay, which Mr. Channing himself has felt more than once, and to which, had he followed the promptings of divine grace, and not struggled against tendencies which he was conscious of, he would long ere this have yielded.

5. The fifth era is the present, and is characterized by the principle of coöperation, or rather, is to be so characterized. Of this era we have not much to say, for we do not, like Mr. Channing, claim to be a prophet. The principle of coöperation, however, is no new principle, as Mr. Channing asserts; it is as old as society, that is, as old as the human race itself. The "fraternity" the author preaches was known from the beginning, and ceased to be a fact only with the confusion of languages and the dispersion of the human race. In the Christian sense, fraternity by election and grace, as distinguished from that by natural generation, has always been proclaimed and realized in the church. Coöperation must be either by force of nature or by virtue of grace, either compelled or voluntary. What it is or can be by force of nature, the author may learn from the history of gentilism, which, we imagine, is not precisely what he wishes for. It cannot be compelled without a despotic authority, against which he declaims. If voluntary and by grace, it can be realized only in the Christian church, which reëstablishes unity in the elected human race, or chosen people of God, and will make the elected commensurate with the natural human race, in proportion as men voluntarily submit to her authority.

We pass over what the author says of "Revolutionary Tendencies," or "the Position of Judge," and also what he says of "Unitary Tendencies," or "the Position of Prophet," the fourth and fifth general divisions of his Discourse; for we do not know who has installed him as judge, and because he appears to us to be one of those prophets whom the Lord commands us not to hear,—prophets of their own hearts, of whom the Lord says, "I did not send these prophets, yet they ran." "The prophet that hath a dream, let him tell a dream; and he that hath my word, let him speak my word with truth; what hath the chaff to do with the wheat? saith the Lord." He who asks us to listen to him as a prophet must show us the seal of his commission from the Almighty. We pass over, therefore, these two divisions of his Discourse, and come at once to his official statement of what he terms the "fundamental principles of Social Science."

"1. The one God, infinite and eternal, lives in three modes; of which Love is the principle,—Beautiful Joy the end,—and Wisdom the harmonizing medium; and throughout creation every existence, as made in the likeness of the Being of beings, is triune also,—having an impulse of

good for its motive power, a coöperative use for its ultimate destiny, and a form of order as the law of its development.

"2. The divine idea of man is of many men made one, or, in other words, of a race unfolding, through ages, around the globe, from simple, original unity into every possible variety, and thence by combination into fulfilled, composite unity. The centre of this race is God in man; its destined end, a heaven of humanity; and the mode of its growth, the formation of societies, whose members may be trained to beneficence, and in whose confederacies, peaceful and prosperous, may be brightly imaged the divine blessedness.

"3. The life of man is love, inspired continually by God, who, from everlasting to everlasting, attracts the members of every race to unity, and to himself, by rational freedom,—thus governing his children by the law of liberty, while rewarding them by the liberty of law : and the method of holy and humane existence is so to harmonize Collective and Individual good, that societies and nations may be reconciled in all interests, and become fit temples for the indwelling divine Spirit.

"4. The form of this unitary life is the law of series, by which, throughout creation, divine Justice graduates,—intermingles,—combines the varieties latent in every unity, and out of seeming discord evolves sublimest concord. This plan of perfect order so distributes the functions of society, that each primitive affection finds the freest play, and persons the most diverse in character and power are bound in one by mutual service, as are the organs of a living body.

"5. As divine Goodness is manifested in the impulses which animate all creatures,—and divine Wisdom in the law which, regulating all movement, finds expression in intelligent spirits,—so divine Power reflects itself in the beauty of the universe, whose every particle and coacting whole symbolize the perfect peace of God; and as nature, thus fashioned in image of the Almighty, is designed as the mould for finite energy, the indispensable condition of human refinement is organized industry, and work exalted into art.

"6. The aim of a community should be to form a collective man, wherein the inspiring principle of Love, the distributing method of Law, and the refining conditions of Beauty, may be severally developed and mutually completed, and thus, by interaction, their common end fulfilled. Property should be held in joint-stock ownership;—labor made coöperative in groups and series of groups;—economy, refinement, and pure influences secured by families united in a combined dwelling:—profits equitably distributed to partners, in proportion to Labor, Skill, and Capital;—anxiety and sorrow lightened by a system of Mutual Guaranties, extending to all the risks and responsibilities of life;—honors and trusts assigned by election according to approved usefulness in special functions or in general direction;—physical, mental, moral growth insured by an integral education, at once spiritual, scientific, and practical, and

embracing the whole of life;—and chiefly the divine rule of All for Each, and Each for All, embodied and actualized in unity of interests.

"7. In such organized societies alone can individual men be formed to integrity;—for only *there* can infants be worthily welcomed at birth,—children purely and symmetrically developed,—young men and women guided to vocations appropriate to their peculiar powers,—the mature upheld in magnanimous efficiency by a consciousness, that, in laboring for the commonwealth, they are insuring the welfare of their families, and their own highest good,—the aged reverenced, solaced, cheered,—and every person taught by *life* to know the worth of a human being, and the loyalty due to a united race; and, finally, only from societies thus constituted can states, nations, humanity, become one in that fraternity of freemen, which, in spirit, truth, and deed, will be the kingdom of God,"—pp. 22–24.

This statement has evidently been drawn up with great care, and that it is satisfactory to the author we may infer from the fact, that he has recently republished it, as an official statement of principles, in *The Spirit of the Age*, a paper of which he is the editor, and which takes the place of *The Harbinger*, whilom the organ of the Fourierists, or American associationists. But however carefully it may have been drawn up, and however well satisfied the author may be with it, it is to us exceedingly obscure, confused, vague, and uncertain; and without referring to the author's antecedents and concomitants, and drawing upon our own knowledge of the authors he has studied, and from whom he has borrowed most of his doctrines, we should be utterly unable to extract the least intelligible meaning from it. To analyze the seven paragraphs cited, or articles of the author's creed, to ascertain the precise number of propositions they contain, and to determine the precise sense and value of each, would far transcend our ability, or, if not our ability, at least our limits, and our patience, as well as—what is more to the purpose—the patience of our readers. We must therefore confine ourselves to some three or four of the more general and more fundamental propositions.

1. "The one God, infinite and eternal, *lives* in three modes." What does the author mean by saying that God *lives?* Does he mean to distinguish between the divine *esse*, or being, and the divine *existere*, or existence? We presume so. He, then, holds that our primary conception of God is that of pure essence, *das reine Seyn* of the Hegelians, and supposes that the conception of God as existence—*das Wesen*—is secondary. Hence God does not

live or exist in himself, but in his evolutions, his works, or the universe, which express him. This is the doctrine of the school to which the author appears to us to belong, and is in accordance with what, in our former article, we found to be his own doctrine. Hence God is not conceivable as living or actually existing God without the universe, and the universe is as necessary to him as the medium of his life, as he is to the universe as the fountain of its being. God, regarded in himself, is the ideal of the universe, and the universe is his realization,—to him, as Mr. Channing once said to us in conversation, what the picture is to the ideal or design of the artist. But as God is the infinite ideal, and tends to the infinite revelation of himself, he must run through an infinite variety of being in order to actualize his infinite potentiality. This tendency to infinite realization of himself implies his infinite progress in his life, and the infinite progress in the universe, from the lowest and least perfect forms of existence, to the highest and most perfect. Here is the foundation of the modern or pantheistic theory of progress, which we find in Hegel, Cousin, and Pierre Leroux, and the law of which Fourier professes to have determined.

But this doctrine implies, as ordinarily taken, that the ideal can realize itself, that pure essence can clothe itself with existence, and that the cause is completed, fulfilled, perfected, in the effect,—that is, what does not exist can act, and imperfection can, of and by itself, perfect itself. As we actualize our potentiality by our efforts, and may be said to grow and to consolidate and enlarge our powers by acting, and to live only by *doing*, so it is thought that the same may be predicated of God himself, as if the reason why this is true of us, namely, that we live, move, and have our being in God, could apply in his case as well as in ours! Under another point of view, the progression of life supposed is merely a progression in order, irrespective of space or time, that is to say, God and the universe form one eternal and indissoluble whole, embracing in itself every conceivable variety or form of existence. This seems to us to have been the view of Hegel himself, and is the only consistent pantheistic view conceivable. This, so far from proving the common theory of progress, denies it, and reduces all to eternal immobility, and real silence and death,—teaching that life and motion are only sense-illusions, arising from the contracted sphere of our vision, without any thing to respond to them in the world of reality. But take the

doctrine in either sense, it is incompatible with the ends Mr. Channing contemplates. If the first view is taken, progress is impossible, because pure essence without existence is nothing but mere potentiality or possibility, and the possible cannot reduce itself to act,—that is, mere possible existence cannot make itself actual existence; for it must be actual before it can act, or perform any thing. If the second view be taken, progress is equally impossible; for all is complete as it is, can be neither more nor less, nor other, than it is, either in whole or in part. Yet Mr. Channing and all the associationists are great believers in progress, and will tolerate no immobility,—no, not even in God.

Theologically considered, the distinction between the divine *esse*, or being, and the divine *existere*, or living, is inadmissible. Being, abstracted from existence, is merely possible being, not actual being; and the distinction, if asserted, implies that God, considered in himself, in our ultimate conception of him, is merely potential or possible God, and must be reduced to act, before we can assert that he exists, or *actually* is. But the possible cannot reduce itself to act, for to reduce is to act, and only the actual can act. How, then, from merely possible God obtain actual, living God? The author must either say there is no God, or else suppose something more ultimate than God, which reduces the pure essence to existence. If he says the former, he concedes that his distinction is tantamount to the denial of God; if he says the latter, he supposes an exterior cause of God, and therefore a cause prior to the first cause, and a cause of the cause of all causes, which, we need not add, is absurd. He cannot say this; he is not at liberty to deny God, for he begins with the assertion of the existence of the one infinite, and eternal God; nothing, then, remains for him, but to agree with the schoolmen, that God is most pure act, *actus purissimus*, excluding from his being all potentiality, and all conceivable distinction between his essence and his existence, his being and his life. His essence is existence, and his existence is essence. He is infinitely and essentially living,—living from, by, and in himself.

A little philosophy, of which Mr. Channing and his school claim to have so much, would suffice, we should suppose, to teach him that pure essence, or being, without existence, is absolutely inconceivable. God, non-existent, but as the dark background of existence, as some profess to conceive him, is absolutely unintelligible, and really indistinguishable,

as Hegel himself says, from nothing. In God we live, move, and are; and therefore it is only in him we can see, know, or conceive at all, as Malebranche has shown in his theory of *Vision in God*, whatever we may think of the theory itself. Every conception of which we are capable, whether of the actual or the possible, conceals at bottom, connotes, or implies the conception of God as actually existing, living God. The idea of God logically precedes all our other ideas, and in fact chronologically, although not distinctly, or as distinguished from our other conceptions; for to distinguish implies reflection, which belongs to a later period of life. This idea, the idea of God,—not of pure abstract being, as Rosmini, if correctly reported to us, maintains,—is the *forma*, or formative principle, of the intellect, or faculty of intelligence. It is the light by which the faculty is constituted intelligent faculty, and by virtue of which we see all that we do see. Take away from the mind this idea, you take away the very power of intellection, and leave to man nothing intelligible. To take away this idea is to deny God, and if you deny God, you deny, not only all actual existence, but all *possible* existence; for the possible is conceivable as possible even only by virtue of the conception of God as actually existing being, whose actual power can reduce it to act, make it actual, if he pleases. Hence, we must either say that we can conceive nothing at all, and assert nihilism,—which is impossible, for we cannot, if we would, deny our own existence without at the same time asserting it,—or else we must concede that our primitive conception is the conception of God as living God, in whom no distinction between essence and existence is admissible or conceivable, as the church has defined, as all Catholic theologians teach, as every sane philosopher maintains, and the common sense of mankind asserts.

But "the one God, infinite and eternal, lives in *three modes*." Since we can admit no distinction between Deity and God, between the divine essence and the divine existence, whatever be the distinction of modes here intended, they must be understood as distinctions in the divine being or nature. To suppose them to be in the divine being or nature is to suppose that nature to be composite, essentially composed of substance and mode, or of subject and accident. But this is not admissible. The composite is subsequent to the components, and God, if composite, can be resolved into something more ultimate than himself. The substance is

potential in relation to the mode, the subject in relation to the accident; but God, we have seen, is most pure act, and therefore excludes from his being all potentiality. If we suppose God to be composed of substance and mode, we must suppose a power anterior to him that composes him, or unites the substance and mode so as to form from their union the living God; which, as we have seen, is to suppose a cause prior to the first cause, and a cause of the cause of all causes. Our readers may be inclined to believe, that Mr. Channing predicates the three modes of God operating out of himself, not of his being, but of his operations. This, however, is not the case; for he is evidently speaking of God, regarded in his own life, not as operating in space and time, but as infinite and eternal, therefore above and prior to his external operations in time. He must, therefore, predicate the mode of his being, and not of his operations.

"The one God, infinite and eternal, lives in three modes; *of which* Love is the principle, Beautiful Joy the end, and Wisdom the harmonizing medium." But what is the antecedent of *which? Three modes?* Then what are the modes themselves? Love will be the principle of all three, beautiful joy the end, and wisdom the medium; but of all three what? This does not appear. *Lives?* It is not, we believe, according to Lindley Murray to make a verb not used as subject, or as subjective member of a sentence, the antecedent of a relative pronoun; but world-reformers may, no doubt, reform grammar as well as other things, and we suppose the author really means to tell us, that, of the divine life or living, love is the principle, beautiful joy the end, and wisdom the harmonizing medium. As God lives from, in, and by himself, and no distinction between his essence and his existence is conceivable, we must predicate the love, joy, and wisdom of the divine *being*, and they are themselves the three modes of its existence; which, after what we have said, must mean, if any thing, that God, in our highest conception of him, is essentially composed of principle, means, and end, which are love, wisdom, joy. What all this means is more than we know. It is a doctrine of the author, that all existences mirror or image God, and he has told us that every man is constituted of three elements, namely, love, truth, power, related to each other as inmost, mediate, outmost, or as motive, means, end. It is, therefore, only fair to presume that he holds that God is

constituted, in like manner, of three elements, which are in him, as in man, related as motive, means, and end, as inmost, mediate, and outmost. God then, is to be regarded as a whole, composed of beginning, middle, and end, like a good oration; but what this really means is not very intelligible to us. That God, in operating out of himself, that is, in creating the universe, acts by means, from a motive, or for an end, may be said; and that the motive is his own infinite love or goodness, wisdom the means, and, as to his creatures, beautiful joy the end, may also be said; but this has nothing to do with Mr. Channing's doctrine. He asserts that God lives in three modes, and that he lives from love to joy, by or through wisdom. But what, since these three elements constitute God, is he who lives thus? He cannot be the joy, for that is the end he seeks; and he cannot be the wisdom, for that is the means he uses. To say he is no one nor all of these taken singly, but is all of them taken together, in their union or composition, is—besides the absurdity of supposing a being seeking an end which he essentially is—to suppose the divine nature to be complex, and therefore subject to analysis and dissolution. It denies the unity and substantiality of God, by making him a mere union or totality, and is open to all the objections already urged.

In republishing this first article of his creed in *The Spirit of the Age*, Mr. Channing has made a slight addition, which may help us to understand him. "The absolute Being, infinite, eternal, though in *himself* utterly unapproachable, is presented to our highest conceptions as triune,—the one, the one in many, and the many in one. To us he appears to live," &c. The doctrine of the author, we think we cannot be mistaken in saying, is, that God is for us human beings only in his manifestations,—that to our highest conceptions he is presented only as, so to speak, the manifested or actualized God, inseparable and indistinguishable from the principle, means, and end of the manifestation, or actually evolved universe. Whether back and independent of the actual universe he exists, we know not; for out of the universe—that is, as living in and out of himself, independent of the universe—he is inconceivable, "utterly unapproachable," even in conception. Thus Cousin says:—"Le Dieu de la conscience n'est pas un Dieu abstrait, un roi solitaire relégué par-delà la création sur le trône désert d'une éternité silencieuse et d'une existence absolue qui ressemble

au néant même de l'existence; c'est un Dieu à la fois vrai et réel, à la fois substance et cause, toujours substance et toujours cause, n'étant substance qu'en tant que cause, et cause qu'en tant que substance, c'est-à-dire étant cause absolue, un et plusieurs, éternité et temps, espace et nombre, essence et vie, indivisibilité et totalité, principe, fin et milieu, au sommet de l'être et à son plus humble degré, infini et fini tout ensemble, triple enfin, c'est-à-dire à la fois Dieu, nature, et humanité. En effet, si Dieu n'est pas tout, il n'est rien; s'il est absolument indivisible en soi, il est inaccessible et par conséquent il est incomprehensible, et son incompréhensibilité est pour nous sa destruction. Incompréhensible comme formule et dans l'école, Dieu est clair dans le monde qui le manifeste, et pour l'âme qui le possède et le sent." * The identity on this point, of Cousin's doctrine and Mr. Channing's cannot be reasonably doubted.

God, according to Cousin and our author, is at once one and many,—is one in many, and many in one. But this is not conceivable. Unity necessarily excludes multiplicity, and multiplicity unity. If God is one, he cannot be many; if many, he is not one. Nothing in the world is more certain. Mr. Channing is in pursuit of unity; but if he supposes plurality in God the first cause, or the first link in his series of evolutions, he can never obtain unity; for unity can no more be obtained from plurality, than perfection from imperfection. Plurality proceeds from unity, not unity from plurality. In God is the cause of multiplicity or plurality; but not, therefore, is he himself multiple or manifold. It is false to say that God is many in one, or even that he is one in many. God does not lose his unity in creating variety, any more than an artist loses his, in producing a variety of pictures. Is the artist a man in designing a man, a horse in designing a horse, a flower in designing a flower, a fly in designing a fly? And does he become many in designing many, and they become one and identical in him? If he loses his oneness in the variety of his designs, where is the unity in which they become one? If God, in creating many, is himself many, he retains no unity in which the many can be one. The absurdity of Cousin's and Channing's doctrine results from the assumption, that God does not and cannot create, but simply evokes, and, in order to produce man, becomes himself man; a horse, be-

* *Fragments Philosophiques*, 3e éd., Tom. I. p. 76.

comes himself horse; a cabbage, becomes himself cabbage; that is to say, what we call creatures are but forms or modes of the manifested God,—pure pantheism.

The author misapprehends the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, and is mistaken in supposing that he represents God as triune. His God is not triune, but threefold; for, by introducing divisibility, plurality, variety, diversity, into the one primary conception of God, he denies the unity of the divine being. His God is complex, not simple; a totality, not a unity; for a divisible unity is inconceivable,—a contradiction in terms. His love, wisdom, joy, are not the three hypostases of the Christian mystery, and in no sense respond to them, or can by any possibility be the real sense of the Christian symbol,—what Christians would mean by it, if they understood themselves, as Mr. Channing would say; because they are all three essential to the divine nature. In neither one nor another of them is God without the other two. They are distinctions in the divine essence. Love is not God, if distinguished from wisdom, nor wisdom, if distinguished from love. But the sacred mystery asserts that God is absolutely one in his substance, being, nature, or existence; indivisible, indistinguishable, and most simple. The triune God is not God existing in a threefold being or nature, but one nature, one essence, one substance, one being, one existence in three persons. Personality is the last complement of rational nature. The divine nature, which is rational nature, if we may so speak, is one and indivisible, in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and the plurality is only in the last complement, or personality; so that "the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Ghost is God, yet there are not three Gods, but one God." Mr. Channing cannot say, Love is God, Wisdom is God, and Beautiful Joy is God, and yet there are not three Gods, but one God; for, according to him, God is only the union, or totality, of the three; and, since they are distinct by nature, if he should call each separately God, he would assert three Gods, not one divine being in three persons. He therefore neither asserts the substance of the Christian Trinity, nor a triune God, as he supposes.

So far as the three elements Mr. Channing names are to be regarded as attributes of the divine being, they are undoubtedly distinguishable from one another, in our apprehension of them, or manner of conceiving them; but not in God, nor from his divine *esse* or being. This distinction of

attributes, which we concede, does in no sense respond to that of three persons; because all the divine attributes are common to each of the divine persons. Morever it is only virtually real, and exists in our minds with merely a foundation in reality. Regarded in himself, since God is most simple,—*simplicissimus*,—as he must be if, as we have proved, he is most pure act,—*actus purissimus*,—there can be no distinction between him and his attributes, nor between one attribute and another. His attributes are himself, and in himself all his attributes are identical. He is goodness, wisdom, justice, power, &c.; and goodness, wisdom, justice, power, &c., are in him one and the same. But he being infinite, and we finite, we cannot conceive him adequately, and are obliged to conceive his attributes separately, and, in our conceptions, distinguish them both from his divine *esse* and from one another. This is allowable, because he *eminently* contains the distinctions we make, or contains himself that which equals and more than equals, all that we conceive in our separate conceptions.

But we must quicken our pace, or we shall never reach the end of our journey. "And throughout creation every existence, as made in the likeness of that Being of beings, is triune also,—having an impulse of good for its motive power, a coöperative use for its ultimate destiny, and a form of order as the law of its development." This throws some light on what has preceded, and proves that God, as well as his creatures, has, in Mr. Channing's view, an ultimate destiny, that is, beautiful joy. Who appointed to God his destiny? Does God work to realize or perfect his own beautiful joy? Do you suppose him, in the beginning, destitute of complete blessedness, and that he creates out of his own emptiness to fill up his joy, not out of his own fulness, and that his blessedness is completed or perfected in his creatures? This is what we have all along seen to be Mr. Channing's doctrine. He does not appear to be able to conceive a God perfect in himself, and creating from pure disinterestedness, for the sake, not of increasing his own joy, but of communicating his goodness and blessedness to creatures. He condemns selfishness, and yet, with an inconsistency not uncommon in system-mongers and world-reformers, makes God himself intensely, infinitely selfish, laboring only to perfect his own existence, and to fill up the measure of his own joy. He would seem, then, not to wish us to be perfect as our Father in heaven is perfect, but more perfect,

to have an altogether higher perfection, so as, by our noble and disinterested conduct, to help perfect God, and complete his "Beautiful Joy."

If every creature is made in the likeness of God, as Mr. Channing represents him, it by no means follows that every creature is triune; for according to him, as we have seen, God is not triune, since he is a totality, not a unity, a mere union or complexity of different elements. Theologians find in man, who is made to the image and likeness of God, some faint analogy to the most holy Trinity; but that every creature's existence reproduces in itself the image of the three persons of the Godhead, is a proposition the author may find it not a little difficult to prove. But letting this pass, we are unable to conceive—perhaps owing to our native and acquired dulness—how a being can be essentially constituted of an impulse, a coöperative use, and a law of development. An impulse implies some one who imparts and some one who receives it, and from both of which it is distinguishable. But who or what gives the impulse? It cannot be man himself, because the impulse is a constituent element of his nature. Who or what receives the impulse, or is moved by it? Not man, again, for he is indistinguishable from it. A coöperative use implies a thing used, distinguishable from the user, and an end to which it is used. What is the thing that is used? Not man, because he is the use,—the use being one of his constituent elements. Who is the user, or coöperator? Not man, for the same reason. What is the end to which the coöperative use is directed? Beautiful joy? But that also is a constituent element of man, without which man is not constituted, and therefore identical with the use and user. Cannot the author see, that, if he makes the three elements constitutive of the creature, he must write—nonsense? No being, conceived to contain its motive, means, and end in itself, as constitutive of its nature, can be conceived as active. The actor must be one, simple, indivisible, and the whole being must be on the side of the actor, and distinguishable from the end for which it acts. If man is divided into motive, means, and end, there is no entire man to be placed on the side of the actor, or to seek, by the means, the end. One third is detached, and set before the other two as the end; and the other two, again, are separated, and one third takes the other third as its means of gaining the first. Is this really conceivable? Can the third part of man, distinguished from

the other two thirds, be a simple, complete, active being? Or suppose Mr. Channing does not mean to separate them, —suppose he considers them united; then he must consider the whole man essentially and entirely in each of the three terms,—that he is all motive, all means, all end, simultaneously and together, and therefore that man uses himself as the means to obtain himself! We have seen a young dog amuse himself running round after his own tail; but that is nothing in comparison with a man running round after himself, like one of the characters in Jean Paul Richter's *Titan*, who is everywhere seeking his *Ich*, his *Ego*, which he fancies he has lost.

2. "The divine idea of man is of many men made one, or, in other words, of a race unfolding, through ages, around the globe, from simple original unity into every possible variety, and thence by combination into fulfilled, composite unity." This means, we suppose, that man, properly viewed, is many men made one, or unity unfolded, in space and time, into every possible variety, and through that variety becoming completed or actualized unity. But this, if it mean any thing, must mean something which is not admissible. Mr Channing recognizes in his system no simple, original unity, from which the race can unfold into variety; for he makes man essentially the mere union of three distinguishable elements, related to each other as motive, means, and end; and he also represents God, the fountain of all being and existence, essentially composite, composed, as man, of three distinct elements, which are in like manner related to each other in him. He supposes plurality, multiplicity, in God, or first link in his series of evolutions, which is reproduced in each and every evolution or existence, and therefore denies all simple, original unity as his point of departure, whether for God or for creatures. Besides, unity cannot unfold. *Simple*, original unity *unfolding*, is a contradiction in terms. Only complexity, multiplicity, plurality, can unfold, all of which are excluded by simple unity, and, in turn, exclude it. Even if the author could, without contradicting himself, assert simple, original unity, he could not assert that the idea of man is of a race unfolding from unity. There is no difference between a unity that unfolds into variety, and no unity at all.

"And thence by combination into fulfilled, composite unity." Here is queer philosophy. The race unfolds from simple unity into every possible variety, and from variety

into fulfilled, composite unity. Unity is fulfilled in variety; that is to say, unity, considered in itself, is not actual unity, is only potential unity, and becomes actual unity only in multiplicity and composition! Unity, then, must cease to be unity in order to be unity. Our modern philosophers have made strange discoveries. "Thence by combination into fulfilled, *composite* unity." Composite unity! What sort of an animal is that? Why not talk of a round triangle, or a square circle? A *composite* unity is no unity at all, but a sheer contradiction in terms. Composition denies unity, and unity denies composition. By no conceivable combination of particulars can you obtain unity; for combination gives only a union, a whole, an aggregation, all terms which are excluded by unity, and which exclude it in turn. Mr. Channing can hardly be ignorant of this, for he has once, unless our recollection fails us, been able to distinguish between union and unity.

The contradictions and absurdities which meet us at every turn in the author, and which we grow weary of pointing out, result, we suppose, from his eclecticism, or rather syncretism, in which he includes and attempts to harmonize systems essentially incongruous and irreconcilable. He has some reminiscences of Christian theism, which he would retain and reconcile with the pantheistic conceptions he has, consciously or unconsciously, adopted; and these last he wishes to harmonize with the doctrine of progress furnished him by the dominant sentiment of the age, or modern *Weltgeist*, and which is his favorite doctrine, to which all in his system is subordinate. Some whom he respects advocate Christianity; others whom he respects equally as much, perhaps more, advocate pantheism; and both classes advocate progress. He concludes, therefore, that Christian theism, German pantheism, and French socialism or progressism are, at bottom, identical, or, at least, mutually reconcilable. He throws them all into the same category, and reasons from them as if there was no fundamental difference between them, and hence the confusion and contradictory character of his thought and speech.

Christian theism asserts one God, infinitely perfect, self-existing, eternal, independent, absolutely one and most simple, excluding from his being all potentiality, all complexity, composition, multiplicity, variety, distinction, and therefore asserts other existences, or the universe, visible or invisible, only as created by his omnipotent power out of noth-

ing, or, what is the same thing, out of his own infinite fulness;—fulness, we say, not *stuff*, as Cousin maintains, which would imply the eternity of matter, or that God is the *materia prima* of the universe. Pantheism denies the creative Deity, and asserts that God is all, or the whole, and that nothing but God exists. Man and nature, as distinguished from him, are, in its view, no real existences, are nothing but the infinite fulness of his own being. The world of space and time is a mere illusion, for there are and can be no separate existences coexisting, and no succession of events. All is eternal, immovable, silent. But now comes the great difficulty. To reconcile the idea of a creative Deity, *Deus creator*, with the idea of an uncreative Deity,—a God who creates the heavens and the earth, and all things visible and invisible, with a God who creates, does, nothing, and is all that is or exists,—is hard enough; but to reconcile this latter idea, which denies the world of space and time, and therefore all progressibles, with the idea of universal and unlimited progress, is for Mr. Channing a still harder, as well as a more pressing, problem.

To solve these problems, the author, while he asserts the creative God, as he must in order to assert the world of space and time, quietly assumes that creative and uncreative are the same, or that creation and evolution have one and the same meaning, and that to assert a God unfolding himself in variety is the same thing as to assert a God creating the universe. This disposes of the first difficulty. He then, in order to be able to conceive of God unfolding, and to reconcile the idea of the uncreative Deity with the idea of progress, imagines multiplicity and variety in God himself; that is, in the first cause, or the first link of his series. All now is simple and easy. God contains infinite variety, which he is infinitely developing. Each evolution, since it is an evolution of God, is an image of God,—or, so to speak, God himself in miniature, God in its own sphere,—and therefore contains a variety in itself, which, in its turn, it must evolve. Its evolutions, again, each in its degree, contain a variety, which also must be evolved, that is, actualized. These successive or serial evolutions are what is meant by progress. When God, as the first evolver, has evolved all his variety, actualized his entire potentiality, and each evolved existence has evolved all its variety, actualized its entire potentiality, according to the law of the series ascertained and determined by Fourier, all potentiality is actualized, and the

universe is the actualized God,—God in his completeness and integrity. Then nothing more remains to be evolved; the work is done; and God, from whom and for whom are all things, is completed. Plurality and variety are commensurate with unity, and God and the universe may go to sleep, or, as Fourier seems to hold, may die altogether, and universal night and silence close the scene.

But as simple, as beautiful, and as *scientific* as all this may seem to our modern philosophers, it by no means reconciles the different ideas which are forced into juxtaposition. By resolving creation into evolution, the author loses Christian theism, and falls into pantheism; and by placing multiplicity and variety in God in order to be able to assert evolution and progress, he dissolves his pantheism, and falls into pure atheism; for atheism consists precisely in the denial of unity, and the assertion of multiplicity, plurality, variety, in the first cause. Atheism, again, is irreconcilable with progress; for multiplicity, plurality, variety, &c., are subsequent to unity, and inconceivable without it. Hence, if placed in the first cause, represented as essential in the first link of the series, by excluding unity, they deny themselves, and therefore all existences, and then all progressibles. Thus every effort the author makes only removes him the further from the goal he seeks, which we have found to be uniformly the case with every one who engages, outside of the City of God, in schemes of world-reform, however great their abilities, or praiseworthy, in itself considered, the general or peculiar end they propose.

A little sound philosophy and common sense, we should think, might enable the author to perceive, that, if he takes multiplicity and variety for his starting-point, though he must arrive at nihility, he can never arrive at unity; and that unless he asserts Christian theism, he can never assert progress, for it is only inasmuch as he admits a *creative* God that he can conceive of progressibles. He must assert the God of the Christian and common sense, or the dead unity or uncreative God of old Xenophanes and the Eleatics; or, in fine, he must deny unity and assert plurality in the origin of things, with the atheist, and therefore nihilism, since we have already shown, that, without the conception of God, no conception is possible. If he asserts the second, he loses the universe, and can talk no more of progress, for unity has no progression, and, however multiplied into itself, gives and can give only unity for its product. If he says the

third, still he can talk no more of progress, for nihility has as little progress as unity. But if he takes the first, he escapes every difficulty, and can assert the universe with all its variety; for then he supposes for it an adequate cause. He can also, since he has a world of space and time, talk of progress, not indeed in attaining to a perfection never actual, and by means of imperfection, but in recovering a perfection lost, and approaching a perfection eternally actual in God. Progress is conceivable only in space and time, and to be able to assert its possibility we must be able to assert the reality of the world of space and time, which we cannot do either as pantheists or as atheists. Progress also implies motion, but motion is inconceivable without a prime mover, who is himself immovable, at rest. This is as true in the moral as in the physical world. Pantheism denies the prime mover, by asserting a dead, uncreative unity, which, if immovable, nevertheless imparts no motion; or, if you take Mr. Channing's view, God, as anterior to creation, is not actual, but merely potential; and the potential cannot move, for it cannot act, since only the actual can act. Atheism, of course, denies the prime mover; for, rendered consequent, it denies all things, is universal negation. Christian theism asserts a prime mover, the eternal and immovable God, who causes motion, but does not himself enter into motion. Under any and every point of view, then, our modern advocates of progress could never have committed a more serious blunder than in denying the creative God, —*Deus creator*,—and in seeking a foundation for their doctrine in pantheism and atheism.

But "the divine idea of man is of many men made one." In what are they *made* one? The unity of the human race, that is, of what is for Mr. Channing the human race, does not now exist, and he admits it does not by the very fact that he is seeking its unity, and proposes it as the end to be gained. If made one, then, they must be so made in something which they are not and have not. What is this something? Variety? So Mr. Channing appears to teach; but this is a mistake. Never will you arrive at unity through variety; for the further you travel in variety the further do you recede from unity. Mankind, in themselves considered, are many, as Mr. Channing himself concedes, otherwise he could not speak of "many men made one." If many, if a multitude, as they certainly are, they have not, and cannot have, the principle of unity in themselves, and can be made

one only by virtue of some principle of unity above themselves, existing out of them and independent of them. What or where is this principle, of which men may participate, and by participation become one in it. It is not in nature, for nature is multiple, diverse; it is not in man, for the very idea of man, Mr. Channing says, is of many men *made* one, and therefore the many must participate of it before *man* is conceivable; it is not in grace, for the author recognizes no order of grace distinguishable from the order of nature. If not in one or another of these, it can be nowhere, cannot be at all. Mr. Channing, then, really recognizes no principle of unity, nothing in which the many are or can be made one. And yet he calls his doctrine the *unitary* doctrine,—professes to be seeking *unity*, in obedience to *unitary* tendencies!

"The centre of this race is God in man." Thus, according to Mr. Channing, God lives in man, and not man in God, as religion teaches. This confirms what we have presented as his doctrine, that God lives in his evolutions, and is completed, actualized or perfected in them; that is, the cause is completed, fulfilled, in the effect, and therefore the cause depends on the effect for its perfection! "The centre of this race is God in man." This proves conclusively that Mr. Channing recognizes no unity, or principle of unity. He cannot say the human race attain to unity by participating of God, and becoming one in him; for he is in them, not they in him; and although he is in them, they are, nevertheless, without unity. God cannot, then, impart unity to them, or by their union with himself make them one. Let the author talk no more of unity. But if God lives in man, what more do you complain of? "Its destined end, a heaven of humanity." The end of the race can, whatever it be, be actualized only in individuals. If the end is humanity, it can be nothing else than the production of individuals, that is, the fulfilment of the command, if command rather than permission it is, *Crescite et multiplicamini super eam* (sc. *terram*). But what is the destined end of individuals? Do they count for nothing in your world-scheme? It is remarkable how little account our modern reformers make of individuals, and of individual rights. They are genuine philanthropists,—love all men in general, and no one in particular: seek to make all happy in general, and render every one miserable in particular. "Its destined end, a heaven of humanity." A *heaven* of humanity! What is that? We are sure we do not know.

But we are transcending our limits, and are weary of the subject. We have, either in what we have heretofore advanced or in what we have now said, anticipated all we wish to say on the remaining propositions we have cited. We have aimed throughout to preserve our gravity, and to treat Mr. Channing with the kindness and affection due to the sweetness of his disposition and the gentleness of his manners. Whether we have in all instances succeeded, or not, our readers must judge. Mr. Channing sees, as all men see, and not more clearly nor more vividly, perhaps, than thousands of others not of his school, that there are innumerable evils in the world; and he holds that every man should do all in his power to remedy them. He believes men might and should live as brothers, and that, if they would, wrongs and outrages would cease, there would be no more war, no more oppression, no more injustice, and the whole earth would be filled with love and joy,—and so do we. If every man did right, nobody would do wrong; if every one lived as he ought, nobody would live as he ought not to live. Nothing in the world more true. We agree with you exactly. But how do you purpose to make all men live as brothers? Here is, for you, the question of questions. This, the only question that it was necessary to answer, Mr. Channing answers not; and none of our modern world-reformers or system-mongers answer in a very satisfactory manner. We have listened to most, perhaps to all the more notable, of their answers, but not with much edification. The only direct and practical answer we recollect to have heard is the world-famous answer of the Jacobin, "Be my brother, or I will kill you." This is plain and direct, and has, at least, the merit of expressing truly the spirit of those who deafen us with their everlasting declamations about "brotherhood," "universal fraternity."

Mr. Channing, we cheerfully admit, does not precisely hold to killing; but he has a great affection for the Jacobin, and takes him under his protection. Moreover, in his unwearied efforts to stir up discontent, to make people sensible of their sufferings, to open the wounds of society, to uncover its running sores, and exhibit them to everybody,—in dwelling upon the evils we suffer, forgetful of the good we receive, so much more than we deserve, and exciting hopes that can never be peacefully realized, nay, never realized at all,—he, whatever his intention, effectually prepares the millions, so far as his influence extends, for the Jacobin

movement, and the adoption of the Jacobin answer. The associationists, we deny not, profess to be opposed to the resort to physical force, and to advocate only peaceful modes of reform; but, if we recollect aright, Robespierre made his first appearance before the public as the author of an essay against capital punishment. The associationists, whatever their intentions or professions, are but panders to the physical-force party, or, if they like the figure better, recruiting-sergeants to the destructive army of revolutionists. Let them not imagine that we can be taken with their professions, even when we do not question their sincerity. They cannot promulgate their principles, and continue their declamations against civilization and society, without loosening all social bonds in their adherents, and rousing up the wild and ferocious passions of our nature,—passions which no theory, no reasoning, no smooth-toned rebuke or mild entreaty, can restrain, and which, when once broken loose, will precipitate the populations moved by them into war, bloodshed, and plunder. Hope not, madmen, ye can apply the lighted torch to flax without having it burn, or to a magazine of powder and not have it explode. You cannot go on, year after year, denouncing social order, denouncing society itself, denouncing every restraint of law, all faith, piety, conscience, every thing the race has hitherto held sacred, and hope that the multitude, if they heed you, will remain quiet, charmed to peace by the dulcet persuasions you, at rare intervals, let fall from your sweet lips, or that they will not take up arms to realize the visions of Mahomet's paradise on earth, with which you have maddened their brains and inflamed their lusts. We should shudder at the bare thought of doing you injustice. We would not willingly offend your pride or wound your sensibility; but we tell you, pretended peaceful reformers, that the basest and most horror-inspiring criminals, on whom our society inflicts the supreme vengeance of the law, are harmless in comparison with you, pure-minded, moral, and heroic as ye fancy yourselves, and kind-hearted as ye really may be; for you kill reason, you murder the soul, you assassinate conscience, you sap society, render order impossible, take from law its moral force, from our homes all sanctity, from our lives all security, and leave us a prey to all the low, base, beastly, cruel, violent, wild, and destructive propensities and passions of fallen nature. O, mock us not with the words Brotherhood, Fraternal Love, Universal Peace! We have

heard those words from profane lips too often; and never have we heard the multitude echoing them from their leaders but we have seen society shaken, order overthrown, virtue treated as a crime, the prisons crowded to suffocation with the loyal and the true, the scaffolds groaning beneath their burden of innocent victims, the guillotine growing weary with its unremitting toil, and the earth drenched with the blood of her fairest and her noblest children. Repeat those words outside of the City of God, in what gentle tones and peaceful accents you will, you, at least your followers, will come at last to the answer, "Love me as your brother, or I will cut your throat."

Yet suppose not that we war against the words themselves. Rightly applied, they are good, noble, and spirit-stirring words. Brotherhood, fraternity, the unity of the race, and the union of all men in one grand and true association, are great ideas, and, in their only practical sense, no discovery and no possession of yours. The human race began in unity, and their unity was preserved in the race, as perpetuated by natural generation, till the confusion of tongues at Babel, and the consequent dispersion of mankind, as recorded in Genesis. Since then, in that race, unity, brotherhood, fraternity, have not existed, nor been attainable. They have since been attainable only by election and grace in the chosen people, in the "seed of Abraham"; for there only has the ideal truth, in which alone man finds his unity, been preserved in its integrity. But there they have been, and are, and will continue to be, realized. You cannot have these without the principle from which they are derived; and since that principle is lost in the natural human race, you can have it only as God supplies it by a new creative act, an act not included in nature, therefore supernatural,—and then only through the medium and on the conditions it pleases him to appoint. We know this is distasteful to you; but, instead of rejecting it, you would do well to correct your taste, or put yourselves in the way of having it corrected.

Since the calling of Abraham, the father of the faithful, the true integral human race has been found only in his posterity by election, the chosen people of God,—that is, the Catholic Church. It is there only that the race, broken by the fall, and deprived by guilt of the unity in which alone is true intellectual and true spiritual life, can be reintegrated, restored to pristine unity, and enabled to live a

normal life. Out of this society you may vegetate, you may intellectually conceive of unity, nay, even intellectually apprehend many fragments of the truth which is whole and entire in it; but come into immediate relation with it, participate of it and become one in its unity, you cannot. Concoct as many theories of unity, of association, as you please, they will be only theories of unity, they will not be it; contrive all the machinery you can invent for realizing it, and you will find yourselves with a well-spread table of—empty platters and glasses; for if you have it not as the integral principle of your life, you must be born again or you cannot have it, cannot partake of it otherwise than as a hungry man eats rich viands in his dreams, and awakes and finds it was only in his dreams.

The history of gentilism, from the dispersion of mankind in the days of Phaleg, should have taught the associationists all this; and they might, one would think, have inferred as much from the failure of every attempt to recover unity, or to reform individuals or nations, outside of the integral elected race, or Catholic society. Out of society, out of the church, you have only the shadow or echo of truth, never truth itself; you have only far-off glimpses of life, which you mostly misinterpret,—only, plurality, diversity, division, mutual repugnance, as you yourselves not only concede, but prove; and what sane man, with these for his starting-point or his means, can hope to attain to unity, concord, peace? Did not old Archimedes even demand a whereon to stand, a *πού στῶ*, in order to move the world? Are ye so silly, then, as to fancy that you can move it with your fulcrum resting on nothing?

CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS TOLERATION.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1849.]

Toleration, or, to be more exact, religious liberty, is in every one's mouth, and the constant theme of declamation with all who would depreciate their ancestors, glorify themselves, or win the applause of the multitude; but, unless we are greatly deceived, it is a theme on which there is much loose writing, and still more loose speaking and thinking. Comparatively few appear to us to understand it, or to have any passable appreciation of its reach and conditions. All men, in words at least, are stanch friends of religious liberty, ready to live and die in its defence; but the great majority seem to us to mistake it for the liberty to deny and to enslave religion. The early Protestant sects, who, wherever they were able, subjected religion to the secular authority, fined, imprisoned, exiled, or martyred Catholics, claimed to be the friends of religious freedom, and the liberators of religion from spiritual despotism; the old French Jacobins plundered churches, suppressed the freedom of worship, abolished the Sabbath, overturned altars as well as thrones, massacred the clergy, decreed that death is an eternal sleep, and installed the goddess of reason, under the pretence of religious liberty, and amid deafening proclamations of universal toleration; the present socialists, radicals, or red-republicans of France, Spain, Italy, Germany, Switzerland, profess to be fighting under the flag of religious no less than of civil liberty, and yet their successes are everywhere marked by insults to religion, the expulsion of the religious, the spoliation of churches and convents, and the persecution of the clergy. The most superficial observer can hardly fail to perceive that the age understands, by religious liberty, not the freedom to worship God in the way and manner he prescribes, but the freedom not to worship him at all,—the freedom to enslave or suppress his worship, to plunder his temples, to desecrate his altars, to deny his existence, to blaspheme his majesty, to trample on his laws, and to live like the beasts that perish.

But, although we are anxious to avoid every unnecessary quarrel with our age, we must tell it, that this is no religious liberty at all, that it is the enslavement of religion, where not its total extinction, and the freedom of irreligion, infidelity, heresy, and schism. Religious liberty, as we understand it, is *the absolute freedom of religion, in its doctrines, discipline, and worship, from all human authority*, and therefore implies the *absolute incompetency, in spirituals, of all human authority, whether public or private.* We say the absolute freedom of *religion;* by which we, of course, mean the true, that is, the Catholic religion. Consequently, we recognize no religious liberty where our church is not free in her doctrine, discipline, and worship, and where all men have not full and entire freedom to profess the Catholic religion without restraint from, or responsibility to, any human power whatever, whether vested in the king, the aristocracy, or the people. Where this freedom is wanting, there is no religious liberty. This freedom we demand, not as a favor, not as a gracious concession from the prince or the republic, but as our right, as the indefeasible right of our church, for the reason that she is the church of God, the representative of the divine sovereignty on the earth; and this freedom we are bound in conscience to assert, and to vindicate, if need be, as did the early Christian martyrs under the persecuting emperors of pagan Rome, not indeed by slaying, but by submitting to be slain.

From this view of religious liberty, it is evident, that, when we speak of *toleration*, we have and can have no reference to our church; for she holds immediately from God, and we recognize no power on earth that has the right to restrain her worship, and therefore none that has the right to *tolerate* it. The question of toleration lies below the question of religious liberty, and relates solely to false religions,—to infidel, heretical, and schismatical sects. Are these to be tolerated, or are they to be prohibited? Shall we assert the natural right of every man to choose his own religion, or shall we assert, and as far as able enforce, the moral obligation of all men to profess the true religion? Shall we be intolerant and exclusive, or assert and maintain universal toleration? This is the question.

To answer this question, we must distinguish between two sorts of toleration,—political or civil toleration, and religious or theological toleration; that is, toleration of false religions in the temporal order, and toleration of the same

in the spiritual order. These two tolerations are often confounded, and supposed to be inseparably connected. Hence many assert religious or theological toleration as the condition of justifying the assertion of political or civil toleration, and many also deny political toleration, in order, as they suppose, not to be obliged to assert religious toleration. But the two are in reality distinct, and one has no necessary connection with, or dependence on, the other. Political toleration of religion is the permission conceded by princes or republics to their subjects to profess the religion they choose; religious toleration is the permission granted by Almighty God to all men to profess any religion they please, or none at all, and implies the equal right, or the indifference, of all religions before God, or in reference to eternal life. Universal political toleration presupposes that all religions are compatible with the peace and safety of civil society; universal religious toleration presupposes that all religions are acceptable to God, and available for salvation. The state regards religion solely under its relation to social interests, and the theologian regards it primarily in its relation to the future life or the salvation of the soul. It is easy, therefore, if we understand the distinction of the two orders, to see that it is possible to be politically tolerant and yet religiously intolerant, if not politically intolerant and yet religiously tolerant.

The question of the political toleration of religion we shall consider at some length before we close; but, for the moment, we must confine ourselves to religious or theological toleration. Religious or theological toleration is what is commonly called *indifferentism*,—that is, the doctrine that men may be saved in all religions, in one as well as in another, or that every one may by saved in his own religion, the religion of his country, or of his sect. To concede this doctrine is religious or theological toleration, as distinguished from political or civil toleration; to deny it is religious or theological intolerance and exclusiveness, expressed in the Catholic dogma, "Out of the church there is no salvation." Whatever conclusion we may or may not come to on the subject of political toleration, or the indifference of religions before society and the civil authority, we must, unless bereft of reason, be religiously or theologically intolerant and exclusive; for toleration in the spiritual order is, at bottom, neither more nor less than the denial of the religious principle itself.

Certain it is, from natural reason, that no man can be saved unless he renders to God an acceptable worship, and that no worship is or can be acceptable to God, except the worship which he himself prescribes. Moreover, it is equally certain, that no man can be saved who does not, at least, fulfil the law of nature. By the very law of nature, all men are bound to worship God, and to worship him in the way and manner he himself prescribes. If he leaves them to the natural law, and prescribes his worship only through natural reason, undoubtedly such worship as they can render by a prudent, diligent, honest use of reason, and the means bestowed for such purpose, will be the acceptable worship, and all that can in justice be demanded of them; but if he prescribes a supernatural religion, and promulgates it with sufficient motives of credibility, as he must needs do if he promulgates it at all, then are they bound to worship him according to that supernatural religion,—bound by the very law of nature itself to receive and practise it; and they want even natural morality if they do not. Such a religion, with sufficient motives of credibility, he has prescribed in Christianity. How, then, can we assert the indifference of religions, and contend for religious toleration? Since God prescribes the Christian religion, the law of nature, as well as of revelation, binds us to believe and obey it. If we do not, we fail to fulfil the law of nature, as well as to render the acceptable worship, and are convicted of sin under both the natural law and the revealed. How, then, can we hope to be saved?

Christianity and Catholicity, at least in the faith of Catholics, are identical,—one and the same thing. We do and can recognize no Christianity, properly so called, out of the Catholic Church. We recognize, indeed, in those who are out of her communion, many human excellences, many noble and generous sentiments, many amiable and philanthropic qualities, many just and profound thoughts, many estimable private, domestic, and civil virtues, which we delight to honor, and which will have their reward in their own order, as St. Augustine teaches us in regard to the ancient Romans; but we recognize in them no supernatural faith or sanctity, nothing distinctively Christian, nothing meritorious of eternal life. Out of the church there is no Christian religion, and therefore, if no salvation out of the Christian religion, none out of the church, as the church herself expressly teaches, and has solemnly defined in her

general councils. "He cannot," says St. Cyprian, "have God for his father who will not have the church for his mother." To concede religious toleration, or the indifference of religions, is neither more nor less than to deny the Christian religion itself, and to give up our faith as Catholics. If you require us to do this, you deny our right to be Christians, and are yourselves, even in defending toleration, intolerant; if you concede our right to be Christians, you concede the right of religious intolerance, and then have no right to assert or to demand religious tolerance.

Every man is obliged, by the constitution of the human mind itself, and the very nature of things, to assert the principle of religious intolerance and exclusiveness. We know by natural reason, without revelation, that there is and can be but one true religion; for truth is one, individual, and most simple. This one true religion is necessarily the one which God himself institutes or prescribes; all other religions are false religions, and to suppose that one can be saved in a false religion is absurd and impious; for it is to place truth and falsehood on the same footing, and to suppose that God, who is truth itself, makes no difference between them, that is, counts falsehood as if it were truth! A man cannot believe this, unless he gives up reason; nor even then, for without reason he can believe nothing at all. Indeed, all truth, all good, all opinions even, are and must be intolerant and exclusive. Truth cannot tolerate error, or even the semblance of error; good excludes evil; right excludes wrong; holiness excludes unholiness. Nothing in the universe tolerates its opposite. In regard to all things we are obliged to assert a right and a wrong, a true and a false, and whoever asserts the one necessarily denies the other. Even he who asserts the indifference of all religions denies their difference, and is, in a manner, himself intolerant and exclusive. Hence we see, in our own days, sects formed against sectarism; and Dr. Bushnell, just now one of our New-England "lions," is busy, consciously or unconsciously, in rallying a party around his pretended Christian dogma, that there are no Christian dogmas, and should be none. Every man, who believes in any religion at all, believes his own religion is the true religion, the only true religion, and therefore that all other religions are false religions. He must, then, either believe that salvation is attainable in no other religion, or else that it is attainable in a false religion; which, as we have seen, is absurd. If he believes his religion is the true religion, he believes it is the

religion that all men are bound to believe,—for truth, like right, is obligatory,—and therefore believes that all men are prohibited from believing any other. Every man must, then, do or say what he will, be religiously intolerant and exclusive.

As Catholics, it is well known that we are obliged, by our very religion, as well as by natural reason itself, to deny religious indifference, and to maintain the impossibility, *in hac providentia*, of salvation out of our church. This may offend fashionable latitudinarianism, but it is nothing that we should hesitate, or in the least degree be afraid, to avow; for no severer sentence can be pronounced upon any pretended faith or church, than that it fears to assert its own indispensableness to salvation. What is it, in fact, we want a faith or church for, but to save us? and what reason have we, or can we have, for embracing any particular faith or church, but that we cannot be saved without it? A faith or church that concedes the possibility of salvation in another or outside of itself, confesses that it is not the one true faith or church of God,—therefore, virtually, that it is a false faith or church, unacceptable to God, pernicious to the souls of men, and to be eschewed by all, as they fear hell or hope for heaven. Hence all Protestant sects, of past and present times, are condemned out of their own mouths; for not one of them has, or ever has had, the courage or the audacity to assert that there is no salvation out of its communion,—that is, if we understand the matter, the courage or the audacity, without contradicting itself and conceding the contrary, to assert its own truth. This, perhaps, is a fact not insignificant. Falsehood is, by its own nature, compelled to lie unto itself as well as unto others.

The age, we grant, demands religious toleration, and religious indifference is the order of the day. Many are shocked, or affect to be shocked, when they hear us say that there is no salvation out of the Catholic Church; they allege that it is harsh, illiberal, uncharitable to say so; and even some of our own Catholic friends, now and then, try to persuade themselves and their dissenting brethren that this is going a little beyond the mark, and savors somewhat of bigotry and indiscreet zeal. But he has little claim either to moral or to logical consistency, who refuses to say the true religion is the true religion; and, certainly, there cannot be much bigotry or indiscreet zeal, if we use the terms in their ordinary sense, in asserting that the Catholic religion is the true religion. But he who so asserts necessarily

asserts that all other religions are false, and therefore, either that it is possible to be saved in a false religion, or that there is no salvation out of the Catholic Church. More liberal or tolerant than this we cannot be, in the very nature of things, if we would, unless we could be foolish enough to contradict ourselves, and maintain, that, of contraries, both may be true.

However this may be, as Catholics we have nothing to do with liberality or illiberality in the matter. We have not instituted the laws of mind, and they remain unchanged, whether we conform to them or not. We do not make, and cannot unmake, the truth; and it is eternally and immutably the same, whether we assert it or deny it. It is not *our* truth; it in no sense whatever depends on our intellects, our wills, or our affections; and whether it pleases or displeases us or our friends, appears to us or to them liberal or illiberal, we have just as little power as right to alter it. Should we seek to conceal it, to soften it, or to explain it away, we could only sully the chastity or destroy the integrity of our own faith, and confirm the unbelieving and misbelieving in their dangerous delusions. Still would it be as true as ever, that our religion is the only true religion, and that there is salvation in no other. The solemn truth, that out of the church no one can ever be saved, would remain in all its force, unaffected by our concessions. Knowing this, —knowing that it is the truth which liberates,—we dare not conceal it, and are bound in Christian charity to proclaim it. We must not mistake natural sympathy and good feeling, or the natural kindness or softness of our tempers, for Christian charity. Christian charity, certainly, never gratuitously offends,—is never harsh, bitter, or censorious,—is always meek, gentle, affectionate, kind; but it seeks, always and everywhere, the substantial good of its objects, even at the risk of giving them momentary displeasure or pain; and, unhappily, in this perverse world, men generally have the most repugnance to that which is the most essential to their everlasting welfare.

We are not ignorant that many persons object to the intolerance and exclusiveness we assert,—that is, to the Catholic dogma, Out of the church no one can ever be saved,— not only that it is harsh and illiberal, but that it is contrary even to the justice of God; for it implies, they say, that he will consign them to eternal tortures for not doing what they never had the power to do. To punish them for not

doing what has never been in their power to do is, we grant, unjust, and we may be well assured that our God will never do it. But the objection has no validity, unless it be true that there are persons who live and die without ever having it in their power to become joined to the Catholic communion; consequently, they who urge this objection must prove that there are such persons, before they can have any right to insist on it, or we be under any obligation even to entertain it. An objection which rests for its validity on an uncertain principle, or an unproved assumption, proves nothing, and may always be dismissed without an answer. But is the assumption the objection makes even provable? We know that our religion has been promulgated in all the earth for eighteen hundred years, and, as far as we know any thing of the matter, that, if there is any nation to which it has not been preached, it has been that nation's own fault, because it would not receive, but repelled with insult and persecution, her divinely-commissioned preachers. We know, also, that sufficient grace is given unto every man, that he who seeks shall find, and that if he knocks it shall be opened to him. Who, then, is prepared to prove that a single adult person, since St. Paul declared the Gospel had been preached in all the earth, has ever died out of the church, who could never, if he had made a proper use of the means placed within his reach, have found his way into her communion. Can they who urge the objection in any possible way whatever prove this? How can they say that even the ordinary missionary has ever failed the ready mind and the willing heart? Known unto God are all hearts from eternity; all things are at his disposal, and it can cost him nothing so to order it, that, wherever there is one ready and willing to receive the truth, there the missionary shall be ready to teach him, and to introduce him into the communion of the church. How know you that he does not so order it, and that, if any have died without actually having heard of the church, it has been their own fault,—that is, because they would have rejected her in case she had been presented to them? Till you can assert the contrary with infallible certainty, your objection has no validity; for the difficulty it suggests is confessedly restricted to those who are ready and willing to receive the truth as soon as proposed to them.

But let this pass. The dogma in question certainly can in no sense impeach the justice of God, if it asserts the con-

demnation of none who have fulfilled the law of nature. Men are not entitled to salvation even for fulfilling that law; but they may certainly be justly condemned, if they do not fulfil it. Suppose, then, as the objection itself supposes, that in the gentile world there are persons, or may be persons, who, concurring with the graces they receive, fulfil the natural law: what obliges us to suppose that they must die out of the communion of the church, even if it be conceded that they have no *ordinary* means of entering it? God may, if he chooses, use *extraordinary* means to bring them into the church; and it is far more reasonable to suppose that he will work fifty miracles to bring men into the *medium ordinarium*, if necessary, than it is to suppose, that, contrary to the whole economy of grace, he will save a single soul without it. We know that he has made use of extraordinary means to bring men into the church, as in the case of Cornelius, and that of the eunuch, recorded in the Acts of the Apostles; and, indeed, he has always used them in the conversion of nations; for in no instance has a nation been converted, in which the ordinary means employed for its conversion were adequate to the ends. Why may he not use extraordinary means in the case of individuals, as well as of nations?

Again: in asserting that no one can be saved out of the church, we do not assert that all those who die out of her communion will be condemned precisely for the guilt of not being in her communion. Invincible ignorance, unquestionably, excuses from sin in that whereof one is invincibly ignorant. If there are persons out of the church who are invincibly ignorant of her,—that is, persons who never have had the power of becoming acquainted with her, and of being joined to her communion,—they certainly are not guilty of the sin of infidelity, and cannot be condemned for that sin. But invincible ignorance, though it excuses from sin, has no saving efficacy, no positive power to advance the soul towards the kingdom of heaven. Certainly, mere negative infidels, as they are called, are excused from the sin of infidelity; yet, without conversion, they cannot be saved, for, "without faith it is impossible to please God." Hence St. Thomas says,—"Infidels of this sort are damned, not, indeed, for the sin of infidelity, but for other sins, not remissible without faith." Infidelity is not the only sin for which men are damned; if it were, we should be obliged to assert, that all bad as well as good Catholics will be saved;

nor is it necessarily, by any means, the only sin of those not in the Catholic communion. The condemnation of these will not be for the sin of infidelity, if they are not guilty of it, but for their other sins. They will be condemned, not by reason of the guilt, but by reason of the fact, of being out of the church, for their sins against the natural law, which are remissible only through the church.

Finally, we are told that there are persons out of the church who are not only free from the sin of infidelity, but from all actual sin. But this is a gratuitous assumption; for, without a special revelation from God, we cannot know that there are such persons, and nothing, so far as we are aware, either in reason or sound theology, authorizes us to assume that there are or can be. But suppose there can be, and that there are, such persons, nothing obliges us to assert, or permits you to assume that we assert, their condemnation to the *tortures* of hell. The Catholic dogma objected to simply teaches, that no one can ever be saved out of the Catholic Church. that is, enter into eternal life,—see God in the beatific vision by the light of glory. What the dogma obliges us to assert is, that salvation, in this sense, which is supernatural both in its principle and its terminus, is unattainable out of the church. But this salvation does not necessarily stand opposed simply to the torments of hell. Hell is twofold, and consists in the punishment of loss and the punishment of sense. None are saved who do not escape both; but not therefore does it necessarily follow, that all who are not saved are doomed to suffer both. All are guilty of original sin, and original sin itself forfeits heaven, and incurs the punishment of loss; but the church does not teach that it incurs also the punishment of sense. Hence unbaptized infants, who die before committing actual sin,—though they lose heaven, can never see God by the light of glory,—do not, as our theologians teach, suffer the punishment of sense, do not, as we are permitted to hope, suffer positive pain, but will be gainers by having existed. Not of them, but of actual sinners who die in their sins, is it to be said, "Good for them if they had never been born."

Suppose now,—and if the supposition is inadmissible the objection vanishes,—that among the gentiles there are persons who die out of the church, free from all actual sin: they, certainly, will never see God, will never enter heaven, will not be saved; yet nothing obliges us to believe that they will be doomed to the punishment of sense, or to the positive

sufferings of hell. What will be their fate, beyond the fact that they will not be saved, we do not know, and do not attempt to determine. We remit them, if such there are, to the bounty of God, who, for aught we know, may place them in the category of unbaptized infants who die in their infancy. But no injustice is done them in not admitting them to the beatific vision; for to see God by the light of glory is a *gratuitous* reward, promised only to supernatural faith and sanctity, never due and never promised to mere natural innocence or to mere natural virtue. The defect of natural innocence or of natural virtue excludes from it, but the possession of either or of both does not and cannot entitle to it; and natural innocence and virtue are all that it can be pretended that these have. Hence, supposing such persons, supposing them to die free from all but original sin, no injustice is done them in excluding them from salvation, and therefore the dogma which denies the possibility of salvation out of the church asserts nothing contrary to the justice or even to the fidelity of God.

But granting all this as far as regards Jews, Mahometans, and pagans, that is, unbaptized persons, it cannot apply, we are told, to persons in heretical communions, who are invincibly ignorant; for these are baptized, and in their baptism have received the infused grace of faith and sanctification. But the reasoning we have used to show that it is not proved, and is not to be assumed without proof, that there are any who die without ever having had the power, if they had made the proper use of the means within their reach, of being joined to the Catholic communion, applies here in its greatest force, and renders an answer really unnecessary. The possibility of invincible ignorance, in an heretical communion, of the Catholic Church,—since the Catholic Church is always included in the formal reason of faith in those very articles which all admit are necessary, *necessitate medii ad salutem*,—may well be questioned, and is not to be presumed, especially since those of whom you would predicate it have received in their baptism the habit of faith which is a predisposition to believe, and a supernatural facility in believing, the truth. But let this pass. Suppose invincible ignorance in the case to be possible, and that there are persons baptized in heretical communions, who die invincibly ignorant of the Catholic Church, we grant that they are excused from the sin of heresy. If they have been sinners, they will be damned for their sins; if they have retained

their baptismal innocence,—an improbable supposition,—or if they make an act of perfect contrition and die free from mortal sin,—another improbable supposition,—they will undoubtedly be saved; but not as members of heretical communions, but as members of the Catholic Church, to whose communion they were joined by baptism. Consequently, the admission of their salvation forms no exception to the dogma, that out of the church no one can ever be saved. These, therefore, present no difficulty. But we may remark, by the way, that none, whether among the schismatical, the heretical, or the unbaptized, who are aware of the dogma of the church and the explanations which Catholic theologians give of it, can be invincibly ignorant. They, whatever must be said of others, have had the opportunity of hearing the church, and their ignorance is vincible, culpable in its cause, and can no longer excuse from sin. Whatever their characters in other respects, they may, therefore, be justly condemned for the single sin of infidelity, heresy, or schism, as the case may be.

We may say, in brief, that we are obliged, by the Catholic dogma of exclusive salvation, to divide all mankind, in the first instance, into two classes,—namely, Catholics and non-Catholics. Salvation is predicable only of Catholics, because they only are where there is the means of salvation; it is to be denied of all not Catholics, or who die in the second division, for they are out of the church, and at least under the penalty of original sin, and there is no remission of sin out of the church. This is all that the dogma of exclusive salvation imports.

In the second instance, in regard to those who will be condemned to hell, including both the punishment of loss and the punishment of sense, we recognize four classes. 1. All who die bad Catholics. These will be damned for their sins and their abuses of the graces and privileges which have been extended to them. 2. All who have impugned the known truth, that is, persons who have actually known the Catholic Church and faith, but have rejected or refused to believe her, and died in their sin. These are formal heretics, schismatics, or infidels, and will be damned, if for no other sin, for their infidelity, heresy, or schism. 3. All who might have known the truth, if they had sought it, but did not seek it,—that is, persons who, though they have never actually known the church, yet have had the opportunity of knowing her, and of becoming joined to her communion,

and have neglected to avail themselves of it. These are, by implication, infidels, or heretics, and will be damned for the sin of having neglected to become Catholics when they might. 4. All who, though they may never actually have had an opportunity of becoming Catholics, have nevertheless sinned against the law of nature. These will be damned, not for the guilt of not being in the Catholic Church, but for their failure to keep the natural law. On the supposition of the truth of the Catholic Church, there is nothing contrary to the justice of God in the damnation of these four classes.

In the third instance, you tell us that there is yet another class, not included in the first general division, nor yet in any one of these four special divisions,—namely, a class invincibly ignorant of the church, yet innocent of all sin against the natural law, the only law by which they can be judged. But you do not and cannot prove the existence of such a class; you have no authority for alleging that there is or can be such a class, and we are unable to reconcile its existence with the publicity of the Catholic Church, the ease with which she may be distinguished, the well-known fact that sufficient grace is given unto every man, and that Christ is always, along with the church, operating by his grace to bring all men to her communion, as well as to save them in her communion after they have entered it. But, if there be such a class, they cannot be saved; for they are out of the church,—have by original sin incurred the forfeiture of heaven; and there is no remission of sin but through the church. But, as God was not obliged in justice to bring them into the church, he does them no injustice in not admitting them to the beatific vision,—the only punishment to which we are obliged by faith to hold that they are doomed.

Thus much we have thought it not improper to remark on the first branch of our subject, that no false inferences may be drawn from the fact that Catholic writers, as well as others, contend for the political toleration of the various sects. We assert rigid intolerance of all false religions, in the spiritual order; but it must not, therefore, be supposed that we deny, or do not assert, the legitimacy of their toleration in the political order. It is true, as we have said, that, in speaking of toleration, we exclude our church; for there can never be rightfully any question at all, whether she shall be free or not. She is God's church, and is free by divine right, not by the concession of the prince or the commonwealth.

As much, we concede, we do not and cannot say for the sects. They are contrary to the will of God, forbidden by his law, and have no divine right to be at all. But not therefore does it follow that the civil authority is bound to suppress them, or is not bound even to tolerate them. The state—and we beg that the fact be borne in mind—is not commissioned to execute the *whole* law of God; and, though it can never rightfully do any thing contrary to that law, it has authority to enforce it only in externals, and even in externals only so far as necessary to the maintenanceof the peace and welfare of society. There are mortal sins against the law of God, of daily and hourly occurrence, that transcend the reach of the civil magistrate, and which he has no right to punish. We may transgress against God in thought as well as in deed; but the state must leave our punishment to him who has said, "Vengeance is mine, and I will repay,"—save when our sinful thoughts break out in deeds contrary to the rights of our neighbour or the real interests of civil society. Till then, our offences pertain to the spiritual order, and do not fall under the cognizance of the civil magistrate, who has no competency in spirituals. There are also virtues,—such as faith, hope, charity, meekness, gentleness, humility, benevolence,—all strictly obligatory upon all men, which the civil authority cannot enforce, and has no right to enforce; for, though of the last importance to the peace and safety of society, they lie, as to their principle and motive, wholly within the spiritual order. Everybody knows this, and nobody, to our knowledge, directly contradicts it. It does not, then, follow, from the exclusiveness of religion in her own order, that the political order must always enforce the same exclusiveness, and suppress whatever is opposed to it.

All must agree that the state has no right to establish a false religion, or to prohibit the true religion; because every man has from Almighty God himself full and entire freedom to profess the true religion, and no one can, under any circumstances whatever, be bound to profess or adhere, even externally, to a false religion. To profess the true religion is the duty of all men, and no government has or can have the right to hinder its subjects from performing their duty. Hence Protestant, schismatic, and infidel governments are justly accused of transcending their powers, exceeding their commission, and violating the first principles of religion; for, with the exception of our own, which acknowledges its own incompetency in spirituals, there is not one of them

that has not prohibited, or that even now more than barely tolerates, the Catholic religion. Every state in Europe, not professedly Catholic, establishes by law even now a false religion, and in several of them the true religion is strictly prohibited, or not tolerated at all. Sweden and Denmark establish Lutheranism, deny all civil rights to Catholics, and forbid their subjects, under severe penalties, to unite themselves with the Catholic Church. In Russia, no man is allowed to leave the national church for ours; in Prussia, conversions from Protestantism to Catholicity, and efforts on the part of Catholics to effect them, are, or recently were, forbidden by law; and it is only two or three years since the Norwegian Storthing first granted a partial toleration to the Catholic religion in Norway. It is still, we believe, proscribed by law in Holland, and has owed a precarious freedom, for some years past, chiefly to the connivance of the prince. In Switzerland, it is now suffering a cruel persecution from the government, and her noble prelate, the Bishop of Lausanne and Geneva, has recently been imprisoned, and is now in exile, simply for discharging his episcopal functions. We need not mention the well-known penal laws of England and Ireland, partially repealed in 1829, but still leaving the profession of the Catholic religion subject to many restrictions and vexations. By these laws, it was death for a priest to say mass in England, or to receive a member of the establishment into his church. Indeed, it is well known that Protestantism and infidelity, wherever able, have never failed to copy the example of pagan Rome, to place an interdict on the Catholic religion, and to enjoin, and to seek by pains and penalties to enforce, a false religion, or the profession of no religion. But all governmental acts of this sort are violences rather than laws, and have and can have no binding force. We are always bound to resist them, at least passively; for we must obey God rather than men; and there are times when charity to our neighbour may require us to resist them even actively.

But, though the state has no right to enjoin the profession of a false religion, or to prohibit the profession of the true religion, yet, is it not bound, we may be asked, to enjoin the profession of the true religion, and to prohibit that of the false? It certainly would be, if it were commissioned to promulgate and execute the *whole* law of God, and if there were nothing in religion left to conscience and free will. But the latter, we know, is not true; for even the

canon law strikes only external actions, and the church judges matters of conscience only in her tribunals of penance, approach to which is and must be an act of free will, and before which the culprit is his only and his voluntary accuser; and the former cannot be assumed, for that would make the state the church, and render all distinction between the secular society and the spiritual inconceivable. It would be the absorption of the church in the state, than which nothing is more to be dreaded, as the history of Russia since Ivan IV., and of England since Henry VIII., abundantly testifies. The state has civil, but no spiritual, functions; it is not in holy orders; it has not received the mission of evangelizing the world; and it has no vocation to preach the Gospel, or to assume the direction of consciences. It is certainly bound to recognize and protect the full and entire freedom of the true religion, and to suppress by force, if necessary, all external violence against it; for this is included in the civil rights of those who profess it; but it can legitimately use coercion, either in favor of the true or against a false religion, only for purely social reasons, and only so far as necessary to the maintenance of the order and interests of society; for, as we never cease to repeat, its functions are purely civil, and it has no spiritual competency.

Certainly the obligation or right of civil governments, not Catholic,—where there is no publicly recognized infallible spiritual authority to determine which is the true religion,—to enjoin the profession of the true worship, and to prohibit others, cannot be asserted; because the government, having only civil functions, cannot judge in spirituals, or discriminate between one religion and another. It cannot, then, enjoin one worship or prohibit another, for fear, if for no other reason, that it may enjoin a false religion and proscribe the true; and therefore it must, even in common prudence, tolerate all religions not obviously immoral, like the obscene and cruel rites of many pagan nations, or directly incompatible with the safety and welfare of society. This binds all governments not Catholic to universal toleration, because all religions but the Catholic are confessedly fallible, and can, on their own showing, offer the government no infallible judgment by which it may form, or to which it is bound to submit, its own.

With regard to Catholic governments, or governments of Catholic countries, where there is an infallible spiritual authority publicly recognized by the nation, we distinguish

between those governments which have only the ordinary obligations of civil government and those governments which hold from the church, or under the express condition of professing and defending the Catholic religion. Governments of the first-mentioned class are bound to acknowledge the true religion, and to throw their *moral* influence into its scale; for the state, as well as the individual, is bound to have a conscience, and even a good conscience; but nothing in the constitution of the state binds these governments to enforce the profession of the Catholic religion, or to prohibit that of other religions; and as these religions, if not palpably immoral, are not, in themselves, social offences, the government has no right to declare them so, or to suppress them. These governments, having by their constitution only the ordinary functions of civil governments, can do no more for the true religion or against false religions than the interests of society demand; and as such governments themselves presuppose a state of society in which false religions, as such, are not incompatible with these interests, they are bound to tolerate them, and leave their suppression to the operation of moral causes.

As to the second class of Catholic goverments distinguished, that they are bound to recognize the Catholic religion as the law of the land, and are not free to tolerate all religions, we grant. But there are few, if any, such governments now in existence; and the reasons which formerly demanded and justified them have, in the social changes which have taken place in recent times, lost their force, and cannot now be urged for the establishment or the maintenance of similar governments. In the middle ages, nearly all the European governments not pagan were professedly Catholic, and did and had the right to punish open infidelity, heresy, and schism,—always sins against God,—because then they were directly crimes against society, forbidden by the public law; and crimes against society the civil government has always the right to punish. But now, when that political order has passed away, and, in the altered circumstances of our times, these sins against God are no longer to be treated as direct crimes against society, the government is not bound, and has no right, to punish them; because civil government has never the right, we repeat, to punish any sin, except for the reason that it is a social offence, which society cannot, with a just regard to its own safety, suffer to go unpunished.

We do not assume that infidelity, heresy, and schism were

social offences, merely because they were declared such by the laws, or made such by the fundamental constitution of the state. The laws, as in pagan Rome, or in England before Catholic emancipation, may establish a false religion and prohibit the true; but that does not make the profession of the true religion a social crime, or incompatible with the legitimate interests of society. If religion and the laws come in conflict, it is the laws that are to be reformed, not the religion that is to be suppressed. To say otherwise,—to say that false religions are justly punishable by civil society, simply because contrary to the civil law,—would be to concede that the profession of the true religion may be justly punished in those states in which the civil law prohibits it. The laws must themselves be just, or they do not bind; and the fundamental constitution of a state must be legitimate, or a measure is not justifiable simply because authorized by it or necessary to preserve it. What we assert is, that the political order, which, in former times, declared infidelity, heresy, and schism, when breaking out into overt acts, social offences, was itself just; because then they were such offences in fact as well as in law, and the laws only declared a truth which existed independently of them. The intolerance of the government was justifiable, because demanded by its fundamental and essential constitution, and that constitution was itself justifiable by its absolute necessity, under the circumstances, to the existence of society and the interest of civilization.

In the barbaric ages which followed the destruction of the western Roman empire,—ages against which we hear so many noisy and senseless declamations, and in which we ourselves find little, except Catholicity and what proceeded from it, which does not revolt us,—the church of God had a double mission to perform, and was obliged to add to her spiritual functions the greater part of the functions of civil society itself. She was the sole repository of what had been saved from the wrecks of the old Roman civilization, and the only civilizing force that remained after the barbarian irruption and devastations. The lay society was dissolved by the ruin of the empire and of the civilized populations, and was no longer adequate to the management of secular affairs in accordance with civilized order. The church was obliged to add to her mission of evangelizer, which is her mission of all times and places, the temporary and accidental mission of civilizer, of the nations. She

must tame the wild savage, humanize the ruthless barbarian, reëstablish social order, revive science and the arts, and restore and advance civilization. All had been demolished, and she had all to reconstruct. She had to be statesman, lawyer, physician, pedagogue, architect, painter, sculptor, musician, agriculturist, horticulturist, bookbinder, and common mechanic or artisan,—in fine, every thing but money-changer and soldier. Having thus the chief part of the work of civil society to perform, it became absolutely necessary that she should have a civil and political existence and authority,—that she should be incorporated into the state, as an integral element of the civil constitution, and have her worship, without which she could have as little social as religious influence, recognized as the law of the land as well as the law of God. There was no other condition of rescuing society from the chaos and barbarism in which it was plunged, and of reviving civilization and securing its progress. Infidelity, heresy, and schism, which were as directly in opposition to her mission of civilizing the nations as to her mission of evangelizing them, were then directly and proximately crimes against society, and as such were justly punishable by the public authorities. In attacking the church, they attacked civil society itself, struck at the very conditions of social order, and jeopardized every social interest.

But, from the nature of the case, this mission of civilizer of nations is restricted to barbarous ages and countries, for the very good reason that the church cannot be called upon to civilize nations when they are already civilized. This mission she has now, in great measure, accomplished in what is called Christendom; and the necessity of that particular political order which specially protected her in its performance, or which was requisite to enable her to perform it, does not now exist. The lay society she has rescued from barbarism, and civilized. It has now the arts of civilized life in its own possession, and does not need, as it once did, in barbarous ages, the church to teach it how to make shoes, bind books, or brew hop-beer. It is now competent, under the *spiritual* direction of the spiritual society, to the management of secular affairs. It has, in these affairs, which properly belong to it, attained to majority, and no longer needs in regard to them, so far as purely secular and as they involve no moral principle, to be under ecclesiastical tutelage. The church is now free to resign her

temporary civil functions, and to devote herself exclusively to the mission of evangelizing the world. It is not necessary that she should be now incorporated into the state, in the sense she was in the barbaric ages; and consequently infidelity, heresy, and schism, though as great sins against God as ever, are not now crimes against society in the sense they then were, or to be punished as such; and therefore, as long as their adherents demean themselves peaceably, offer no external violence to the true religion, and discharge their ordinary social obligations, they are to be politically tolerated, and left to answer for their sinfulness, great as it unquestionably is, to God himself.

This reasoning cannot well be disputed. When infidelity, heresy, and schism, as well as any other sins against God, are clearly and directly crimes against society, they are justly punishable by the civil authorities; but when they only remotely offend against social interests, and are chiefly censurable only as they injure the soul, they are not so punishable, and the prince or commonwealth is bound to tolerate them. This is the principle we lay down. In former times, they were obviously and directly crimes against society, and as such were justly punishable by the civil magistrate; but, owing to the civilization effected by the social labors of the church, they are not now such crimes, and therefore not now punishable as such, but are to be politically tolerated, for they now can be, without directly or immediately endangering the existence of social order, or sacrificing the general interests of civilization. Here are the facts we assert.

All this is virtually conceded by all the respectable publicists of our times. No intelligent Protestant or infidel really denies—though we know not how long it will be so—the immense services rendered to civilization by the Catholic Church, and with one voice all those who give us philosophies of history, from Guizot to our Kentucky friend, J. D. Nourse, agree that she could not have rendered those services without the civil constitution which made hostility to her faith, discipline, or worship social offences. The present popular theory of those who are not Catholics is, that the church was the true church, and faithfully and successfully performed her mission, down to the epoch of the Protestant reformation, and that she is a false church now, because now she leaves the interests of civilization to the lay society, and does not exert herself directly to pro-

mote them, which, according to them, she is bound to do, since, say they, her mission is merely that of civilizing mankind. We are aware of no intelligent voice, in even the uncatholic church, that does not defend the mutual relations of the civil and ecclesiastical societies which obtained in the barbarous ages as wise and necessary for those times, or that pretends to condemn them, except when insisted upon as equally necessary or proper in the altered state of modern civilization. Here is all we ask. Restricted to the temporary and accidental mission of the church as civilizer, we recognize a truth in what our popular authors advance. They say the political order in question was just and necessary during the barbarous ages; so say we. They say it is not just now; so say we; and therefore we, as well as they, reject it for our times. Because the church approved it in one set of circumstances, we are not obliged to maintain that she must approve it under every set of circumstances. Principles are immutable and eternal, but their application must vary according to the circumstances of time and place. This the popular authors themselves contend, and this is all we allege; and we have no quarrel with them, except when they assert that the mission of the church is primarily and exclusively that of civilizer, and contend that she is false or dead now, because she does not now labor directly for the advancement of civilization, which, we need hardly say, is as silly as it is untrue.

It is evident from what we have said, that, though we assert the most rigid theological intolerance, and the wisdom and justice of the political intolerance which nobody denies was during many centuries asserted, and sometimes practised, by Catholic states, we are bound by Catholic principles to assert for our times the toleration of all religions compatible with the existence and interests of society.

We do not, our readers will observe, justify the political intolerance in question, on the ground that it was sanctioned by the public opinion of former times, nor do we defend the political toleration of false religions now, because public opinion now demands it. Public opinion may often be pleaded in excuse or in extenuation of the conduct of individuals, but it is never to be appealed to as the standard of right and wrong, especially when the question turns on principles and institutions either sanctioned or not disavowed by an infallible church. Not the public opinion, but the public necessities, the interests of society, of civili-

zation, justified the political intolerance; and these would, if they existed, justify it now as well as then,—and not only justify it, but even demand it. Let the modern political and social order be broken up, the civilization which Christian nations have, by painful toil and sacrifice for so many ages, slowly worked out, be swept away, the whole of Christendom overrun with hordes of ruthless and lawless barbarians, and the world be plunged once more into the darkness and chaos of barbarism,—and let the church remain the sole repository of what has been retained of the former civilization, the only living social organism, the only living organic force, able to reduce chaos to order, to restore society to its normal condition, to reproduce and provide for the advance of civilization,—and we would say at once, Revive the former political and social constitution; incorporate the church again into the state; let her resume anew her functions as civilizer, as well as evangelizer, of the nations; let her faith, discipline, and worship, without which she can have no social influence even, be made the law of the land, and whatever is repugnant to them be declared a crime against society, and, when manifesting itself in overt acts, punishable as such by the civil magistrate;—and we should have little respect for the head, little reverence for the heart, that could not or would not say as much. But now, we repeat, when such is not the state of things, and, until some terrible calamity not now foreseen, and in all human probability, not likely to occur, shall throw society out of its normal order, and bring it back, we say, Let the church be the church, and the state be the state, the two orders be distinct, and the lay society, under the *spiritual* direction of the spiritual society, manage the temporal affairs of the world, as now, thanks to the church, which did not fail in time of need, it is able to do; let the public law, where it is proper, recognize the true religion, but let it punish no sins against God any further than they are directly and immediately crimes against society. False religions are, no doubt, always offences against society, as are all sins against God; but, as we have said more than once, when and where they are only remotely and indirectly so, when and where they are not directly and immediately so, the civil law has no right by coercive means to repress them, and could not do so if it should make the attempt. Their adherents, in all other respects discharging their social duties and demeaning themselves as good citizens, must be

protected in their civil rights, and their punishment be remitted to the discipline of the spiritual society and the justice of God.

The church cannot tolerate the punishment, by the civil authority, of offences purely spiritual, because the civil authority cannot do it without trenching upon her province. She allows no one to be molested merely for his want of faith, because, for his want of faith, the unbeliever is answerable to God alone. Faith is voluntary, and cannot be forced. Whoever chooses to run the risk of the penalty of eternal damnation annexed to infidelity is free to be an infidel, and Almighty God neither does violence, nor suffers any power on earth to do violence, to his free will. He proffers eternal life to all men, tells them the conditions on which they may receive it, gives them the necessary graces to accept and secure it, urges them by the most powerful motives which can be addressed to reason, conscience, free will; but he forces no one to accept it. He demands the heart, its free, voluntary obedience, and will accept and reward only the free-will offering. Hence the church strictly and solemnly forbids any one to be forced or compelled to receive the faith. Hence her missionaries are never armed soldiers, but humble preachers, bearing only the crucifix and pastoral staff. Never has she allowed the unbaptized—Jews, pagans, Mahometans, infidels—to be forced to profess the Catholic faith, or force to be employed against them, except to compel them to tolerate the preaching of the Gospel. If in Catholic states they have ever been disturbed or molested on account of their unbelief, it has been against her authority, or because they practised violence against the profession of the true religion; or because they were dangerous subjects to the state, and could not, under the circumstances, be safely tolerated,—as, for instance, in Spain under Charles V., when the Jews and Moors conspired in secret and with the enemies of the church, not simply to secure the peaceable enjoyment of their own religions, but to overthrow both altar and throne, both of which the state had the right, and was bound, to protect and defend, to the full extent of its power, against any and every class of enemies.

The church certainly claims authority over all baptized persons, by whomsoever they may have been baptized; for they are, in the sacrament of baptism, born her subjects, and she has a right to their obedience. Heretics and schis-

matics are her rebellious subjects, and she has the same right to reduce them to obedience and to compel them to conform their life to their baptismal vows, that a temporal sovereign has to reduce a rebellious province to submission to his legitimate authority. But she can reduce them only by such means as she possesses, and can inflict on them for their rebellion only such punishments as she has at her command, which are all spiritual. If they make war on her, and attempt to seize her churches, to rob her of her possessions, to desecrate her altars, and to suppress her worship or restrain its freedom, as was the case with the early Protestants in every country where they had power enough, and which caused the terrible religious wars of the sixteenth century, and the persecution of Protestants by Catholic princes, she has the right to call in the secular power to her aid, and it is bound to repel them by force; because they themselves then transfer the controversy from the spiritual order to the temporal, and attack the social and civil rights of the church no less than her spiritual rights. But when they themselves restrain their heresy and schism within the limits of the spiritual order, make no attempt to propagate their pestilential errors or iniquity by violence, and attack none of the rights of the church or of the faithful, she, as we have seen, recognizes no right in the secular authority to molest them, unless guilty of other crimes against society,—and then only on principles which apply equally to all classes of social offenders. As simple heresy and schism, she cannot call in the secular authority to aid her in suppressing them. She is therefore reduced to her own spiritual resources, to addresses to their reason and their conscience, and can inflict on them only spiritual punishments, ecclesiastical censures, of which the greatest is excommunication. This, to a believer, is a terrible punishment, we grant; but to those who do not believe, who excommunicate themselves, and glory in being severed from her communion, it is not a punishment too severe to be borne.

But even in inflicting her spiritual censures, and in all of her dealings with her rebellious subjects, the church always has their reformation at heart, and never forgets that her mission is to save men's souls, and not to destroy them. She pleads with them, and leaves no measure untried that is likely to be successful; and she keeps the door always open for the return of the penitent. When she is under the painful necessity of delivering over to Satan those who set at naught

her discipline, it is for "the destruction of the flesh," that "they may learn not to blaspheme." To the very last, she pleads with all a mother's sweetness, affection, and grief; and if they are finally melted, and willing to return to their duty, she opens wide her arms, and wide her heart, to receive them, and generously forgets their past disobedience. Even the much decried and calumniated Inquisition, which it is possible politicians in some instances have abused, owed its origin to her maternal solicitude, and was instituted no less for the protection than for the detection of the misbelieving. She would interpose the shield of her maternal love between her rebellious subject and the secular arm to the last, till all hope was gone, till all her resources to reclaim him were exhausted. They know little of the church of God who call her cruel, proud, haughty, revengeful, thirsting for the blood of heretics, and rejoicing in their punishment by the civil authority. Long, long does she forbear with them,—long, long does she suffer them to rend her own bosom,—before she can endure to withdraw her affectionate embrace, and abandon them to their self-chosen doom.

And here we are admonished of what should be the spirit of our intercourse with our unbelieving and heretical neighbours and fellow citizens. Rousseau asserts that the dogma, Out of the church there is no salvation, is antisocial, and that whoever professes it should be banished from the commonwealth. But he might as well have said, that the dogma, No one who dies guilty of mortal sin can be saved, is antisocial, and he who holds it should be banished from society. We certainly regard infidels and heretics as guilty of mortal sin before God, and therefore, if dying in their infidelity and heresy, as condemned to hell. But they are not the only persons whom we regard as mortal sinners; and all who die mortal sinners, even though they should die nominally in our own communion, must, according to our faith, receive the same doom. There are persons in the church who will talk, write, fight for their religion, do any thing for it but live it, whose doom will be far more severe than that of many heretics and unbelievers; nay, we know not but we ourselves may be of the number, for no man knoweth whether he deserves love or hatred, unless he has received a special revelation from God. We live in a world of sinners, and there may be in our own families, in our bosom companions, sinners for whose salvation we have as little reason to hope as we have for that of the unbeliever

or the heretic. These things are so, and must be so, and our rule of conduct is and should be the same towards sinners of all classes, that is, to conduct ourselves so as, if possible, to win them all to the love and practice of true religion.

It is very true that all who are not joined to the Catholic communion, if they die as they are, will come short of salvation. This we know by infallible faith; but we do not know that all who are not now joined to that communion will die as they are, and have no right to presume that they will. Nothing assures us that their hearts will not be softened, their pride subdued, their eyes opened,—that they will not one day behold, love, and conform to the truth, and enter into the kingdom of heaven, while, perhaps, we ourselves shall be thrust out into exterior darkness, where there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth. It is no less an error to hold that all out of the church will be damned, than it is to hold that they can be saved without being in the church. If we so held, there would be some foundation for Rousseau's charge; our doctrine would be antisocial, and we should be unable to discharge our social duties toward those out of our church. But we hold no such doctrine. There is a place of repentance for them as well as for us, and nothing forbids us to hope and to labor for their salvation. The Lord alone knoweth who are his, and we have no right to presume, as long as there is life, that the doom of any one is sealed. We must, then, treat all men, those without as well as those within, as persons for whom Christ died, as persons who may be saved, and whose salvation is to be desired by us with an unbounded charity, and for which we are to rejoice to make any sacrifice in our power. Here is the reason why the dogma objected to is not antisocial, and why to profess it is no breach of charity to our neighbour, but if done in the proper spirit, is the very reverse,—is, in fact, the highest evidence we can give of the truth and fervor of our charity.

The object of the church, in all her dealings with those without, as well as with those within, is the salvation of souls. This must be ours, also, as her faithful children. This object we shall be able to further only as we live in accordance with the spirit of our religion. It requires no deep or extensive knowledge of mankind to know that the road to their convictions lies through their affections. If we would be instrumental, under God, in converting them,

we must begin by loving them, and by our love winning their love. Nothing is gained by convincing a man against his will; often the very logic that convinces, where the affections are not won, serves only to repel from obedience to the truth. We succeed in influencing others for their good only in proportion as we set before them an example fit for them to follow,—are meek, gentle, humble, charitable, kind, and affectionate in our intercourse with them. And why shall we not love these neighbours and countrymen of ours, who have not the inconceivable happiness of being in the church of God? Who are we, that we should set up ourselves above them,—that we should boast over them? What merit is it in us, that we are not even as they? or how know we that ours will not be the greater condemnation? Are they not our kinsmen according to the flesh? Has not our God loved them with an infinite tenderness? Does he not proffer them his love with infinite sweetness? And has he not so longed for their love that he has died to win it? How, then, shall we not love them and labor for their salvation with a charity that burns with an intensity proportioned to their danger? Is it not here where we come short? Repelled by the bigotry, fanaticism, and hard-heartedness of some, attracted by the sweetness, affection, and kind offices of others, are we not prone to look upon these countrymen of ours who are out of the church, either as persons whose conversion is hopeless, or as persons who need no conversion;—excusing ourselves from zealous labors to bring them to God by persuading ourselves that their conversion either is not possible or not necessary,—forgetful that in either case we sin against faith and charity, and in both show ourselves wanting in true love of our neighbour, and therefore of God? Is not here, in this double error, the reason why so few, comparatively, of our countrymen are brought into the one fold, under the one Shepherd?

There is nothing in modern heresies that should discourage us. The world, before this, has been afflicted with as deep, as wide-spread, and as obstinate heresies as it is now. We must not suppose that we have fallen upon peculiarly evil times. Evils, indeed, there are, but our lot is cast in comparatively good times. What is the situation of Catholics now in comparison with what it was under the Arian successors of Constantine? or when the wild and destructive hordes of northern barbarians overwhelmed the western empire? or when the yet more destructive Saracenic hosts,

with the Koran in one hand and the scymitar in the other, shouting "There is one God and Mohammed is his prophet," overran the East, and, over more than half the known world, over the fairest provinces of even Europe herself, supplanted the Cross by the Crescent? But Arianism has been subdued, and is remembered only in the immortal records of its victors; the barbarians have been civilized; the Saracenic hosts have been checked, their power has been broken, and their once formidable empire retains a fitful existence only by the iniquitous policy of nominally Christian princes, who forget their God and the interests of civilization in a vain endeavour to maintain an ever-varying balance of power, and to arrest the march of destiny. Better the Russian than the Turk at Constantinople. Protestantism itself, which swept away a third part of Europe, as the tail of the Apocalyptic dragon swept away a third part of the stars of heaven, has spent its force, has been driven back far within its original confines, and, for two hundred and fifty years, has made no progress in the Old World, but towards destruction. True, unbelief, indifferency, socialism, communism, revolutionism, are, or just now were, rife;—true, they held during the last year their carnival, convulsed the greater part of Europe, exiled the sovereign pontiff, took possession of the Eternal City, and for a moment seemed on the point of rising to empire. But defeat follows on the heels of victory, their chiefs have fallen, are in exile or in prison, and they must soon be objects of ridicule and contempt, rather than of fear and dread. They are in the nature of things short-lived. The human race loves order, and must be a believer. It must worship,—must have a religion; and the Catholic religion alone has life, has energy, has power. Even to a superficial observer, all other religions or pretended religions are struck with death, and are in their agony. Appearances indicate that a glorious day is dawning for the church, and that there awaits her a more splendid triumph than she has ever yet enjoyed. The Lord God omnipotent reigneth. Let us not feel that these unbelieving and misbelieving countrymen of ours—who now, alas! have no hope but in this hollow and transitory life, who are laboring for that which is not bread, and spending their strength for that which satisfieth not—are all doomed to be lost, and that they of all the world are to have no part in the new triumphs reserved for Catholicity. Let us not feel that the time is never to come, when, for their many civic

virtues and their generous contributions to an oppressed and famishing nation, they can receive no higher reward than the discovery of the gold mines of California. Let us not look upon their conversion even as difficult. They, too, are famishing, and for the bread of life. We have only to remember that this land is under the protection of the immaculate Virgin, and to live as true children of Mary, in order to behold this noble country—whose destiny, if we are faithful, promises to surpass what the boldest imagination can conceive—won to the Cross, and standing foremost among the Catholic nations of the earth.

But to return from this apparent digression, we will simply add, in conclusion, that, while we have asserted, as we were bound by reason and faith, the most rigid intolerance and exclusiveness in the religious order, and have justified the constitution and laws of Catholic states, during the middle ages, in declaring infidel, heretical, and schismatical sects social crimes, and punishing them as such, we have shown that, in a normal or civilized state of society, Catholicity is perfectly compatible with political toleration, and concedes at least as extensive toleration as is professed, and for the most part honorably maintained, by our American government. Our religion contains nothing, in case we should become the majority, and the political power should pass in this country into our hands, which would require any external changes in our existing political institutions, in our domestic and social economies, or in the present mutual relations of the civil and the ecclesiastical powers. In taking possession of a barbarous country, Catholicity must labor to change the institutions, the laws, the manners and customs, as well as the religion and interior sentiments, of the people. It has to do the same in taking possession even of a falsely civilized country, like India, China, or Japan. Catholicity can never tolerate the social institutions which are cherished by these oriental nations, as the decisions of Rome, in the controversies between the Jesuits and Dominicans, fully prove. It can tolerate any form of government; but it can, wherever it becomes resident, tolerate no despotism, no government that is not a government of law. The prince, whether monarch, aristocracy, or democracy, must govern according to law, and, as far as possible, according to just law; for she recognizes no security for the worship of God where there is no protection for the rights of our neighbour, any more than she recognizes love to God where there is

none to our brother. She can never tolerate the oriental doctrine of castes, for she teaches that all men are of one blood, are brethren, equals before God, and should be equals before the law. The great reason why Christianity penetrates so slowly into these oriental nations is, no doubt, the fact, that not their religion only, but their whole order of society, their whole political, social, and domestic life, is unchristian, and must be changed in order to make them Christian nations. A Chinese or a Hindoo might object, with truth, to the introduction of Christianity, that it would change his political and social institutions, as well as his religious beliefs and usages.

But when Catholicity took possession of the Roman empire, it changed nothing except the spiritual order, and what held from it. It stepped into the Roman civilization as if it had been expressly prepared for it,—as it no doubt, in a great measure, had been,—abolished the false gods, purged the temples of their idolatry, cleansed them with holy water, converted them into churches, and consecrated them to the true God,—changed the manners and customs of the people as far as they depended on the false religions which had been professed, but retained the social institutions, the schools, the academies, the laws, the whole exterior domestic and social economy as she found it, only infusing her own spirit into it, and animating it with a purer, a higher, and a more vigorous life. The same will be the case here. Our civilization is founded on a right basis,—is Roman and Christian in its groundwork; and there never has been a state constituted throughout more in harmony with Catholic principles than the American. Its founders were not Catholics; far from it; but they would have been startled to have seen how much they were indebted to Catholicity for every important improvement they adopted. Their innovations were, for the most part, borrowed from Catholic teachers. Our American fathers had, unhappily for them, turned their backs upon the church; but they had been nursed in the bosom of her civilization. That civilization they brought with them to this New World, purged of the barbaric leaven which was still, in some measure, retained in the mother country, and against which the popes and the whole spiritual society had protested for ten centuries. Whoever will examine the respective civil institutions of England and this country will hardly fail to perceive, that what of England we have rejected is what she owes to her barbarous ancestors, and what we have added

which she has not has been borrowed from Roman and Catholic civilization. Indeed, just in proportion, under a civil and political point of view, as we have receded from England, we have approached Rome and Catholicity. They betray no little simplicity, and ignorance of modern civilization, who suppose that the triumph of Catholicity here would be the subversion of our political and civil constitution. Our institutions throughout are based upon the great principles of reason and common sense, which our church presupposes and sanctions, inspired by Catholic tradition, and sustained by that portion of Catholic life which the Protestant populations were able to carry with them when they broke away from its source, and which, we would fain hope, is not yet wholly extinct. Indeed, the body for Catholicity seems to us to be here already prepared. It is moulded from fine, rich, red earth, in a form of majestic proportions, and of surpassing beauty, wanting nothing but the divine breath to be breathed into its nostrils in order to become a living soul. The conversion of the country would destroy, would change, nothing in this admirable body, but it would quicken it with the breath of the Almighty, and secure its continuance, and its beneficent and successful operation.

We have not, we grant, defended the political toleration of different religions on infidel or even Protestant principles. It would have been idle to have done so; for everybody knows that those principles are not ours, and cannot be, unless we give up our religion. We cannot place the sects on a footing of perfect equality with the church, and defend their freedom on the same ground that we do hers; because error can never exist by the same right that truth exists. The popular ground of defending the toleration of all religions by the state is the assumption of their equal right before God. This ground cannot be held by a Catholic; and if we had assumed it, and on the strength of it asserted that Catholic states are bound to maintain universal toleration, who would have had any confidence in our sincerity, or not have supposed that our assertion was made merely for the purpose of escaping the odium of appearing to oppose the toleration by Catholic states of heretical or schismatical religions now, when toleration is popular, and we stand in need of it for ourselves? Every intelligent Protestant or unbeliever, with the history of the middle ages before his eyes, would have said, "Yes, these Catholics here in this

country, where they are weak, are exceedingly liberal, and preach universal toleration ; but let them become strong, let them once get the political power, and we shall quickly see that they are as intolerant in the political order as they are confessedly in the spiritual order." We Catholics must never forget that Protestants and unbelievers have a theory, to which they are wedded, that we are all ready to lie and swear to any thing for the sake of Catholicity, and that we can go so far as to profess indifferentism, infidelity, or even Puritanism, if we think we can thereby promote the interests of our church. Our assertions count for nothing with them. We are, in their estimation, fools when honest, and knaves when intelligent. Externally considered, it is evidently for our interest, here in this country, and, indeed, in many other countries at the present time, to preach toleration; and they suppose interest governs us, as it does them, and therefore they place no confidence in our preaching, unless we show clearly and undeniably that it is in harmony with the principles of our church, where she is strong as well as where she is apparently weak.

We have therefore defended the political toleration of the sects as a Catholic statesman, on strictly Catholic principles, without the least compromise,—without descending for a moment from the high ground of the infallibility and immutability of our church,—without blinking, or hesitating to justify in its fullest extent, the political intolerance manifested by Catholic states to infidelity, heresy, and schism in past times. We have shown that not mere policy, but the very principles of our holy religion, require us now—on the supposition that modern unbelievers, heretics, and schismatics are civilized, and no longer barbarians, or addicted to barbarous practices—to assert and maintain as broad a toleration as our American constitution guaranties ; that they forbid the punishment by the civil authority of sins against God, however great, when not incompatible with the peace and welfare of society; and that the church can of herself inflict only spiritual punishments, and no greater spiritual punishment than excommunication. If this does not satisfy, it is not our fault, nor that of our church.

THE CHURCH IN THE DARK AGES.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1849.]

Our attention has been specially called to "The Dark Ages" by *The Christian Examiner*, the literary and theological organ of the American Unitarians, for May last, in an article entitled *The Artistic and Romantic View of the Church of the Middle Ages*, written, as we learn from the initials appended to it, by one of the ablest and most respectable of our New England Unitarian ministers. Aside from its theology, with which, of course, we have no sympathy, *The Christian Examiner* is second to no periodical in the country; and it was in its pages that Channing, Norton, Ware, the Peabodys, Lamson, Walker, Frothingham, Dewey, Ripley, and others, first became generally known to the reading public, and acquired their literary reputation. We have many pleasant, as well as painful recollections connected with it, for we were ourselves for several years counted among its contributors; and the men who gave it a character, and made it a leading organ of New England literature as well as of Unitarian theology, were for the most part, our personal acquaintances and friends, whose many amiable qualities, generous sentiments, private and social virtues, we always delight to remember. The writer of the article we have designated is a young man of more than ordinary natural endowments, of respectable attainments, and a cultivated taste. He is earnest, and seems really to have some principle, and to be disposed to treat those from whom he differs with fairness and candor. He shows, in the article before us, better temper, more liberal feeling,

*1. *Mores Catholici: or Ages of Faith.* By Kenelm H. Digby, Esq. Cincinnati: 1841.

2. *The Dark Ages: a series of Essays intended to illustrate the State of Religion and Literature in the Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries, reprinted from the "British Magazine," with Corrections and some Additions.* By the Rev. S. R. Maitland, F. R. S. and F. S. A., Librarian to His Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury, &c. London: 1844.

3. *The Christian Examiner and Religious Miscellany.* Boston: May, 1849.

more manliness, and more loyalty to truth, than we are accustomed to meet or to expect from writers who oppose the church, and we have read him occasionally with pleasure. His sneers are comparatively few; his declamations are not very long, nor remarkably violent; his reasonings, if his premises were sound, would frequently be conclusive; and many of his criticisms are just and well merited.

The article itself is principally taken up with criticisms on various works which have recently appeared in favor of the middle ages, and more especially with a review of the *Mores Catholici: or Ages of Faith*, by Kenelm H. Digby, one of the most remarkable literary productions of our times. With the writer's remarks on several of these works, especially those which have emanated from the Puseyite or Oxford school, we in the main agree. The Oxford men who remain attached to Anglicanism, and even some others, in what they wrote before they abandoned it, appear to us to betray much childishness and want of manly criticism; and their indiscriminate commendation of the middle ages is not less offensive to our judgment, and even more offensive to our taste, than the indiscriminate condemnation of them so characteristic of our modern Evangelicals. Even Pugin's exclusive and excessive praise of Gothic architecture has well-nigh turned our stomach, and driven us out of our former sober admiration of it. We have no sympathy with one-sided views in art, and just as little with the spirit that forgets that we have the same church which our ancestors had,—that she is not dead, but living,—as dear to us as she was to the mediæval knights and monks,—as good, as wise, as powerful, as young, as fresh, as beautiful, as vigorous, as she was in the Dark Ages.

The writer in the *Christian Examiner* bestows his chief attention upon the *Mores Catholici: or Ages of Faith.* He justly praises, and, if it were possible, even overpraises, this work for its immense erudition, at once comprehensive and minute; but he contends that it is partial, deceptive, and not to be relied on as a faithful representation of the middle ages. It should, he thinks, be regarded not as an historical work, properly so called, but as "A Romance Founded on Facts of Mediæval History." It is impossible to conceive an author more thoroughly imbued with the spirit of romance, or more interesting for the rich and brilliant hues which his imagination throws over every object he presents. But the coloring he gives to the middle ages is his own; he

fails to present them, in their totality, as they really were, and he disguises or suppresses such of their phenomena as are not agreeable to his Catholic faith or Catholic fervor. No man, we apprehend, has carefully read Digby's work, without feeling that there is some truth in this criticism. For ourselves, we admire the *Mores Catholici* for its various learning, its deep reverential tone, its undoubting faith, its sincere and fervent piety, and its noble appreciation of Catholic honor and Catholic heroism; but we have never been able to give it any very high rank under the relations either of art or of science. The author is saturated with the religious, and also with the romantic, spirit of the *later* mediæval times; he has a keen relish for art, and we are told that his merits as a painter are beyond those of an amateur; but as a writer he exhibits very little artistic skill. He has vast learning, and he accumulates a mass of materials from all sources, near and remote, open and recondite, at which we stand aghast; but his power to mould these materials into a proper shape, to reduce his facts to their proper places, under their proper laws, and to draw from them the proper inferences, seems to us to be more than ordinarily defective. His book is a chaos of erudition, of faith, piety, sentimentality, and romance, which, indeed, may often be read for edification, for its gentle and subduing effects on the heart, but which can seldom be consulted with entire confidence as a work of simple instruction. It does not give us, nor does it enable us to form, a complete picture of mediæval life in its totality; it is one-sided, often fanciful, illusory; and its rambling character, its absorbing subjectivity, its neglect of order, of method, of proper definitions and distinctions, render it not unfrequently as apt to suggest conclusions against Catholicity as in its favor.

In reading Digby's work, we certainly receive the impression, that, in his view at least, society in the middle ages was in what we may regard as its normal state, really under the spiritual direction of the church, and, with insignificant exceptions, obedient to her doctrines and to her precepts,—that the church was in fact, as well as in right, supreme, had all things her own way, and was able to realize for society, as well as for individuals, in the secular order no less than in the spiritual, her ideal of Catholic life on earth. The facts he relates, collected from all ages and nations, appear to be intended to illustrate that life, and to

prove that it was, under both the secular and religious aspects, successfully realized. Hence to him the middle ages are peculiarly Catholic ages, that is, "ages of faith," as he expressly denominates them; and therefore to be not only admired, but imitated. But if this be really his view, he makes the church responsible for their general and special character, and therefore binds himself to defend them in their totality, under their secular as well as under their religious relations, or to give up his Catholicity. This the writer in the *Examiner* has not failed to perceive, and hence he throws in Digby's face the iniquity, the vices, the corruptions, the barbarism of those ages,—which it were idle to attempt to deny or to conceal,—as a conclusive refutation of the claims of the church as the church of God. Undeniably false and monstrous as is the reasoning of our Unitarian friend, nevertheless, as against Digby, it is apparently sound, and not easily set aside; for it rests on an assumption which Digby himself certainly has the appearance, at least, of making, and nowhere of denying.

Our readers are well aware that we are not among those who are continually decrying the middle ages; we have frequently defended them, and are always ready to defend them, against their calumniators. We are far from believing them to have been throughout, under all their relations, so dark, so utterly wretched, as it has been for a long time commonly imagined, and we by no means admit that the present is so far in advance of them as modern advocates of progress would persuade us; but we have never supposed that we were bound to praise them indiscriminately; we are far from being prepared to regard our church as implicated in the totality of their phenomena, and we cannot permit either our friends or our enemies to lay them, with all their evil as well as their good, upon our back, and compel us to carry them with us wherever we go, or else give up our Catholic faith and worship. They are, thus taken, a load which we have no disposition to carry, and which no man has the right to insist upon our carrying. As we often say, we are Catholics of the middle ages, because Catholicity never varies, and undergoes no development in the sense of the believers in "the progress of the species," and because the Catholic, as a Catholic, of one age is the Catholic of every age. But as men, as affected by simple human movements, we belong to the nineteenth century, in which our lot is cast, and we labor to serve our own genera-

tion, under the conditions to which it and we are subject, without calumniating either the past or the present.

The apparent error of Digby, and the real error of his Unitarian opponent, as of nearly all the modern adversaries of the church, is in neglecting to make a very obvious distinction between the divine element in the middle ages, represented by the church, and the human element that subsisted and operated by its side; and in failing to distribute to each of these elements its appropriate share of the collective phenomena. The secular or human element then, as before and since, held divided empire with the church, and is answerable for a portion of the phenomena we encounter in mediæval history; and as the church was then not alone, was not the sole operative or efficient cause, it is obviously unjust, as well as unscientific, to hold her responsible for any portion of those phenomena, except those which, directly or indirectly, proceeded from her as their principle.

As far as the part of the church, or her influences and effects, are concerned, Digby's work misstates, miscolors, exaggerates, nothing, and fails, if in any thing, simply in falling short of the full truth. We are to distrust it only when it goes beyond the religious element, and the facts dependent on it, and claims to be a faithful picture of mediæval life in its totality, of what depended on the human as well as the divine. It is then a false picture; for the human element was not so catholicized, nor, as to its independent and hostile operations, confined within so narrow limits as its author supposes; and the church was not so supreme, did not, in fact, exert so exclusive and so abiding a control over entire mediæval life, as he represents. Here is the grand defect of Digby's book, and here is the point on which we insist. There is no truth in the assumption which Digby seems to make, and which our Unitarian friend really does make, that "the church had a thousand years of almost triumphant ascendency." In this world the church is militant, never triumphant. Only he who perseveres unto the end is permitted to triumph. That the supremacy of the church was generally admitted, in the middle ages, as a doctrine,—that she maintained an ascendency over heresy greater than she did in some periods before them, or than she does now,—as far as our present argument is concerned,—may or may not be true; but that she had an almost triumphant ascendency, or any thing ap-

proaching it, over the secular order, is utterly false, and throughout the entire thousand years supposed, she had not for one moment her unrestrained freedom, and often, often, had she to struggle for her very existence against pagans, heretics, schismatics, Mahometans, and lawless, ambitious, licentious, and barbarous sovereigns. Never, indeed, did she give more unequivocal proofs of her supernatural origin and support, than in those ages of ignorance, violence, and blood, —never did she struggle with more manifest supernatural constancy and force, or win more glorious trophies to her celestial prowess; but never found she her path beset with greater difficulties, or was her just dominion resisted by more numerous, fiercer, more powerful, or more obstinate enemies.

The assumption that the church reigned quietly and peacefully during the middle ages, is warranted by no authority, and is contradicted by the whole history of the period. That period extends from the beginning of the sixth century to the close of the fifteenth. A simple glance at its history will suffice to dissipate the illusion, that the middle ages were all the work of the church, or that she worked throughout them comparatively at her ease. Those ages open with the destruction of the western Roman empire, and the permanent settlement of the northern barbarians on its ruins. For all western Europe the old Græco-Roman civilization is destroyed, save the wrecks preserved by the church, and some few towns in Italy and Gaul. The old cultivated populations are in great measure exterminated, and the few that survive have been plundered, impoverished, and for the most part reduced to slavery. Over the vast extent of the once flourishing, wealthy, and highly civilized and christianized provinces of the empire, you see nothing but ruined cities, deserted towns and villages, large tracts of once cultivated land becoming wild, a thin population, composed of miserable, trembling slaves, and rude, ignorant, proud, arrogant, and merciless barbarian masters. The churches and religious houses have been demolished or plundered; the schools and institutions of learning, so numerous and so richly endowed under the empire, have disappeared; the liberal arts are despised and neglected; the domestic arts, except a few, are lost or forgotten; war, pillage, general insecurity, misery, want, have loosened all moral restraints, unchained the passions, and given free scope to vice and crime; the clergy are few, poor, illiterate,

for their conquerors, as subsequently in Ireland, have left them no means of education; and besides, they belong for the most part to the conquered races, and are therefore despised. The barbarian conquerors and masters, moreover, are not all even nominally Catholic. Many of them are Arians; more of them are pagans, still adoring their old Scandinavian and Teutonic deities, and looking with proud disdain on the Christian's faith and the Christian's worship. An Arian kingdom has been erected in northern Africa, another is establishing itself in northern Italy; what is now Switzerland and eastern France was subject to the part heretical, part pagan, but wholly savage Burgundians; in the rest of France there are portions of the old Gallo-Roman population that have not yet received the faith, and portions of the old Celtic population who in their dense forests still cherish their ancient Druidism; the barbarian kingdom in Spain has but recently and imperfectly yielded to Catholicity; the British churches have lost their vigor, and are confined to the narrow district of Wales, and through all the rest of Britain paganism is rampant, and the altars smoke with sacrifices to Woden and Thor. Ireland alone, at this period, is a Catholic oasis in the immense desert of heresy and barbaric infidelity. Belgium in part, all Germany, all northern and all eastern Europe above the Byzantine empire, are one unbroken Cimmeria of heathenism; and even Rome herself is not all Catholic, nor even all Christian. Such is a birdseye view of what is now the most civilized and the ruling part of the globe, at the opening of the middle ages; and such, after having once christianized the empire, was the new world committed to the charge of the church. Far more disheartening were her prospects than when she concealed herself in the catacombs, or bled under Nero, Decius, Maximian and Diocletian; and far more laborious was the task now before her than that which she had accomplished in passing from that "upper room" in Jerusalem to the throne of the Cæsars.

Nor was it only at the beginning of the middle ages that the church found herself in face of a hostile world. The hostility continued till the close of the period, and even then did not cease, but broke out under a new form, that of Protestantism, with undiminished virulence. It was in the middle ages, we must remember, that Mahometanism sprang up in the desert, and, breaking forth with wild and ferocious fanaticism, for eight hundred years devastated the fairest

and most fertile regions of the earth; that the Iconoclasts persecuted the church and sought to prepare it for Islamism; the Greek schism originated and was consummated; the Huns made their new invasion from the East; the Saracens ravaged the south of Italy and France, and established themselves in Spain; the fierce and shaggy Norsemen came down from the frozen North, with their wild courage, their savage cruelty, and their Scandinavian superstititions; the dissolute Albigenses renewed the heresy of Manes, and perpetrated their horrors; the Beghards, Wicliffites, followers of the *Evangile Eternel*, and other sectaries, arose, and by their pantheistic and socialistic movements and insurrections in England, France, and the Low Countries, preluded not unworthily the pantheistic and socialistic revolutions which we have seen, during the last year, convulse all Europe, and threaten the destruction of all law, all order, all society, both civil and religious. Add to these great facts, the deplorable effects of which are still widely and deeply felt, that during these same ages there was scarcely a moment of peace between the civil and the ecclesiastical powers. The civil authority never ceased to enroach on the spiritual, and the church was obliged to maintain a constant and severe struggle to prevent herself from being swamped, so to speak, by the state, as the schismatical and heretical churches of England, Russia, Scandinavia, and northern Germany have been and now are. In order to protect society and herself against armed heathenism, Mahometanism, and barbarism, the church was obliged to revive, or suffer to be revived, in Charlemagne, the western Roman empire, before Europe was prepared for it; and ever after she was but too happy when in his successors she did not find, instead of a protector, a cruel, oppressive, and sacrilegious spoiler. It is easy now to say, that the revival of the empire was premature and bad policy; but it was the best thing possible at the time, or, if it was not, it was inevitable so far as the church was concerned, and she could not have prevented it if she had tried. Pious as Charlemagne was, he never suffered religion to interfere with his ambition, or the church to stand in the way of realizing his projects of temporal aggrandizement. The empire once reëstablished, barbaric as it necessarily was, a formidable schism between the temporal authority and the spiritual commenced, which continued to widen as long as the empire existed. Rarely was there a "Kaiser" of "the Holy Roman Empire," from Charlemagne to Charles V.,

that respected the freedom of the church, that allowed her to exercise her spiritual discipline without his interference, that permitted her without restraint to manage her own affairs, or that did not wage open or secret war against her. Rarely did the church, in her struggles for religious liberty against the temporal powers, come off victorious; never was she able, through the whole period of the middle ages, to gain, and never yet has she gained, in even a single Catholic state, the freedom and independence she enjoys here in these United States, which is all she asks, and all she has ever struggled for. The very instance of Philip the Fair of France insulting Boniface VIII., and successfully braving his authority, cited by the writer in the *Christian Examiner* to prove the "enormous power of the popes," is a striking proof of their weakness, and of how completely they lay at the mercy of the crowned despots and tyrants. The sainted Hildebrand, the seventh Gregory, one of the most powerful of the successors of St. Peter, was driven from his throne by the temporal authority, and died in exile. We all know that the rivalries and machinations of the temporal powers effected and sustained the great and scandalous schism of the West, which the church could never have survived if she had not been upheld by the arm of the Almighty. It is all a delusion, the notion which some seem to cherish, that the church met no resistance in the middle ages, and that emperors, kings, princes, and nobles demeaned themselves as her obedient sons. Their submission was the exception, not the rule, and their protection of the church was seldom any thing but a pretext for enslaving her. They seem never to have responded to her call to execute the sentences she pronounced, unless it suited their humor, flattered their ambition, or promised them some temporal aggrandizement. They seldom heeded her spiritual censures, or her excommunications, if they persuaded themselves that they could guard against their evil temporal consequences; and it was rare, indeed, that a prince, even excommunicated and deposed, could not command the support of his army, of the greater part of his own subjects, and even of the national clergy. Godfrey of Bouillon, subsequently the pious Crusader, fights for Henry of Germany after the pope has deposed him, against his competitor Rudolph, sustained by the church. If the barons of England desert John Lackland, it is for reasons of their own, not because he is under excommunication; and a few years after, they can conspire

against him at Runnymede, under the lead of Archbishop Langton, in defiance of the excommunication pronounced by the pope against them.

Nothing is more evident to every one who has studied them without being captivated by their romance, or blinded by his hatred of Catholicity, than that the church was by no means the only force at work in the middle ages, and that she was far enough from being able to carry out into practical life all her own views, and of having every thing to her own liking. She had by no means a "thousand years of almost triumphant ascendency for the full trial of experiments," as our Unitarian friend rashly asserts. She was resisted on every side; her rights were perpetually invaded; her authority was continually braved; her discipline was seldom suffered to have free course; her clergy, when they did not add the feudal to their ecclesiastical character, and become princes and barons as well as priests, were treated by the representatives of the barbarian conquerors with contumely and contempt; and her doctrines, her precepts, her admonitions, were scorned or set at naught by the great whenever it suited their humor or their passions. The church became the possessor of great riches, it is true; but her wealth bore witness full as much to the vices, the crimes, and the disorders, as to the piety and zeal of the times, and, moreover, she possessed them in no small part, simply in her accidental character of the public almoner. The donations and bequests she received were not seldom made by a tardy and doubtful repentance, in the hope, we fear often vain, of purchasing repose for the soul of a sinner whose life had been spent in breaking every precept of the decalogue. The "baron bold" of romantic poetry was not unfrequently a bold blasphemer, a dissolute and sacrilegious wretch, an oppressor of his people, measuring his rights only by his might. We are not insensible to the charms which romance lends to the middle ages, or to the golden hues which a rich and fervid imagination spreads over them when contemplating them at a distance, or in the brilliant lamp-light; but whoever has ventured to look at them, stripped of all the deceptive coloring of his own fancy, in their nakedness, as they actually were, will quickly dismiss the pleasing illusion that they were in any peculiar sense "ages of faith," or that it is from them that we are to form any adequate notions of what are really *Mores Catholici*, or Catholic morals and manners. Not in them, indeed, had our good mother

the fair field and the fitting opportunity to realize her idea of Catholic secular life. Faith there was, and piety, and charity, and heroic sanctity, such as has never been surpassed, and the blessed fruits of which we and all modern civilized nations are now reaping; but alas! something else was there too,—something which did not proceed from the church, which she did not sanction, which she never ceased to oppose, but which resisted all her supernatural efforts, and continued to exist in spite of her.

Undoubtedly, it will not answer to recognize in modern society only the human element, and to attempt to explain all its phenomena from the point of view of simple human activity. In no age, certainly in no age since the advent of our Lord, is it true to say that all in human history is the product of man alone. The Christian religion, the Catholic Church, has placed in the modern world a divine element, supernatural in its source, in its principle, in the mode of its operation, and in its effects. This element was in the middle ages, represented there by the Catholic Church; and all the phenomena or historical facts of those, as of all other ages, which proceeded from her, or have received her sanction, we as Catholics are bound to maintain, and are ready to maintain, against all challengers, to be just, right, pure, holy, and salutary to the life of society and of the individual soul. But if we are bound to recognize the part of the church, we are equally bound to recognize the part of man. Because we recognize the church in the dark ages, it must not be supposed that we recognize only her, and hold her, or concede that she is to be held, responsible for all the phenomena we meet in their history. She never subsists alone, and neither in society nor in the individual, in professedly Catholic states nor in professedly Catholic men, is she the only efficient cause or operative force. In the individual believer, human nature remains after regeneration; the flesh survives, and, as long as we live, lusteth against the spirit, making the Christian's life, whatever its interior peace or consolation, one unremitting warfare, from which there is no escape. This, since true of the individual, must also be true of society. In every society, large or small, by the side of the church subsists fallen human nature, with its evil concupiscence, its grovelling propensities, its disorderly affections, its fierce and ungovernable passions. It will not answer to overlook the facts which have their origin in this source, nor will it answer to charge them to the account of

the church. Both elements coexist, both have their respective phenomena which are intermingled and grow together in history, as grow together the wheat and the tares in the same field. In forming our judgment we must discriminate between them; and if we do this, and assign to each element its own phenomena, or the class of facts of which it is the principle, we shall have no difficulty in granting all that the most unscrupulous of the enemies of Catholicity allege against the middle ages themselves, and yet maintaining the claims of the church as the infallible church of God.

The discrimination we here insist on, all Catholic writers, Digby among the rest, no doubt, silently intend, and suppose they never fail to imply; but when writing with reference to those who are out of the church, and who therefore have an interest in overlooking it, they seem to us not to make it as clear, as express, as prominent as its importance demands. Thus Digby, who certainly would, if called upon, admit its propriety and even its necessity,—wishing to present a popular argument for the church, addressed to the emotions and the affections rather than to the pure intellect, and unhappily consulting the tastes, prejudices, and tendencies of the Puseyitish class of his former Anglican friends, as if they were the fair representatives of the uncatholic world, at least of the Protestant portion of it,—passes it over as if it were a matter of sheer indifference; and assuming, or appearing to assume, that all was substantially Catholic in mediæval times,—that society was then in its normal state,—that the church found herself in the midst of a civilization, surrounded by a secular order, precisely to her mind,—that there was nothing in the measures she adopted, the policy she pursued, the institutions she cherished, designed simply to meet an exceptional state, to provide for accidental wants or temporary exigencies, and which, under other circumstances, would be neither necessary nor desirable,—looks at every thing through the Claude Lorraine glass of his own sunny imagination, sees every thing *couleur de rose*, and writes as if the human element—then, as ever, but too active—had been wholly suppressed, as if the church had supernaturalized the whole secular order, and made it one with herself by infusing into it her own divine and supernatural life. Our Unitarian friend, wishing to obtain an argument against Catholicity, is delighted to find this conceded to his purpose, assumes as unquestioned the exclusive ascendency of the church, makes no discrimination between the

phenomena which are really hers and those which are really not hers, and, fixing his eyes solely either on facts which have the corrupt human element for their principle, or on measures which, though adopted or approved by the church, have their reason and justification in the exceptional secular order of the times introduced by the barbarian conquest, and not to be brought within the rule except after centuries of painful and often interrupted civilizing labors, he finds enough, and more than enough, that no man of ordinary virtue and intelligence can approve, and which we should be utterly unable to reconcile with the claims of the church, if we were bound to maintain or to concede that she had in the middle ages full power to suppress the lawless workings of our fallen nature, or to shape the entire secular order to her will. Digby, assuming or conceding the exclusive dominion of the church, finds scarcely a defect in the secular life, as must have been the case if she had in fact had the dominion he concedes; our Unitarian friend, taking the same exclusive dominion for granted, from the manifest defects of the secular life concludes the defects of the religious life,—that the church must herself have been defective, barbarian, and superstitious,—as concluded Machiavelli and Rousseau, and as conclude all our modern socialists;—falling thus into a monstrous error, which we should suppose the age, if its boasted intelligence had the least foundation in fact, could easily escape.

Making the proper discrimination, we as Catholics can judge the middle ages with as much freedom as can they who are not Catholics, or as we ourselves can judge pagan Greece or Rome, Egypt or Syria, India or China, or modern Mahometan and Protestant nations themselves. Of their aggregate phenomena, the church is undoubtedly responsible for that portion of which she is the principle, or which she has expressly or tacitly sanctioned; but these are all good, and, reference had to time and circumstance, the severest critic, unless he sets all reason and common sense at defiance, cannot bring even the shadow of a reproach against them, as Digby's work itself proves, and as many of the adversaries of the church admit, and have admitted over and over again. As to the remaining phenomena or historical facts, those which did not proceed from the church, but depended on causes and influences hostile to her, and against which she never for one moment ceased to struggle, we have no responsibility, and feel in them no special interest. Our church is not

implicated in them, for she neither produced nor approved them, and was indeed no slight sufferer from them; she is not answerable for not having prevented or suppressed them, for she can govern men, collectively or individually, only by moral power, through reason, conscience, and free will. The divinity of our Saviour was not implicated in the treachery of Judas Iscariot, nor were the truth and sanctity of his religion rendered questionable by the fact, that, when he was arrested and brought before the Roman governor, his disciples all forsook him, and Peter thrice denied him. The moral disorder and wickedness of the world furnish no argument against divine Providence,—in no sense impugn the goodness of God, or the wisdom or the power of his government; because he has made man a free agent, governs him by the law of freedom, not by the law of necessity, and does and will do no violence to his free will. The church, as the representative of God on earth, can govern only as he governs, and is, therefore, restricted to a moral dominion over men. She cannot coerce them into sanctity; she cannot force them against their wills to receive her sacraments, and it would avail nothing if she could; for although they do not depend on the recipient for their efficient power, they can produce their sanctifying effect only when he interposes no obstacle to their operation; and an obstacle he does interpose when his will is against them, or, if old enough to have a will, is not for them.

There is an inexcusable want of science, as well as gross injustice, in holding the church responsible for the conduct of those members of her external communion who disobey her instructions, and will not comport themselves as her faithful and dutiful children. Science traces effects to their cause, and classifies phenomena according to their principle. It is not science, but nescience, to ascribe to the church phenomena which, though found intermingled with hers, she has not produced, and which are repugnant to her. Our modern travellers, who have so much to say of the ignorance and corruption they meet or pretend they meet with in Catholic countries, would do well to bear this in mind. The individuals they hold up as exhibiting the fruits of Catholicity are precisely those who do not exhibit them,—are precisely those who neglect the teaching and break the precepts of the church. The practical effects of any religion must be judged of from the uniform characters of those who sincerely and faithfully practise it, not from the character of

those who do not. Whoever would look for the fruits of Catholicity must look for them in her obedient children, who believe what she teaches and do what she commands. The moral and religious worth of these no sane man can really question. The rule which we adopt in reference to Catholic individuals we must adopt in judging of Catholic nations and Catholic ages. The glory of the church is not tarnished by human depravity, even though it is found in persons attached to her external communion. Let this be always borne in mind, as well when we judge the middle ages as when we judge the Christian ages which preceded or which have followed them. The glory of the church in the middle ages is, not that there was then no human depravity, no injustice, no ignorance, no superstition, no violence, no barbarism, but that she was able to resist the hostile influences to which she was exposed, to preserve herself from becoming ignorant, superstitious, violent, or barbarous, and that, by unwearied effort and constant struggle, she was able gradually to get the better of those hostile influences, to subdue the barbarism, to restore social order, and to recover civilization, to place it on a solid and imperishable basis, and to provide for its future advancement. Here is her glory under the secular point of view. The darker the colors in which you paint those ages, the grosser and more revolting you prove their barbarism to have been, the more do you enhance her merit, the more unequivocal testimony do you bear to the fact that she is God's church, upheld by his almighty arm, and assisted by his supernatural presence. Had she been human, she would have been carried away by the floods of northern barbarism and have become herself barbarian; had she been human, had she not been God's church, she could never have survived the wreck of the old Græco-Roman civilization, but would have been dashed to pieces with it; had she been human, had she not been God's church, she could never have stood firm and immovable as wave after wave of barbarians rolled on and beat with fearful impetuosity against her,—could never have gained an influence over those ferocious hordes, whose sole occupation was war and plunder, penetrated their hearts with some portion of her own light and warmth, infused into their souls sentiments of gentleness, meekness, love, and peace, and raised them to be the foremost nations of the earth. The greater the task she had before her, the greater was her need of divine assistance, and the greater her glory in having accomplished it.

We may, perhaps, find here one of the reasons why Catholics, who have from earliest infancy been reared in the bosom of the church, appear so indifferent to mediæval history, and show so little solicitude to prove, that, on its secular side, it was not as dark and forbidding as Protestants heretofore have been accustomed to represent it. They have, in fact, no special interest in vindicating it. They seek their Lord, not in the dead past, but in the living present,—in the church that is, and is to be until the consummation of the the world, unvaried and invariable; and they may well leave the history of their antiquity, save so far as necessary to repel charges preferred against the church, to those outside of her communion. Hence, the attempted rehabilitation of mediæval society in our days is the work of Protestants; the romantic school is of Protestant German origin; the greater part of the recent historical works, many of them really able and learned, which have refuted the stale charges against the popes and the church in the middle ages, are nearly all from Protestant, at least uncatholic, authors; and the mania which rages for reviving mediæval arts, tastes, usages, and institutions chiefly affects Oxford men and their friends, disturbing the equilibrium of comparatively few Catholics. It is an admirable economy, that they who see that their church is a mere corpse should seek to dress her in the robes of the past, instead of those of the present. It spares the living and does no harm to the dead. Indeed, we are expecting the assailants of the church to shift, ere long, their position, and to attempt to rob her of the glory of having subdued the barbarians and founded modern civilization, by stoutly maintaining that there were no barbarians to subdue; that the Goths, Vandals, Huns, Franks, Burgundians, Longobards, &c., were highly cultivated and polished tribes, far in advance of the degenerate races they invaded and supplanted; that the middle ages were admirable for their successful and complete realization of the loftiest and most perfect civilization; and that we poor Romanists fail to be Catholic, because we fail to be sufficiently mediæval! We are looking for books and pamphlets intended to prove that the grand error of the popes, their grand apostasy, which caused and justified the reformation, consisted in their regarding the invaders and destroyers of the Roman empire as barbarians, in resisting their advanced civilization, and laboring to impose upon them the inferior and effete civilization of Greece

and Rome. Nay, we already see evident indications that we are soon to be subjected to this new line of attack; and in more than one Puseyite publication we detect the germs of the view we here suggest, and which the romanticists seem to us to be pledged by their fundamental principles to develop and mature.

It does not enter into our present purpose to discuss at length the actual character of the dark ages on their purely human and secular side. As far as the church was implicated in their phenomena, we accept them and glory in them; but as it regards all lying beyond, we feel comparatively indifferent. Under the point of view of humanity, it matters little to us, as Catholics, how dark, how superstitious, how turbulent, violent, or barbarous they were. Certainly we do not believe, and it will take much to persuade us, that they were truly civilized ages, either when compared with the present or when compared with classic antiquity. *Civilization* is a word, no doubt, not easy to define, and different persons may define it differently; but as we define it, the middle ages, aside from what they owed to the church, were barbarous ages. We take the word in what we suppose to be its ordinary sense, as designating the exterior and interior life of a cultivated and polished people, having a fixed residence, and living under the empire of law, as distinguished from the empire of mere arbitrary will; and making abstraction of religion and what is derived from it, our standard of civilization is that of ancient Greece and Rome, combining the *νόμος* of the former with the *jus* of the latter. Here, we frankly confess, we are Græco-Roman, and to us all tribes and nations are barbarian just in proportion as they recede from the Græco-Roman standard. We do not assert, we do not pretend, that, prior to Greece and Rome, no people had been truly civilized; we raise here no question as to whether the Græco-Roman civilization was indigenous or whether it was borrowed; we simply assert that the civilization of Greece and Rome, at their most flourishing period, under the purely human point of view, is the standard civilization of history and of human philosophy. Nowhere else does history show us man receiving, under all the aspects of his nature, so high, so thorough, so symmetrical, and so masculine a cultivation as under this wonderful civilization. Græco-Roman art embodies the highest ideal truth conceivable without the Christian revelation. The

Phidian Jove embodies the highest ideal, not indeed of the Divinity, but of the full-grown man, without Christianity, in the order of nature. Eliminate from the Græco-Roman civilization all that it contains which depends on its false religion, or on its corruptions or misapplication of the principles of the primitive revelation in the sphere of the supernatural, add the Christian religion, and animate it with the Christian spirit, the Christian's faith, and the Christian's love, and you have a civilization beyond which there is nothing to seek.

Tried by this standard, under the secular and human aspect of civilization, the middle ages cannot stand the test. The tribes which overthrew the old western Roman empire were barbarians, and inflicted on civilization what, had it not been for the church, would have been an irreparable evil, of the magnitude of which, confining our views to man merely as a social being and an inhabitant of this earth, we are utterly unable to form any adequate conception. The downfall of ancient Rome and its civilization stands alone in history, and we seek in vain for the record of an event analogous to it. Even external nature, if we may believe the accounts transmitted to us, felt the shock, and the seasons became inclement as society became barbarous. The changes in the natural world in parts of Italy, Gaul, and Britain seem to have been hardly less terrific than those of the political and social world. The downfall of Rome was also a terrible calamity to religion. It undid in a moment the labors of ages, and for long centuries crippled the missionary enterprises of the church, repressed her expansive energies, and imposed on her the immense labors—not yet completed—of re-civilizing mankind, and of restoring civilization to the height to which it had previously attained, or at least to the height at which she found it, when, emerging from the catacombs, she assumed, in the person of Constantine the Great, the imperial purple, and encircled her brows with the imperial diadem.

Nor let it be supposed that these labors of re-civilizing the world were not demanded by the spiritual order. We know our church is catholic; we know that she can reach the heart of the barbarian or the savage, as well as of the civilized man, and can infuse into him her holy faith, her purifying and her sanctifying grace; but it is nevertheless true, that she finds herself at home, in her normal relations to social and secular life, only in the bosom of a high and

true civilization. Man was originally constructed, and society was originally organized, with reference to the Catholic Church, and she can find them adapted to her purposes as a social or national religion, only in proportion as she finds them in their normal state. Their normal state is that of civilization. Neither man nor society, as we know from infallible faith, began either in savagism or barbarism. Savagism and barbarism have resulted from the corruptions which supervened as men departed further and further from the original seat of the human race, and from the primitive revelation. There must have been, therefore, an original normal civilization. This civilization, probably, at no period has ever wholly ceased to exist, although it may have had its seat now in one nation and now in another. But, however this may be, it is evidently, at their flourishing period, domiciliated in Greece and Rome, and is preserved or reproduced in the Græco-Roman civilization, under its human and secular relations, in its purity and vigor. Being normal, and realizing the original type as far as possible without Christianity, the church must have an especial affinity for it, and must bear to it a relation perfectly analogous to that which Catholic theology bears to sound philosophy. Where, then, it does not exist, she must seek to introduce it, and where it has fallen into decay, or been destroyed, she must seek to restore it;—not, indeed, as a preparation for the reception of her faith and charity by individuals,—for that would deny her catholicity,—but as the condition of domesticating herself, so to speak, in the country; of converting or securing the conversion of the nation itself,—baptizing, as it were, its very soil; of becoming the vivifying sap of all its institutions, and the informing principle of its whole instinctive and unconscious life.

History, as well as speculation, establishes this view. The church, in converting the empire, found nothing in the Græco-Roman order of civilization to change, nothing in the essential constitution of the state, nothing in its general economy of life, public or domestic,—in the *res publica* or the *res domestica*,—and very little in the laws themselves. The great body of the civil law, still the public law of all Catholic, and to a great extent of some Protestant, states, existed and was in force before the introduction of Christianity. The changes required were, for the most part, purely spiritual, such as conversion of itself effected, or as the

church, in the discharge of her purely spiritual functions, could herself effect, without the aid of the civil power. What we mean is, that there was nothing in the order of the civilization that constrained her; and after the law had recognized her and ceased to enjoin paganism, she had no other obstacles to contend against than those which human depravity in individuals always and everywhere interposes to her operations. On the other hand, though the church has certainly converted innumerable individuals who were strangers to the Græco-Roman civilization, we can call to mind, at this moment, no nation which had not originally received that order of civilization or has not subsequently been subjected to it, at least in its essential principles, that has ever accepted, or, if it has at one time accepted, has for more than a brief period retained, the Catholic faith. When the barbarians invaded the empire, the limits of the Macedonian and Roman conquests were very nearly those of Christendom. The church had indeed extended her missions beyond, but they were the mere outposts pushed into the enemy's country, or, as it were, the military occupation of a country whose conquest was not yet completed. Other nations assuredly have been brought within the pale of Christendom, but they have remained within only as the church has succeeded in civilizing them,—so to speak Græco-Romanizing them. Wherever the barbaric element has remained predominant in the national life, as in Russia, Scandinavia, Prussia, Saxony, northern Germany, or where, through exterior or interior causes, it has regained the preponderance, as in England, and the once christianized oriental nations, the nation has relapsed into heathenism, or fallen off into heresy or schism. In several of the nations which have fallen off from the church, the old barbaric institutions, traditions, customs, and hereditary hatred of Græco-Roman civilization always survived in the heart of the people, and nourished a schism between its national life and its Christian faith. In nearly all, the barbaric monarchy was retained after the conversion, or subsequently introduced or developed; and between the barbaric monarchy—that is, oriental despotism, the distinctive principle of which is, that the commonwealth is the private property of the prince, the natural termination of all barbaric chieftainship—and the Græco-Roman polity, whose distinctive principle is that the prince represents the majesty of the state,—is the first magistrate of the republic, bound to govern according to

law,—there is an eternal and irreconcilable hostility; because between them there is all the difference that there is between liberty and slavery. Barbarism is essentially slavery,—or rather slavery is the distinctive principle of barbarism,—and the distinctive principle of Græco-Romanism is liberty. Hence, as the church always and everywhere presented herself as the uncompromising asserter of liberty, upholding the supremacy of LAW, and declaring it no less binding on princes than on their subjects, on the master than on the servant, barbaric nations and barbaric governments, recognizing no authority but mere will, would not, and as such could not, submit to her spiritual jurisdiction.

With these views of the relations of the church to civilization, and which it would be easy to confirm by decisions of the Holy See, and by a reference to the history of modern missions in barbarous and savage countries, we can have no disposition to defend the middle ages, save in what they owed to the church, and cannot be expected to sympathize with their sentimental and romantic admirers. Under many relations we believe that, after the tenth century to the middle of the fourteenth, they were far superior to the present, though not under the relations of civilization properly so called. But what they are principally lauded for by our sentimentalists and romanticists is precisely that in them which was the least in accordance with Catholicity and genuine civilization; for it is what proceeded from their barbaric, not from either their Christian, or their Græco-Roman, elements. The revival of letters in the fifteenth century—that century of wonderful activity and enterprise—was a great event, and its bearing on human culture has hardly been over-estimated; but it came in a shape hostile to the schoolmen, and even to Catholicity, and it revived to a fearful extent the old Græco-Roman gentilism. The humanists of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries have produced the romanticists of the nineteenth century. They seized upon the Græco-Roman elements of modern society, sought to render them exclusive, to develop and realize them independently, on the one hand, of the church, and, on the other, of mediæval barbarism, and they deprived them of life, and brought forth a dead and petrified classicism, as offensive to good taste as to true piety,—as incapable of aiding the growth of a truly human as of a truly Christian life. The romanticists revolted at this petrified classicism, and, already gentilized by the old humanists, had no alternative but to seek a living literature

in developing the barbaric elements of the middle ages, and realizing them independently of the Greek and Roman elements, and also of Catholicity. This they attempted, and their success would be the restoration, not of cultivated and polished gentilism, but of rude, unpolished, barbaric heathenism, after the Teutonic and Scandinavian modes.

We are not disposed to deny that the schoolmen were defective in taste. They wrote barbarous Latin, and were seldom good Greek scholars; their humor was grotesque rather than delicate, and their jokes smacked of men who live among themselves, remote from the great world; their forms were dry and rigid, and their rules too narrow and too unelastic for the play of the free spirit and expansive genius of man. The humanists, in combating them and substituting the purer taste and the more symmetrical and graceful forms of ancient art, did a valuable service to the cause of human culture and refinement. So the romanticists, in freeing us from the fetters of a dead classicism, from the narrow and pedantic rules of men who servilely copied the exterior forms, but were incapable of producing in the free and original spirit, of the ancient classics, and permitting us to move more at our ease, according to our natural dispositions, have served the cause of good literature. By their excavations of mediæval romance from the tombs of centuries, and their importations from the old mystic East, they have enlarged our literary horizon and augmented our literary materials, for which we cheerfully render them all fitting ackowledgment. But as the humanists, along with their classicism, revived old gentile theories and speculations, by which they ruined philosophy and shook the faith of no small part of Christendom while professing to labor to confirm it, so the romanticists, to the extent of their influence, must revive the old barbaric heathenism, and tend to ruin literature, art, philosophy, and through them both religion and civilization. The humanists gave us heathenism, but it was cultivated heathenism, which, as to its forms, was repugnant neither to good taste nor to Christianity; the romanticists, the humanists of our time, give us heathenism to an equal extent, and what is worse, rude, uncouth, barbaric heathenism, with its grotesque images, its gigantic figures, its huge disproportioned shapes, its hideous and grinning monsters, which no Christian art can baptize, no power can lick into a Christian shape, inform with a Christian soul, or train to a civilized behaviour. Do the best possible, it will always remain the man-bear of recent German romance.

Nothing would be more amusing, if the matter were not so grave, than to see our romanticists parading the old mediæval romances, chronicles, ballads, lays, and roundelays, as genuine specimens of Christian literature. Indeed, the irony is too obvious to be witty. Even if sometimes the thought and sentiment happen to be Christian, the form is barbarian. The mediæval romancers frequently profane Christian thoughts and expressions, as the old magicians profaned the Sacred Host in their spells; but the substance of their works is always derived from heathen sources. The troubadours of Provence are moved by their own corrupt passions, and sing under Arabic, Moorish, and Manichean influences; the trouvères of Normandy, the bards of Armorica and Wales, the minnesingers of Germany, recite or sing, for the most part, the old barbaric and heathen memories and superstitions of their respective nations, which long survived, and are not even yet wholly extinct, in the heart of the old Celtic, Scandinavian, and Teutonic families. To call the mediæval literature proceeding from these sources Christian is only to prove how far we have lost, or never received, the true conception of Christianity. In admiring such a literature, we give no evidence of a return towards Catholicity; we only show that we are doing our best to return to the state of the barbaric nations before the church had commenced the work of their conversion, and are trying to satisfy our souls with mere vagaries, or to enrich ourselves with the *débris* of old barbaric nationalities, idolatries, and superstitions.

As to the middle ages themselves, we conclude, with an Italian writer, that "they are admirable for their Christian genius, and the nations then, so far as they were animated by the Catholic idea, undoubtedly far surpassed the most cultivated people of gentile antiquity; but except that which they derived, in effect, from religion, we know not what there is in their annals to be admired, and the modern encomiasts of feudalism, chivalry, Gothic architecture, &c., appear to us little reasonable and very dull." In all those lofty qualities of the civilized man, in themselves indifferent to vice or virtue, the man of mediæval history appears to us far inferior to the man of Greek and Roman antiquity. Compared with the latter, he seems to us a mere dwarf, stunted and warped in his growth by a one-sided and incomplete culture. We find in the mediæval man, the moment he steps out of religion, very little of that simplicity,

naturalness, repose, sustained courage, prudent energy, sedate strength, greatness of soul, constancy of will, firmness of resolution, or force of character, which so strikes and charms us in the men of classic antiquity. There is, as Gioberti—a writer whom we like for some things, and dislike for many—has well suggested, a considerable distance between the men of Plutarch and Livy, and the romantic heroes and lion-hearted warriors of Boiardo and Ariosto, with their mad adventures and their silly love-makings.

The causes of this inferiority of the mediæval man, and perhaps equally of the man of our times, we have no space to consider now at length. The remote cause of it lies, no doubt, in the depravity of human nature, in consequence of which men will do a thousand times more to improve themselves and society for the sake of self, or of worldly or human greatness, than they will for the sake of God, or at the command of duty. Hence, in a certain sense, all those religions which are the most consonant to corrupt human nature, and give the largest scope to selfish and worldly motives, will always, for a time at least, be more favorable to the growth of the qualities we have named than Christianity itself. Hence we should look for more striking manifestations of them under paganism, Mahometanism, Protestantism, or modern radicalism, than under Catholicity; for these impose fewer restraints on our motives of action. Christianity, if there is any truth in what we have said in the course of this article, demands, along with her supernatural virtues, the highest human excellence, because she demands for her permanent home in a nation, and her free and regular action on the mass of the people, the highest and truest civilization. But she cannot encourage the cultivation of human greatness for the sake of self, society, or the world; for though she recognizes and uses these as means, she will never suffer them to be sought as ends. Here is her glory, her strength, and at the same time her weakness. Paganism could suffer us to cultivate and perfect our natures for their own sake, and permit us to propose human greatness as our end. Protestantism virtually, if not avowedly, does the same. The church not only tolerates, but seeks, the improvement of society, its progress and perfection, yet only for the sake of the purposes of our present existence, and as facilitating the operation of the means of securing eternal life. Radicalism or socialism disdains to look so high or so far, and is content to propose the

progress and perfection of society for its own sake. As the motives paganism, Protestantism, and radicalism propose or tolerate are those which are the most agreeable to fallen nature, we can easily understand that, for a time, their adherents should be more remarkable for the qualities we have pointed out than the great body of Catholics, who cultivate them only from purer, loftier, and more distant motives, therefore motives less powerful for a depraved will and a corrupt concupiscence. Here, undoubtedly, is the real cause of the inferiority of the modern to the ancient man,—an inferiority which results from his actual moral and religious superiority.

Though the remote cause is in the corruption of human nature, and the fact that paganism imposed less restraint on its operations than Catholicity, the proximate cause of this inferiority is in the schism which has always existed, since the institution of the church, between the secular and the spiritual elements of society. The secular element has never been brought into harmony with the spiritual. The church could not do it at first, because the state was pagan, and persecuted her; and it took her full three hundred years to convert it. But she had no sooner converted it, than the barbarians began their invasion, and she had to commence her struggle against barbarism, which, in part, still continues. She has never been able to baptize secular life, and to institute a culture as perfect for it as that which she has always sustained is for the religious life. The secular order has therefore, from the first, remained outside of Christianity, and the secular mind has never been informed with the Christian spirit. The spirit of all secular art, secular literature, secular science, even when cultivated by Catholics, is and always has been, from Nero to Mazzini, unchristian. This is obvious to every one. Whenever we leave the religious order, escape its external control, and abandon ourselves instinctively to secular pursuits, or in any degree yield to the spirit of the secular order, however pure our intentions in the outset, however firm our faith, sincere and earnest our attachment to our religion, we are imperceptibly borne away in a direction hostile to Christianity, and, ere we suspect danger, are sunk in the quicksands of vice or dashed against the rocks of heresy or infidelity. We have a striking proof of this in La Mennais, another in Padre Ventura, and still another, we fear, in Gioberti,—three of the greatest, and, in various ways, most extraordi-

nary men of our times. All three set out sincere, earnest, and enlightened Catholic priests, with rare philosophical genius and attainments, and rarer knowledge of the spirit and tendencies of the age. La Mennais has fallen to the lowest depths; Ventura has, by his recent conduct at Rome, outraged the feelings of the whole Catholic world; and Gioberti, as his case now stands, or as it is known to us, we must regard as having betrayed his religion and forfeited all his claims upon sincere Catholics. What can more clearly prove that the secular order remains even to this day unbaptized, and that whoever follows its spirit is sure to find himself on the side against the religion of God?

Our modern literature is all full of this schism between the two orders, and the secret of most of the movements of our times is the effort to heal it. From Pusey to Parker, Ventura to Proudhon, the Hegelians to the Fourierists and Icarians, the harmony of the two orders is the secret, in general the avowed, object. But, unhappily, nearly all efforts not only fail, but tend to widen the breach; because they are efforts to heal the schism by harmonizing the spiritual with the secular, instead of the secular with the spiritual. Here is the grand difficulty. As friends of religion, we are obliged to hold on, in most countries, to things as they are, —to desist from efforts to effect such educational improvements and social ameliorations as are good in themselves, such as are really needed, and such as we are most anxious to effect,—because we cannot, in the present state of the world, make a single move in their behalf, without throwing the power into the hands of the men who would subject the spiritual order to the secular, destroy the whole influence of religion, and with it the very conditions of civilization. The certain evil that would follow would infinitely outweigh the good we could effect. If any one doubts it, he has but to meditate on the exile of the Holy Father at Gaëta, and consider what during the last year has taken place at Rome. The Holy Father attempted wise and judicious reforms in his states, and, in consequence, was driven from his throne, not by the men opposed to them, but by the very men who clamored for them, who feasted him a whole year for them, and in whose favor they were more especially effected. The very attempt on his part to ameliorate the temporal order drove him into exile, and gave up his dominions to as miserable a set of infidel vagabonds, as cowardly a set of miscreants, as the sweepings of all Italy

could furnish. If the men who so clamor for reform, and so strenuously urge the amelioration of the secular order, would lay aside their hostility to religion, and consent to work with the church, under her spiritual guidance, she would soon, through them, effect all needed ameliorations, establish a true system of secular culture, effect a new civilization, which would give us tempered together in one, as Gioberti demands, the full-grown Christian and the full-grown man, as much superior to the ancient Græco-Roman civilization as the morals of Christianity are superior to those of paganism. But the thing is not possible so long as they are able, and continue, to keep the secular order armed to the teeth against her. But as human depravity will last as long as the world stands, the schism between the two orders will probably never be entirely healed, and the glorious results for civilization, so easy to effect if men were only reasonable, or not madmen or fools, will probably remain for ever without being fully attained. All we can do is to be faithful to the spiritual order, and to labor diligently to realize them as far as possible,—not for the sake of the temporal good to be secured, but for the sake of the purposes of our present existence, and the free and unimpeded action of the church in preparing men for eternal life.

Our Unitarian friend will find, if he meditates what we have written, his article answered as far as answer it needed. We have not followed him step by step, nor was it necessary; we suppose him capable of applying principles, when they are furnished to his hand, without our applying them for him. He will see that we rely no more than he does on poetry and romance as evidence of the truth of religion. To some minds they may be occasions of conversion, and they were in some respects so in our own case, dry logic-grinder as many people suppose us to be, for they removed certain obstructions there were to the operation of the grace of God on our heart; but causes or grounds of conviction they never were, and never can be. Christian art has its uses, and important uses they are, too. Persons of a certain temper may be led by it to reflect on the claims of the church, or it may soften their feelings and subdue for the moment their prejudices, and prepare them to listen to her claims. So far, it contributes, and legitimately, to conversions; but as an argument addressed to the reason, or as a motive of credibility, it is of no value, for it may well be questioned if Christian art, as pure art, has ever surpassed, or even equalled, pagan art.

We recognize no church *of* the middle ages; but the church *in* the middle ages, as in all ages, our Unitarian friend will see, we hold to be irreproachable, not, indeed, because we are a great admirer of those ages themselves, nor because we believe they were themselves irreproachable, but because what there was in them objectionable proceeded from causes independent of the church and hostile to her, which she had no power to control, and could remove only in proportion as she could induce men to become voluntarily her subjects. There were, doubtless, things which she did then that she would not do now; for the circumstances now are different, and do not demand, might not even justify, them. She is in the world to bless it; and while her doctrines and principles remain eternally unvaried and invariable, she applies them with perfect freedom to the circumstances of time and place. She never permits herself to become the slave of routine or of stereotyped modes of exterior action. When society is in an exceptional state, she deals with it accordingly. When it throws upon her the burden of providing for the poor, she does it in the best manner existing circumstances allow. We rejoice when we read that seventeen thousand poor were fed in one day at Cluny, and we see in the fact her maternal solicitude and forethought for even the temporal subsistence of her children; but we see no evidence in it of the perfection of the secular order of the time, and no reason for wishing to perpetuate a state of society, that leaves such a number of poor daily to be fed at a single monastery. Many of the institutions which the church founded and cherished in the middle ages have passed away, or must pass away, with the social changes which are constantly taking place; but this is no cause of reproach to her, or of alarm to us. Others, better adapted to the altered circumstances of new ages, she will institute in their place, and gain the same ends by other means. And thus it is, that, while we adhere to the church in all times, and *because* we do so, we are free to condemn barbarism wherever we find it, and to labor with all our zeal and ability for an advanced, and, if possible, an ever-advancing, civilization.

CONVERSATIONS OF AN OLD MAN AND HIS YOUNG FRIENDS.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for 1850.]

I.—*F.* I HAVE been told that your views on most subjects were not always what they now are. My father says he has known you when you boasted of being a liberalist in polities and in religion, when you professed yourself a firm believer in the progress of the race, and were really a man of the modern world, sympathizing with humanity, and foremost in the various socialist movements of the day.

B. I did not, as a young man, differ much from most young men of ardent temperaments, lively sensibilities, generous impulses, and little practical knowledge; I said and did a great many foolish things.

C. You will hardly persuade your young friends that it is foolish to sympathize with our kind, to feel that every man is our brother, to plead for the wronged, and devote ourselves heart and soul to the progress of liberty, and the melioration of society, especially of the poorer and more numerous classes.

B. We are, till after long and sometimes bitter experience, the dupes of words and phrases. It is not difficult to disguise mischievous purposes in fine words; it is also easy, in pursuing even a laudable object, to say and do a great many foolish things. It may be very laudable to fell a tree that cumbers the ground, or hides our prospect, but not very wise to attempt to do it by climbing up and beginning at the top. It is rather foolish to cut off the branch on which we must stand. We may fall and break our necks, and not accomplish our purpose after all.

G. By which you would admonish us that our ends are not necessarily good because we express them in fine phrases, and that even good ends are wisely sought only by appropriate and adequate means?

B. Precisely, my young friend. Schiller's Marquis of Posa bids us remember when we are old, the dreams of our youth. Some follow his direction, and remain ignorant in spite of experience. Others do not. It is not, as you

youngsters suppose, that we harden with age, grow cold and selfish, and cease to interest ourselves in the welfare of others; it is that we profit by experience, and that a wider survey of men and things, a deeper insight into the springs of human action, individual and social, enable us to see what we proposed in the ardor of youth is seldom desirable, and when desirable, seldom practicable. Youth deals mostly in generals, and rarely descends to particulars. The evils which afflict the individual and society spring chiefly from moral causes, from inordinate desires, and unrestrained passions. The methods of amelioration which our young enthusiasm proposes appeal exclusively to these for their support, and can only strengthen them, and aggravate the evils we seek to remove.

O. Pardon me, but I am a little impatient at the outcry which even you do not disdain to echo against human nature. I have never been able to see any truth or justice in this perpetual admonition to restrain our feelings and subdue our passions. The moralist seems to me to make himself the accomplice of the despot.

C. All our native instincts, unperverted feelings, and generous sentiments are for liberty. They lead us to resist the tyrant, and where they have free scope, tyranny can never gain a permanent establishment. The tyrant would repress them, annihilate them, so that we may have no spirit or disposition to rebel against him. It is the fox preaching to the geese, the wolf to the lamb.

B. All very spiritedly said, my young friends; but it is nothing very novel. I have in the course of my life said as much and a great deal more. All authority appears to us in youth very hateful. We see not its reason or necessity, and we fancy that it only creates the crime that it punishes. I thought my mother was exceedingly tyrannical, when she gave me, then a boy some four or five years old, a severe whipping for telling a lie. I have lived long enough to thank her for that whipping over and over again; for it impressed indelibly upon my memory this important lesson,—If you speak at all, speak the truth. Indeed, all authority that restrains us, or hinders us from doing whatever we wish, seems to us tyrannical. Tyranny is always odious, and so we conclude that we ought to be freed from all restraint and at liberty to follow our inclinations. Since our inclinations, instincts, feelings, passions, resist whatever resists them, we conclude that they are intrinsically opposed to

tyranny, and that whoever would restrain them is a tyrant, deserving of universal execration. God, indeed, gives us no faculties that it is unlawful to exercise—in a lawful manner, and he requires the physical destruction of no element of that nature which he has created. All the several elements of our nature may be exercised, but they are to be exercised in the order the Creator intended, in due subordination, the lower to the higher; or, in other words, order and harmony are to be maintained in the bosom of the individual, and between individual and individual, and you will need very little experience of practical life to learn that this is impossible without authority and self-denial. We see not this at first, but gradually it dawns on our minds, and by and by becomes clear to us, and from hot-headed radicals, clamoring for liberty, seeking the elevation of mankind and social progress by removing all restraints, and giving loose reins to appetite and passion, we become sober conservatives, insisting upon submission to authority, obedience to law, as the first lesson to be taught, and the first to be learned.

F. I do not object to all authority; for one needs not to have lived long to be aware that order is desirable, and that it is not possible, without authority of some sort, to maintain it. But I want order with liberty, not order without liberty.

O. The authority should be reasonable, and govern by appeals to reason, not by a resort to physical force, as if man were a brute.

B. I am not learned in such matters, but I have heard it stated, that man combines in his animal nature the distinctive traits of every species of animal with which we are acquainted. Certain it is, that he has an animal nature distinct from his rational nature, and that he is often beastly in his habits, and brutish in his conduct. It is not seldom that it is necessary to treat him as a wild colt or an unruly ox. Physical force is frequently the only force that can restrain him, and corporal chastisement the only argument he is able to appreciate. The fine sentimentalisms now so common are very becoming in the young men and maidens who delight in them. One is rarely pleased to see an old head upon young shoulders. I am always afraid of a very wise youth. It is unnatural, almost monstrous. I am never displeased to hear the young and inexperienced protest against the use of the rod, and, in their sprightly way, maintain that parents and magistrates should always govern by moral

suasion,—by love. It carries me back to my own spring-time of life, before I had dreamed the support for virtue which the sentiments afford is very precarious, or how hard it is, even when one's reason is fully convinced, to resist passion, or to overcome inveterate habits. Parents and magistrates should, unquestionably, govern by love, but love, if worthy of the name, is far more an affection of the rational than of the sensitive nature. It is often the highest proof of love the parent can give, to chastise his child, and the prince would show little love to his subjects, and have little claim to be called the father of his people, if he should do nothing to protect the innocent, and to repress crime by punishing the guilty.

F. I think authority, whether parental or civil, relies too little on moral power. The parent would succeed better if he would pay more respect to the reason of the child, and the prince would have less occasion to resort to physical force, if he would be more ready to treat his subjects as reasonable beings.

O. I would have authority appeal always to reason and affection. We obey cheerfully and readily, when we obey from conviction and love.

B. Authority is bound to be reasonable, and has no right to exact any thing contrary to reason or justice. Yet whatever *legitimate* authority commands must be presumed to be reasonable, till the contrary is established, and whether we see its reasonableness or not, it is ours to obey for conscience' sake. As long as it commands nothing contrary to the law of God, its commands are binding upon us, and cannot be lawfully disregarded. Authority is under no obligation to reason with its subjects, and I have seldom seen good come from its attempts to set forth the reasons of its acts. The parent who reasons with his child usually wastes his breath. He who is so unreasonable as to demand what is not reasonable, will seldom prove himself a good reasoner. The reasons can rarely be given, because they for the most part surpass the child's comprehension.

When my eldest son was born, I entertained the doctrine contended for by my young friends. My child was never to be crossed, no restraint was ever to be placed upon his will or inclination; I would use only moral suasion, and induce him to conform to my wishes by simple appeals to his reason and affection. It did not occur to me that moral suasion can have little efficacy with a child not yet capable

of moral action. I tried, however, to carry out my theory. I soon found that it was founded in sheer ignorance, and, if practicable at all, could be so only by having two or three grown persons of extraordinary natural endowments, and rare accomplishments, whose sole business it should be to attend upon one child. I learned that, though affection in a child is early developed, and is never to be disregarded, yet it is seldom, if ever, sufficient to enable him to resist the ten thousand temptations he has to do what his own preservation requires him not to do. He must be restrained long before he can in any possible way understand the reason of the restraint. Even when sufficiently advanced to understand it, in some measure, it is not enough to induce him to practise the requisite self-denial. My experience taught me that long moral lectures have as little effect on children as they usually have on grown people. A word, a proper word, in the proper tone, at the proper time, is useful; beyond, the fewer words we use the better. The child must be made to obey, and obey because the father bids. "I your father bid," is the only proper reason to address to a child,—at least till the habit of obedience is well formed. Taking care to be uniformly reasonable, just, and kind, the parent will have, in ordinary cases, rarely occasion to resort to coercion; but sometimes, let him do the best he can, he will find the rod indispensable.

Men are but children of a larger growth, and are always in need of tutors and governors. We can count on their good behaviour no further than they are imbued with the principle of obedience; and that is no obedience at all which is yielded only from private conviction and inclination. If our reason, love, feelings, inclinations, are on the side of authority, and go with its requirements, so much the easier will it be for us to obey; but if we refuse to obey when what is commanded demands their sacrifice, we lack the principle of obedience. We must obey, whether agreeable to our feelings and convictions or not.

C. That appears to me to be pushing the matter rather too far. It denies to me the right to have any will of my own, and may make it my duty to act contrary to my own convictions.

B. It undoubtedly does not favor what is called the right of private judgment; but that is no solid objection. Private judgment and authority, in the same matter, are not reconcilable. The subject cannot be both subject and sov-

ereign. The world for three hundred years has been trying to solve the problem, how authority can be authority and yet not be authority,—how men can be governed where all are governors and none are governed; but it does not appear to have made much progress. Where the sovereign has the right to command, the subject is bound to obey, and has no right to have any will of his own other than his sovereign's will. We have no right *over* our sovereign, or to sit in judgment on our judge. Our will should be to conform to the will of God, expressed by himself through such organs as he has constituted, and we have no right to have any will or any conviction to the contrary.

F. Nothing is more sacred than a man's own convictions, and I know of no more intolerable tyranny than that which compels him to do violence to them.

O. It is because religion, or what claims to be religion, fails to respect our private convictions, because it tramples on the sacred rights of the mind, and prohibits free inquiry, free thought, free speech, and free action, that so many in the modern world are opposed to it. No man wishes to be without religion, and every one would willingly embrace a religion which should not demand the sacrifice of his manhood.

C. The priesthood seem to me to stand greatly in their own light. They do not appear to comprehend the age. The dominant sentiment of our age is the love of freedom, of humanity, and it will not submit to be directed by those who seek to repress its lofty aspirations and its noble energies. If the clergy would respect the age, it would respect them; but it has sworn it will not bow the neck to the yoke of servitude, and surrender its conscience to those who will not respect its rights.

B. It was Lucifer, I believe, that Milton represents as saying,—

> "Better to reign in hell, than serve in heaven."

But Lucifer finds less freedom in reigning than St. Michael in serving. The principle of license, and that of despotism, are one and the same, and the clamor for freedom usually indicates only impatience of law, and the desire for the predominance of mere will,—the essential principle of despotism. Your radical is always an ingrained despot, who, finding he cannot himself rule, resolves that nobody shall rule. Clothe him with authority, and he forthwith institutes the Reign of

Terror. You never find your Robespierres as moderate in the exercise of power as even your Mirabeaus, your Ledru-Rollins as your Lamartines, your Thierses as your Guizots. That the dominant spirit of our age is freedom from all restraint may be true enough, but I have never read of an age, claiming to be civilized, in which there was less of the spirit of true liberty, or in which tyranny, under the form either of anarchy or of despotism, more abounded. The age not only has failed to establish liberty in any proper sense of the term, but has labored, not unsuccessfully, to render its establishment for a long time to come extremely difficult, if not absolutely impossible. The revolutionary efforts throughout Europe, in our day, to introduce democracy, have loosened the bands of society, to a great extent destroyed respect for law, and left authority no possible means of preserving itself and maintaining social order but the resort to physical force. I can prudently give a child, who I know will not abuse it, far more liberty than I can one who I know will use whatever liberty I give him only for his and my ruin. Government threatened in its very existence by a numerous band of restless spirits, who are constantly plotting againt it, is obliged to resort to the most stringent measures of repression,—measures which would be as unjustifiable as unnecessary, if the whole population were submissive and loyal.

The great mass of the people are easily imposed upon. Let a number of men set up and continue for a certain length of time the cry, that religion is hostile to freedom, and they begin to think that there must be something in it. Where there is so much smoke there must be some fire. Religion certainly is opposed to license, it certainly does require us to practise self-denial, but this simply proves that it is the necessary basis of all true liberty. There is no liberty without justice, and justice is inconceivable without religion. What you call freedom of mind is its slavery, did you but know it. The mind was created for truth, and finds its freedom as its food, only in the possession of truth. Without truth it has no free movement, no active force, no life, but necessarily droops, withers, and dies. A worse calamity is not conceivable, than to be doomed to be ever seeking the truth and never to find it. He who is so doomed has no resting-place, no repose. He has no solid footing; at every step, he feels the ground give way beneath him. Darkness is before him, darkness is behind him. He can-

not see his hand before his face, and yet he must move on, for to stand still is to sink into the abyss; but whither, he sees not. He knows not where he is, or in what direction he is moving, or ought to move. It is idle to pretend that such a man has freedom of mind, for he has no mind at all, —cannot make up his mind on any thing.

My young friends do not at this moment appreciate what I am saying, for they have not yet felt the pressure of life. They are just entering what appears to them a career of free inquiry,—buoyant and hopeful, sustained in part by their animal spirits, and in part by the truths they have learned from their tutors and governors, and which they have not as yet wholly effaced from their minds. They are charmed, too, by the novelty of their situation and the freshness of their emotions, and borne onward by the excitement of the exercise. But the excitement will soon subside, the freshness will fade, the novelty will wear off, and the heart and soul will cry out for their appropriate food. It is dangerous tampering with the eternal laws of God; a day of vengeance is sure to come. If you are not among those, as I trust you are not, who cannot learn even in the school of experience, you will one day cease to find delight in the pursuit of what continues constantly to elude your grasp, and will fall back upon yourselves weary and disheartened; a universal lassitude will succeed to your present buoyancy, your hopes will be withered, and nothing will remain for you but to seek forgetfulness in sensual gratification, or in the vice of avarice or ambition.

Strike out religion and morality, and nothing remains but our animal nature and its objects. The sensualist did not begin in gross sensualism. He began in soft and sweet sentiments, which, as he was conscious of no impure intention, he imagined to be pure, and such as he could safely indulge. Nay, he imagined it almost a sin to forego them. Day by day they grew upon him by indulgence, till they became too strong for ordinary virtue to repress, and then he found them to have been only the germs of beastly vices and grievous sins. The beginnings of all vice and crime are pleasant and sweet to our animal nature; but all emotions or sentiments originating in that nature are vice and crime, when fully developed. "Every man is tempted, being drawn away by his own concupiscence [or lusts], and allured. Then when concupiscence hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin; but sin when it is completed begetteth

death." The modern world followeth concupiscence, the inferior or irrational nature. It began in what is most pleasing and seductive in that nature, which it dignifies with the names of liberty and philanthropy. But these when taken as affections of the animal, not of the rational soul, can be followed only on condition that we gradually discard both revealed religion and natural. Hence you find that your modern reformers, notwithstanding their fine words and lofty phrases, tend with all their energy to establish the supremacy of the flesh over the spirit. Hence their breach with the past. The past has labored, not indeed always with complete success, to institute and maintain a social and political order in which the rational nature should be supreme, and the animal be subordinate, and held, as far as possible, in subjection. This our reformers condemn; they seek to organize society and the state on an entirely different set of principles, so that intellect and reason shall be the mere instruments of appetite and passion. It could not be otherwise; for the flesh knoweth not God, and, if followed, excludes God and the whole rational nature.

Freedom of inquiry, thought, speech, and action, rightly understood, are no doubt good things; but your friends who claim their exclusive possession have very little right to them. All they understand by them is freedom to think, speak, and act against religion, without losing their reputation, or suffering any social or civil inconvenience. The pickpocket, the thief, the robber, the adulterer, the murderer, the traitor, wish, no doubt, as much, and with as much justice. I have never found unbelievers actuated by a love of truth; I have never found one of their number going forth in pursuit of it with a free mind, and an open heart, ready to receive it. They are all disciples of some master, and if they inquire at all, it is only to confirm their prejudices. I have no reason to think that I was, when among them, less candid, open, and truthful than the rest; yet I never knew what it was to seek for the truth, till I became a believer. I sought to refute that doctrine, or to establish this, never distinctly to ascertain what is true doctrine; and I embraced the truth only as it forced itself upon me. I had no intention, no thought, of becoming a Catholic; I did not even ask myself whether Catholicity was true or false. Its truth burst of itself upon me, while I was busily engaged with something else; and I accepted it only because I could not help it. It interfered with all my plans of life, with all my old habits,

with all my associations, and was any thing but pleasant to flesh and blood. But it broke upon my mind with such clearness, distinctness, and force, that I had no power to resist it. I did not seek it,—it came of itself; I did not find it,—it found me, and took me captive, and carried me away in spite of myself.

I have looked over no small portion of the literature of the modern liberal world; I have looked in vain for some trace of free, strong, and manly thought. Your most admired authors are cramped in their movements, narrow and superficial in their views, and generally weak and flippant in their expressions. They are strong only in their appeals to passion, and invariably fall far below the better sort of enlightened heathen. Out of the departments of physical sciences and mathematics, which do not require a very high order of intellect, the greatest names you can boast are Bayle and Voltaire, and these have been able to make no real advance on Celsus and Julian. Jean Jacques Rousseau was a sophist, a puny sentimentalist, and a disgusting sensualist, who set forth nothing novel that was not false. Your English deists, Lord Herbert, Tindall, Toland, Woolston, &c., are the dullest of mortals. I never could fairly read through one of their stupid productions. Your liberals have succeeded in shaking the faith of many, in sowing doubt and despair; but I do not call to mind a single subject on which their lucubrations have thrown new light. They only repeat one another, and are tediously monotonous in error. What are the greatest of them by the side of such men as St. Athanasius, St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. John Chrysostom, St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, St. Augustine, St. Gregory the Great, St. Bernard, St. Thomas, Suarez, Bossuet, the great fathers and doctors of the church, the really great men of the human race,—great as men, as scholars, thinkers, philosophers, as well as great in sanctity, the highest order of greatness,—what beside these men are your Bayles, your Voltaires, your Rousseaus, your Tom Paines, your Saint-Simons, your Owens, your Fouriers? These men were at the summit of their respective epochs, and every one of them has contributed to the sum of human knowledge and virtue.

There is no doubt the age would respect religion, if religion would respect it; but religion gives the law, it does not receive it. Unbelievers, no doubt, would accept religion, if she would make herself infidel; but has it never occurred

to our wise young men, that religion become infidel is no longer religion? You remind me of my old friends, the Unitarians, who are in the habit of maintaining that their religion is the best in the world for checking the spread of infidelity,—because it presents nothing that an unbeliever can find any difficulty in accepting. It brings Christianity down to the level of the unbeliever's capacity, that is, strips it of every thing, except its name, that distinguishes it from infidelity. I know no solid reason why an unbeliever should hesitate to accept of a Christianity which requires him to change only his name. The clergy very possibly stand in their own light by not conforming to the dominant spirit of the age,—if religion be, as our sage liberals pretend, mere priestcraft, and if they seek only temporary popular applause. But the clergy are the *ministers* of religion, and have no authority over it. If they were at liberty to mould it to the various and ever-varying caprices of the multitude, to make it one thing in one age or country, and another thing in another, no sensible man could respect either it or them. It is singular that our liberals take it upon them to advise the clergy, in order to secure respect for religion, to adopt a policy which would show on its very face that they hold religion to be mere craft and imposition, and still more singular that they should suppose any friend to religion should not see that their advice is that of an enemy.

O. Yet the clergy, as a body, have always shown themselves hostile to liberty, and have never sufficiently urged the importance of improving society, and elevating the lower classes.

C. Their chief study relates to another world, and they appear to have proceeded on the principle, that it matters little what is our condition in this world, if we but secure the salvation of our souls in the world to come.

F. They proceed as if the chief business of religion were not to teach us how to live, but how to die,—as if we had nothing to do in this world but to get out of it the best way we can!

B. That the clergy have as a body been opposed to what is sometimes called liberty is no doubt true,—but this is to their honor. There can be no question that they have taken the words of their Master literally, "Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice;" but this does not prove that they have at all neglected man's social well-being, for the only certain way of making sure of earth is first to make sure

of heaven. He who lives solely for heaven lives the best life even for this world. The clergy, as a body, have always been the friends of liberty, but they very frequently deny that what some men call liberty is liberty, and I know no reason for asserting that they have less authority than their opponents to define what is, or is not, true liberty. They certainly teach that this world is not our abiding-place, that we are here only pilgrims and sojourners, that we are here to prepare for another world, for the return to our native country. If in this they are right,—and which of my young friends dares say they are wrong?—this world is, in itself considered, a matter of no importance, and social well-being, save in its bearing on our eternal welfare, deserves no attention. That state of society which is the most favorable to preparation for heaven, is the best. Supposing, then, the clergy do as you allege, it is only a proof that they are faithful to their God and to the human soul; and if my young friends were to inquire into the matter, they would find that the evils they complain of result solely from attachment to the world, from giving it an undue place in our affections, and from not following the teaching of the clergy, and trampling the world beneath our feet. If all men would live for heaven, and not for earth, there would be no tyranny, no oppression, no political or social evils. "Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be superadded to you." This world feeds only our animal nature, and you should be prepared to maintain that man ought to live as a mere animal, before you venture to urge your objection to the Christian doctrine of detachment and self-denial.

O. Supposing Christianity to be true, the clergy are, no doubt, justifiable; but the very fact that it enjoins this detachment and self-denial is to me the best of all reasons for believing it false.

B. That is, Christianity is false because it asserts in man something superior to the human animal, and for man a higher destiny than that of the beasts that perish! Whatever asserts the superiority of the soul over the body, and teaches us to live for the soul instead of the body, is false! My young friend, I grant, is consistent with himself.

F. But is it not an objection to the church, that she uniformly frowns upon all efforts to ameliorate the political and social condition of mankind?

B. I am not aware that she ever does so. She may

frown upon the efforts of hot-headed radicals and savage revolutionists, for she does not recognize the so-called "sacred right of insurrection" as one of her dogmas. She enjoins obedience to legitimate authority, so long as it commands nothing contrary to the law of God, and therefore regards sedition, insurrection, rebellion, as sins against God, no less than as crimes against the state. But she is always on the side of honest freedom, and never fails to exert all her influence to lessen political and social evils; and to augment the sum of political and social well-being.

C. Before you became a Catholic, you were the friend of the people, ready to do battle to the best of your ability in their cause; now we find you siding with the people's masters, sympathizing with the despotic governments that, in the recent revolutions in Europe, have repressed the popular movements for liberty. Is it not because your religion requires you to do so?

B. There are several ways of telling a story. In my youth I was a wild radical, and sympathized with rebels wherever I found them,—unless rebels against the authority of the mob. I took it for granted, that all old institutions are bad, and tend only to restrain the free spirit of man, and I looked upon every established government as necessarily tyrannical, and hostile to liberty. Whoever seeks to demolish old institutions, and to overthrow all fixed government, belongs, I said, to the party of progress, and is on the side of humanity. I sympathized with Lucifer in his rebellion against the Almighty, and with admiration heard him say, in Milton, after his defeat,—

> "All is not lost; the unconquerable will,
> And study of revenge, immortal hate
> And courage never to submit or yield
> And what is else not to be overcome;
> That glory never shall his wrath or migh
> Extort from me: to bow and sue for grace,
> With suppliant knee, and deify his power,
> Who from the terror of this arm so late
> Doubted his empire, that were low indeed,
> That were an ignominy and shame beneath
> This downfall; since by fate the strength of gods
> And this empyreal substance cannot fail;
> Since through experience of this great event,
> In arms not worse, in foresight much advanced,
> We may with more successful hope resolve

To wage by force or guile eternal war,
Irreconcilable to our grand foe,
Who now triumphs, and in the excess of joy
Sole reigning holds the tyranny of heaven."

But in those mad days when I was animated by the spirit of the age, I was any thing but a friend to the people.

I have not sympathized with the recent European revolutions, not, indeed, because I am hostile to the people, but because I love them and wish their good. Kings and nobles are nothing to me. What have I to gain by opposing popular frenzy, and telling the people they are fools and mad? Am I not one of the people? Is not my earthly lot, and that of my children, bound up with theirs? Why should I desert my old friends, and expose myself to the reproach and obloquy of popular leaders? I do not concede that nobody understands or seeks the good of the people but radicals, red-republicans, communists and socialists. I oppose these because they are the enemies of the people, as well as of God. Men who consult the lessons of past experience, who respect the wisdom of past ages, and uniformly act under an abiding sense of their accountability, are fully as likely to understand and seek the real good of the people, as your atheistical and immoral revolutionists, who despise all knowledge, wisdom, or authority but their own.

I can hardly restrain my indignation when I find our liberal press representing these recent revolutions as attempted in favor of the people. A more God-forgetting and God-forsaken set of mortals it would be difficult to find, than the leaders of the European liberals, who excited these revolutions and sought through them to introduce popular government in the European states. There may be here and there an honest man in the ranks of the party, but among the chiefs I have not found a single one worthy of the least respect for his moral principles or his practical virtue. Some of them have received a passable education,—are not deficient either in scientific culture or refinement of manners,—but as yet not a great man, a man of a high order of character, has appeared among them. Mazzini has low cunning and some rhetorical ability; Lamartine is a mere phraze-monger, and Kossuth is a whimpering sentimentalist. Bem and Dembinski, their ablest generals, have proved what they were by turning Turks,—if reports are to be credited.

Ledru-Rollin is a cross between Marat and Robespierre. Nothing in the world is easier than to gain a reputation by opposing authority, declaiming for liberty, and professing unlimited devotion to the cause of the people. One needs but rattle off a few commonplaces for liberty, or against despotism, to gain the admiration of the multitude, and the name of patriot and people's friend. Chime in with popular passions, and those passions will swell your voice, and sustain you—for a time.

I was trained to sympathize with European liberals, and to receive as so much law and gospel whatever received the sanction of French infidels, Polish and Italian refugees, and English Whigs. In later years I have asked myself what European liberals, or the liberals in any country, from the Gracchi down to our own time, have ever effected for the liberty or the happiness of the people. In modern times they have frequently been in power. They were in power in England in the seventeenth century; they beheaded their king, brushed away the lords temporal and the lords spiritual, and had every thing their own way. The nation gladly, to get rid of their misrule, submitted, under Cromwell, to a military despotism—to a slavery hitherto unknown in England. They were in power in Holland under the De Witts, and brought their country to the verge of ruin. They were in power in France in 1789, 1830, and in 1848, and in each instance, as long as they held the power, terror reigned, and there was no security for person or property. Never do they rise to power but they prove themselves real despots, savages, and butchers. No nation has yet been found that could for any considerable length endure their sway, or that has not on the very first opportunity thrown them off. Religion and philosophy teach us that it must be so, and history proves that it is so. The reason is, that every liberal is by nature a despot, and it is his spirit of lawlessness and insubordination that places him in opposition to authority. However he may disguise the matter from himself or others, he wishes to be governed only by his own will, that is, to make his own will the government, which is the essential principle of despotism. When I hear a man declaiming lustily for liberty, I suspect it is for liberty to pick my pocket, or cut my throat.

If you are wise, you will place no confidence in European liberals. You cannot rely on one of their statements. They fear not God, and regard not man. The truth is the

last thing in the world they see or choose to tell, and whoever has in these days relied on their published statements has found himself deceived. Witness the case of the Hungarians. Up to the very last moment, the liberal press in Europe and this country teemed with glowing accounts of the successes of the Hungarians, and the defeats of the Russo-Austrian forces, while every man not blinded by his sympathy with the rebels knew that these successes and defeats were pure inventions,—as well as everybody knows now that the Russo-Austrian army met with no serious check even once during the whole campaign.

In none of the European states was a revolution called for. Abuses of administration there may have been, but it is well known that the governments were doing their best to correct them; evils, no doubt, there were, but chiefly of that nature which no government can reach, and which will generally be greater under a democratic government than any other. As a Catholic I complain of nearly all the European governments, for their denial of the freedom of religion, and their taking into their own hands the business of education, which of right belongs to the church; but besides this I am aware of no well-grounded complaint that could be brought against any of the European governments, and this was no ground of complaint with the liberals. None of them were tyrannical, or showed any disposition to tyrannize over their subjects, and whatever severity they practised was practised against those only who were continually conspiring to overthrow them. The complaints of the liberals were ridiculous. "The government won't keep still and suffer us to destroy it. It is detestably tyrannical. It has no respect for the rights of the people; it puts down free discussion; it insults the majesty of reason, and tramples intellect in the dust. It puts out the light of the soul, and involves man in darkness. It will not let us quietly cut its throat, and insists that we shall demean ourselves as good citizens and loyal subjects!" This is the sum and substance of their complaint, as you may gather, if you will, even from *Le Mie Prigioni* of Silvio Pellico.

F. But do you not overlook the fact, that all the European governments were antipopular in their constitution? The liberals were struggling to introduce popular forms of government as the condition and guaranty of popular liberty. In this I sympathize with them, and regret that the combined forces of the crowned despots have been able to triumph over them.

O. Their triumph is only for a time. The friends of the people, European democrats, are defeated, but not subdued, nor even disheartened. They have not struggled in vain; their cause lives; the sacred fire of popular liberty is still cherished, and they will conquer at last.

> "Yet, Freedom! yet, thy banner torn, but flying,
> Screams like the thunder-storm *against* the wind;
> Thy trumpet-voice, though broken now and dying,
> The loudest still the tempest leaves behind;
> Thy tree hath lost its blossoms, and its rind,
> Chopped by the axe, looks rough and little worth,
> But the sap lasts,—and still the seed we find
> Sown deep, even in the bosom of the North;
> So shall a better spring less bitter fruit bring forth."

The people have been awakened, and tyrants will never charm them to sleep again. Henceforth no throne is firm, no crown sits secure. The struggle will never cease till the people obtain their rights.

B. My young friends, I see, do not lack the power to declaim. But lofty words and high-sounding periods cost little expenditure of thought. I am no prophet, and therefore shall not undertake to say what will or will not occur hereafter. I do not, however, think the struggle between society and its enemies is by any means ended. There is no doubt great truth in what you say about the people having been awakened. So large a portion of the European population have been rendered dissatisfied with their condition, —have been made to believe that their sufferings are due to bad government, or to a falsely organized society, and induced to hope amelioration only from popular institutions, —that I do not believe the democratic movement will suddenly subside; and the youngest of you probably will not live long enough to see social peace restored, and legitimate government at liberty to devote all its energies to the welfare and prosperity of its subjects.

If I, like my young friends, believed that popular liberty and democracy were inseparable, and that it is impossible to have one without the other, I should undoubtedly think and feel very differently, in respect of European liberals, from what I do at present. But you liberals are too illiberal for me. You are political bigots, and would compel us all to think as you do. You will allow of no political salvation out of democracy. I cannot stand that. I nowhere read

that Almighty God declares all forms of government, except the democratic, are illegitimate. When he himself framed immediately a civil polity for his chosen people, it was not the democratic. The Jewish polity was, as near as it can be described by comparison with secular governments generally, a federative aristocracy, under the hierarchy, which was monarchical. The church has never made democracy a dogma of faith, and I have never been able to find in the Holy Scriptures a single passage that gives the preference to the democratic over other forms of government. If I find myself the citizen of a democratic state, I hold myself bound to sustain democracy. I am a republican by habit, association, and by preference for my own country; but, excepting my own country and Switzerland, I know of no country in which the introduction of democratic republicanism would not sacrifice liberty, and prove a curse to the people. I therefore do not regard European liberals as worthy of our sympathy because they are struggling for democracy. That is rather a ground of accusation against them.

It is very easy to call the emperors of Russia and Austria despots and tyrants, to rail at Metternich, and pronounce Haynau a butcher, to call the victims of their just punishment the martyrs of liberty, and to brand as enemies of the people all who will not say as much. Nay, it is not difficult to make the dear people themselves believe so. But it will take much to convince me that Nicholas of Russia is not a better man than Joseph Mazzini, Haynau a better friend of the people than the weak and whimpering Kossuth, or that Prince Metternich has not done more for real liberty and the welfare of the people of Europe, during the last thirty years, than has been done by all your liberals from Hampden to M. Proudhon. I do not expect you to believe me to-day. You are young, and filled with the spirit of liberalism. You have not yet learned that the first lesson in freedom is submission to authority, and the practice of self-denial. There is and can be no freedom for irreligious men, or a godless nation. Never is it the free government that makes a free people; always is it the free people that makes the free government. You may turn the matter over as you will, to this you must come at last. "If the Son make you free, you shall be free indeed." If he does not, you are slaves in democratic America no less than in despotic Turkey.

II.—*F.* All you say seems plausible enough, and perhaps follows logically from principles that cannot very well be denied; but there is always danger in pushing matters to extremes. I am a Catholic as well as you, and, unlike you, have been one from my infancy, and I would rather die than give up my church. I am a "Catholic of the Catholics," and have no need to be instructed by neophytes in my religion, however much my seniors in years. Pushing the principles of our religion to their last consequences, and taking extreme views of all questions of practical life, can do no good,—is impolitic, subjects our church to unnecessary odium, and imposes too heavy a burden upon us who mingle in the world, and have more or less to do with "our separated brethren." Virtue, the philosopher tells us, is the mean between two extremes.

B. I am very happy to hear my young friend say that he is a Catholic,—a fact which I own I had not even suspected. As a neophyte I stand rebuked. But I have heard of Catholics who will fight to the death for their religion, as a point of honor, who yet will not live it. The test of a man's love of Catholicity is in living it. If ye love me, says our Lord, keep my commandments; and this we must do, if we would enter into eternal life. Extremes are dangerous, no doubt; but it is always well to understand our terms. Virtue, in a certain sense, may be the mean between two extremes, but I have never understood that the extremes were more and less of virtue itself. Too little virtue to be virtue is not virtue at all, and I have never been aware that a man can have too much virtue to be virtuous; at any rate, I do not think any of us are likely to sin by an excess of virtuous action. Extremes are not in pushing true principles to their logical consequences, but in false principles themselves. A man can no more have an excess of truth than he can of virtue.

R. But what we object to is, that you are ultra. You were always, we have been told, even when a Protestant, disposed to be ultra in every thing. You would push your Protestantism, your notions of government and society, to such extremes, that no one could act with you. And now you push your Catholicity to extremes.

B. Beyond Catholicity itself?

R. No; I do not precisely say that; but you push it farther than it seems to me necessary to go. You are too rigid, too uncompromising,—nay, to be plain, you are too bigoted and intolerant.

B. Bigotry is the obstinate adherence to one's own opinions, without any solid reason for them, and a blind intolerance of whatever contradicts them. If half that is said of my frequent changes be true, I must have very little obstinate attachment to any opinions, and in those matters which are really matters of opinion, it might be difficult to adduce an instance in which I have shown myself intolerant. Nor am I aware that in matters which are mine, and of which I have the disposal, I have been thus far in my life remarkable for my rigidness, or want of liberality. The tendency to push matters to extremes has never been one of my besetting sins, and I have always been ready to accept any compromise that seemed expedient, if it involved no compromise of principle or dereliction from the truth. But I confess I am not and never was one of those who could say, "Good Lord," and "Good Devil," not knowing into whose hands I might fall. As to *ultra* Catholicity, I do not understand it. You might as well call a man ultra orthodox, as if one could be orthodox, and at the same time more or less orthodox. Orthodoxy is a definite quantity, and one has it, or has it not. It is not a creation of mine, nor of yours, and all that either of us has to do is to accept it as prescribed to us by the church. You can either hold it or not hold it, but you cannot both hold it and not hold it at the same time. You are bound to go as far as your religion requires you to go, or you sin by defect; and if you go beyond what it permits, you sin by excess. The medium is not something arbitrary, left to your will and caprice or to mine; it is determined by the truth itself. If I go beyond the truth, I certainly go too far, and you, if you go not as far as the truth, go not far enough. As you concede that I do not go beyond Catholic truth itself, it strikes me that, instead of charging me with the sin of ultraism, you would do much better to humble yourself and do penance for your short-comings.

F. All this looks plausible, I grant, and yet I see no need of being so *very* strict. There is no need of exaggeration.

B. All exaggeration is wrong, and to be condemned; but as long as one is within the bounds of truth, I do not see how he can be guilty of exaggeration. Then I do not understand what you mean when you say that there is no need of being so very strict. I must be as strict as truth and virtue or I fall into error and sin. You doubtless remember that the early Christians were so very strict as to choose

rather to undergo the most cruel tortures or to suffer death in its most frightful shapes, than to offer a single grain of incense to Jupiter or to the statues of Cæsar. Do you think they were foolish, ultra, more strict than their religion required them to be, and that they might, with credit to their religion, and without sin in themselves, have offered incense as the pagan magistrate commanded?

M. That was all very well in the martyrs, and we honor them for it; but what your young friends contend is, that it is not necessary to place ourselves in opposition to our age, and to shut ourselves out from all communion with our kind, because they do not happen to be of our way of thinking.

B. I was not aware before that Catholicity, the Catholic Church, the immaculate spouse of God, the mother of all the faithful, is *a way of thinking.* "Blessed is the man who hath not walked in the council of the ungodly, nor stood in the way of sinners, nor sat in the chair of pestilence" (Ps. i. 1); but I do not remember that a blessing is anywhere pronounced upon those who follow the counsels of the ungodly, or hold communion with the workers of iniquity. "What participation hath justice with injustice? or what fellowship hath light with darkness? or what concord hath Christ with Belial? And what part hath the faithful with the unbeliever?" (2 Cor. vi. 14, 15.) In matters not of religion the faithful may, no doubt, have intercourse with such heretics as are tolerated, and they are certainly not required or permitted to oppose the age in any respect in which the age is right. But we cannot conform to the age wherein the age is wrong without sin, for that is precisely what is meant by sinful conformity to the world. That would bring us into bondage to the world, into bondage to sin, from which it is the design of our religion to free us. This setting up the age as a standard is by no means Catholic, and to fall in with the children of this age in their worship of it is as much idolatry as that which the early Christians resisted unto death.

F. You mistake our meaning. We do not advocate full conformity to the age; all we mean is, that, as the age manifestly tends to popular institutions, to the extension of popular liberty, it is an exaggeration of Catholic doctrine to contend that we should resist this tendency, fight against the people, and exert ourselves to uphold old abuses and despotic rulers.

B. My young friend certainly does not sin by an excess of clearness and precision in his ideas. If he would take a little pains to distribute things according to their categories, and to keep those things distinct in his reasoning which are distinct in their nature, I cannot believe that it would do him any serious harm. Catholic truth does not, of course, require us to uphold abuses or despotic rulers. In asserting things are *abuses*, and rulers despots, you assert your right as a Catholic to resist them, and, within the limits of prudence and charity, your duty to resist them. All that is clear enough. But before you can pronounce a ruler a despot in the bad sense of the word, you must prove that he is not a legitimate ruler, that he is a usurper, a tyrant, an oppressor; and before you can call things *abuses*, you must know that they are not legitimate *uses*.

O. But it must always be right to favor the democratic tendency, to support popular institutions, and to struggle even unto death for liberty. What more glorious than to die fighting bravely for liberty, equality, fraternity?

B. Our company is too small, my young friend, to make it worth our while to get into the heroics. You can leave "Cambyses' vein" till you come before the crowd. It demands very little expenditure of thought to move a large audience; wind is the chief thing requisite for that. But in a small company, where each one present is cool, declamation is out of place. There it is necessary, if you would produce a favorable impression, to have clear and precise ideas, and to clothe them in appropriate language. When you address only a dozen, you speak to a dozen critics. When you address five thousand, all individuality is merged in the crowd, and you speak not even to one. Save your big words, liberty, equality, fraternity, till you have the mob before you. I heard these words, and screamed them in a tolerably strong voice, from the very top of my lungs, long before you were born. They were as popular in my boyhood as they are in yours, and they who screamed them then had as little love or understanding of them as have those who are loudest and foremost in vociferating them now. To tell you the honest truth, those big words are rather stale, and in very bad taste. You must wait till a new crop of fools is produced, before you can commend yourself by using them. Liberty, understood as the liberty of reason, of justice, of truth, is always a good, always to be defended, always to be asserted at all hazards; but understood as the

liberty of passion, of man's inferior nature, it is any thing but good; it is only another name for slavery, for neither the individual nor the community is, or in the nature of things can be, free, save in governing and restraining the passions, as I never cease repeating to you, and as all young men, and, I am sorry to say, some old men, are always prone to forget. Liberty is in justice, and so is equality. Of each, justice is the measure. What is just is equal, and he who is subjected to no unjust restraint is free. And fraternity is only in the Catholic communion.

O. But you evade the question of democracy, and do not tell us whether it is or is not always right to fall in with the democratic tendency.

B. I have the example of the early Christians before me, and I have read the lives of many martyrs, who would not have been doomed to death for their religion, but who would have been permitted to live, and even have been loaded with honors, if they would only sacrifice to Cæsar, that is, to the state, or temporal authority, to which they owed civil allegiance. I am persuaded, nay, I know, they did well, and I would rather be crowned with them, than enjoy the pleasures of the senses for a season, and be sent to hell at last. I never sacrifice to the temporal authority. I obey it for God's sake, in all things it commands, which are not of sin, which are not incompatible with my love and duty to God. Beyond that, I have only one answer to give it,—"We ought to obey God rather than men." Where democracy is the law I obey it, not because it is democracy, but because it is the *law*; and I hold that I am bound to sustain popular institutions, simply for the reason that I am bound, and to the extent and only to the extent that I am bound, to sustain the laws of my country. Where monarchy or aristocracy is the law, I say precisely the same of it, as I very plainly intimated in our former conversation.

O. But suppose the people in an undemocratic state, in a monarchy or an aristocracy, should come to the belief that their condition would be essentially improved by changing the existing form of government, and adopting the democratic, would they not have a right to do so, and ought not every one, as a friend to liberty, to wish them success, aid them in the attempt to do so, and sympathize with them if defeated.

B. That depends on the sense in which you understand the word *people*, and on the fact whether their belief is well

or ill founded. If you mean by *people* the state, they have, undoubtedly, the right to make such changes in the form of their civil polity, not suicidal, as may seem to them good; but I am not bound to wish them success, or to aid them in effecting such changes, or to regret their defeat, if the changes are foolish, uncalled for, and likely to be productive only of evil. If you mean by *people* the people not as the state, but as subjects of the state, they have no such right, for they are, in that sense, bound to obey the law.

R. Then you deny popular sovereignty,—that the people are sovereign.

B. That, again, depends on the sense in which you take the word *people*. If by *people* you mean the state, I do not deny their sovereignty, under God; for I admit that the state is sovereign, and, within the limits of the moral law, may do what it pleases. If you mean by *people*, not the people as the state, but the people as subjects of the state, I deny their sovereignty; for it would be a contradiction in terms to assert it. They who are held to obey the law, in the sense in which they are held to obedience, are not free to abrogate or change the law. You cannot very logically assume democracy, and from your assumption conclude it.

F. Here is where I complain of you. You admit, indeed, that you are bound to uphold a democratic government where it is the law, but only because it is the law, not because it is the inherent right of every people.

B. That is to say, you complain of me, not because I refuse to obey *Cæsar* where he has legitimate authority to command, but because I will not sacrifice to him as God. Decidedly, my young Catholic friend, you would have been in little danger of martyrdom, had you lived even in the reign of Nero, Decius, Maximian, or Diocletian.

F. You are too severe. We live in a democratic country, and you know that the great charge against our church is, that she is hostile to democracy; and the interests of our church herself require us to refute that charge, by showing that she is favorable to democracy.

B. The great charge against the church in the time of the pagan emperors was, that she was hostile to the heathen gods. Suppose some liberal-minded Catholic had risen up and said to his brethren, We live in an idolatrous country, and the great charge against our church is, that she is hostile to idolatry; her interests therefore require us to refute this charge by burning incense to Cæsar. What would the old saints have replied to him, do you think?

M. The cases are not parallel. Democracy is lawful, but idolatry is never lawful.

B. Precisely. Idolatry can never be tolerated, because it is never lawful; but we may conform to democracy because it is lawful. Certainly, where it is the law democracy is lawful, and there the church commands us to sustain it; but where it is not the law, but monarchy or aristocracy is, there democracy is not lawful, and to undertake to show that there our church favors it would be to attempt to show a falsehood, and to prove that our religion favors sedition and rebellion, and that by becoming Catholics we are emancipated from the civil law,—no great recommendation of Catholicity to statesmen, I should think. It would be a much better reason for expelling her from the state, than for introducing her. In a word, my young Catholic friend, it would be well for you and me to remember that the church does not rest upon our shoulders, that she has a more powerful supporter than either of us, and that the most effectual method we can adopt of serving her interests is to demean ourselves as her faithful children, believe what she teaches, do what she commands, and leave the care of protecting her to him whose spouse she is. The best security we can give our heretical countrymen, or which they as lovers of our institutions can ask, is, that our church is wedded to no particular form of civil polity, and commands us always to obey the law, and to discharge faithfully and conscientiously our duties as citizens and as subjects.

For my part, I pity the blindness and malice of those who urge the charge to which you refer; and I pity still more the silly Catholic, who, in order to get rid of it, tries to prove that his church is democratic, runs into the wild extremes of radicalism in order to prove that his religion has no influence on his politics, throws up his cap and grows frantic with joy whenever he hears of a rebellion, and hails as a patriot and a saint every despicable scoundrel, whose only merit is that he is a rebel, and has succeeded in kindling the flames of civil war in his country. He may call himself what he pleases, but he is a disgrace to his religion, a living scandal, and unworthy the name of man, much less that of Catholic. No, no, never applaud yourself for being a Catholic of that stamp; call yourself a heathen at once, put on avowedly the livery of the devil, so that all men can see and mark you for what you are.

F. You may be as severe as you please; but I shall

never be persuaded that I cannot be a good Catholic and a good democrat.

B. You can be a good Catholic and a good democrat, if you properly understand yourself. A firm and loyal supporter of democracy, where it is the established order, that is, where it is the law, you not only can be, but if a good Catholic, must be; but a democrat in the sense that democracy is the inherent right of the people everywhere, and that the multitude in every country has the right, when it chooses, to overthrow the existing legal governments for the sake of introducing it, or, in other words, that democracy is universally the legitimate and only legitimate form of government, and that every other form of government is illegitimate, tyrannical, a usurpation, and therefore null and void from the beginning,—which is the modern European, and, to some extent, American, sense of the word—you can not be, and at the same time a good Catholic. If you take the word in this sense, you make Cæsar God, and can worship him only by disavowing the law, and falling into sheer idolatry.

F. But suppose the government of a country dissolved, to have wholly forfeited its rights, so that there is no legitimate government existing; would not the people have the right, in such country and in such case, to establish a democracy, although the previous government had been monarchical?

B. If, as you suppose, the previously existing government is really and totally dissolved, and no political constitution remains in force, the people are thrown back under natural law, and are free to reconstitute the state as seems to them good,—in the democratic, the aristocratic, or the monarchical form, just as they please. The right of the multitude, where there are no legal institutions, to establish the democratic order, is no more to be questioned, than their obligation to sustain that order where it is the law. What I deny is, that every form of government but the democratic is, in itself considered, illegal, illegitimate, or tyrannical; and that the people, as subjects of a state, have the right to rebel against any existing legal government not democratic, for the sake of introducing democracy. The right to resist tyranny I am not the man to deny, and that the tyranny of the prince, according to the reasoning of the American Declaration of Independence, absolves the subject from his allegiance, I have always held, and, as a Catholic, must hold,

unless I would condemn the principles and practice of my own church. It is only on this principle that I defend, or am able to defend, the power which she has claimed and exercised of deposing Catholic sovereigns when they became tyrants, and absolving their subjects from their allegiance. The doctrine of the divine right of kings and passive obedience, as preached by Anglican ministers of the seventeenth century, I no more hold than did Bellarmine, Duperron, or Suarez. No Catholic, without temerity, could hold it; for every Catholic must hold that civil power is a trust, and, like all trusts, may be forfeited, and is forfeited when exercised manifestly against the legitimate end of government, that is, the public good. The inamissibility of political power has just as little credit with Catholics as the inamissibility of grace. I have no respect for the memory of Dutch William, but I have never felt that, were I an Englishman, I should be obliged to uphold the cause of the Stuarts, or refuse allegiance to the Guelfs. I do not believe in the legality of the present French republic, for the Constituent Assembly was not freely elected; but I do not feel it necessary to make myself the champion of the Bourbons, or the enemy of the Bonapartes. The Bourbon family have done enough, a hundred times over, to forfeit their original right to the crown of France, and Louis XVIII. was in my eyes no more a legitimate French sovereign than was Napoleon. If the Bourbons, after the restoration, had given the church her freedom, and abandoned the old Gallican traditions, they would hardly have been driven a second time into exile. A new restoration may take place, and become legitimate, but nothing in my judgment necessarily prevents either the republic or the empire from also becoming legitimate. For my own part, not being called upon to legislate for France, or to decide what her interest requires, I have no preferences on the subject, except that I must prefer any thing to red-republicanism. Nor do I bring under the rule I have laid down colonies and conquered nations. A conquered nation as long as it remains a nation, retains the right to assert, when it can do so with prudence, its national independence; for the right of self-government is inherent and inalienable in every nation as long as it is a nation, that is, as long as it has not by its own consent, expressed or implied, become merged in another. With regard to colonies the case is less clear; but I have no doubt that they *can* arrive at majority, and when they do that they may throw

off the authority of the mother country and set up for themselves. What I deny is simply what in modern times is called "the sacred right of insurrection," or the right of the multitude to rebel against a government that only exercises its constitutional powers, and to seek, by way of revolution, to change the administrators or the form of the government, for the sake of what they regard as political or social amelioration. But after a revolution has been effected, the old order destroyed, and a new order established, capable of answering the just ends of government, I hold myself bound to accept and obey the new government, not, indeed, because the people had a right to effect the revolution and introduce it, but because, now it is established, it cannot be opposed without compromising the public good, which I am bound in morals to consult.

I am not opposed to popular governments as such, but I am opposed to the principles on which you young democrats defend them; for those principles are repugnant to all government,—to democratic governments themselves, as well as to others. It is just as easy to defend what is good on sound as on unsound principles. If you want merely to sustain your democratic institutions, it suffices to put them under the safeguard of law, and of that religion which makes it binding upon us in conscience to obey the law. But if you wish, under the pretext of establishing democracy, merely to assert the right of rebellion, insurrection, revolution, then I grant my principles will not aid you. And here is precisely why I oppose you. I find no fault with you for believing that democracy is the best form of government for every nation, though I myself believe no such thing; but what I do find fault with you for is the assertion of the right of the mob in every nation to introduce it against existing law and order, whenever they judge it expedient. This would be to assert the universal right of rebellion, which is the negation of all government, and as incompatible with the maintenance of democratic as of any other government, as I should suppose the democrat himself might see and understand.

You young and unreflecting democrats defend democracy on the Jacobinical or revolutionary principle. It is to that principle I object, and we may have, as we have had, in our own country, occasion to see and deplore its mischief. It manifests itself in various sections of our country, and ever and anon we are threatened with a dissolution of the

Union. Just now, one class of fanatics are threatening to dissolve the Union, because slavery is legalized in some of the states; and another class threaten to dissolve it, because there is resistance made to extending slavery where it now does not legally exist. The ring-leaders of both, if not madmen, would deserve punishment for their disloyalty, and would not be suffered to run at large, if public sentiment had not already sanctioned the revolutionary principle, and taken from power all its sacredness. With the revolutionary principle fermenting in the minds and hearts of the people, there can be no government, or none but a government of mere physical force. Abandon your revolutionary doctrines, reassert loyalty as a virtue, and advocate your democratic institutions on the ground that they are the law, and that every man is bound to obey the law, and I am as good a democrat as any of you. But as for advocating democracy on principles which deny law, undermine all government, and leave every one at the mercy of the irresponsible will of the majority, I cannot do it; and if you maintain that I must, or be no democrat, then I am, and thank God that I am, no democrat. I demand a government of law, not of arbitrary will, whether your will or mine,—the will of the majority or of the minority.

N. What you say is very just, but your distinctions are too subtile and abstract for the popular mind; and you will be generally supposed to maintain doctrines that you do not.

B. Possibly so. But you offer in this a strong argument against democracy itself. It is true, any distinctions that do not lie on the surface, that require a little patient thought and power of discrimination, are too subtile and abstract for the popular mind taken collectively, although within the comprehension of almost every one taken singly. Here is the difficulty you always have in popular governments, unless the people are Catholics, and have that intellectual culture which the hearty love and practice of their religion is always sure to give, and not otherwise to be obtained. The great body of the poorest and least educated class of our Catholic population, the "ignorant Irish," as people are fond of saying, can understand any of the distinctions I have made, although never taught to read or write; and no Catholic, except a mongrel Catholic, who, because he has mingled with heretics, read their books, listened to their political harangues, and caught up a portion of their slang,

fancies he is learned, and a bit of a philosopher and politician to boot, will stumble at any of them. I have had some experience in this matter. I have addressed, on the subject of which we have been speaking, both Protestant audiences and Catholic, and have even been astonished at the difference between them. To the Protestant I am obliged to simplify my language, to multiply my illustrations, and use all the precautions I would if addressing a class of pupils on one of the lower forms, and yet find that I make myself only imperfectly understood; while, to a Catholic audience, made up in no small part of laborers and servant-girls, I can speak right on in my own natural way, as I do to you, and feel always sure of being very generally understood, and of having my distinctions marked and appreciated. My audience are religious, and their religion has given them understanding. If one has got something to say of serious importance, something that is really worth saying and necessary to be said, something not superficial, but solid and profound, it is a pleasure to address a genuine unsophisticated Catholic audience. Your words are sure to tell; they do not bound back to you, as does your axe when chopping cork. It is my experience in this respect that has convinced me that a Catholic country, a really Catholic country, can be well governed under a democracy, and that a Protestant or an infidel country cannot be.

A Protestant country cannot be, because Protestantism is illogical, unintellectual, both in itself and in its influence. Ask a Protestant what he believes; he can tell you, within certain limits, what he does *not* believe, but in vain does he try to tell you, in any clear or precise manner, what he does believe. In mere worldly matters, or material interests, he may be shrewd, and show intellectual acuteness and clearness, but in all other matters, in all that pertains to great principles of justice, or the higher order of intellectual and moral truth, he no sooner opens his mouth to speak, than you see that his mind is darkened, that his mental perception is dull, and his ideas are muddy and confused. He even regards all mental clearness, distinctness, and precision of thought as scholastic subtilties, to be despised by every man of common sense. Indeed, if you show a tendency to distinct, clear, and exact thought, he will make it the ground of reproach to you, and will applaud himself that he is above such littleness. Hence it is that Protestantism and Protestant culture, however powerful they may be in over-

throwing an old established order or obscuring and rendering ineffectual well-settled principles, are peculiarly unfitted to sustain popular institutions. Hence, as a general rule, popular freedom has little prevalence in Protestant countries. England is the freest Protestant country in Europe, and she is less free than she was when Catholic. Ours is the only really free country in the world where the majority of the people call themselves Protestant, and we owe our freedom to the accidents of our situation, and to the fact that the colonists were very generally dissenters from the Anglican establishment, identified with the Anglican monarchy, not at all to Protestantism as such.

Nothing will save freedom here but the prevalence of Catholicity. Wild and reckless fanaticism is at work with our institutions, undermining law, and preparing the way for anarchy and despotism; principles are widely disseminated by all parties, that are incompatible with the existence of society itself; ever and anon, parties growing more and more formidable for their numbers and influence, spring up amongst us, and seek to translate their false principles into facts, or to make the country practically conform to them. In vain do you seek to arrest the evil. To do so you must draw, now and then, even nice distinctions, and call upon the people to discriminate. But your distinctions are condemned as vain subtilties, as above the comprehension of the people, as unpopular, and making you unpopular; and the very men who see and feel their importance will make them subjects of ridicule with the people, and bid the rabble hoot at you for expressing them. Democracy itself has a natural tendency to merge the individual in the crowd, to bring every thing down to a commonplace level, and to superinduce the habit of asking, not, What is true and just? but, What will the people say? What will go down with the people? It is only by virtue of the presence of a highly intellectual religion, like the Catholic,—a religion that leaves us neither to reason without faith, nor to faith without reason, but gives us reason with faith, and faith with reason, that is adapted to the human soul, appeals to man's spiritual nature, and by its august offices, its solemn prayers, its public instructions, and private meditations, keeps the mind and heart in constant exercise on the highest order of truth,—that the levelling and deadening influence of democracy can be neutralized, and the mental activity and discrimination necessary to its preservation and whole-

some operation can be secured. The very objection you urge against me is conclusive against your favorite democracy, unless you have the church present as the religion of the great majority of the people. Protestant or godless democracy, like that which is popularly preached at home and abroad, would very soon plunge the most civilized nation into barbarism.

The considerations you suggest only show the necessity of the Catholic Church, under a political and social point of view no less than under a religious, to the salvation of society as well as to the salvation of the soul. It is necessary to inspire that spirit of self-sacrifice, that heroic virtue, without which society becomes a field of blood, or a mere charnel-house. All the evils of society spring from pride and the predominance of the flesh, and no greater absurdity was ever sent up to us from the pit, than that of attempting to maintain order and social prosperity by playing off the pride and lust of one against the pride and lust of another. Less absurd were those grave philosophers of Laputa, who attempted to extract sunbeams from cucumbers. You cannot extract virtue from vice, nor develop social order and well-being from the elements of disorder and ruin. You can remove the evils only so far as you succeed in removing or in subduing the pride and lust from which they spring. It needs no great philosophy to know this, and still less, one would suppose, to perceive that you neither remove nor subdue the causes by employing them and providing for their universal activity.

Your modern reformers, socialists, communists, red-republicans, and radical democrats, are a stupid race of mortals, and as blind as they are destructive. They all undertake to obtain from unmitigated selfishness the results, which, in the nature of things, can be obtained only from the severest and most self-denying virtue. All their schemes are based on the principle, that selfishness is to be made to produce the results of the most perfect disinterestedness, or that pure selfishness, having a perfectly open field and fair play, is the equivalent of pure disinterested affection. What falsehood! What nonsense! Yet these men call themselves philosophers,—the great lights of our age! Alas! "if the light that is in you be darkness, how great is that darkness!"

As long as ignorance and sin remain, as long as men retain their vicious propensities and passions, there will be evil in the world, and there is not a more consummate fool than

he who looks for a perfect civil polity, or a perfect state of society. Something to mitigate, even to ameliorate, no doubt, may be done, but can be done in no merely outward way. Nothing can be done further than you can reach the individual mind and heart, and bring them into harmony with the will of God, as he has revealed it in his word, and proclaims it through the voice of his church. Men will never succeed in ameliorating their earthly condition till they learn to live for heaven alone, till they see all things in the light of God as their supreme good, and seek to modify them only at the bidding of divine charity.

You young men, even some of you who call yourselves Catholics, forget this. You have suffered yourselves to be seduced by the tempter. Protestantism and infidelity have no power over you, when they attack directly your church or her dogmas; there you are on your guard and are firm; but you have not been equally on your guard against their indirect attacks, their attacks through your social affections and sentiments, your love of political liberty,—intensified by long ages of Protestant misrule and oppression in the countries of your birth or descent,—and your desire of worldly prosperity and social position. Through these the tempter assails you; through these he whispers to you honeyed words, makes you sweet promises, and excites brilliant hopes, only to undermine your faith, to entangle you in his snares, and to drag you down to hell,—to hell both here and hereafter. Here is your danger; here is your weak side. You listen with the open hearts of generous youth, with the confidence of unsuspecting innocence, to the soft words of the betrayer, as to an angel of light. You are caught, you are led on from step to step, till you find yourselves far from the home of your fathers, far from the affectionate embrace of your mother, in arms against your church, false to all your vows to God, false to yourselves, a grief to all good men and angels, and a joy only to the enemies of religion, who, while accepting the treason, despise the traitor. The very devils despise those they are able to seduce, and so do their children and servants, infidels, heretics, and schismatics.

Nay, my young friends, if you would be free and noble, and honored even, listen never to the siren voice of the charmer. The entrance of the career into which she would seduce you may be bright and flowery, but its progress grows darker and rougher at every step, till it finally ends

abruptly in the blackness of eternal despair. I know that career which you are tempted to believe opens into life. I entered it as innocent and as full of hope as yourselves, and, as I fondly trusted, with motives pure and holy. Alas! how was I deceived! I lost my innocence, my virtue, every thing that a man should hold dear and sacred, found myself the companion of scoffers and blasphemers, a chief among the revilers of God's truth and God's law, and have gained only a stock of bitter experience, and a source of continual regret. Fear God, my young friends, and keep his commandments, for this is the whole of man. Be true to God, and he will never abandon you; serve him as he commands, with promptitude and fidelity, and fear nothing for your earthly prosperity, or for the spread and maintenance of liberty.

III.—*F.* You have not satisfied me. I love and honor the church in her place, and I yield neither to you nor to any other man in my reverence for the clergy, or my obedience to them so long as they keep within their proper sphere. But when the church encroaches on the civil authority, and seeks to establish a theocracy, I cease to respect her; and when the clergy leave the spiritual order, and undertake to dictate to me the political conduct I am to follow, I hold myself free to disobey them, and, if need be, to resist them with all my might. I am a man and a citizen, as well as a Christian, and no power on earth, if I can hinder it, shall wrest from me my rights as a man, or interfere with my convictions of duty as a citizen. If the pope himself should undertake to control my conduct as an American citizen, I would laugh him to scorn, and even, if necessary, make war on him as soon as I would upon any foreign potentate.

B. Bravo! my young friend; you are not lacking in brave words and high spirit, such as it is.

O. F talks very well, and if he could as a good Catholic talk as he does, it would amount to something. They who are not Catholics would then have some assurance that your church is not incompatible with civil liberty and social progress.

G. Very true. But F's talk is all gammon, and can deceive no one. He is a poor Catholic, and he will never persuade me that he is talking in the spirit of the religion he professes. He either does not know his religion or he does not believe it, and holds on to it only because he is too proud to forsake the religion of his fathers.

F. You all seem to know my religion better than I know it myself; but I have never known one, brought up a Protestant or an unbeliever, that did not entirely mistake her character; and in no respect is she more misapprehended than in her teachings on the mutual relations of the two orders, temporal and spiritual. I know that the extravagant pretensions of bigots and ultramontanists have led many to think that I cannot as a good Catholic say what I have just said, and I own that the conduct of such popes as Gregory VII., Alexander III., Innocent III., and Boniface VIII., which I dare be known not to approve, may seem to confirm the false notion which has given rise to the unmeasured obloquy which has been showered upon the church; but I know also that I am free to use the language I have just used, and that in doing so I only prove myself a dutiful and prudent son of the church.

B. Rather of the synagogue of Satan, you mean, young man. The spirit with which you speak is satanic; but what you say is partly true and partly false, though even the true becomes false in the connection and for the purpose you say it.

O. We thought so, and were sure you would get a rebuke from the Catholic side.

F. I have great regard for our venerable friend; but he is young as a Catholic, and has not yet lost the zeal and intolerance of the recent convert. I do not, he will permit me to say, recognize him as an authorized expounder of Catholic faith and theology. I was born and bred a Catholic.

B. I thought you, like the rest of us, were born an infidel and child of Satan.

F. I am not, and never was, an infidel. I have always been a Catholic, and my father and mother were Catholics before me, and so were all my ancestors, as far back as the time of St. Austin and his forty monks, sent by St. Gregory the Great to convert the Anglo-Saxons. There has never been an infidel or heretic in the family, that I have ever heard of.

B. There may, however, have been some not very good Catholics, and it is possible that the stock has degenerated. Yet you are mistaken in saying you were always a Catholic. You were born—as is every one, excepting always the Blessed Virgin, and those sanctified in the mother's womb, as were the prophet Jeremiah and St. John the Baptist—an infidel and child of Satan, and you became a Catholic only

in holy baptism. We who grew up in heresy, and spent the vigor of our lives in the service of Satan, are not meet, I grant, to be called Catholics, to be treated as children; but it is hardly meet in you who have been orthodox from your infancy to tell us so; you should rather rejoice over our conversion, for you know that there is joy in heaven with the angels of God over one sinner that repenteth, more than over ninety-and-nine just persons that need no repentance. I claim not to be an authorized teacher; I am but a simple layman, and know very little of Catholic theology. I only know what I am taught, and all that is not censurable in me is that I do not take it upon me to teach my teachers, nor to boast over those who may chance to be less instructed than myself. It is for youth to be proud and arrogant, to fancy it knows all things, and possesses all virtues; it is for old age, looking back upon a painful experience, to be modest and humble, to deplore its ignorance and bewail its short-comings.

F. Forgive me. I did not mean to be assuming or disrespectful.

B. Of course not. You but spoke as it is the fashion for young men now-a-days to speak,—out from the fulness of your own self-confidence, and in utter unconsciousness of the attitude you assume, or the bearing of your speech.

F. You are severe.

B. Kindly so, if I am, as you will yourself feel, long before you are as old as I am; for I do not think you are one of those who are incapable of profiting by experience. But enough of this. I am a convert, I grant, and you are not. You have to thank God that you had Catholic parents, who brought you up in the church, and early instructed you in what you should believe and in what you should do; and I have to thank him no less, nay, still more, that he has had the ineffable goodness to call me from error and sin, and make me in my old age a member of his church. In your case and mine, all the glory is due to him, and to him alone. Neither of us has wherein to glory but his grace, and neither has wherewithal to boast over the other. The point to be considered is, not which of us is greatest, but what is the truth on the question raised which we both, as Catholics, must hold.

My young friend, if as well instructed in Catholic doctrine as he would persuade us, knows that one may utter some things which are censurable as heresy, others as simply erro-

neous, others as rash, others as scandalous, others as ill-sounding, and others as offensive to pious ears. Now, supposing he can say all he has said without absolutely falling into heresy, he may still be obnoxious to some of the other notes of censure. What he says is disrespectful to the church, to the Holy Father, and the clergy, and, to say the least, sounds bad and is offensive to pious ears, and, as it may well lead some to sin, it is scandalous. Aside, then, from the correctness or incorrectness of the particular propositions he utters, he has no right to say what he says; for a man may be guilty at common law of a libel, though he utters only the truth, by uttering it in a malicious spirit for a malicious purpose, and in this sense, it is sometimes said, the greater the truth the greater the libel. So much must be said as to the *animus* of his remarks.

As to the matter itself, I agree that the church is to be honored and obeyed only in her place; but who, according to Catholicity, is the judge of what is her place? And how can a Catholic, who, if a Catholic, believes without doubting that she is infallible, commissioned by Almighty God to teach us what we are to believe and to command us what we are to do, ever make the supposition that she does or can get out of her place? I have been taught that our Lord is himself supernaturally present with the church all days unto the consummation of the world, and that he assumes to himself the responsibility of keeping her in her place, and preventing her from going astray or encroaching upon the rights of any individual, community, or interest. As my young friend claims to be well versed in Catholic doctrines, he will set me right if I have been wrongly taught.

F. I do not pretend that you are wrong in this. I hold the church is infallible and holy; but I do not therefore hold that popes, cardinals, ambitious prelates, and priests are infallible and impeccable.

B. Fair and easy, young man. Mind the categories, or you may get into a category yourself, as Captain Truck would say. That popes, cardinals, prelates, priests, are personally impeccable, nobody pretends; so that matter we can pass over. That cardinals, prelates, and priests, teaching out of their own hearts, are not infallible, are as fallible as other men, I concede; but that they are fallible when teaching what the church has taught them, or commands them to teach, I deny, and so must my young friend himself, if a

good Catholic. Personally they are fallible, but when teaching in the communion of the church their teaching is infallible. As to the Holy Father, when speaking as a private doctor, he is in the condition of any other private doctor; but when he teaches as pope, officially, as the visible head of the church, and defines faith or morals for the whole church, you cannot say he errs, for you are bound, under pain of excommunication, to believe, *ex animo*, that his definition is true, and you are no more at liberty to impugn a doctrinal definition, formally, judicially, given by a pope, than you are to impugn a doctrinal definition given by an œcumenical council. The mere speculative denial of the infallibility of the pope is not *formal* heresy, and he who makes it may be absolved; but the practical application of this speculative denial to any particular doctrinal definition made by the pope, or the denial of the truth of any doctrine the pope defines to be Catholic doctrine, is heresy, and, if persisted in, excludes from the Catholic communion. This being so, you are not held to be a heretic because you say the pope may err, not, indeed, because what you say is not false, but because, being obliged to believe he never does err, it is a harmless absurdity, which the church has never considered it necessary to condemn, and which she overlooks in compassion for the logical weakness of those who make it. I do not, then, by any means concede to you that a definition of faith or morals for the whole church by the sovereign pontiff can be erroneous, and the moment you select any one and pronounce it erroneous, I shall pronounce you a heretic.

F. That you may indeed do, if the definition has been accepted by all the pastors of the church.

B. I shall make no inquiry whether it has been so accepted or not; because the definition binds me in conscience the moment that I know the pope has made it, as is evident from the fact, that, if I should refuse to believe it *ex animo*, or dare to reclaim against it, I should incur, *ipso facto*, excommunication. You are not by any means at liberty to withhold your obedience till you have consulted all the pastors of the church, and ascertained whether they agree that it is due or not.

F. Well, be that as it may; if the pope should command me to make war on my country, or bid me encroach on the rights of the temporal power, I will say, what I have heard even from Catholic pulpits,—I would scorn his command;

I would refuse him obedience, and resist him to the utmost of my ability.

B. Very likely you would. But there is very little Catholic piety in abusing the pope hypothetically, and if he has been so abused from Catholic pulpits, so much the more shame. But it is for us to leave the incumbents of those pulpits to answer to those who have received authority to call them to account for their conduct. We will say nothing of them, only, if they have done what their religion does not warrant, we will take care not to imitate them. Indiscreet men, no doubt, sometimes occupy pulpits; men who, in endeavouring to throw off one charge brought against the church by her enemies, incur another not less dangerous. When one treats disrespectfully the vicar of our Lord, and makes use of expressions that diminish our reverence for those the Holy Ghost has placed over us, we know he has forgotten himself, and is not acting in accordance with the instructions he has received. Thus far I own I am not bound to follow him. The supposition you make is absurd and impossible, and it is idle to say what we would or would not do in case it should happen. Wait till the supposition becomes possible, before you make up your mind what you will do.

O. But is not a man's first duty to his country?

B. No, sir.

C. As I thought. I always believed the Catholic religion incompatible with patriotism and the rights of the civil power; and this is the reason why, as an American and a republican, I, who am no bigot, and respect the rights of conscience in every one, deprecate its spread amongst us.

R. The Catholic owes allegiance to a foreign potentate, and therefore can never be a good citizen or a real patriot.

F. It is to prove that you are wrong that I have taken the ground I have, and which our venerable friend here, with his ultramontanism and old world notions, attempts to controvert. Verily, I am half inclined to think he has just been disentombed from the dark ages, and supposes the world is now what it was then, and that he can safely revive old, obsolete ideas. Don't believe a word he says. He has, saving his presence and begging pardon of his years, no discretion, and neglects entirely the cardinal virtue of prudence.

M. I am, nevertheless, inclined to believe that you are

wrong, and that he is a better expounder of Catholicity than you are. I should despise your church, indeed, if she were what you would make her.

F. You say that because you despise her already, and delight to have her presented in the most odious light possible. I am not willing to hang a millstone round the neck of my religion; and he who represents her in the light to which I object I must regard as her enemy.

B. Keep cool, my young friend, and do not let your zeal for your religion, which I perceive is very ardent just now, hurry you into rash judgments. Zeal, to be commendable, must be according to knowledge. I have said, and I repeat it, that my first duty is *not* to my country, and I will add that I do not find patriotism ever mentioned as a virtue at all. Nay, as far as I have studied the history of the church, I have found an overweening patriotism, or nationality, among the very worst enemies religion has had to struggle against. It has been the fruitful cause of all, or nearly all, the schisms which have rent the seamless robe of our Lord, and among the most active causes of the rise and continuance of all the great heresies of ancient and modern times. Protestantism would have been stillborn, if there had been no narrow and contemptible national feeling and prejudice in Germany, Holland, and England to come to serve as its nurse. What to me are the arbitrary lines and boundaries which separate nations, and as a consequence make them enemies? I know only two classes of mankind,—those who belong to the church of God, and those who oppose her. The church is my country, and Catholics are my compatriots, my kinsmen, my brothers, and my sisters, wherever born, wherever they live, of whatever nation, race, or color,—white, red, yellow, or black. Those who are not Catholics, whether pagans, Mahometans, Jews, or heretics, are all of one general class, the enemies of God and children of Satan; for whose conversion and eternal salvation I am always to pray and labor, but with whom the less strict my connection the better. I am to do them good for God's sake, to the full extent of my power; but beyond, I have no part or lot with them. Christianity introduces a higher bond of union than that of nationality, and bids me seek a higher glory than national heroism, and a sublimer virtue than patriotism. The church is catholic, and would mould all nations into one vast republic, melt all into one grand brotherhood, by uniting all in the same faith, the same hope, the same

charity, the same worship under the supreme law of God. In presence of this law, which is the same for all men, of whatsoever age or nation, talk not to me of your narrow and contracted patriotism; and before the church of God, commissioned to teach all nations till the end of time, dare never speak of your petty nationalities, or your diversities of race, sept, clan, or family.

No; my first duty is *not* to my country; my first and my whole duty is to God, and to God alone. I owe no other duty than my duty to him, my only Sovereign, my only Lord and Master. Whatever duty I am bound to render to my country, my parents, my children, my friends, or my neighbours, is included integrally in my duty to him, and I am bound to render it to them only because I owe it to him, and he commands me to pay it to them. I am accountable to God alone; I am rightfully no creature's subject; no man, in his own right, is my master, and I deny the legitimacy of all authority that derives from man, or has simply a human origin. No man, no body of men, has the inherent, underived right to command me, or to bind me, either in soul or body, in thought, will, or deed. That portion of my duty to God which he commands me to render to my country, to the civil government, to parents, children, friends, or neighbours, I am bound for his sake to render them, and I shall fail in my obedience to him if I do not,—shall be guilty of a sin against him, and deserve his eternal wrath and condemnation.

You young radicals, in your wild enthusiasm and misdirected zeal for liberty, madly deny the very principle of liberty, and under pretence of asserting liberty assert the fundamental principle of slavery. You are poor statesmen, and poorer philosophers; for you have not yet learned that the principle of all slavery, as of all tyranny, is in the assertion of man's native, inherent right to govern man, or what is the same thing, to institute and enforce government. Government of some sort you must have; and therefore you must assert somewhere the right to govern, and consequently the duty of obedience. As you wish to be able to resist the governing authority when you choose, you declare it to be of human origin, well knowing that what is of human origin is never in itself sacred and inviolable, and that, being human, you, as also human, must have as much right to resist it as it can have to command you. Believing yourselves cleverer than the average of the people, and therefore

concluding that you have above the average chance of being leaders and governors, if you can have a democratic constitution of the state, and confounding liberty with your own liberty to govern, you suppose that you have secured freedom when you have succeeded, not only in making government derive its powers from a purely human source, but from the multitude at large. Thus far all very well. But you do not look on the other side, and you see not that your assertion of the human origin of government, in order to be able to resist it when it does not suit you, is the denial of all right on the part of government to govern, and that therefore you are reduced to the alternative, either no government, as maintain Garrison, Foster, Abby Folsom, &c., or a government that has no right to govern, that is, an illegitimate government. The former is practicable only in theory; practically, there will always be some government, for without government there is and can be no society, and without society man cannot live, since he is essentially social in his nature. Then you must adopt the latter, and then have only illegitimate government, that is to say, only usurpation and tyranny, under which there is and can be, in principle, only slavery.

Foolish boys, you fancy that you can have freedom without legitimate authority, and legitimate authority without God. But you can no more have a state without God than you can a universe. Political atheism implies universal atheism, and that in turn implies universal negation. An atheist may be a minister of state, but if there were no God there could be no state to administer; for the moment you ask what is the foundation of the state, you must have recourse to a law anterior to the state, by virtue of which it is organized or constituted; and the moment you ask the origin of that law, you must go back of the people to a law giving them the right to organize the state, and therefore back of creation itself, up to the creator, God, who alone, in the last analysis, is sovereign, the fountain of all authority, and of all law that is law.

Deriving the law from God, who has the inherent right to govern us as he will, because he has made us, and is both our supreme good and the supreme good in itself, we get a solid foundation for freedom. We then deny the principle of tyranny and slavery, the right of man to lord it over man; we declare all men equal before the law, therefore, as to their rights and duties, equal one to another; therefore, that one

has no right of his own over another, and therefore, again, one owes nothing to another. Here is freedom, full and absolute, because there is nothing due except to God, the supreme good, and nothing demanded except what is due to him; because there is no arbitrary will or authority, and nothing is exactable from any one but what God himself has made so, and what he has made so can be exacted only by virtue of his authority, and according to the law he prescribes.

Since God is the sovereign good, the supreme good both in itself and of all his creatures, he has taken care to command us to pay as much of what we owe him to our country, to our civil rulers, to our parents, to our children, to our neighbours, as is necessary or proper for their and our good. Ascertain, then, what portion of my duty to God he has made payable to my country and the civil authorities, and that I will acknowledge myself bound in conscience, for his sake, to pay them; but I am bound to pay them nothing more, and even this only for the reason that he bids me do so.

F. That is all I ask. But when the clergy forget that, and either refuse themselves, or forbid others, to render it—

B. They will fail in their duty to God, and incur his condemnation. No doubt of it. When the sky falls, we shall catch larks.

F. You seem to speak as if that could never happen.

B. Remember, I speak not of heretical ministers, or the so-called sectarian clergy, for I do not count them as clergymen. I speak of the Catholic clergy, to a professed Catholic, and I ask him if he is not bound to believe that these are commissioned by Almighty God to teach him his duty.

F. Of course I am.

B. Then it would seem to be the ordination of God, not that you should sit in judgment on the clergy, and see whether they do or do not properly discharge their duty, but that you should go to them to learn yours. The clergy are ordained to teach you, not you to teach them, and you receive the will of God through the church at their hands, not they at yours. They are your pastors, not you theirs; and the Holy Ghost has placed them over you, not you over them. The shepherd leads the flock, not the flock the shepherd.

F. I admit that the clergy are my guides in all spiritual matters, and that I am bound to obey the representatives of the church in every thing spiritual. The church is a spiritual, not a temporal kingdom, and in the spiritual order, un-

der God, she has plenary sovereignty. Here my obedience is due to her, and if I do not yield it I am a bad Catholic. But in the temporal order she has no right to command me, and if her ministers attempt to do it, I have the right to resist them, and by the blessing of God I will resist them. I will perform my duty, but I will also preserve my rights.

B. So you have said, and nobody doubts your readiness to resist the pastors of your church, and to display your prowess against the clergy. But you claim to be a Catholic, and I hold you bound to be true to Catholic teaching. Who then for us, as Catholics, has received authority from God to expound and declare unto us our duty to him, and to say what part is payable to him immediately, and what part is payable to our neighbour, to our country, or to the temporal order?

F. The church is commissioned to teach us our duty in the spiritual order, and the state is supreme in the temporal order. Church and state are two separate and coördinate powers, each supreme and independent in its own order. The state is a usurper when it interferes in spirituals; and the church, when it interferes in temporals. The state has no spiritual jurisdiction; the church has no temporal jurisdiction.

B. Your reply is not precisely to the point; but let that pass. To whom belongs the right to tell us where is the line that separates the two orders, and to define the powers of each, or to say when one does or does not encroach on the jurisdiction of the other?

F. Why,—why,—it belongs to each to decide in its own case.

B. And suppose there should be disagreement, and the two orders should set up conflicting claims, who or where is the umpire to decide between them?

F. As to that, no umpire is needed; the line between the two orders is so broad and plain, that there can be no mistake as to where it is.

B. So you may think; but you must be aware that there has been, if not mistake, at least disagreement, and Protestants with one voice tell you, that the church during the middle ages attempted perpetually to encroach upon the temporal jurisdiction of princes, while all Catholics worthy of the name maintain the contrary, that the princes were constantly usurping the rights and prerogatives of the church, and that all she attempted was to resist their usurpation, and main-

tain the independence and freedom of the spiritual order. If you have not forgotten the controversies about investitures and kindred matters between the popes and the German emperors, the Clarendon constitutions, and struggles between the archbishops of Canterbury and the kings of England, you must know that there have been grave and earnest disputes between the two orders. The church, too, has temporal possessions, churches, convents, abbeys, lands, endowments, bestowed upon her by the piety and zeal of her children for spiritual purposes. Do these pertain to the temporal order or to the spiritual order? Has the church jurisdiction in regard to her own temporalities, or does the jurisdiction pertain by right and inherently to the state? You are very ignorant of history if you know not that the church has on this question decided one way, and the temporal order, for the most part, the other. Practically, then, the line is not so broad and obvious that no mistakes or disagreements can arise between the two powers. Where do you lodge the power to decide? You say, virtually, nowhere. So Almighty God has left his work incomplete, and in certain cases that may and do arise, we simple believers have no means of knowing what is our duty, whether we are to obey the church or join with the temporal order against her; whether we are to fight for her or against her. Suppose the two powers are in conflict; the church, by virtue of the obedience I owe her, calls upon me to rally to her side, and to resist what she denounces as the tyranny and sacrilege of the civil power; and the civil power, by virtue of my allegiance to it, calls upon me to rally to its standard, and aid it in maintaining what it calls its rights against ecclesiastical usurpation. Here is a case of conscience. Which am I in conscience bound to obey? Now, when a Catholic has a case of conscience, to whom does he go, to whom is he bound to go, for its solution? To the minister of state, or to the priest of the church? Are questions of conscience spiritual or temporal? Do they pertain to the temporal jurisdiction or to the spiritual?

F. To the spiritual, of course.

B. Very well. I go, then, with my case of conscience to my parish priest. He either cannot or will not solve it, or does not solve it to suit me; appeal may then be made to the bishop; and from the bishop to the chair of St. Peter, to the sovereign pontiff, the ultimate appeal in all questions of the sort. The pope will decide, because, by the very

terms of the supposition, he, as the supreme head and ruler of the church, under God, has already decided, that my duty is to obey the church, and support her against the encroaching temporal authority. He had decided the case in the outset by commanding me to resist the temporal authority. In the case, as it goes up to him by appeal, you as a Catholic cannot deny his right to decide, and therefore his decision here binds me in conscience. But his right to decide on the appeal is only the right to declare what is the law in the case, the very right he exercised when he issued his command, and if I have no right in the one case to appeal from his decision, I have none in the other. As I have no right, as must be conceded, to appeal from the decision on appeal, I have none to appeal from his command in the outset.

F. So it would seem, I grant.

B. Then the church is herself the judge for all the faithful in the case, and it is hers to define her own powers, the extent of her jurisdiction, and, in thus defining her own jurisdiction, the extent of the spiritual order, to define the powers and extent of the temporal order. You began, my young friend, by putting the cart before the horse. You said you honored the church in her place, and the clergy in their own sphere. You would have spoken more like a Christian, if you had said, I honor and obey the state in its own place, and I respect and obey the ministers of state so long as they keep within their own sphere; but when they come out of it, and intermeddle with spiritual matters, I will neither honor nor obey them; for I must obey God rather than man.

M. I am no Catholic, but I have always maintained that a consistent Catholic must assert the independence and supremacy of the spiritual order, and, begging F's pardon, I must regard him either as insincere in his professions of temporal independence, and making them merely for buncombe, or as wholly ignorant of the first principles of his religion, nay, of all religion, if religion. One may see what his principles lead to in the history of the German Protestant churches, and of the Anglican Church, the handiwork of Henry VIII. and his saintly daughter Elizabeth. One or the other order must be supreme; and if we shrink from claiming supremacy for the spiritual order, we must concede it to the temporal, and thus subject conscience to the civil magistrate, and convert the church into a mere police

establishment, and ministers of religion into a part of the constabulary force of the state. If religion is any thing at all but mere statecraft, it is the supreme law, to which men in the temporal order, as well as in the spiritual, must conform.

R. But, if we allow religion to be supreme, and identify it with the Catholic faith and worship, what security have we that the Catholic Church will not abuse her power, and bring us into a hopeless spiritual bondage?

F. That is precisely the difficulty I foresaw, and I consequently claimed for myself and all men the right when it abused its powers to resist it.

G. All very well; but you as a Catholic can have no right to decide for yourself when she does or does not abuse her powers; for that would be private judgment, which your church does not allow. You cannot allow the state to decide, for that would be the monstrous absurdity of raising the temporal order above the spiritual, against which our Puritan fathers so earnestly protested, and which gave rise to their dissent from the Anglican establishment. I see no way of solving the difficulty but by rejecting all distinction between the two orders, or rather by restricting the powers of the state to a very few matters, and recognizing no church authority at all. I am a democrat in my politics, and a liberalist in my religion.

B. Of which you have more reason to be ashamed than to boast. You gain nothing, except the exchange of faith for unbelief or indifference, and order for anarchy. And then, what you choose to allow or disallow alters nothing of what God has established. You can deny Christianity if you choose, but that does not make it false, or you wise in denying it; you can say there shall be no church authority, but if God has established the Catholic Church with the authority she claims, what you say will not alter the fact, and though that authority may crush you, you will not be able to crush it. It is idle for men to talk as you do, as if they had the sovereign disposal of all things. Remember the world is not of your making, and that its government is not committed to your hands. God reigns and will reign, whether it suits you or not.

As to the difficulty you raise, it only demonstrates the folly of my very clever young friends. Never make impossible suppositions, or suppositions which are intrinsically absurd. The church, if a human institution, may abuse her

powers, and you can have no guaranty against her doing so; but no Catholic concedes that she is a human institution, or attempts to defend her as such, unless he is a fool. The very supposition of the church is the supposition that she is an institution specially created and protected by Almighty God to teach us what he commands us to believe and do, and his whole divine nature is pledged that she shall do this infallibly. This pledge is guaranty enough, and there is no room to reserve to ourselves the right to resist her in case she should abuse her trust or get out of her place. She cannot abuse her trust, because God will not suffer her to do it. You deny the Catholicity you profess, if you maintain the contrary, or allow it to be supposable.

F. But this is no answer to those not Catholics.

B. I have, at present, nothing to do with them, and I have no disposition to go out of my way to attempt to satisfy those who are incapable of being satisfied. I have no means of satisfying those who believe my church a mere human institution, except by convincing them that she is not a human institution, but the very church of God. I cannot expect, and I shall not try, to make her acceptable to those who it is assumed are to continue to be her enemies. I cannot make the same thing be and not be at the same time.

Your whole difficulty, however, grows out of the fact that you mistake the division line between the spiritual order and the temporal. You include in the temporal order the whole moral law, or law of God, in so far as it is the measure of our secular life. Here is your fundamental error. No man, no body of men, no community, no state, no nation, has the right to do wrong, and every one is bound to do right. The measure of right in all orders, and the sole measure of right, is the law of God, and to teach and judge of that law is a purely spiritual function, not a function of the temporal order, and therefore it belongs universally to the spiritual authority, and not at all to the temporal. I do not claim temporal jurisdiction for the church, and she leaves the temporal order free in all that is purely temporal; but she does not recognize in it any spiritual competency, and therefore does not acknowledge its right to teach and judge of the law of God, that is, the moral law, in any sphere. Within the limits of that law the temporal order may do what it pleases, and the faithful are bound by their duty to God to obey it; but the acts of the

temporal order which transgress those limits trench upon the spiritual order, and are therefore illegal; and if they require us to act in violation of the moral law,—that is, the law of God,—we are not only not bound, but even forbidden, to obey them; for we must obey God rather than men. The church, as the keeper and expounder of that law, doe not administer temporal affairs, but she does claim and po sess the right to define the moral law which must govern them and the authorities administering them. She is, under God, and by his special appointment, the teacher and supreme judge of all morality, and therefore of the morality of seculars, and of their morality in secular affairs as well as in any others. Whatever pertains to morals comes, by its nature, within the jurisdiction of the spiritual order.

What you are to remember is, that you are to be moral, that is, to obey the law of God in all your acts, to whatever department they belong, and that the state, the civil or temporal order, has no competency as a moral teacher, has no authority at all to decide what the law of God does or does not command, even in regard to secular matters. It has no spiritual function whatever, and is bound to receive the law of God from the spiritual authority, and to take care and transgress no one of its precepts. Your error is in supposing that the temporal order is itself the teacher and judge of the law of God, in so far as that law extends to secular life. This is a monstrous error; for it completely sunders religion and morality, confines religion to the service of the temple, and subjects the whole moral order to the temporal authority,—the very thing the enemies of religion are always attempting to do, and which I am sorry to find one who calls himself a Catholic ready to aid them to do.

IV.—*C.* Notwithstanding all you say, your doctrine is distasteful, humiliating, and repugnant to the natural instincts and aspirations of the human heart.

B. No doubt of it. But is that to its reproach, or to yours?

C. How can you expect us to embrace a doctrine repugnant to our feelings and tastes, that contradicts our natural tendencies and aspirations?

B. I do not expect you to embrace it by a natural predilection, and it is certain that you cannot embrace it without the grace of God moving and assisting you to do so.

Z. But is it not a sufficient condemnation of a religion, that it is contrary to our nature, above our natural strength, and can be embraced only by violence to our nature?

B. If our nature were sufficient of itself to attain to the end for which its Maker has intended it, and if it had not fallen and become corrupt and enfeebled, perhaps so.

W. Surely, our nature is all that God has made it, and it would be unjust on his part to demand of it what it is not able to do.

B. That all may be, and yet God may justly appoint us to a destiny above our natural reach, because he may provide us with graces and helps above our natural powers adequate to its attainment. And in this he would show himself, not only just, but superabounding in goodness. In our nature he has promised us only the good to which that nature by its own powers is adequate. But in the order of grace he provides something better, a far higher good for us, and furnishes us with sufficient means to obtain it. Instead of murmuring at this, we should be grateful for it, and see in it an additional motive for love and gratitude to him.

Z. But why need this supernatural destiny be attainable only by violence to our nature? I see no reason why we might not have been so made that nature and grace should aspire to the same end, so that we might have followed our nature and grace at the same time.

B. Such, in a certain sense, was the case with us prior to sin. Prior to sin, our nature was turned towards God, was held by grace in subjection to his law, and it required no interior struggle to fulfil it, and attain to our supernatural destiny. But by sin that grace was lost, and our nature became turned away from God, and inclined to evil. In consequence of this, our nature, that is, the flesh, is now opposed to God, and we can obey his law and live for our supernatural destiny only by doing violence to it. Hence you see that a religion may be very true, very holy, and indispensable to our salvation, and yet be very distasteful to the natural man, and altogether repugnant to the instincts and aspirations of the natural heart.

Z. But one cannot believe what he finds repugnant to his natural feelings.

B. That were some comfort, if it were true; but in the various vicissitudes of life, I find myself obliged to believe many things exceedingly repugnant to my feelings. There are a great many disagreeable truths, even in the order of nature, which all of us are compelled to believe.

Z. I am in the habit of relying on my feelings, and when I find I cannot feel with you in what you say, I say at once I do not and cannot believe with you. I do not like your doctrine, for it sacrifices the pure feelings, the noble emotions, and the gentle affections of the human heart to the cold propositions and rigid deductions of a dry and inexorable logic.

B. Such may be your habit, but the question for you to determine is, whether it is commendable or the reverse. If the propositions and deductions of logic are true, if they conform to reality, your feelings, emotions, and affections, which are opposed to them, are false, and are neither pure nor noble, and if followed lead into falsehood and sin. They are repugnant to truth, and therefore they, not the propositions and deductions, are in fault.

Z. But I am tired of dry and rigid logic, of the cold forms of the intellect. I want the heart, the warm and loving heart, and the heart is a better guide to the truth than the understanding.

B. That is to say, you are a bit of a sentimentalist, too indolent to think, and simply disposed to lie at your length under a wide-spreading beech, and indulge the luxury of feeling—

"Lentus in umbra
Formosam resonare doces Amaryllida sylvas."

This is no uncommon case with young men, especially when smitten by the sweet face and laughing eyes of Amaryllis. But the state of mind you describe is not one to boast of, or to parade before the world. It is a state in which one is expected to say and do a thousand foolish things, but no one ever thinks of taking them as a proof of his good sense, or piety and orthodoxy. Man is not a block of marble, nor is he required to be a mere logic-grinder. The heart has its place and its office; but, when used in a good sense, it means the will, not mere sentiment, and the will, as a blind faculty, never does or can act, save in reference to objects presented to it by the intellect, or that are intellectually apprehended. The heart, distinguished from the understanding, is no guide to truth, for it cannot apprehend truth, and it can be safely trusted only when it is enlightened or informed by intellectual apprehension.

Z. What I mean is, not that we are to follow blind feeling, but our intuitions, that is, the truth as intuitively be-

held, rather than as drawn out into logical statements and formal propositions.

B. So that you can disport yourself in the vague, and never be called to an account for any thing you say, however false or absurd. Intuition, on the part of the subject, is an intellectual act, but in the intelligible order it is never a clear, distinct, conscious apprehension of the object, and one knows not that he knows what he intuitively apprehends, till he makes it an object of reflection, and logic is simply the instrument or form of the reflective understanding as distinguished from the intuitive. The intuitions are never practically available as intuitions. They must be embodied in language, and presented through it to the mind, before we can distinctly know what they are, or make any use of them. And the moment you begin to use language, you are in the domain of reflection, and answerable at the bar of logic.

C. That is too metaphysical for my understanding. What is the reason you cannot talk in the plain language of common sense, so that simple men even can understand you?

B. My young friends are too hard with me. They bring out doctrines which can neither be confirmed nor refuted without resort to metaphysical principles and distinctions, and the moment I attempt to subject them to these principles and distinctions, they cry out, That is too metaphysical, —give us common sense, and speak so that we can understand you. I am accused of making too much of logic, and overlooking the feelings and affections. You tell me these are trustworthy, and our surest guides to truth. I reply, the value of these is in the fact that they are informed by truth, and conform to it, and that they can be so only as we intellectually apprehend the truth; for truth is apprehended only by the intellect. The feelings can no more apprehend it than the eye can apprehend sounds, or the ear colors. Then you shift your ground, and tell me that they are our intuitions, not properly our feelings and affections, you mean. I acknowledge the fact of intuition, and that all our knowledge in the natural order, in the order of the intelligible as distinguished from the superintelligible, rests mediately or immediately on intuition for its evidence. But intuition of the intelligible, as distinguished from the sensible object, is, though apprehension, an unconscious apprehension, that is, in intuition we apprehend the object indeed, but do not take note of the fact that it is we who appre-

hend it. We do not consciously connect the apprehending subject with the apprehended object, and therefore the intuition is what Leibnitz calls simple perception, wanting the character of apperception, in which we apprehend both the object and ourselves as apprehending it. How, without adverting to this fact, am I to test the value of what you allege? And how, without understanding this, are you to be disabused of your error?

The truth, and the whole truth, of the intelligible order, is undoubtedly in our primitive intuitions, in which are all the principles or *data* of the speculative reason in the order of nature. But in the state of pure intuition this truth is not available, is never practical knowledge. It must become apperception first, and this it cannot become without reflection. Reflection is a turning back upon or rethinking the objects revealed in the intuition. But as the intuitions in themselves, save when intuitions of sensible objects, are simple apprehensions, and not apprehensions which we are conscious of having, the reflective intellect cannot seize this object in them and make it the object of its own action. It must be presented in language, and therefore, as it must have been already embodied in language, language must be a divine revelation, not a human invention. Without language, intuition is very possible, but reflection is not possible at all; and understanding by thought a reflective act, or an intellectual act in which the actor apprehends both the object perceived and himself as subject perceiving it, De Bonald is right in saying that man cannot think without language. Every human speech, however cultivated, or however rude, contains the elements of all that is knowable, and through its medium is repeated, so to speak, in a tangible form, to the reflective understanding, what is revealed to primitive intuition. And when so presented, it is intuitively evident, because in intuition the intelligible object evidences itself.

Intuitions, then, are practically available only as evidencing and rendering certain the truth presented to reflection through the medium of language. They are not the fountain from which we primarily draw those truths by reflection, but the authority by which we know and assert them to be truths. You cannot, then, follow pure intuition, to the neglect of reflection, if you would, and you cannot reflect without language. But if you use language, you must make use of intellectual forms and logical statements, how-

ever great your repugnance to them, and the only question to be settled is, whether you make a good or a bad use of them. I have no more fondness for metaphysical systems than you have. I have and wish to have no metaphysical system of my own. I accept in metaphysics simply logic, or the right use of reason in its application to the various matters that fall under our observation, whether by revelation or intuition. The attempt to build up systems of philosophy, and of natural ethics, independent of theology, I cannot approve, and I hold it to be as foolish as was the attempt of the builders in the plain of Shinar to erect a tower whose top should reach to heaven. It has probably arisen from the apparent success with which speculative science was cultivated among the gentiles, and the use which the fathers made of it in their controversies with the heathen, and the scholastics in reducing Christian doctrine to the form of theological science. But the truth in the natural order, though barely possible to be known by our natural light, can without revelation be known only to a very few. The gentile philosophy was far enough from being perfect, and yet what perfection it had was by no means derived solely from the light of nature. No nation, people or tribe has ever yet been abandoned to the simple light of nature. A portion of the primitive revelation has been preserved to all in language, and some traditions of it have always been retained and transmitted from father to son, even in the most degraded and savage tribes. It is by virtue of these traditions of the revelations made to our first parents, embodied and preserved in every speech or language of men under heaven, that the gentile philosophy attained to what of perfection it had; and it is the ignoring of these traditions, the discarding of the fuller revelations of the Gospel, and the attempt to build up a philosophy by simple natural reason, despoiled of whatever it had received from revelation, that has led modern philosophers into the monstrous systems of error which are boasted as the crowning glory of the modern world.

W. All that may be very plausible to those who understand it, but I still insist that a religion which contradicts my natural instincts and tendencies cannot be true. God gave me these instincts, implanted these tendencies in my nature, and as he can never be in contradiction to himself, he cannot have given me a religion that is repugnant to them.

B. That might be, if your nature was in its normal state; but your nature has been perverted by the fall, and turned away, as I have said, from God. Its instincts and tendencies now bear you from him, and therefore a religion which is to convert you and bear you to him must necessarily contradict them, and require their repression and mortification.

Z. That proceeds on the assumption that what your church teaches is true, which I do not concede. I hold to the innate rectitude and perfectibility of human nature.

B. And for what reason?

Z. It must be true, if what your church teaches of man's corruption by sin, his need of redemption, and the necessity of grace, is false.

B. If what the church teaches in these respects be false, the innate rectitude and perfectibility of man must be true, conceded; so if what she teaches be true, what you assert of this rectitude and perfectibility must be false. Pray, tell me on what authority you assert that you are right and that she is wrong?

W. She is wrong, because what she teaches is repugnant to our natural feelings and tendencies.

B. Why not, you are wrong, because your natural feelings and tendencies are repugnant to what she teaches?

O. The church has for eighteen hundred years been in the world, and yet evil abounds, and therefore it is clear that her system is false. If hers is false, ours must be true.

B. But if evil abounds in spite of all the church has done to eradicate it, how much more it must have abounded if there had been no church!

Z. It is clear to every *enlightened* mind, that the cause of the evil suffered by society and individuals is all owing to the false system of the church. Her system makes man of no account, places no generous confidence in human nature, and allows man to place no reliance on himself. Making him nothing, allowing him no rights before God, no strength, no virtue of his own, it is not surprising that he has done nothing, and does nothing, to meliorate his condition.

B. You probably regard the church as an evil.

Z. Most assuredly I do, and were it not that I respect your feelings, I should speak of her in terms of the strongest reprobation.

B. That the church exists is a fact in the world's history. It is either the work of Almighty God, or of man himself.

If you say it is the work of Almighty God, you cannot maintain that it is an evil without blasphemy.

Z. I do not say it is the work of God. It is the work of men,—vile, crafty, wicked men.

B. Prior to the church, then, there were vile, crafty, wicked men, capable of creating a great evil.

Z. Certainly.

B. It would seem, then, that there was evil before the church, and you cannot say that she has caused all the evil in the world. How did your human nature, of which you predicate innate rectitude and perfectibility, become so corrupt as to produce the vile, crafty, wicked men who created so great an evil as you hold the church to be? And if men could without the church become corrupt enough to create her, how does it follow that, if she were removed, all evil would be removed?

M. I hold that the church is of human origin, and now a most mischievous institution, which the good of society and of individuals requires to be abolished; but I do not think that its originators were wicked men. They were governed by good motives, sought really to promote earthly felicity and to advance mankind, and I have no doubt that the church in its origin was a good institution, far in advance of paganism and of Judaism, and for a long series of ages, that is, so long as it was in harmony with the intelligence of the times, it exerted a beneficial influence. Its grand defect was in its inflexibility and want of expansive power. If it had only adopted the theory of development, and admitted the principle of progress into its code of doctrine and morals, it might have advanced with the advance of general intelligence, and continued to be a useful institution. The church now does harm, because it is no longer in harmony with our times, because it has fallen behind the age, and labors to confine our intelligence to the beliefs, and our conduct to the morality, of the age in which it originated. In order to do this, it is obliged to repel all progress of intelligence, and to claim an authority over the minds of men which is tyrannical, and to which no man conscious of the rights and the dignity of his nature will submit.

B. That is your theory of the origin of the church. I have not leisure to examine it at length; but you cannot hold it and be a very rigid moralist. The men who founded the church professed to erect her as a divine institution, on certain facts. These facts, if facts, clearly and unequivo-

cally established her divine origin. Now, with regard to these facts, these men could not, humanly speaking, be deceived. They either knew them to be facts, or they knew them not to be facts. If facts, the church is divine, not human; if not facts, these men lied when they asserted them to be facts, and were liars and impostors, and the church was a lie and an imposition. Now, how can you say liars and impostors are good men, governed by good motives? And how can you say a stupendous lie and imposition can be and do good even for a time? Does the *enlightened* morality of the nineteenth century allow you to maintain such monstrous propositions?

Z. I maintain no such thing, and believing the church to be a sink of iniquity, I believe her origin was in wickedness, not in virtue.

B. Yet you see that you cannot easily explain the origin of that wickedness consistently with your doctrine of the innate rectitude and perfectibility of human nature.

M. For that reason I assign the church a good origin, and believe it the work of good men.

B. Yet agree that it has become wholly evil, and now produces only evil.

M. Certainly.

B. If it was good in its origin, worked good for a time, and has from first to last been only what men have made it, how, if human nature has the innate rectitude and perfectibility you assert, has it ceased to be good, and become productive only of evil? The evil it now produces must have had a cause, and as the church has, according to you, been all the time subject to human control, this evil can have had only a human origin, that is, it must have originated in the wickedness of the men who have managed the church. How do you, with your views of the impeccability, perfectibility, and self-sufficiency of human nature, account for this wickedness?

M. I would say the evil originated in ignorance rather than in wickedness.

B. Be it so. But according to you the church was at first adapted to the wants of man and society, and for a series of ages aided progress. As human nature is perfectible, and inherently progressive according to you, churchmen themselves, inasmuch as they as well as you share human nature, must have continued for a long series of ages to advance under the church, and therefore at any point of time subse-

quent to her origin must have been more competent to mould her to the wants of that subsequent time than they were to fit her to the age in which they created her. Will you explain to me the reason of their failure to do so?

M. They had lost sight of her real human origin, had had so much experience of her benefits, that they had come to believe her really a divine institution, and therefore were deterred by reverence and praiseworthy religious motives from effecting in her the changes and modifications really required.

B. And this coming to regard and to reverence as divine what was really only a human creation, you take, I suppose, as an evidence of progress, of enlightenment, of the perfectibility of human nature!

M. My theory, I see, is not tenable.

W. The true cause, I apprehend, why the church was not made to keep pace with the progress of intelligence was, that in the dark ages it had acquired great wealth and political power, and they who enjoyed these, who lived in luxury, and lorded it over the people, were selfish, grasping, ambitious, and would not suffer any change or innovation, lest they should lose them.

B. Do you approve their conduct?

W. By no means.

B. They were wicked men, were they not?

W. Certainly they were.

B. Yet they followed, I presume, their own natural instincts and tendencies.

W. No doubt of it.

B. Nevertheless, you hold to the innate rectitude, perfectibility, and self-sufficiency of human nature!

C. I take a very different view of the case. I believe Christianity was from God, that its first preachers were inspired and holy men, but through the ignorance and perversity of their immediate followers, who only imperfectly understood their doctrines, it began to be corrupted by an admixture of surrounding heathenism, and has been growing more and more corrupt down to our times, save the partial purification effected by the reformers in the sixteenth century, and by their successors.

B. Yet human nature is impeccable, perfectible, sufficient of itself to attain to its destiny, and there has been continuous progress in knowledge and virtue from the earliest ages down to the full blaze of the nineteenth cen-

tury, when reformers are as thick as grasshoppers on an August afternoon.

P. I take a different view still. I believe that man has fallen, lies under sin, needs redemption, and can be redeemed and attain to his destiny only by divine grace. Thus far I agree with the church, and have no confidence in the sufficiency of human nature for itself. I believe also that redemption is through the atoning blood of the Saviour, and that the Christian Church, one and catholic, was founded by Almighty God, as the ordinary medium of salvation. But the bishop of Rome encroached upon the rights of his brethren, and gradually usurped power over the whole church, and set himself up as the vicegerent of God, and allowed no liberty of instruction, nor right of private judgment. From that time all manner of errors crept into the church, the simple doctrines of the Gospel were overlaid with a mass of heathenish notions, and the pure worship instituted by the apostles was corrupted by the introduction of the whole heathen ritual.

B. When did all that take place?

P. Why, I cannot fix the precise date when it took place, but it began with Constantine, and continued from that time down, till Luther and Calvin sounded the note of reform.

B. How do you suppose the usurper happened to be the bishop of Rome rather than any other bishop? Do you not hold that previously all the bishops were equal?

P. It was owing to the fact that Rome was the capital city of the empire, and the church of Rome the richest and most influential church of the time.

B. If I recollect aright, when, according to you, this process of usurpation began, Rome had ceased to be the capital city of the empire. Constantine had founded Constantinople, and made it the capital of the empire, and the customary seat of the emperors of the whole empire was never afterwards at Rome. Your first reason, therefore, fails, and may be dismissed. Your second is no better. That the church of Rome was the richest church of the time is not a fact. It had been from the beginning one of the poorest, and was for a long time in splendor and wealth far inferior to many of the oriental churches, such as those of Antioch, Alexandria, and Constantinople. Constantinople from the time of Constantine was a Christian city, while Rome remained long after a pagan city, and had pagan senators as

late as the time of St. Ambrose, archbishop of Milan. The city of Rome was almost the last stronghold of paganism in the western empire, and had not been wholly christianized at the close of the fifth century. None of these external causes you assign can explain why the usurper was the bishop of Rome, rather than the bishop of Constantinople, of Antioch, or Alexandria.

Then this usurpation does not strike me as a very feasible thing. Grant, if you will,—what in fact I deny,—that the Roman pontiff had a disposition to encroach, to usurp power, you must bear in mind that his disposition must have been met by the resistance of all the bishops in the world, who, you must presume, were as much disposed to keep their power as he was to usurp it. Now supposing the eighteen hundred bishops of the Roman empire to have commenced with the fact and the right of equality, ignorant of the papacy, and acknowledging no primacy of power in the bishop of Rome, and each as determined to keep his power as the bishop of Rome was to usurp it, what progress in usurpation do you imagine the Roman pontiff could have made? Suppose, as on your ground you must suppose, that each of these bishops had the disposition of the Roman, the odds against his success and in favor of them would have been far too great for one to be willing to bet on his head, or for any reasonable man to accept your theory.

But suppose the matter to be as you state, what is your remedy? If God has founded a church, and taken no better care of it than you suppose, who can rely on it? If your theory be correct, God must have founded his church, and then abandoned it to the care of men, and concerned himself no further with it, which is sheer Epicureanism, only transferred from the natural order to the supernatural, and involves sheer atheism as its logical consequence, as much as it does when confined to the order of nature. If God abandoned his church to the care of men, and they through their ignorance and perversity corrupted it, so that for at least eight hundred years the true church was no longer to be found on the earth, what surety can you give, or have you for yourselves, that, even if you could restore it, as your fruitless efforts for three hundred years show you cannot, men would not soon corrupt it again?

Your grand error, my young friends, is in the denial of Providence. Some of you are out-and-out Epicureans, and

hold that God made the world, gave it a kick, set it agoing, and bade it go ahead on its own hook and take care of itself; others among you do not say quite so much of the natural world. You are willing, one division of you, to say that he had so much regard for the world that he founded a church for its redemption and salvation, and another division of you, that he made a revelation for its benefit; but you both agree that he abandoned the church or the revelation immediately to its fate,—threw it upon the great concourse of men, and said, Here, take it, and make the most of it; I have no further concern with it. Here you deny the providence of God in the supernatural order. Now I beg you to reflect seriously on this denial. God has created the world from nothing, and it is only by virtue of his immanence in the world through that creative act that the world exists or does not return to nothing. But he remains thus immanent, and all created power is insufficient to annihilate or displace a single monad. By the same free act of his will by which he created the world he preserves it, and suffers no change in its physical constitution to take place but according to his own good will and pleasure. So also by his grace has he created the Christian order, or the "new creation," the church and all that pertains to it, and it subsists only by virtue of his immanence in it through his act of grace creating it, and were he to cease for a single moment to be so immanent in it, it would sink instantly back into nothing. So long as he is so immanent, it is and must be preserved, and all the powers of earth and hell strive in vain against it. Men may beat against it, and break their own heads in the shock, but they cannot move or injure it. There is, then, no medium between its entire indefectibility and its total ceasing to be. Your theory, whether you call it the church or simply revelation, of its gradual, partial, or total corruption, is untenable, and you have no middle ground on which to stand between the Roman Catholic Church and the absolute denial of Christianity; and if you deny Christianity, you have nothing but sheer humanism, the absolute divinity of human nature, putting man in the place of God, setting him in the temple of God to show himself and to be worshipped as if he were God.

THE EDINBURGH REVIEW ON ULTRAMONTANE DOUBTS.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1851.]

THE reputation of *The Edinburgh Review* for ability, learning, and criticism was established before we had learned our letters, and has been respectably sustained in spite of its formidable rival, *The Quarterly*. It has suffered in late years, but it is still the especial favorite with our countrymen, and it probably is more influential on this side the Atlantic than on the other. It is in accordance with the prevailing tone of the great body of educated Americans, nominally Christian, moderately liberal, and really deistical. It places the state before the church, and loyalty above religion, but disowns the name of unbeliever, and condescends to patronize Christianity so long as it is content to serve in a subordinate sphere, and exhibits no symptoms of aspiring to independence. It respects the clergy as useful parish constables, and offers no opposition to them so long as they keep entirely aloof from all secular affairs, and interpose no obstacles to the intrigues or ambition of Whig politicians. It is wise, but its wisdom is not that which is from above, and therefore may be regarded as an admirable representative of English Whiggism, personified in Mr. Augustus Tomlinson, who with great prudence and success devotes himself to robbery and housebreaking, and to lectures on ethics and metaphysics.

The article in the number before us entitled *Ultramontane Doubts* is written with cleverness and tact, and with more intellectual power than we are accustomed to look for among Protestants. Protestantism is essentially an unintellectual religion, and in their best days Protestants made but a sorry figure at reasoning; but latterly they appear to have lost the little share of intelligence they originally carried with them from the church, and to have become utterly un-

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able to do any thing in the way of argument, except to vituperate, and invent, and circulate foolish and absurd stories about priests and religious. Anti-Popery lecturers and editors, in our times, and especially in our country, seldom seem able to rise above the poor old fishwoman falling into her dotage, and the fact that they are popular and can attract crowds and rapturous applauses, is a sad commentary on the moral and intellectual culture of the Protestant community. It is, therefore, refreshing to meet even one Protestant who shows some signs of intellectual life, who has the courage to make some show of argument, and who, perhaps, has understanding enough of the matters on which he writes to be capable of being refuted. We had well-nigh despaired of ever meeting such a one, and now that he presents himself we greet him cordially and cherish him as a friend. We hope his courage will not fail him at his first onset, and that he will not as soon as he receives the first blow, like our ordinary adversaries, disappear, to be seen or heard of no more for ever. Seriously, it gives us pleasure to meet a Protestant who has a beard on his face, and who has the strength to give and to take sturdy blows. We are tired of combating mere boys, or mere *simulacra*, or shadows as unsubstantial as the ghosts of superstition.

Let it not, however, be imagined that we have really encountered one of the giants. The reviewer is no giant, that is certain; he is not above the medium size of the species, and is Titanic only in his disposition. He is great only in comparison with the ordinary herd of Protestant controversialists, as was Gulliver among the Liliputians. He brings forward no new argument, suggests no difficulty that has not been met and answered at least a thousand times; but he has contrived with much art to obscure certain matters very plain in themselves, and to confuse certain questions so successfully, as to embarrass the uninformed Protestant mind, and to satisfy those already satisfied, that we Catholics are sad reasoners, and in the last analysis no better than Protestants themselves.

The purpose of the reviewer is to check the spread of Catholicity in Great Britain, by a skilful appeal to the national and political prejudices of Englishmen. He begins by referring to the hope expressed by many Catholics, that England is on the eve of her return to the church. He does not believe this hope has any solid foundation; but conceding it for the sake of the argument, he wishes Roman

Catholics charitably to assist him "to ascertain fairly and logically what will be our duty in reference to this realm and constitution of England, when that inevitable hour arrives in which our consciences shall compel us to return to their communion; and to what extent our state and laws must be reformed and remodelled in the event of our national conversion." This he contends is very important, for "not a few of his countrymen feel it impossible to conjecture how to comport themselves, on the adoption of any *known* theory of the infallibility and supremacy of the Roman Church, towards the institutions and laws of their own country, and in relation to those doctrines of intellectual and religious freedom which at present are most 'surely believed amongst us.'" He concedes that the Catholic subjects of the queen, as a body, are truly loyal, but he thinks their loyalty is an inconsequence, not authorized by their religion, but preserved and manifested in spite of it. The theory of Catholicity adopted by such Catholics as the Duke of Norfolk, Lord Camoys, Lord Beaumont, Mr. Anstey, and, perhaps we should add, the Earl of Shrewsbury, men whose loyalty to their queen is not to be questioned, is, he thinks, only a modified Protestantism, and not the genuine Catholic article at all. Englishmen, if converted, "would conscientiously feel compelled to adopt a much more ultramontane position." But here comes up the difficulty. If we adopt the ultramontane doctrine, then we must accept "principles to which loyal and patriotic Englishmen cannot subscribe." But if we do not adopt the ultramontane doctrine, we render the seat of infallibility doubtful, which renders the infallibility itself, if not doubtful, at least of no value as a rule; or if we remove the doubt as to the seat of infallibility, and agree as to its organ, we must say the organ, whether pope or council, is sometimes infallible and sometimes not, for it is certain the organ, take which you will, has uttered "principles to which loyal and patriotic Englishmen cannot subscribe." But if the organ is sometimes infallible and sometimes fallible in its utterances, it is necessary to have some rule by which to determine when its utterances are infallible and when not, and no rule but that of private judgment is possible. That is, the reviewer attempts to show that the Catholic cannot be consistently a Gallican, because Gallicanism pushed to its last consequences is simply Protestantism; that to be a consistent Catholic he must be an ultramontane; but, if an ultramon-

tane, must hold "principles to which loyal and patriotic Englishmen cannot subscribe." This is the argument of the article.

The reviewer's inquiry is, as it strikes us, quite superfluous; for it relates solely to what may or may not be the duty of Englishmen towards civil government when they are compelled by their consciences to return to the Catholic communion, that is, after they have ceased to be Protestants and become Catholics. Whatever may be their duty, it is and can be of no interest to a Protestant, because, by the very terms of the supposition, there are to be no Protestants to be affected by it. Moreover, it does not indicate a very high religious or even moral sense, after one has become conscientiously convinced that he ought to return to the Catholic Church, to stop and inquire how obedience to his conscience will affect his political or civil relations. If a man is convinced that he ought to become a Catholic, he is convinced that the Catholic Church is God's church, and therefore infallible, and consequently that whatever she teaches him to believe must be true, and whatever she commands him to do must be just.

We must tell the reviewer, in the very outset, that we deny the jurisdiction of the court in which he proposes to try us. He makes politics the standard of religion, and summons the church to plead at the bar of the state. But he forgets that religion, if any thing, is the *lex suprema*, and that politics, loyalty, and patriotism are to be judged by her, not she by them. Loyalty is a virtue commanded, and therefore defined, by religion. Whatever does not come within her definition, or whatever would conflict with her commands, is by that fact alone proved to be not the virtue of loyalty, not a virtue at all, but a crime against society, and a sin against God. So also of patriotism. It is a virtue as prescribed, and within the limits prescribed, by religion; outside of these limits, and not subject to religion, it is a vice, a crime, or a sin. Politics are simply a branch of ethics, and ethics are nothing but moral theology, the application of religious principles and dogmas to practical life. Politics are, therefore, by their own nature, below religion, and subject to her authority. To attempt to judge her by them is worse than simply ridiculous. She herself is the standard, and if you mean to be religious at all, you must conform your politics to your religion, not your religion to your politics. This is simply a dictate of common sense.

In whatever light we consider the reviewer's inquiry, it is simply absurd. He must either deny religion, or accept religion. He cannot do both at once. There is no possible way of reconciling two contradictories. Do our best, and we cannot reconcile religion with the feelings, wishes, and notions of those who hold all religion to be false and mischievous; for every religion, in that it claims to be religion, claims to be the supreme law, and to possess the right to demand unqualified obedience. Religion is infallible truth and justice, or what God, who is truth itself, teaches men to believe, and what God, who is justice itself, commands them to do. There can be no crompromise between truth and falsehood, or between justice and injustice, any more than between Christ and Belial, God and the devil. The Free Kirk of Scotland, in asserting its independence of the civil authority, should have taught the reviewer that religion is above the state, and he can hardly be unaware that a parliamentary church like the Anglican, is no religion at all, but a part of the general police establishment of the kingdom. If he accepts religion he must accept it as religion, not as politics. He can deny all religion if he chooses, and is willing to take the responsibility of doing so, but he cannot accept it, and then object to it that it is religion. He can allege that Catholicity is false, and, if he proves his allegation, reject her on that ground, which is of itself a sufficient ground for rejecting her; but he cannot allege that she is false, because, if accepted, she would modify his politics, disturb his political convictions, or restrict his loyalty or his patriotism; for, if true religion, she has the divine right to determine his politics, and to define his patriotism and his loyalty or his duty to the state. Religion, therefore the church, if true religion, has by its own essence authority over kings, emperors, princes, and states, and they are as much bound to obey her as are the meanest of their subjects. The man who denies this has not as yet the most elementary religious conception.

The reviewer thinks that Englishmen, were they to become Catholics, would feel bound in conscience to be ultramontanes, for he thinks the ultramontane doctrine that which is the most consistent with the general theory of the church. On this point we have no dispute with him. We are ourselves ultra-ultramontane, and have not the least sympathy in the world with what is called Gallicanism, though we have deep love and veneration for *Catholic*

France. But if you adopt the ultramontane doctrine, contends the reviewer, you must concede that your church has erred. Why so? Because "English Protestants are apt to feel suspicious that" she has asserted "principles to which loyal and patriotic Englishmen cannot subscribe." This is a serious difficulty indeed, and one which proves that it is a mistake to suppose that the Protestant has nothing to say for himself. We cannot deny that English Protestants are apt to feel such suspicions, but, happily, in the present discussion we have nothing to do with the suspicion of English *Protestants*, for the inquiry the reviewer sets out with he himself restricts to Englishmen after their consciences compel them to return to the Catholic communion. We cannot deny, again, that the church has asserted principles to which "loyal and patriotic Englishmen," even though professing to be Catholics, refuse or will refuse to subscribe, but this, perhaps, is not a conclusive argument against her infallibility. Englishmen are, no doubt, very respectable, at least as their own little insular world goes, but we do not recollect that they in their capacity of Englishmen, whether nominally Catholics or not, ever received a divine commission to teach, or a promise of immunity from error. As we have read history, the church of God existed some centuries before there were any Englishmen in existence, and we are pretty sure that not to them, as Englishmen, was it said, "Going, teach all nations . . . . . to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you, for behold I am with you all days unto the consummation of the world." With all deference to our cousins across the water, we must tell them frankly that we do not recognize them, however "loyal and patriotic," as the infallible church of God, from whose decision there lies no appeal. The church of God, whatever else she is, is catholic, not national, and her prerogatives are those of no particular nation as such, not even of the Italians, as Gioberti, in his false and exaggerated patriotism, would persuade us. Here, again, we must deny the jurisdiction of the court, and cannot consent to plead at its bar. Who says "the church of God" pronounces a higher word than he who says "patriotic and loyal Englishmen." That patriotic and loyal Englishmen cannot subscribe to the decisions of the church may be a grievous misfortune for them, or an excellent reason for condemning them as heretics; but it is just no reason at all for saying the church has erred. The reviewer forgets that the Cath-

olic church is neither the Kirk of Scotland, nor the Anglican establishment. It is only a church created by Englishmen, deriving its institution and its mission from their queen and parliament, and which they have made and can unmake, that can be tried by the national feelings, convictions, or prejudices of Englishmen. Englishmen, when compelled by their consciences to return to our communion, will most likely cease to be Anglicans.

But what are these principles, said to have been asserted by the church, to which English Protestants are apt to feel suspicions that loyal and patriotic Englishmen cannot subscribe? According to the reviewer, they are the claim by the church of the power by divine right to depose temporal sovereigns, to absolve their subjects from their allegiance, and to persecute heretics. Here our readers will perceive that the reviewer holds that loyal and patriotic Englishmen must place loyalty before religion, the state before the church, and heresy before orthodoxy. If they can only provide for the state, for the temporal order, and secure immunity for heretics, they must be prepared to let the church or orthodoxy shift for itself. A true Christian would reverse this, and contend that in securing the church he had secured the state, and that, if he secured orthodoxy, he need not be solicitous to secure to heretics the freedom to deny it, and thus destroy themselves. But let this pass, as it is a consideration not likely to weigh with the reviewer.

Suppose the church has claimed the power alleged, what then? If she is what she professes to be, she is infallible, and then, if she has claimed it, she infallibly has it, and you in objecting only condemn yourself. You must be able to prove infallibly that she does not possess it, before, from her having claimed it, you can conclude that she has erred. Are you able to do this? The church claims to be infallible, to teach and govern all nations by divine authority, and the claim of infallible authority can never be set aside by an authority confessedly fallible. What infallible authority have you for denying that the church possesses, by divine right, any power she has ever claimed or claims? Do you say Englishmen cannot subscribe to it? But Englishmen are not infallible, and may themselves be the party in the wrong. Do you allege popular opinion? Since when has popular opinion become an infallible criterion of truth and falsehood, of right and wrong? Do you say the temporal authority denies it? Is the temporal authority infallible?

Do you say yes? Then you must prove it. No? Then it may be mistaken, and its assertion counts for nothing. Then, again, who made the temporal authority the judge of the spiritual? Who made its voice authoritative against the religious or spiritual authority?

Do you, finally, say the power is intrinsically evil, and such as can never, by any one, be lawfully claimed and exercised? It is, then, *malum in se*, always and everywhere wrong to depose temporal sovereigns, to absolve their subjects from their allegiance, and to punish heretics, by whomsoever it may be done. Are you prepared to take this ground? Then sing your palinode without delay. Call up your Scotch ancestors and sentence them for having made war on their king and having sold him to the English Parliament; let your righteous indignation break forth against the Long Parliament and Cromwell, for having not only deposed, but tried, condemned, and actually beheaded, Charles I.; draw up an indictment against your Whig progenitors for having called in Dutch William to expel James II., disown your "Glorious Revolution" of 1688, and declare Victoria I. an usurper. Why, the very essence of English and Scotch whiggism is that kings may be deposed, and their subjects absolved from their allegiance, and the massacre of Glencoe, the penal laws of England and Ireland, and the recent Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, which has received the royal assent almost at the moment we are writing, prove that "loyal and patriotic Englishmen," especially if whigs, hold it lawful to persecute, if not heretics, at least true believers. Universal European liberalism, the able organ of which the *Edinburgh Review* has been for nearly half a century, holds nothing to be more certain than that it is right to depose temporal sovereigns, and that subjects may not only be absolved from their allegiance, but rise up in arms and depose them whenever they take it into their heads to do so. Ask Lord Palmerston, ask Lord Minto, ask the present Sir Robert Peel, ask Lord John Russell, the first minister of the crown, ask your friends, Mazzini, Canino, Ledru-Rollin, Herr Hecker, Herr Struvé, and the whole band of red-republicans, who, in 1848, overturned or shook every throne in Europe, if it be not so. If you happen to be an admirer of Washington, and the republic of the United States, read in the Declaration of Independence by the American Congress of 1776, "that these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states; that they are *ab-*

solved from all allegiance to the British crown; and that all political connection between them and the state of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved." You cannot as liberals, as whigs, as Englishmen, nor even as Americans, living under governments founded either on the right of revolution, as is that of Great Britain, or on the principle that the tyranny of the prince forfeits his rights and absolves his subjects, as is ours, maintain that in no case and under no circumstances can temporal sovereigns be deposed and subjects absolved from their allegiance. Nay, no one can do it without asserting, with the Anglican ministers under the Stuarts, the divine right of kings, the inamissibility of power, and passive obedience, a doctrine ably combated at the time by Cardinals Bellarmine and Du Perron, and the Spanish Jesuit Suarez, and which would deprive the people of all hope of freedom, and make God himself the accomplice of the civil tyrant. You cannot deny that civil power is amissible, that it may be forfeited, and then that temporal sovereigns may, under some circumstances, be justly deposed, and their subjects absolved from their allegiance. Then you cannot conclude that the church is fallible from the simple fact that she has claimed and exercised the power over temporal sovereigns and their subjects to which you object.

The difference, on the supposition that the church has claimed and exercised the power in question, between the reviewer and us is, that, while we claim it for the church as commissioned by God to teach and govern all nations, he claims it for demagogues, conspirators, rebels, revolutionists, and the vague something called the people; that is, the mob, for the people acting without government and against government are a mob, and nothing else, whether in larger or smaller numbers. And what does he gain for loyalty and patriotism by denying the power to the church, and claiming it for the mob? If you deny it to the church, you must claim it for the mob, since there is nothing else for which you can claim it; for being a right against the temporal sovereign, it of course cannot be claimed for him. You must, then, either deny all right to resist the tyrant, and assert absolute civil despotism, or else concede the deposing and absolving power either to the mob or to the church, that is, the spiritual authority; and can you ask us to spend time in proving, that, even on the score of human prudence, the church is altogether the safer depositary of

the power? The English rebellion under the first Charles, the French revolutions of 1789, 1793, 1830, and 1848, and the red-republican insurrections in Switzerland, in the Italian states, in the smaller German principalities, in Berlin, and in Vienna in the last-mentioned year, as well as the revolutions now fomented throughout Europe by the secret societies, and which are kept down only by immense standing armies and the most stringent police regulations, are a proof, that to concede this power to the mob is only to render freedom impracticable, and undermine all authority, and subvert all society. Great Britain herself, who opens her arms so lovingly to the political refugees from all the continental states, and permits them to organize on her own territory a conspiracy against all legal order and all social existence, has in her bosom a large and increasing body of chartists, socialists, and malcontents, who will at no distant day bring home even to her obtuse understanding the danger of asserting the sovereignty of the mob. If we wish to maintain legal order, or even society at all, we must assert authority, and maintain that, in face of the subject, it is always and everywhere sacred and inviolable. In face of the mob, authority must be presumed to be always right. Then, since constitutional monarchies, republics, and democracies, as we know from experience, can tyrannize as well as the most absolute monarchies,—since it is impossible so to organize power that it may not be abused, and most grievously abused,—nothing remains but hopeless tyranny and oppression, or the recognition in the religious or spiritual authority of an umpirage between sovereigns, and especially between sovereigns and their subjects. For this umpirage the Catholic Church is peculiarly fitted. She is in all nations, and therefore has an interest in and tenderness for each; she is confined to no one, and is above all, with an equal regard for all, and for both sovereign and subject, and therefore is independent of the peculiar prejudices or policy of either, and prepared to be impartial and just in her decisions. Some such umpirage is felt even by our age to be necessary, as proved by your congresses of sovereigns, and by the congress of nations contended for by your peace fanatics, Cobden and Elihu Burritt, and human wisdom can devise none to be compared with that which Providence has provided in the Catholic Church. The history of the modern world since her umpirage, formerly recognized, has been generally rejected by European nations,

the long and bloody wars that have since raged, the large standing armies that are kept up, the immense national debts that have been contracted, the tremendous influence on politics and national movements exercised by Jewish bankers, the present unsettled state of society, the high-handed measures of government, and the general poverty and suffering of the agricultural laboring class throughout Europe, prove the absolute madness of these nations in attempting to proceed without the umpirage of the church, and the absolute necessity of its restoration. Nations without that umpirage are in the condition of a population without government. They are as nations in a state of anarchy, and an anarchy as to their external relations necessarily superinduces anarchy or despotism as to their internal relations. Right yields to might, and justice deserts the habitations of men. Even humanly speaking, then, since the power must exist somewhere, and its exercise is necessary, the church is its proper depositary.

The reviewer cannot conclude against the church from the supposed intrinsic wrong of the power in question. He can conclude against her only on the ground that, though the power is good and just enough in itself considered, she has it not by divine right, but has usurped it. But in order to take this ground he must unchurch her; for if she be the church of God, the true spiritual authority, she must necessarily have this power by divine right, since it is inherent in the spiritual authority as such. The reviewer forgets this. He quietly takes it for granted that the temporal authority, if not absolutely supreme, is at least absolutely independent, and in no respect whatever subject to the control or supervision of the spiritual authority. He proceeds as a politician, looks solely to the state, and is indifferent to religion so long as it touches no matters of interest to the secular power, but holds that the secular power has the right to repel it, if it does any thing of the sort. He understands by religious liberty freedom from religious obligation, the right of the state to have no religion, and to brush religion out of its way if it presumes to interfere between it and the realization of its plans, or the execution of its purposes. He in reality makes the state his religion, his church, and claims for it the rights and prerogatives which the Christian claims for the spiritual authority. This is the tendency of politicians in all ages, and in no age more than in our own. It is at bottom only the same general tendency of the flesh to

rule the spirit which every Christian has to struggle against, and which causes all the confusion experienced in the bosom of the individual and of society. But religion is the *lex suprema*, and its perfect freedom, independence, is necessarily its supremacy. It is the supreme law or it is nothing; and if the supreme law, it is for states no less than for subjects, for princes are as much bound to obey the law of God as their subjects, and in their public as in their private relations. Religion is supreme over all men, of whatever rank or dignity, and in every department of life, individual or social, private or public, for no one in any rank or relation has any right to be irreligious; and to deny this is simply to deny religion itself. If, then, we suppose a church at all, that is, a divinely instituted authority, commissioned to teach, to interpret, and declare the law of God, we must suppose it supreme, and in all cases paramount to the temporal power; that it is the church that prescribes the sphere of the temporal, within which it is free, and not the state that prescribes the sphere of the church. The spiritual by its own essential nature defines the temporal, and therefore the powers of the state, and at the same time its own powers. Consequently, in every case of a collision of the two authorities, the temporal, not the spiritual, must yield. We must obey God rather than men, and therefore in every case the spiritual authority rather than the temporal, for the temporal loses its divine right to command, and becomes a purely human authority, which is no authority at all, the moment it commands any thing contrary to the spiritual authority, commissioned to interpret and declare the law of God.

That this conclusion will not be subscribed to by "loyal and patriotic Englishmen" is very possible, but we cannot stultify ourselves in order to gain even their subscription. The fact is as we state it, in the very nature of things; and do not let us so besot ourselves as to suppose that we can hold religion as religion, and yet subject it to the state, or withdraw the state from its control. Do let us be one thing or another. Either pronounce all religion a cheat, an imposition, mere priestcraft, or else accept it as divine, and authorized by God himself to speak in his name, and therefore with the majesty of supreme authority. It is either one or the other, and there is no medium. Read M. Proudhon. He will tell you, and prove to you too, with an invincible logic, with a terrible consistency, that we only betray our folly and cowardice when we seek to find some

middle ground, a *via media*, and that you must deny all religion, the very sovereignty of God, or else concede the supremacy of religion, and recognize in the chair of St. Peter the plenitude of power asserted by St. Gregory VII., Innocent III., and Boniface VIII. How the iron logic of this bold blasphemer puts to shame the timid and hesitating dialectics of the bravest Protestant!

The reviewer, doubtless, is far better qualified to speak for loyal and patriotic Englishmen than we are; but, if he does not misrepresent them, they are extremely deficient in religious knowledge, and have not yet learned the first question and answer of the catechism. The spiritual is not for the temporal; the temporal is for the spiritual, as the body is for the soul, not the soul for the body. What absurdity to contend that the body should govern the soul, or to allege that the soul transcends its sphere whenever it prescribes the law to the body and attempts to restrain its appetites and propensities! Man's only destiny is eternal life, to see and enjoy God in the beatific vision. For this and this alone the law of God commands him to live, and the temporal can be legitimate only as rendered subordinate and subservient to this end. Man has no temporal destiny, properly speaking, and his only destiny is spiritual, eternal. The temporal order, therefore, has and can have no temporal destiny, no destiny in the temporal, and consequently has its destiny or its end only in the spiritual order. Society, the whole secular order itself, has no secular end, and exists only in reference to the spiritual destiny of man, and is to be regarded only in so far as made subservient to the salvation of the soul. The state is instituted for the management of secular affairs, it is true, and it has no right to meddle with any others; but it is bound to manage these affairs under the spiritual law for the spiritual end, and therefore under the law of which the spiritual authority is the interpreter, and for an end which God through that authority prescribes. Evidently, then, the spiritual authority, however constituted, to whose hands soever confided by Almighty God, is by its own nature supreme in regard to the whole secular order, because confessedly supreme in all that regards man's spiritual destiny, and therefore under God, the sovereign of all temporal sovereigns, of all emperors, kings, princes, states, no less than of individuals employed in the immediate service of the sanctuary. The church, then, if the true church, if the divinely instituted

spiritual authority, has, we do not say temporal authority, for that we do not claim for her, but plenary spiritual power over the whole temporal order, and necessarily possesses by divine right all the power over princes and their subjects she is alleged to have claimed and exercised. These powers are hers, not merely by an express grant of temporal authority, but because they are inherent in her as the spiritual authority. It is then supremely ridiculous to attempt to unchurch her by proving that she has claimed and exercised them. If what she claims to be, she cannot but possess them, and cannot but have the divine right to exercise them. You must, then, prove that she is not the church of God, that she is not the divinely instituted spiritual authority, before you can object either to her having exercised or to her having claimed them.

We claim power of any sort for the church only on the ground that she is what she professes to be, the true church of God, representing the authority of God in his plenitude on earth. We hold her divinely commissioned to teach, interpret, and apply the law of God to all cases that can arise in any department of human life. If she is not thus commissioned, she is a false church, an impostor, and we recognize in her no authority at all. You need not then be frightened at our ultramontanism. If she is what she claims to be, she is infallible, and then all her decisions must be infallibly just and true. Are you among those who fear justice and hate the truth? Yes? Then you condemn yourself. No? Then what more do you want? You have yourself begun by saying that "none can be more convinced than ourselves of the truth of the declaration which we often find on the lips of Roman Catholics, that 'there is no better rule than that of an infallible church.' This we think certain." Do understand, then, that infallibility means infallibility, and that the decisions of an infallible church are infallible. An infallible church can err in nothing she commands the faithful either to believe or to do. What, then, do your loyal and patriotic Englishmen fear? What can they fear, when they are conscientiously convinced that she is God's church? If she has deposed temporal sovereigns, can you not see that it is infallible proof that they deserved to be deposed, and that she was right in deposing them? if she absolves subjects from their allegiance, that they are absolved by the law of God, and she has the power to absolve them? and if she punishes

heretics, that heretics deserve to be punished, and she has the right to punish them? Do understand that the infallibility of the actor necessarily carries along with it the infallibility of the act. If the church is infallible, what more do you want? Do you want an independent guaranty that she will not abuse her infallibility? Is not the infallibility itself the best guaranty that you can have or desire? Do you deny her infallibility? Then you are not concerned in the inquiry you raise, for you are inquiring only after the duty of those whose consciences compel them to return to her communion, and no man's conscience can compel him to do that unless he is convinced that she is what she professes to be, therefore infallible. But deny her infallibility, if you choose, and prove that she is not what she professes to be; we will then concede you all you ask, and abandon her to your tender mercies, to be treated as you treat any one of your own sects. But we deny that, from the simple fact of her having claimed and exercised the powers you object to, you can conclude that she has erred; for if infallible, it is infallibly certain that she possesses them and has the right to claim and exercise them, and you in denying it are only blaspheming the immaculate spouse of God. Supposing, then, as you allege, that the church has asserted the principles to which you say "loyal and patriotic Englishmen cannot subscribe," you must unchurch her, set aside her claim to infallibility, before you can be permitted to allege this fact against her. The reviewer will therefore perceive that we can easily escape from the dilemma which he has labored so hard and so skilfully to construct, and in which he supposes he has concluded us.

Nevertheless, the reviewer does not establish the fact that the church has asserted the principles to which he contends Englishmen cannot subscribe. We are well aware of the passages he cites from St. Gregory VII., Innocent III., and Boniface VIII.; but we must tell him that these passages do not sustain his allegation,—not, as he supposes, because we hold the utterances of the organ of infallibility are sometimes fallible, and sometimes not, for we hold no such thing; but because it does not appear that they are utterances of that organ at all. We do not, in saying this, abandon the ultramontane ground. We accept the papal infallibility; but that infallibility is not, even on ultramontane principles, a personal prerogative of the pope. It attaches to his office, not to himself personally, and therefore he is

the organ of infallibility only when speaking in his official character, and officially deciding a point of faith or morals for the church. We say *faith or morals*, because it is only in questions of faith or morals that any Catholic asserts the infallibility of the church, whether speaking through the sovereign pontiff or a general council, or, in fine, through the body of her bishops teaching in communion with their chief, the successor of St. Peter, each in his own diocese. We concede to the reviewer that the pope is infallible in interpreting the Scriptures, and that the great popes cited do support their claim of the deposing and absolving power by the sacred text; but as we assert the infallibility of the pope only when deciding officially, *ex cathedra*, a question of faith or morals, we are obliged to hold the pope infallible only in reference to the precise point before him to be decided. When the question before him is the interpretation of the sacred text, we concede his infallibility; but nothing obliges us to hold him infallible in interpreting it, when its interpretation is not, so to speak, the question before the court. The interpretation is then an *obiter dictum*, and, though deserving of great respect, is not a declaration of the law. The rule that obtains in the civil courts, and with which every lawyer is presumed to be familiar, is the rule that obtains here. Now, in the instances the reviewer cites, the popes were not defining the faith, nor judicially interpreting the sacred text, but simply arguing from it and theological reason in justification of their acts; that is, they were reasoning, and not defining, and therefore their utterances cited were not the utterances of the organ of infallibility. This is evident from the fact that these utterances are not articles of faith, and are not insisted on as such by ultramontanes, since, if they were, the Gallicans, who do not accept them, would in the view of ultramontanes be held to be heretics, which is not the fact; for the Gallican is admitted to be a Catholic, and the dispute with him turns on a question confessedly not of faith. Whatever principles the church has asserted or asserts are confessedly, in the view of all Catholics, of faith; but as these principles are conceded even by those who hold them not to be of faith, it follows that the church has never asserted them.

We in this are far from saying that the principles set forth by the popes referred to are not true, very far from admitting that these great popes erred in what they said. All we say is, that they did not define the matters involved,

and therefore that what they said is not formally of faith, and if not formally of faith no Catholic can be held under pain of heresy to accept it, or obliged by his faith to assert the principles involved. All that the Catholic is obliged on ultramontane principles to maintain is the divine right of the popes to do what in the cases alleged they did do, and to exercise the same power in all analogous cases. This much of course he must maintain. But in taking the ground that the views presented by the popes of their own powers are not to be regarded as definitions of faith, we do not by any means, as the reviewer imagines, render it doubtful to whose hands the infallible authority is confided, within what limits the utterances of the organ of infallibility are infallible, and what are the utterances themselves. He says we render these three things doubtful and thus destroy the infallible church as a rule, because we must settle them before we can use it, and we have and can have only private judgment with which to settle them. We dispute hopelessly, he says, as to the seat of infallibility. We are obliged, in order not to accuse infallibility of erring, to contend that the utterances of the organ of infallibility are sometimes infallible and sometimes not, and can never decide which of its utterances are to be received as infallible, and which are to be counted fallible. These preliminary difficulties are conclusive against the church as an available rule, and render it more perplexing for a Catholic with his infallible church to know what he ought to believe and do, than it is for a Protestant who makes no pretensions to an infallible church. The reviewer is a man of a fertile fancy. Yet Protestants insist so often and so strenuously on this objection, here put in its strongest form, that we are sometimes inclined to believe that they do really persuade themselves that there is some force in it.

The reviewer says we dispute hopelessly among ourselves as to the seat or organ of infallibility. We have, he alleges, four theories amongst us on this point, one that the pope alone, a second that the council alone, a third that the pope and council conjointly, and a fourth that the universal church diffusely, is the organ of infallibility. He evidently supposes, or wishes to insinuate, that these are four exclusive and mutually hostile theories, and that he who accepts any one of them must necessarily deny the others. He perhaps is not so well informed as he thinks. From these four theories we must strike the second, for nobody contends

that the council alone is infallible, and for the excellent reason that there is no such thing as an œcumenical council without the pope, and only œcumenical councils are ever held to be infallible. Then, of the remaining three, we must remind the reviewer that they are not three *theories* as to the seat of infallibility, but three modes or respects in which the church is held to be infallible, and the assertion of one involves no denial of the other two. The pope and council conjointly is simply the council, neither more nor less, and all Catholics without a single exception hold the council infallible in all matters of faith and morals. "The universal church diffusely" means, we suppose, what our theologians term the *ecclesia dispersa*, or church dispersed, in distinction from the *ecclesia congregata*, or church assembled in general council. The church in this sense, again, is held by all Catholics to be infallible, and what in this sense she teaches, to be of faith. The infallibility of the church in these two respects, assembled and dispersed, is of faith, and no man can deny it and be a Catholic. In addition, all, except a few individuals,—now chiefly laymen, devoted to politics, ambitious of state or court favor, or desirous of introducing political changes which are repugnant either in themselves or in the manner of introducing them to Christian morals, and who are called Gallicans, although the Gallican hierarchy disowns them,—hold that the sovereign pontiff alone, when defining officially, *ex cathedra*, a question of faith or morals, is also infallible. Those who hold and those who deny the pope's infallibility hold, be it remembered, the church to be infallible in the other two respects mentioned. All the dispute there is amongst us is then confined to the first-named mode, that is, whether the pope, *loquens ex cathedra*, be or be not infallible. But even here the dispute has little practical importance, for the Gallican holds that he is bound to receive the papal definitions and constitutions as infallible, unless there is a reclamation against them, and a reclamation cannot be made, for the first bishop who should reclaim would be *ipso facto* excommunicated. The Gallican is not permitted to dispute any definition of the pope when it is actually made, and he never does it. Bossuet, we believe, concedes that there is no instance of an erroneous papal definition recorded, and there is never a question whether the papal definitions actually made are or are not of faith. The Gallican bishops accepted at once, as the infallible voice of the church, the papal condemnation

of the five propositions extracted from the book of Jansenius, and the Jansenists themselves acknowledged the authority of the pope and the infallibility of his definition of the doctrine, and only objected that the pope is not infallible in deciding a question of fact, such as whether the five propositions were contained or not in the book of Jansenius. The propositions they agreed were to be condemned as heretical, but as to the fact whether they were contained in Jansenius or not, they wished to maintain a respectful silence. But the Gallican bishops rejected this distinction as a vain subterfuge, insisted that the papal constitution was infallible, and as to the question of fact no less than as to the question of doctrine.

The reviewer says that the theory which ascribes infallibility to "the universal church diffusely" is unintelligible. "The universal church resembles some gas, enormously voluminous and elastic; it has no visible dimensions, no tangible solidity. It is a nebulous matter, of which the orb of truth may be *a making*, for aught we know, but of which it has never yet been made." No man appears to advantage who writes on what he does not understand. The universal church, as the reviewer understands it, may, if he will pardon the bull, be unintelligible; but as a Catholic understands it, it is very intelligible. It consists of the whole body of pastors or bishops in communion with the pope, their visible head and visible centre of unity. A body with a visible centre and a visible head cannot, except in Scotch metaphysics, be destitute of visible dimensions or tangible solidity. The church dispersed, of which we predicate infallibility, is composed of these bishops or pastors teaching in communion with the successor of St. Peter, each in his own diocese. This is the ordinary way in which the church teaches, and it is only when errors arise, and there are heresies to be anathematized, that she ever teaches in any other way. To know what she teaches in this way is always an easy matter. By virtue of the papacy, the episcopacy is held by the bishops *in solido*, each standing for all and all for each. All must respectively agree with the pope, and if all respectively agree with him, all, by a well-known mathematical axiom, must respectively agree with one another. To know, then, what the universal church teaches, you have only to consult the first bishop you meet, we care not if a Gallican bishop, in communion with the pope, or your parish priest approved by his bishop. All the talk,

then, about the doubtfulness of the seat of infallibility amounts to nothing. The Gallican is, no doubt, more or less inconsequent, that is, not a good reasoner, but he can always learn without difficulty what the church commands him either to believe or to do; and the ultramontane, though asserting the papal infallibility, asserts nothing to be of faith which the Gallican does not also assert; for he does not assert the papal infallibility as an article of faith, or hold it to be of faith in such a sense that speculative denial of it must subject one to canonical censure for heresy.

The second difficulty we have already resolved. The utterances of the organ of infallibility, whether the pope, the council, or the church dispersed, are infallible without any limitation; but the pope, although infallible when that organ, is not always it, or does not always speak as it, and what he says in any other character is not necessarily the voice of the church. Doubtless, we must use reason to determine when he is defining a question of faith or morals, or is only arguing or acting in regard to matters on which no Catholic claims infallibility for the church; but this does not concede that we are forced to rely on private judgment to say when the utterances of the organ are infallible and when not. Not every exercise of reason is a private judgment. The proper exercise of reason on those matters to which reason is competent is in no respect a private judgment, because it is not a judgment of reason as peculiar to this or that individual, but as common to all men. Private judgment is only when the matters judged lie out of the range of reason, and its principle is not the common reason of mankind, nor a catholic or public authority, but the fancy, the caprice, the prejudice, or the idiosyncrasy of the individual forming it. Catholicity does not supersede, it presupposes, reason; and no Catholic so understands the rule of an infallible church as to suppose it can be adopted and made available, or applied without any use of reason. The church addresses herself to men as creatures endowed with reason, and as using their reason and using it reasonably. The point in the case before us for reason to decide is, not whether this or that utterance of the organ of infallibility is infallible, but is this or that an utterance of the recognized organ of infallibility. The former is out of the province of reason, and, if we were obliged to decide it by natural reason alone, we should be obliged to rely on private judgment; but the latter is within the competency of reason, and its

decision by reason is not an act of private judgment. The case, moreover, presents no difficulty, for the definitions of the church or of the pope are always rendered in clear and precise language, and bear on their very face the unmistakable marks of their real character. The documents which we must consult are official documents, which speak for themselves, and are as easily distinguished as the enactments of a legislature, the edicts of a king, or the judicial decisions of civil courts. It is only those that come in an official form that we are obliged to receive as authoritative, and therefore as infallible. Consequently, there is no inquiry as to within what limits the utterances are infallible, and no difficulty in determining what are the utterances of the infallible organ.

It follows from what we have said, that we can take either horn of the reviewer's dilemma without any grave inconvenience. If we say the church has asserted "principles to which loyal and patriotic Englishmen cannot subscribe," nothing obliges us to concede that she has erred, because the inability of Englishmen to subscribe may be their own fault, and can weigh nothing against the church, and because the principles in question are evidently inherent in the spiritual power. If we choose to deny that those principles are of faith, we can do so without denying the papal infallibility, because the pope has never defined them to be of faith. If, again, we choose to go further, and deny, with the Gallican, that the pope possesses by divine right the deposing and absolving power, we can do so without being forced to rely on private judgment, with the Protestant, or losing the infallible church as the rule of faith.

We have said we are bound to hold that the pope had the right to depose temporal sovereigns, and to absolve their subjects from their allegiance. Thus far all Catholics are agreed. We hold with ultramontanes that he possessed the power he claimed and exercised by divine right; Gallicans, as well as we, hold that he had the power, but contend that he held it, *jure humano*, by the will of the people, or the concession of Catholic sovereigns. The Catholic people and sovereigns, of course, consented to the exercise of the power, or else the pope could not have exercised it, at least with any effect; but we do not believe that the right to exercise it was conferred by them, for it appears to us plainly inherent in the spiritual authority as such, and St. Gregory VII., Innocent III., and Boniface VIII. manifestly claim it, not

as a temporal, but as a spiritual power. The Gallican view, though not contrary to the faith, seems to us to be a questionable expedient for relieving the apprehensions of the temporal authority, conciliating civil tyrants, and retaining court favor, and fitted to pave the way for withdrawing the state from its subjection to the law of God, or, what is the same thing, permitting it to interpret and declare that law for itself. But it may be well to examine the cases in which the deposing and absolving power has been exercised.

That the popes have, in certain cases, deposed temporal sovereigns, and absolved their subjects from their allegiance, is undoubtedly true; and that they have a right to do so, in all analogous cases, we suppose must be conceded, whether we adopt ultramontane or Gallican doctrines. But they have done so in no case that need alarm the delicate loyalty and patriotism of either a Catholic or a Protestant Englishman. The power has never been exercised over an infidel prince, or one who was not a spiritual subject of the pope, and bound by his profession, the tenure of his crown, and the constitution and laws of his realm, to protect and defend the Catholic religion. Such was the case with Henry IV. of Germany, and such was the case with the Albigensian counts of Toulouse. Such, too, was the case with Elizabeth of England, a case, perhaps, as favorable to the reviewer as can be selected. She was excommunicated by St. Pius V., deposed, and her subjects absolved from their allegiance. But she had personally professed the Catholic religion, had succeeded to the crown as a Catholic, when the Catholic constitution of England was still in force, and the Catholic religion was part and parcel of the law of the land. She was bound by her profession, her coronation oath, the tenure of her crown, and the laws of her realm, to be a Catholic, and to protect and defend the Catholic religion. When she turned heretic, violated the constitution of her kingdom, oppressed her subjects, abolished Catholicity, expelled the Catholic bishops from their sees, set up a new hierarchy of her own creation, and persecuted, exiled, imprisoned, hung, and beheaded Catholics for adhering to their religion, she deserved excommunication for her heresy and wickedness, and deposition for her intolerable tyranny. The Protestants of England themselves would instantly depose their present amiable and popular queen were she to become a Catholic, and they would contend that they have the right to do so, because she holds her crown only inas-

much as she is a Protestant, and is bound by her coronation oath to protect and defend the Protestant religion as by law established. What they hold it compatible with their loyalty and patriotism to do to their queen for embracing the true faith and seeking a heavenly crown, the pope could well do to Elizabeth for abolishing the true faith, establishing heresy, and persecuting true believers; and if the pope permitted the king of Spain to attempt to drive her from her throne, they have nothing to say, for they count it gloriously loyal and patriotic to have called in Dutch William to expel his father-in-law, the Catholic James II. Loyal and patriotic Englishmen cannot complain of the church for having done, in favor of the constitution, the laws, and the religion of England, what Protestants glory in having done against them.

It is evident from an analysis of all the cases of deposition that can be cited, that the popes have always respect to the constitution of the civil power, and that when they interpose against the sovereign, it is always to vindicate the rights of the nation invaded by the prince. Where a sovereign has made no war on the constitution and laws of his realm, where he has been faithful to his obligations, and has preserved the tenure of his crown, and ruled justly, according to the constitution and laws, the pope has never claimed the power to depose him, or to absolve his subjects. It is clear, then, that the present queen of Great Britain, in case she does not persecute Catholics, and deny them the freedom of their religion, does not come within the category of any of those cases in which the popes have asserted the deposing and absolving power. She is a Protestant, it is true; but she has violated no law of her kingdom in being one, and breaks no obligation which as queen she has taken by remaining one. There is no principle ever asserted by the church on which, were her subjects to become Catholics, she could be deposed. Her Catholic subjects now owe her allegiance, and are bound by the church to obey her in all things not repugnant to the law of God, and the fact of the rest of her subjects becoming Catholics could work no change in her rights, or in their obligations to her as temporal sovereign. To say that Catholics cannot be bound to obey an heretical prince is not true. Belgium is a Catholic nation, and yet the prince is Protestant. The pope has not absolved them from their allegiance. The Catholic subjects of Prussia are held to owe allegiance to their sovereign, as

much as are the subjects of Austria to their pious young emperor. The apostle, speaking by the Holy Ghost, commands believers to obey even the heathen emperors of Rome, and heresy, when there is nothing in the constitution of the state against it, obviously can no more work a forfeiture of the rights of sovereigns than paganism or infidelity. Doubtless, the church would claim to decide for Catholics what things are contrary to the law of God, and what are not; but this she does now for those subjects of Queen Victoria who have the happiness to be Catholics. Obviously, the rights of the queen to her throne, and the duties of her subjects, in case they should become Catholics, would remain unaffected.

There is nothing in the Catholic religion at war with loyalty and patriotism, so long as loyalty and patriotism are confined within the bounds of virtue, and are not made pretexts for encroaching on the freedom of the spiritual authority in all things spiritual. Doubtless, such loyalty and patriotism as that of the Duke of Norfolk and Lord Beaumont are not compatible with our duty as Catholics, nor even as enlightened and upright statesmen. Every good Catholic must, of course, place God before the king, the church before the state; but this only makes him the more loyal as a subject, and the more worthy as a citizen. Loyal and patriotic Englishmen may object to this, and insist that the state shall be independent of the law of God; but we cannot assert religion at all without asserting it, and not to assert it would be only to leave open the door to absolute civil despotism. We know no way of reconciling Catholicity with atheistical politics, no way of rendering religion acceptable to infidel politicians, and we shall not attempt to do it.

In direct reply, then, to the reviewer's question, as to what will be the duty of Englishmen to the constitution and realm of England when their consciences compel them to return to our communion, we answer that it will be,—1. To expunge from the constitution and laws all those provisions which are directed against the Catholic religion, to free the queen from the obligation imposed by parliament to remain a Protestant, and to give her liberty, if she chooses, to become a Catholic and aspire to a heavenly crown, without forfeiting her earthly crown; and 2. To preserve inviolate, in all other respects, the constitution and laws of the realm, and loyally to obey the sovereign in all things not repugnant

to the law of God, as interpreted, declared, and administered by the church through her proper organs. This reply is clear and distinct, and in strict logical and historical harmony with the principles which the church has asserted and acted on for eighteen hundred years, and is repugned by no principle the church or the popes have ever asserted. Nothing is more certain, than that the church recognizes the civil power as distinct from herself, and autonomous in its own sphere. The supremacy she claims is not a temporal, but a spiritual supremacy; and consists not in the claim to exercise civil power, but in the right to prescribe under God the morality of the state, to prescribe the end for which civil society exists, and as to their morality the means by which that end is to be gained. She denies to the state all competency in spirituals, and asserts that it is bound to observe in all its acts the law of God, of which she is the divinely commissioned guardian and judge. So long as the state respects her authority as this guardian and judge, and faithfully seeks by lawful means the true end of civil government, she leaves it free to pursue its own course, and commands her children to be loyal and obedient to it.

The church, in fact, treats the civil government, as far as the nature of the case admits, precisely as she does the individual. If the individual is simply a Catholic layman, with no other obligations to her than those contracted in his baptismal vows, she demands of him only the fulfilment of those vows; but if he has contracted special obligations towards her, or has received from her special trusts, she demands the fulfilment of them; and if he refuses, she revokes the trusts, and punishes him for his breach of faith. So, if a sovereign contracts special obligations to her, and holds his authority on condition of fulfilling them, she demands their fulfilment; and, if she judges it meet, she deposes him, if he obstinately persists in violating them. This is all just and reasonable, if we admit any church or spiritual authority at all. Queen Victoria has contracted no special obligations to the church, and is not bound to perform any special duties towards her. The England of former times was Catholic, had a Catholic constitution, and its special duties to the Catholic religion; but the England of our times is Protestant, and its conversion to the Catholic religion will not revive the England that was, and the old relations between its government and the Holy See. It will be the conversion to the faith of a new kingdom, and the

special relations between it and the Holy See will depend on the arrangements that may be mutually determined upon. In the mean time, the relations of Catholic Englishmen to the civil power come under the general rule, and in that there is nothing to absolve them from their allegiance to their queen, so long as she does not persecute the Catholic religion, and so long as she rules justly, according to the constitution and laws of her realm.

As to the question of persecution raised by the *Edinburgh Review*, and the alleged duty of temporal princes to extirpate heresy from their dominions, we have only a word to say; for it will be time enough to discuss it at length when Protestants cease to persecute the church. It is not in reply to an English or Scotch reviewer in 1850 or 1851, that we shall attempt to prove that ours is not a persecuting church. The old penal laws against Catholics are not yet all wiped out from the English statute-books, and the recent Ecclesiastical Titles Act, which renders the exercise of the Catholic religion in Great Britain contrary to the civil law, shows what sort of friends of religious freedom English Protestants are. No matter what the pretences are, the recent law is an act of pure persecution, and as such it would make even Protestants ashamed, if shame they had, of calling themselves the friends of religious liberty. The reviewer's impudence in pretending to be the advocate of religious liberty while approving that law, is a little too great to permit us to treat him with that courtesy which we always wish to observe towards an opponent. As for the church, she asserts the freedom of religion, but she does not, that we are aware, assert the freedom either of heresy or of infidelity. She does not profess liberality, nor boast toleration as one of her glories; but she has never authorized the punishment of heretics with other than ecclesiastical censures, save when and where they have attacked the legally established order of things. The church is a kingdom, a spiritual society, and it is ridiculous to say that she has not as much right to defend and protect herself as any civil society has to protect itself. When a class of heretics, like the Albigenses, arise and attack both her and civil society, not with spiritual weapons alone, but with fire and sword, burning her churches and convents, violating her religious, massacring her priests, and assassinating her cardinals and legates, she has the right, if she has the right to be at all, to call in the civil arm to protect her; nay, to call upon the princes

whose subjects these enemies of religion and pests of society are, and who are bound by their oaths and the constitutions of their states to defend her, to extirpate them from their dominions; and to depose them, if, instead of doing it, they favor them. This is the only sort of persecution the church has authorized, and we shall not so insult good sense or outrage common justice as to apologize for it. We should as soon think of apologizing for shutting up a thief in prison, or hanging a cold-blooded murderer. This is not persecution, it is only just punishment; nay, only necessary self-defence. But where heretics demean themselves as good citizens, where they respect the peace of society and the freedom of religion, the church never calls in the secular arm against them, or makes it the duty of sovereigns to extirpate them. She uses only spiritual arms against them. The charge of persecution, so confidently urged against her, is the thief crying out "Stop thief!" in order to divert the pursuit from himself.

We have now replied to all in the article that has struck us as in any sense deserving of notice. We have spoken freely, frankly, plainly; more so than we should have done, if we were not at times disgusted with the timidity and trimming of some English, as well as American, Catholics. We may talk as we will, and trim as we please, but so long as we retain any thing really Catholic we shall not satisfy infidel, or even Protestant statesmen, who place politics above religion. The fact is, Catholicity cannot be made to please those who hate all religion, and whose affections are placed on this world alone. The carnal Jews crucified our blessed Lord between two thieves; and their spiritual descendants cannot be expected to do less to his spouse. The world hated our Lord, for he was not of it, and it hates and will hate his church, for she is not of the world. Her aims are not its aims, and her maxims are not its maxims. It was so in the beginning, is so now, and will be so to the end. "Ye cannot serve God and Mammon," and it is in vain that ye try. There is no use in apologizing for serving God, or for remaining in all things faithful to his church. In trying to prove that your church favors the liberalism of the day, and offers no opposition to atheistical politics, seldom out of fashion, you do her and yourselves foul wrong, and conciliate no favor for either. You grieve your church, you impede her free and energetic action, and render Catholicity, as far as depends on you, weak and lan-

guishing. We have a great respect for Lord Arundel and Surrey, and we admit that he deserves great credit, considering who he is and what are his environments, but we should respect him more, and regard him as more likely to be a successful Catholic leader, if he assumed a higher tone, and asserted with more boldness the absolute supremacy of the spiritual order over the secular. The church can be injured only by Catholics, and Catholics can receive harm only from themselves. If English Catholics had had a more filial affection for Rome, more of the spirit of St. Anselm and of St. Thomas of Canterbury, and less of that which dictated the constitutions of Clarendon, if they had been as prompt to obey the church as they have always been to sustain their princes in their encroachments upon her prerogatives, they would never have had the affliction of seeing their religion proscribed by law in their own country, and a false religion established in its place. Nationalism has from the first been the curse of England, and till English Catholics learn that the Lord loves an Italian, a Frenchman, a Spaniard, as well as an Englishman, they need not hope for the return of their country to the church. They have always been too ready to side with the secular order against the spiritual, and till they correct this fault, they may be sure the state will despise and trample on them.

We trust that we appreciate the delicate position of English Catholics, and we are far from disregarding the admonitions of prudence; but in our times, and indeed in all times, the truest prudence is fidelity to God, and full confidence in his truth. We are too apt to forget that the church does not stand in human policy or human wisdom, that she is under the special protection of Almighty God, and that he will bless no efforts to serve her, the glory of which will not redound to him. We rely too much on ourselves, and not enough on him, and take counsel of our own short-sighted wisdom rather than of the Holy Ghost. We must not be afraid to trust all to God. The truth will sustain itself, and is needed to sustain us, instead of our being needed to sustain it. We regard the free, frank, and energetic assertion of those great principles, which so many Catholics are afraid to avow, and are always seeking to explain away, as the most prudent course now to be adopted. The church was founded by our Lord on Peter, and every attempt to lessen the power of the Holy See, to diminish respect for the supreme pontiff, is only an attempt to under-

mine the foundation of the church. The Greek empire could not bear to acknowlege the supremacy of Peter; it withheld from Rome her due, and it fell into schism, and became the prey or the slave of the proud infidel barbarian. Northern Germany would separate between the church and the pope, and she has fallen into schism, heresy, infidelity, and well-nigh lapsed into her old heathenism; England would distinguish between the pope and the court of Rome, and has become a jest and a byword among the nations. Every nation that has refused filial love and reverence to the chair of Peter has been hurled from the seat of its greatness, as France, Spain, and Portugal can bear witness. The only true policy, the only true wisdom in our times, is in exalting the chair of Peter, and energetically asserting the pontifical authority, and the universal supremacy of the spiritual order. The salvation of the world in more senses than one depends on the Holy See, and on a loyal submission and filial obedience in all things to the successor of St. Peter. We confess, then, that we are grieved to see distinguished Catholic statesmen searching history to find examples of resistance to the papal authority by the temporal power, and concluding from them that a man may be a Catholic and also loyal to his temporal sovereign. Let us, in God's name, have no more of this. Let us dare assert the truth in the face of the lying world, and, instead of pleading for our church at the bar of the state, summon the state itself to plead at the bar of the church, its divinely constituted judge. The state may become enraged, may confiscate our goods, prohibit our worship, shut up our churches and religious houses, imprison, exile, or massacre us; but what then? Such things have been, but they have never been able, so long as Catholics retained their fervor, to injure the church or retard her progress. These things are powerful against us only when our faith is weak, and our love waxes cold. Who has God on his side has no occasion to fear men or devils.

CHRISTIANITY AND HEATHENISM.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1852.]

Somebody has said that history for the last three or four centuries is only a grand conspiracy against truth, and we are every day more and more convinced, that, whether its authors have been Catholics or Protestants, believers or unbelievers, it needs to be rewritten, from the original documents. Certain it is, that Catholics have never yet done justice to the defenders of their cause in troublous times, and that when the full historical truth comes to be told, it will be altogether more favorable to them than they have dared to believe.

Nearly all our popular histories, even those circulating among Catholics, especially in England and this country, have been written from the point of view of the secular order, by unbelievers, misbelievers, or at least by men whose devotion to the state was more lively than their devotion to the church. The truly orthodox have seldom written history; and if men of unimpeachable faith have sometimes written it, they have done it, not primarily as Catholics, but as Italians, Spaniards, Frenchmen, Germans, Poles, or Englishmen, in whose hearts for the time being their country predominated over their church, and their patriotism got the better of their religion. Even ecclesiastical history proper, in so far as adapted to popular reading, has fallen into the hands, when not of open heretics, of Gallicans,—if we may use the term without implying or intending to imply any peculiar reproach to France or to Frenchmen, for the thing we mean has been confined to no nation,—or at least of men moved by Gallican tendencies, and more intent on vindicating the conduct of their political sovereigns towards the church, than on placing in its true light the character of the popes who were forced from time to time to resist them. We have met with no history circulating among the people,

* *Lorraine et France. Etudes sur les Doctrines religieuses et la Politique de ces deux Pays et de leurs Princes.* Par M. G. de la Tour. Paris: 1851.

civil or ecclesiastical, written from the true Catholic point of view, with that deep love and reverence for the chair of Peter which every Catholic ought to entertain, and which are invariably warranted by the facts in the case.

This may, perhaps, be easily accounted for. History is a record of the past, and its proper subject is the dead, not the living. The church has never been numbered with the dead. Always and everywhere present, immutable and immortal, she has and can have, strictly speaking, no past, and is and can be no proper subject of history. She has no need of history for her own instruction and edification. They who partake the most of her spirit, and have the most lively sense of her catholicity in time as well as in space, must always be precisely those who are the least disposed to devote themselves to the long and wearisome study of the chronicles and monuments of past ages. They live in the present and the future, and all the past of interest to them is present in the church, which is one in time and space, teaching all ages and nations, and maintaining all truth. They have for themselves no motive to study history. They have no need of its lessons. The church teaches them, here and now, all they need to learn, and they have only to learn and understand what she teaches to be able to perform well their part either as churchmen or statesmen.

Moreover, the sincere, earnest-minded Catholic, whose faith is firm, who knows that his church is indefectible, that that she is founded upon a rock, and the gates of hell cannot prevail against her, that she is sustained by God himself without the aid of the puny arm of man, has always other and more pressing work than that of poring over the records of the past,—that of relieving present suffering, and of inducing men to live for the glory of God and the salvation of their souls. He finds always, here and now, more than he can do, and has no time or thought to spare for any thing else. He cannot, therefore, consent to devote himself either to the study or the writing of history any further than he finds it necessary in order to refute or repel contemporary heresies. As far as necessary for this purpose he will, indeed, study it, and even write it; but all beyond is to him a matter of comparative indifference. He is prepared to let men read history in their own way, so far as their reading leaves him room to defend the dogmas, the unity, catholicity, apostolicity, and sanctity of the church. He therefore lets much pass that he might well dispute, and

concedes much that a little closer study of documents would prove to be false; because he sees that to concede it does not really affect any thing he holds it necessary to defend. Nothing is, then, more natural than that popular history, from the half-Arian Eusebius down to Fleury, from the Nestorian Socrates down to the Gallican Lingard and the infidel Voltaire, Gibbon, or Hume, should be written by men without faith, by misbelievers, or at best by men whose affections for the church, especially for the Holy See, are cold and languid, if they even exist.

In this way, too, we must explain those numerous unwarranted concessions and uncalled-for apologies made in regard to historical personages and events, by professedly Catholic writers, and which constitute the chief difficulty the modern Catholic encounters in his controversies with Protestants. These concessions have passed into history as undisputed and indisputable facts, and have misled Catholics as well as their enemies. Hence we find even Catholics apologizing for the acts of the sainted Hildebrand, the illustrious Innocent III., the noble Boniface VIII., and the heroic Julius II., acts among the most admirable recorded in history, and which endear these great pontiffs to every truly Catholic heart! What Catholic needs to be told that the sovereign pontiffs most censured by the world are always those most dear to the celestial Spouse of the church? Whom does the world more deeply hate, or more bitterly persecute, than our blessed Lord and Master, whom it crucified between two thieves, and whom it continues to crucify afresh every day? If they call the master of the house Beelzebub, how much more them of his household? Always will the most worthy popes be those most hated and calumniated by men of the world, by heretics, unbelievers, temporal sovereigns, lukewarm and, as we say to-day, *liberal*, Catholics. Whom God loves the world must always hate.

The causes which have operated to throw the concocting of popular history into the hands of the unorthodox or the worldly-minded, have operated also to render all general, or, as it is not inaptly called, *profane*, literature uncatholic and heathenish. In no age or country has popular secular literature been truly Catholic. The popular literature in what Digby calls "the ages of faith," was unchristian in its substance, and breathed the spirit of Græco-Roman gentilism, Celtic and Scandinavian superstition, or Arabic and Moorish sensualism. The songs of the troubadours, trouvères, min-

nesingers, minstrels, and bards, the ballads of Spain, Armorica, and England, which are sometimes adduced as specimens of Christian literature, were as little Christian in reality as the *Arabian Nights Entertainments*, the odes of Horace, Pindar, or Anacreon. Not a few of the popular tales of our own day, written by Catholics for the especial instruction of our Catholic youth, are surcharged with carnal Judaism. They feed their amiable little boys and girls with sugar-plums, and reward them with sugar kisses. They may be passably sound in their didactic chapters, they may contain some wholesome commonplace morality, and abundance of fine sentimentalizing about piety and devotion; but their practical influence on their readers is to enervate their minds, to render their hearts weak and their imaginations morbid, to confine their aspirations to this world, and to induce them to look for an earthly recompense,—a happy marriage, riches, or worldly distinction. Seldom does the author, or rather authoress, dare propose spiritual consolation here, and eternal life hereafter, as the adequate reward of suffering virtue and patient piety.

This all lies in the natural course of things. No matter who creates it, all secular, general, or popular literature, when sundered from sacred letters, is sure to be heathen in its spirit and tendency. It is so when created by a Dante, a Tasso, a Racine, as well as when created by a Boccaccio, a Pulci, an Ariosto, an Alfieri, a Rabelais, a Montaigne, a Voltaire, a Goethe, a Schelling, a Carlyle, or an Emerson. The sincere, the firm, the devout believer, the moment he so far forgets himself as to leave sacred letters, and devote himself to profane or secular literature, becomes for the time being practically a heathen. It cannot be otherwise; because the secular sundered from the spiritual, and cultivated by and for itself, although in an inferior sphere, is the very essence and source of heathenism. Our Lord has defined heathenism for us, and shown us that its essence consists precisely in seeking the secular order as an end, or in seeking secular or earthly goods for their own sake. "For after all these things do the heathen seek." Impossible is it then to waive the spiritual, and fall back on the secular, without lapsing into heathenism. Even Digby's pious bishops, whom he praises for having cultivated polite literature in their youth, seldom fail to tell us in their old age that they regret having done so.

We do not set our faces against all literature, as not a

few will allege; but against all profane literature, sundered from sacred letters, and cultivated separately and for its own sake; just as we reprobate philosophy separated from Catholic theology, and the whole secular order emancipated from the spiritual, and cultivated as a separate and independent order, subsisting morally by and for itself. What, indeed, on this subject, is the Christian law? Is it simply that the secular should be held inferior to the spiritual? Not by any means. The Christian law demands that the secular should be morally subordinated and made subservient to the spiritual, and recognizes in it no right, no legitimacy, except in so far as so subordinated and made subservient. Prior to sin, the body, represented by the secular order, physically subsisted, indeed, but in complete subjection to the rational nature, and moved only at its bidding, with no original or independent motion of its own. It was in all respects subject to reason, and moved only in subordination and subserviency to it. This is the normal relation of the spirit and the flesh, and the exact type of the normal relation of the spiritual order and the secular. In consequence of sin this normal relation has been disturbed; the body has escaped from its original subjection; the flesh has rebelled against the spirit, and now claims to be recognized as independent, and treated as subsisting by and for itself. It cannot now in this life be reduced again to its original subjection, but remains rebellious even in the saint till death. Hence, to maintain the spiritual integrity to which through the grace of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ we are restored, we must resist its motions to independence, and mortify its original and independent desires,—subject it, morally, to the spirit, sternly resist all its importunities, and in no instance suffer ourselves to yield to its demands as a separate and self-subsisting power. We may use the body for spiritual ends, but never suffer the body to use the spirit for bodily or carnal ends.

The same is to be said of the secular order in general. We cannot and should not physically annihilate the secular, for we have bodies as well as souls; but we must annihilate it morally, as we must the flesh, We may consult and use it for spiritual purposes, as a means to spiritual ends, but are not to cultivate it for its own sake, or as having its end in its own order. The secular does not subsist morally by or for itself, and was never created by God for its own sake. It was created and subsists only for the spiritual, and in so

far as it cannot be used for, or made subservient to, a spiritual purpose, it has no moral, or, if you prefer, no Christian significance, and is to be ignored, resisted, or mortified. This world, the men and women in it, states, kingdoms, empires, the church herself, all the works of nature and grace, are for no other purpose than that of the spiritual order, the glory of God in his saints. The right, the legitimacy, of the secular order is in its subordination and subserviency to spiritual ends, themselves subordinated and referred to the glory of God as ultimate end of creation and of grace. For this end, the ultimate end of all, the spiritual order may use the secular, has dominion over it, over all nature, and may press it into its service, and so far as so used or so pressed, it is honorable, is sacred, is holy; but beyond, in so far as it refuses to be so used or so pressed, and claims to be respected for itself, it is the principle of heathenism, opposed to the Christian law, and to be resisted, mortified, morally annihiliated. Hence whoever so devotes himself to the secular beyond its use for spiritual ends, or to it for its own sake, is at least an incipient heathen, and needs only time and opportunity to become a full-grown heathen.

Now all strictly profane or secular literature has its principle and end in the secular order, as subsisting by and for itself, not as a means to a spiritual end, and therefore is, and must in the nature of the case be, really heathen in its principle and tendency. The more we have of it, the more highly we prize it, the more assiduously we cultivate it, the further are we removed from the spiritual order, the more averse do we become to Christianity. The enemies of our holy religion understand this full well, and hence their loud praises of profane literature, and their perpetual ranting and canting about popular education; hence do they never cease to charge the church with being opposed to the education of the people and hostile to intellectual light and culture. But it is never intellectual light, truly such, nor Christian education, that the church opposes, for these she labors unweariedly to promote; it is, as these enemies themselves know, only the false light of heathenism, which dazzles to blind, and shines only to lure men to destruction, and the heathenish education, which educates for the world, the flesh, and the devil, instead of God, and heaven, that she sets her face against and anathematizes.

Protestants are fond of claiming the revival of classical studies in the fifteenth century as one of the most active

and influential causes of what they call the reformation. They are, no doubt, right in this; not, indeed, as they pretend, because these studies marked or effected an intellectual progress; not, indeed, because the people were or became more generally educated, or more truly enlightened, than they had previously been; but because these studies tended to draw off the mind and heart from sacred literature, and to turn them from the spiritual to the secular, from the Christian to the heathen. It is very possible that the people, or at least the learned men, of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, were better educated, as heathens, and better instructed in heathenism, than they were in the middle ages; but this does not in the least imply that they were more generally or better educated as Christians, or that they were better able to appreciate moral and religious truth, or better prepared to discharge the various duties of their respective states in life, and to attain to the end for which man and all things are created. Quite the reverse is the fact. He who should pretend that Luther and Calvin, Melanchthon and Beza, were more enlightened theologians, and better understood moral and religious truth, than St. Anselm and St. Bernard, St. Thomas and St. Bonaventura, or that Philip of Hesse and Henry VIII. of England were more enlightened Christians than St. Henry of Germany and St. Louis of France, would need to be shut up in a mad-house, or at least to be subjected to physic and good regimen. That the chiefs of Protestantism were superior in light and cultivation as heathens to the mediæval doctors and princes, may be conceded; that they were superior as Christians, in the discipline of grace, in the knowledge of God, of the divine law, of duty, it were ridiculous to pretend.

It is easy to understand, on principles quite creditable to the church, why the revival of letters, the *renaissance*, as the French call it, was influential in preparing Protestantism. It was an effect and a cause of the revival of the secular order. It threw men back on the order outside of the church, back on nature as unelevated by grace, and made them prefer the city of the world to the city of God. It was a revival of heathenism, not, indeed, solely because it revived a literature actually created by ancient gentiles, but because it emancipated the secular order from the spiritual, and left men to their corrupt nature, the inexhaustible fountain of all heathenism. Heathenism is nothing but the expres-

sion of fallen nature, neglecting grace and following out its own instincts and tendencies,—following its own inherent law, and acting out itself. It has its source in the natural heart, in the flesh which subsists in every man, though mortified and kept under by grace in the saint. When faith is strong and active, and the church and her ministers are free to fulfil their mission, it is in a measure kept down, and prevented from displaying itself on a large scale; but whenever, whether through increased worldly prosperity, or other causes, faith sickens or dies, and the church is impeded in her free action by the tyranny of the state, whenever the affections are turned away from the church, and the restraints of the spiritual order are disregarded or but slightly heeded, it spontaneously revives, and becomes predominant; because aside from the church, whether before or since its institution as the *Christian* church in distinction from the patriarchal religion and the synagogue, there is nothing but fallen nature, of which it is the natural expression. Heathenism is natural to man in his fallen state, and consequently whatever throws him back on his fallen nature, or stimulates it to vigorous and energetic action, necessarily draws him off from Catholicity, and plunges him into heathenism. Ancient heathenism, eastern or western, was nothing but the natural result of the falling away of the nations from the patriarchal religion, and modern heathenism is nothing but the natural result of breaking away from the church and following corrupt human nature,—as the transcendentalists say, acting out ourselves. The revival of classical literature in the fifteenth century tended naturally to strengthen the corrupt tendencies of the human heart, and therefore to bring up the secular order, and thus to weaken the hold of religion on the intellect and the heart. In doing this it necessarily prepared the way for Protestantism.

Protestantism is, no doubt, a heresy, but all heresy is at best only inchoate heathenism, and needs only time and freedom to become fully developed heathenism; for it is the assertion of the natural against the supernatural, the secular against the spiritual, the human against the divine. Protestantism is civilized heathenism in its natural form since the church, as ancient Assyrian, Chaldean, Egyptian, Greek, and Roman gentilism was the natural form of civilized heathenism before her. It is only the church that introduces into the world another than a heathen element; re-

move her, and nothing but heathenism does or can remain. The essence of all heathenism, whether before or since the Christian Church, is in the emancipation of the flesh, of the secular order, and the subjection of the spiritual. Protestantism, whatever its pretensions, is therefore really heathenism, and nothing else; or, if it please its friends better, since it professes to believe in the Messiah, we will consent to call it carnal Judaism, which holds the Messiah to be a temporal instead of a spiritual prince, the founder of an earthly instead of a heavenly kingdom, places the secular above the spiritual, and puts the creature in the place of the creator,—the essential principle of all heathenism and of all idolatry. It bears the same relation to Christianity that carnal Judaism bore to spiritual Judaism.

No doubt, there are Protestants who will not recognize the truth of this statement; no doubt, there are many who have no suspicion that in being Protestants, they are necessarily heathen or carnal Jews; but this amounts to nothing. They who crucified our Lord between two thieves, and cried out, "His blood be upon us and our children," had no suspicion that they were carnal and not spiritual, and knew not what they did; but this did not alter the fact; and as they were not excused for crucifying our Lord because they knew not what they did, so will not our modern Protestants be excused because they know not what they are. They might know if they would, and they would know if they were not, like their prototypes, wedded to the world, and blinded by their lusts.

It is easy, then, to understand why the revival of classical studies, which was the revival of profane or secular literature, must have favored heresy, and helped to prepare the Protestant apostasy, and even without supposing it to have effected or indicated any advance in true intellectual culture, in the love of virtue, or the knowledge of truth. It is easy to understand, also, why Protestants cannot taste the literature of the church, and always seek to depreciate the learning and intellect of her great doctors, and to wrest from her the education of youth,—to establish everywhere a system of secular education in schools exclusively under the control of the state, the representative of the secular order,—the real significance of their much vaunted common-school system, a system fitted and intended only for the propagation of what is really heathenism.

Ever since the prevarication of Adam there have been, in

the language of St. Augustine, two cities, the city of the world and the city of God, and all history resolves itself into the history of the mutual hostility of these two cities. The city of the world is founded in corrupt nature, the city of God in supernatural grace. The latter is represented by the Catholic Church; the former, in the main, by the state, although the state, rightly considered, and faithful to its mission, holds from and is included in the spiritual order, and has no other office than the application to secular affairs of the law of God, natural or revealed, as promulgated and declared by the pastors of the church. Its true position is that of the secular agent of the spiritual order; but, as the flesh in the individual has a perpetual tendency to rebel against the spirit, and to declare its independence, so has the state a perpetual tendency to rebel against the spiritual order, to emancipate itself from the church, and to assert its right to treat with her at least on the footing of perfect equality. In point of fact, then, the state, or civil authority, almost always represents the city of the world, and, therefore, as against the church, it is always sure to be supported by corrupt human nature, and by all who are emancipated from the religious order, or who feel but lightly the restraints of religion, and of course by all the cultivators and lovers of profane or secular literature.

It consequently happens that, in the struggle between the two cities, the whole force of the state and of general literature, and especially of popular history, both civil and ecclesiastical, is thrown on the side of the city of the world, and, in the struggle between the church and the state, general literature and popular histories are thrown on the side of the state. In history, facts are suppressed, warped, or colored to exonerate the chiefs of the state, and to throw the blame on the chiefs of the church. As the church succeeds only supernaturally and by violence to nature, and as the state succeeds naturally and always triumphs over the church unless God interposes supernaturally to defeat it, the voice of those who side with the state finds always a response in every natural heart, and with the public at large is ordinarily sure to prevail over the voice of those who side with the church and attempt the defence of her chiefs. Many are called; few are chosen. The bulk of the people in every age and nation, at least for the greater part of their lives, have only a dead faith, and walk after the flesh, not after the spirit,—pertain to the city of the world rather

than to the city of God. They are thus predisposed to listen to the partisans of the secular order, and to credit whatever they may find it convenient to allege in its defence. It requires no virtue, no intelligence, to credit them, and hence their accounts of the struggle become accredited history, and form the basis of all popular historical judgments. The true account, being unacceptable to the secular order and to the natural heart, is discredited by all except the enlightened and devout few, on the same principle that a tale of divine and supernatural love touches only few hearts, while a tale of mere human love commands universal sympathy.

What we allege is exemplified in all modern history. The truth has indeed been written, but the works in which it has been written are not in general circulation. They are buried in public or private libraries, unread, or, if read, unheeded, by all except a few old-world students, whose statements have no weight with the multitude. The chiefs of the secular order have told their story, given in the evidence on their side, and all the world has heard and believed it; the chiefs of the church have had no public hearing, and their story and their evidence are known only in private and to a few. Kings have had their historians, their defenders, their flatterers, but there is no work, to our knowledge, in general circulation, that does justice, or any thing like justice, to the chiefs of the church, the supreme pontiffs. Even those works which profess to defend them against their calumniators are written, for the most part, in a secular spirit, and dwell on their secular rather than on their spiritual virtues. The popes, according to their popular advocates, are to be loved and reverenced because they were the patrons of literature and art, fostered material civilization, and promoted the temporal prosperity of nations. If their heroic resistance to civil tyrants is not timidly apologized for or explained away, if by some miracle it is commended, it is because thereby secular liberty was defended, not because thereby the freedom of religion was asserted and vindicated, and the church saved from becoming the slave of the state. The defence of the church is rested on her services as a secular rather than as a spiritual institution,—on her services to modern civilization rather than on her services to the souls of men. St. Gregory's alleged condemnation of all merely secular literature is humbly apologized for, and any amount of special pleading is resorted to in order to prove that the holy pontiff

could not have meant what he said. Gregory XVI., of immortal memory, is harshly treated because he devoted himself to the interests of the church rather than directly to those of the state, and thought more of saving men's souls than of pampering their bodies. The same thing is happening to our present Holy Father, since the silly notion that he was to place himself at the head of European liberalism, and to bless its banners, is clearly seen never to have had any foundation.

Kings and princes, no doubt have been censured by popular historians, and censured beyond all reason; but not for their gravest errors and crimes. We rarely find them condemned for seeking to emancipate themselves from the spiritual order, and to enslave the church,—for refusing to recognize her freedom and independence, and laboring to make the secular order independent and supreme. We hear much of the insolence of priests, the arrogance of churchmen, the pride and ambition of popes in face of the civil power, very little of the insolence of statesmen, the arrogance, pride, and ambition of kings and princes in face of the church. Secular princes and statesmen, poor souls! have been the meekest and humblest of men, always laboring for the good of the state, and prevented from succeeding only by the interference of wily priests, haughty prelates, and ambitious popes. The severest critics of secular princes seldom blame them—unless they fail—for attempting to oppress the church, to confiscate her goods, and to suppress her religious houses. To do such things is meritorious, and has gained for many a crowned monster the praise of being enlightened, liberal, wise, and just. Popular sympathy, today, is far more active in favor of the court of Turin than that of Vienna, and Kossuth and Mazzini are our heroes, not Windischgrätz and noble old Radetzky. Louis Napoleon is a tyrant because he has not oppressed the church, and has refused to persecute her ministers; and his government must be overthrown because it has respected religion. The great princes of popular history are those whose policy has been the most hostile to the church and most successful against the city of God. If anybody doubts it let him read the interesting and instructive work named at the head of this article.

We do not suppose it likely that the heathenish judgments of historical personages and events, already rendered and accepted by the public, can be reversed in the minds of

the great body of the people, but the appearance of this book by M. de la Tour, and various other recent publications, does lead us to hope that something may and will be done to disabuse the great body of Catholics, and to correct the false notions current in the historical works on which they have generally relied. The histories they have read have all been written from the point of view of the secular order; the earlier from the point of view of the court, the later from the point of view of the mob; but there are some indications that hereafter they may read histories written from the point of view of the church. Such histories have become necessary, in some degree, to refute contemporary heresies, and good and loyal Catholics may therefore find it their duty to produce them. Events and prevailing doctrines make it important for the defence of religion that history be reëxamined and rewritten, and it is certain that in so far as it is, the traducers of the church and of her defenders will appear, as they are, unworthy of the least credit. As far as the work has been prosecuted, whether by Catholics or by Protestants, the characters of the supreme pontiffs and devoted Catholic princes, who have been painted in the darkest colors, have come forth cleared of the principal charges against them, and worthy of the affection and reverence of the Catholic heart. The Protestant Voigt has prepared the vindication of the great Hildebrand, St. Gregory VII.; Hurter has done the same for Innocent III.; Roscoe, as far as he goes, for Leo X. and Lucretia Borgia; Ranke, in his history of the popes of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, has refuted much Protestant calumny; and M. de la Tour, in the brief work before us, has triumphantly vindicated the Guises, cleared the princes of the house of Lorraine, whether of the elder or the younger branch, of the aspersions cast upon them by Protestant malice and the jealousy of rival princes, and, Frenchman as he is, has passed a severe judgment, whether deserved or not, on the kings of France, both of the family of Valois and that of Bourbon, and those able statesmen, Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin.

The natural tendency of all civil government, as of the corrupt human heart, is to assert and maintain the supremacy of the secular order. It naturally adopts heathen maxims, and applauds itself for directing its power to the promotion of temporal prosperity, as man's chief good. In its view, man's chief good, at least as far as it has any concern with

it, lies in this world, and its duty is to shape its policy to its realization. It therefore necessarily comes into conflict with the spiritual authority, or the church, and therefore with the pope, as the supreme visible head of the church; for the church teaches that our supreme good is not in this world, and that the inferior temporal good which is permitted us in this life is attainable only by not seeking it as an end, and by living solely for the world to come,—the glory of God and the salvation of the soul. The policy proper on the assumption that our good is temporal must, in the nature of the case, be repugnant to the policy proper on the assumption that it is spiritual, and out of this world. The civil authority, therefore, must either yield to the spiritual, and use its power to further the ends proposed by the spiritual authority, or else the two authorities must come into conflict with each other; for the spiritual authority cannot yield to the civil without ceasing to be spiritual. The state ordinarily refuses to yield, and so ordinarily the relation between the two authorities is that of mutual hostility.

In the contest between the two powers, if the church is free, and able to exercise her spiritual discipline without restraint, and if the clergy are independent of the state, and accountable only to the spiritual authority, she can maintain faith in its vigor, and make certain of victory. This the state knows as well as she does, and hence its constant endeavor is to subject her to itself, by controlling her temporalities and making it necessary for her ministers to obtain its permission to exercise their sacred functions; that is, by reducing her from the catholic to a national church, from an independent spiritual kingdom to a function of the state, and converting the clergy into a branch of the civil police. This is the real meaning of the famous quarrel with the emperors about investitures. The state claimed the faculty of investing the pastors of the church, and if it could have obtained that faculty, it would and could have filled the churches with creatures of its own, and been able to force them to act according to its pleasure. It would have had a national, and therefore a state church, the submissive slave and obsequious tool of its will. We should have seen in process of time in every country what we early saw in the Greek empire, and what we see now in Russia, England, and every Protestant kingdom.

The grand obstacle to the success of the state in its efforts

to enslave the church, and convert the clergy into mere parish constables, was and is the feeble old man who occupies the chair of Peter at Rome. Not Aman was more troubled to see Mardochai sitting in the king's gate, than the temporal sovereigns were to see that feeble old man sitting in that chair.' The papacy is the key-stone of the arch, it is a centre of unity and authority, essential to the very idea of catholicity, for catholicity without unity is a metaphysical impossibility. They who talk of catholicity without the papacy, talk very foolishly, very absurdly. Without the papacy the church could have no organic unity, could not hold together for a moment, but would break into national churches, and each national church would be bound hand and foot, as Anglicanism is, by the temporal sovereign. But so long as the papacy remains intact, the church is and must be catholic, and cannot be national. By virtue of the papacy it is one in all nations, over every particular nation, and therefore under the control of none. When the civil authority attacks it in any one nation, it attacks it in every nation, and the clergy and the faithful in all the other nations can be summoned to its defence. The thing, then, to be done first of all by the civil authority in order to effect its purpose, is always to attack the papacy, and make war on the pope. This the temporal sovereigns have always done, save when they chanced to be truly pious, as St. Henry of Germany and St. Louis of France, and not always even then, or when they needed the papal authority to protect them against a foreign or a domestic enemy; well knowing that when the clergy are withdrawn from their dependence on Rome, they also lose the protection of Rome, and fall an easy prey to the prince, with no power to refuse to aid his projects of usurpation, oppression, or temporal aggrandizement.

Moreover, hostility to the papacy was precisely the kind of hostility to the church that could be carried on with the least risk of alarming the faith or the conscience of the faithful. Courtly prelates and the more worldly of the secular clergy, not always too regular in their lives, would seldom be absolutely unwilling to be released from the discipline of Rome, and placed in dependence on the state, for they knew well that their irregularities would receive no rebuke from the temporal prince so long as they flattered his passions, or applied themselves to the furtherance of his interests. Hence we have in our own days seen Austrian

prelates oppose the repeal of the infamous Josephine laws, even after the government had become willing to repeal them. The universities would also be willing to have the state rather than the church for their sovereign, for it would trouble itself less with their rash, and often heretical, speculations. The great body of the faithful in the humbler walks of life could understand very little of the controversy. They had no immediate and direct relations with the pope, and no clear or definite notions of his powers and prerogatives. They knew their king, their bishop, and their parish priest, and if these sounded no note of alarm, they could take no alarm, and must naturally conclude that all was right. They could not be expected to see, because inconceivable without the papacy, that the blows aimed at the pope were necessarily aimed at the church herself, or feel obliged to refuse to assist their sovereign in a war which they were told was in no sense a war against the church, but against the ambitious and nefarious pontiff who abused his spiritual power to violate the rights of their nation and of their prince. Hence even when, if he had made open war on the church, his subjects would have resisted him almost to a man, the sovereign was rarely unable to bring the whole material, and even moral, force of his kingdom to bear against the head of the church; and if he sometimes was unable, it was in general owing to the regular clergy or the poor monks, who mingled with the people, and, holding immediately from the pope, were almost always indefatigable defenders of the papal rights. This is wherefore the monks or regular clergy, after the popes, have been the principal objects of that secular hatred, of which we saw a striking example in the last century, in the hostility of all the so-called Catholic sovereigns to the illustrious Society of Jesus, and which became so violent that Clement XIV. was obliged, as a measure of peace, to suppress the order. Erasmus, Ulrich von Hutten, and others, who prepared the way for Luther and Calvin, began by showering ridicule on the monks, and by endeavoring to destroy their influence with the people. So the demagogues, preparatory to their recent revolutions in Europe, began by suppressing the Jesuits in France, expelling them from Switzerland and Italy, and making war everywhere upon all the religious orders that remained active and living, and that retained any considerable public influence.

Such from the first was the policy of secular sovereigns,

As long as the feudal constitution of Europe remained in its vigor, and the power of the monarchs was limited by the feudal nobility, the church, save in the East,—where the emperor was absolute and the government a centralized monarchy, that is, a monarchical despotism,—could in general maintain the more essential rights of the spiritual order, and through the nobility when the oppressor was the monarch, and through the monarch when the aggressors were the nobility, compel, after a longer or shorter struggle, the secular authority to respect the papal rights and dignity. She could obtain from the chivalry of Europe, whether they were always governed by as pure motives as might be wished or not, soldiers able and willing to defend her. But when the feudal nobility, after having suppressed the insurrection of the peasants, and defeated at Rosebecque, in 1382, the movement of the communes to revive the municipal *régime* of ancient republican Rome, were themselves suppressed by the combined power of the king and commons, as in France under Louis XI., and the political order tended to centralized monarchy or despotism, she lost her principal political support, and the monarchs were in a condition to pursue their policy against her with fairer prospects of success. They assumed a bolder tone towards the sovereign pontiff, denied his infallibility in deciding questions of faith and morals; distinguished not only between the pope and the court of Rome, but between the papacy and the church; asserted the superiority of the council to the pope; broached the doctrine that the pope holds his authority from the appointment of the church, not immediately from God as the successor of St. Peter; and even contended that the acts of the supreme pontiff do not bind by their own force, and to become binding need to be confirmed or accepted by the universal church. These doctrines, which they took good care to have widely diffused among their subjects, stripped the sovereign pontiff, theoretically, of all real authority as head of the church, reduced his primacy to a mere primacy of order, and made his bulls and constitutions matters of no moment, since it was always easy, where these doctrines were held, for the sovereign to prohibit their publication in his dominions, to prevent the national church from accepting them, or to induce it to declare them null and void. M. de la Tour tells us that "the fathers of the national Council of Tours, assembled by Louis XII., declare null the excommunications which Julius II. might fulminate against

that monarch, prohibit the sending of money to the Holy Father, and all recourse to Rome on any matter whatever, and of their own authority, without consulting the pope, grant the king a hundred thousand crowns from the goods of the church. They prepared, moreover, the Council of Pisa, by which Louis and the Emperor Maximilian, then allied with him, sought to depose Julius, and gave the code of Gallican liberties to Matthew Lang, Bishop of Goritz and envoy to the emperor, which, diffused in the German universities, where Luther was studying, did immense evil" (p. 2). It is easy to see that with such anti-papal doctrines accredited, the monarchs could force the church in their respective states to consult their pleasure, and to refrain from interfering with any of their projects.

We have spoken of the influence of the revival of letters in preparing Protestantism; but in point of fact, the monarchs in the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth had a far greater share in preparing it than had the old humanists. The wars of the Roses had extinguished the feudal nobility in England, and prepared the centralized monarchy, that is, the despotism of the Tudors; Louis XI., with his crafty and cruel policy, had decapitated them in France, and Maximilian had done much to weaken their power in the empire. The tendency throughout all Europe, it is well known, was to the Byzantine or centralized monarchy, and nothing prevented the complete triumph of that political system but the pope, seconded, indeed, to some extent, by Italian and Spanish feudalism and republicanism. In fact, Julius II., that heroic pontiff whom revolutionary movements and duty to the church compelled to be a soldier, was in his time well-nigh the only defender of European liberty and Christian order then remaining in the world. Nothing, therefore, is more natural than that such a pontiff, who well knew how to wield with effect either sword which God had given him, should be an especial object of the hatred of ambitious kings and princes, or than that they should load him with calumnies, use all the arts that malice could invent to render him personally odious, and make him the occasion of attacking the papacy itself. This is only what the red-republicans have done in our own day in regard to Gregory XVI. and Pius IX. Gallicanism—not, indeed, then known by that name, for it was rather of Byzantine than of French origin, and has prevailed no more in France than it has in Germany, England, and even Italy—was, in its most

exaggerated form, everywhere preached by the sovereigns and their ministers, and the people were taught to look upon the holy pontiffs as rapacious, ambitious, the enemies of the rights of sovereigns and of nations, and the disturbers of the peace of the world.

"In France," says a French writer, who on this point need not be distrusted,* "the quarrels of the kings and the popes had from a distance prepared the way for Luther—Julius II., for example, had recently leagued all Italy against Louis XII., to despoil him of all his Italian possessions, and, not content to conquer him with temporal arms, had employed spiritual arms against him, excommunicated him, placed his kingdom under interdict, and absolved his subjects from their oath of allegiance. Such conduct (*félonie*) had exasperated many minds. Louis, on his side, used every means to render the pope odious to France and to Europe. Is it astonishing, then, that so many seigniors embraced the reformation, which broke out a little after? Its cause was in many respects that of the monarchy itself. Hence its partisans found refuge in royal houses, of which they were, so to speak, the loyal servants. This explains how it was that Marguerite of Navarre made them a rampart of her states, and Renée of France, daughter of Louis XII., and Duchess of Ferrara, sustained them with all her power in Italy. There exists on this point a curious letter from this last-named princess to Calvin, which shows very clearly the intimate alliance of the royal cause with that of the reformers. She thanks Calvin for having sent her a gold coin (*écu d'or*) of Louis XII., which that king had caused to be struck against Julius II., with the legend, *Perdam Babylonis nomen.* 'I assure you,' says she, 'that I have gladly seen and accepted it, and I praise God that the king, my father, took such a device. If the grace to execute it was not vouchsafed him, it is, perhaps, because it was reserved for some one of his descendants to accomplish it instead.' The kings called Rome Babylon before she was so called by the reformers."

Whoever has studied with tolerable insight the history of the fifteenth century, is well aware that the question involved was then, as it is now, the supremacy of the secular order, or the administration of civil government on purely heathen principles. The supremacy of the secular order

*Pierre Leroux, in the *Encyclopédie Nouvelle*, Art., "Calvin."

was asserted against the popes by kings in favor of monarchical absolutism, just as it is asserted against Pius IX. by demagogues in favor of democratic absolutism. The sole difference between the two epochs is, that kings then played the part now played by demagogues, and that the kings labored to centralize despotism in the throne, while the demagogues labor to centralize it in the mob. The papacy is now attacked on the pretence that it is hostile to democracy; it was attacked then on the pretence that it was hostile to monarchy. The principle of the attack at either epoch is the same, namely, the supremacy of the secular order; and the aim was, at the former, as it is at the latter, epoch, not precisely to throw off all religion, at least not directly, but to destroy the papacy, so as to nationalize the church, and to subject her to the national sovereignty, and therefore is the same, whether you suppose that sovereignty to be vested in the king or in the people. Society in the fifteenth century was undergoing, as it is now, throughout nearly all Europe, a radical revolution, only kings and princes were then, as demagogues now are, the revolutionists; and revolutionists, whether kings or demagogues, always find the pope in their way, and must either fight him, or desist from their iniquitous attempts to overthrow the legal order of things.

Louis XII. failed in his attempts against the papacy, submitted to the church, and received from her the title of *Christian King*, and from his subjects that of *Father of his People;* but he had produced a profound impression on the mind of Europe, and had raised up a strong public opinion against the papacy. His doctrines and measures, as well as those of other princes of his time, had so weakened its moral force throughout Christendom, that when Luther appeared and declaimed against Rome as Babylon, and the pope as Antichrist, there was little that appeared strange in his language, or that indicated to the minds of his auditors any settled purpose of attacking the church. It was not till he went further, and denied the authority of general councils, that he began really to shock the consciences of the faithful. Maximilian, who, it is said, aspired himself to the papacy, was favorably disposed to him, and instructed his ambassador at Rome to see that no harm befell him; "because," he added, "we may yet have need of him." There is little question that the German princes protected Luther at first, not out of sympathy with his doctrinal innovations,

but with a view of using him, and the party he might form, as a means of extorting concessions from Rome in their favor. We find his Catholic opponents refuting his doctrinal innovations, but only feebly and very timidly rebuking his violence towards the pope. Henry VIII. of England ably defends the seven sacraments against him, but, if we recollect aright, not very heartily, to say the least, the papal authority. Indeed, the opinion seems to have very generally prevailed throughout France, England, northern Germany, and several other states, that the papacy, as including any thing more than a mere primacy of order, was an excrescence on the constitution of the church and that its constitution was, in fact, a blunder. It is only on this supposition that we can, for instance, account for the facility with which Henry VIII. separated his kingdom from Rome, and caused himself to be acknowledged as supreme head of the church in his dominions. Evidently he obtained the support or acquiescence of the great body of his subjects only on the ground that there was little in his measures which appeared to them to be directed against the Catholic Church. They may have thought he was in some respects going too far, but they looked upon him mainly as asserting the rightful independence of his crown and kingdom against the ambitious and unwarrantable pretensions of an Italian priest, who was little or nothing to them. He was only asserting the rights of England and of Englishmen, and therefore to be supported by his loyal subjects.

What may have heretofore seemed mysterious to some in the rapid rise and progress of Protestantism is now easily explained by what we have just seen in our liberal Catholics, that is, Catholics who sympathize with the revolutionary movements of the Mazzinis, Kossuths, Ledru-Rollins, Heckers, Struves, and other red-republican chiefs. These liberal Catholics have, in general, no intention of renouncing the church; they have no suspicion that they are making war on Catholicity, or that there are any grounds for calling in question their orthodoxy. Once in a while one of them will even go to confession and to communion. Yet did they throw up their caps and hurrah lustily when the Roman republic was proclaimed; they were not unpleasantly affected when the Holy Father was driven into exile, —were really delighted when he was stripped of his temporal dominions, and became indignant only when the triumvirate were driven out, and the pope was restored to his

rights by the intervention of France. These men wished no harm to the Holy Father; they may have respected him personally; but they were democrats; first and last they were democrats, and held it far more important to establish democracy throughout Europe than to retain the papacy. Now just understand that in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, a revolution was going on against the feudal monarchy and nobility of the middle ages, and that the passion for centralized monarchy was then as strong and as universal as the passion for centralized democracy is now, and you have the whole secret of the success of the Protestant rebellion explained. There was no intention in the outset of breaking with the church, of rushing into schism, or of setting up a new religion; but the public feeling was that the papacy was hostile to the policy of monarchs, and that the monarchical cause should be sustained against it at all hazards, and that the complete emancipation of sovereigns and the whole secular order from the authority claimed by the Italian priest should be effected. The heresiarchs, regarded as mere doctrinal innovators, counted for nothing, or next to nothing. Luther, Melanchthon, Calvin, Cranmer, and Knox were only the fly in the fable, tugging at the wheel to assist the horses to roll the heavy coach through the ruts, and might have bellowed in high or low Dutch, good or bad Latin, good or bad French, good or bad English, or in broad Scotch, until doomsday, with no other effect than that of making themselves puny leaders of contemptible sects, had not their heretical movement been prepared and sustained by the political passions and revolutions of their time. Protestantism, as a religious movement, deserves not a moment's consideration; its whole strength always lay, and still lies, in its character as a political or purely secular movement. The age had become rich; luxury had become general; the world had resumed its mastery over men's hearts; kings, no longer impeded by the nobles, resolved to centralize their power and reign as absolute monarchs, which they could not do without declaring the state supreme, and subjecting the church to the temporal order, which in its turn could not be done without destroying the papacy. Much progress had been made in reproducing the heathen order, and the world, without precisely knowing what it was about, determined that its reproduction should be complete, and so rebelled against the pope, turned Protestant, and pulled down and trampled on the cross, the

symbol at once of man's salvation and of the supremacy of the spiritual order, or of the subjection of heathenism.

The movement was strong throughout all Europe, and for a moment there did not appear to be a single secular power on whose fidelity the Holy Father could rely. Princes and people were everywhere in rebellion and in arms against him, and his enemies everywhere predicted the speedy destruction of the papacy. But God had promised to be with his church all days unto the consummation of the world, and that the gates of hell should not prevail against her. In vain did the heathen rage and the people imagine a vain thing. In vain did the kings and princes of the earth stand up and conspire against the Lord and against his anointed. The Lord himself defended his spouse and delivered his chosen pontiffs. The human instruments he used in defending the church, our author labors to show, were the princes of the house of Lorraine, the only royal house, he would persuade us, that has uniformly remained faithful to its Catholic engagements. He espouses with a noble zeal the side of the Lorraine princes, of the elder branch in Lorraine itself, of the Guises in France, and of the Habsburgs in Austria, and holds up their conduct in favorable contrast with what he alleges to have been the policy of the kings and ministers of France. He represents the policy pursued by the French court, from the time of Henry IV. down to our own times, to have been uniformly that of humbling the pope, on the one hand, and the Lorraine princes, or more especially Austria, on the other. Having assumed that the Lorraine princes of both the elder and the younger branch were uniformly on the side of Catholic interests, he denounces the French policy as rationalistic, or, as we should say, heathenish, and leaves on his readers the impression, that, if there is Protestantism in Europe to-day, we have to thank the French government, and especially Cardinal Richelieu, who, while he humbled the Huguenots in France, secured, by his hostility to Ferdinand II., their triumph in Germany.

Certainly we are not prepared to approve the policy of Henry IV., which was, to some extent, adopted by Cardinal Richelieu, and the attempt to justify it on the ground that it was necessary to the preservation of a due balance of power has never seemed to us successful. There is something which strikes us unpleasantly in seeing a prince of the church leaguing with the determined enemies of his religion

to humble her friends, and without meaning to endorse the severe judgment of the defender of the house of Lorraine, we must confess that we have never seen a valid excuse for the strange conduct of the cardinal in intervening against Ferdinand,—who, as far as we are informed, had done no injury and offered no insult to France, and was only engaged in a war in defence of the just rights of his empire and of the church,—and forcing upon him a peace in which were sacrificed the Catholic interests of Germany, and, in some measure, of Europe and the world. Such intervention would be much more intelligible, to say the least, in a Protestant, than in the minister of a Catholic sovereign and a prince of the church. But though we have not seen it, we are not prepared to say that the cardinal had no valid excuse, and we do not doubt that if M. de la Tour had set himself as heartily at work to defend this able, though certainly not faultless statesman, as he has to defend the Lorraine prince, Joseph II. of Germany, he would have found it no difficult matter to soften very much the judgments he has rendered against him.

The author apparently sees nothing to commend in any thing French, and he has no mercy on a single French prince or statesman. If good has ever been done in France, it has always been done by a Lorraine prince, an Austrian princess, or by a Bas-Breton prince, princess, or nobleman. The author is a native of Bretagne, and has served in the Austrian army. This is too one-sided to be true. France has committed great faults, great wrongs, but we think a sharp eye might find some redeeming traits in her character, and that she has had some virtues derived neither from the Bretons nor from the Lotharingians. We find much to censure in Louis XIV., yet we are not willing, when pleading the interests of the true faith, to join with heretics in condemning him for his energetic treatment of rebellious Huguenots. The author, we hope, will forgive us, if we say that we have detected in him, as in several others of our good friends in France, whom we highly esteem, and with whom in most things we warmly sympathize, a slight tendency to the whimpering sentimentalism characteristic of our times, over the punishment of great criminals, and which is no mark of real benevolence of heart or of true Christian charity. If the Huguenots of France had demeaned themselves as loyal subjects, if they had been contented with holding and practising their heresy for them-

selves, and had suffered Catholics in their neighborhood to practise unmolested the true religion, the state might have permitted them to damn their souls, as they insisted on doing; but when they abused the liberty secured to them by the Edict of Nantes, to disturb the peace of the state, to persecute Catholics, to sack and burn Catholic villages, to destroy Catholic churches and convents, to murder women and children, or carry them away captive, it was the right, it was the duty, of the civil authority to intervene, and reduce them to subjection; for the first duty of every civil government is to protect the church, and maintain the freedom of religion,—of religion, we say, not of heresy and infidelity, which, as far as we could ever learn, have not, and never had, and never can have, any rights, being, as they undeniably are, contrary to the law of God. After providing for the freedom of religion, and fully securing to every one the right to profess and practise it without let or hinderance from any quarter, it may be wise, just, and even necessary, for the government to leave heresy and infidelity to take care of themselves, and to go for what they are worth. We are no friends to severity, and we are perfectly well aware of the folly of trying to force men into heaven. God himself forces no man to receive his bounty, but leaves all men to the freedom of their own choice, subject only to the penalty of eternal damnation for choosing wrong; but we should be wanting in common sense, if we did not recognize the right and the duty of the civil government, when heresy and infidelity undertake to propagate themselves by carnal weapons, by fire and sword, to intervene, and by physical force, if necessary, to coerce them into peaceable subjects and harmless neighbors.

But passing over French politics, we cannot assent in all respects to the author's unqualified praise of the Lorraine princes. We quite agree in his vindication of the noble Guises, and thank him for it; we think highly of the dukes of Lorraine, especially of the good Anthony and Charles V. The Austrian princes certainly have often deserved well, not only of their country, but of the church; yet we cannot say that they have always been loyal sons of the church, and always true to Catholic interests. Maximilian united with Louis XII. in calling the Council of Pisa to depose Julius II.; his grandson, Charles V., labored to establish centralism in his Spanish possessions, was very lukewarm in suppressing the Protestant rebellion in Germany, was not

very Catholic in his bearing towards the holy Council of Trent, and it was he, we believe, who made war on Clement VII., and they were his troops, who, under the Constable Bourbon, took and sacked Rome, and from whom the Eternal City suffered more than it had in early times from the Goths and Vandals. Maria Theresa was a party to the infamous partition of Poland, a crime and a blunder which must make the sovereigns dumb before the crimes and blunders of the demagogues; and her son, the half-crazed Joseph II., was undeniably one of the worst enemies the church in modern times has had, and he all but threw the church in his hereditary dominions into schism. The well-known Josephine laws, so called from him, were a scandal to Christendom, and far surpassed any thing attempted by Louis XIV., or any other monarch on the throne of St. Louis. In no country in Europe—in the world, we may almost say—was the church less free than she was in Austria from his time down to the accession to the imperial throne of the present young emperor, who promises to revive the early glories of the house of Lorraine, and to rival the fame of the pious Godfrey of Bouillon. Personally, the Austrian princes have been, for the most part, pious and exemplary Catholics; and though in general less irreligious in their policy than most other princes of Europe, they have not escaped the besetting sin of all secular princes, that of seeking to subject the spiritual to the temporal, of treating religion as a civil function, and its ministers as a branch of the civil police. They have almost always insisted on religion, but pretty uniformly on having it under their own control. The sovereign pontiff has generally had as much to fear as to hope from them, for they have seldom been unwilling to take the administration of religion from his hands into their own. Not much more can be said against the kings of France.

M. de la Tour is an ultramontane, but he will pardon us, we hope, if we hint that his ultramontanism is not quite enough for us. He doubtless concedes the papal infallibility, and the pope's supreme authority in all ecclesiastical matters; but he does not seem to have very well understood that the secular order exists only for the spiritual, personified in the sovereign pontiff, and should in all respects be subjected to it. We try all princes and secular powers by their relations to the spiritual order, and care not a fig for any of them any further than they serve it. The church is

all and in all to us, and she is to us only through the sovereign pontiff. Our Lord founded the church on Peter, and we are submissive to her only as we are submissive to Peter, in the person of his successors. The sovereign pontiff is, under God, the fountain of all the authority we respect on earth, and we have no praise for those who offer him insults, or withhold from him the loyalty of their hearts. The saddest page of all modern history is that which records the ingratitude of individuals and nations to the holy pontiffs who, for these eighteen hundred years, have ruled the church of God, and labored for the eternal welfare of mankind. They have borne the brunt of the battle; they have been the mark for every arrow; they have been the peculiar objects of the wrath of man and the assaults of hell; they have often been insulted by their own children; and scarcely one drop of consolation have they during these long ages been permitted to taste, except that consolation which is vouchsafed them by the interior visits of the Holy Spirit. O, how the world has wronged them, and how slow and how loath are we ourselves to make them some little reparation! O, let us away with our cold, half-heretical reserve, away with our ungenerous distrust, and let our hearts gush forth in warm and pure love to the vicegerent of God on earth, and never for a moment suffer a mere secular prince to weigh in the balance with him!

We do not pretend that the popes are personally impeccable, nor that every pope has been a saint; but we have yet to see full evidence that any one of them during his pontificate, has been a very bad man. Nearly all we read against some few of them is mere calumny, invented by men whose projects they had thwarted, or by party, political, or sectarian spite and vindictiveness. We are slow to believe any thing against a single pope, and we have little doubt that even Alexander VI., after he became pope, would be found, if the truth were known, to be, even as a man, worthy of our respect. We place no confidence in Italian lampoons and pasquinades, and when we find a pope painted in very black colors, we always take it for granted that there were very wicked men in his reign, whose schemes of wickedness he defeated, and whose pride and ambition he offended. With this feeling with regard to the popes, the cold respect or courtly patronage shown them by the house of Austria does not satisfy us. We can honor as a truly Catholic government only that government which recognizes cheerfully the su-

premacy of the pope, obeys him as sovereign, and loves and reverences him as a father. Such a government Austria, let M. de la Tour say what he will, never has been, and in reality no secular government of much importance ever was or ever will be.

Yet we concede most cheerfully that, upon the whole, the princes of the house of Lorraine and of Lorraine-Habsburg are hononorably distinguished among the princes of Europe, and that Austria has been, for the most part, the least uncatholic of the great European powers, though, unhappily, always, while laboring to preserve her subjects Catholic, inclining to the policy of the Byzantine emperors, which finally destroyed the church in the East. There is no doubt that, at the present moment, she is the most reliable Catholic power of Europe, and about the only one to which the friends of social order and Christian liberty can now look with hope for the future. Spain has been distracted, impoverished, and weakened by her revolutionary struggles and anti-Catholic policy for the last thirty or forty years. Portugal, of whom it was first said, "The sun never sets on her empire," has become a mere dependency of Great Britain; France, with generous impulses and Catholic instincts, is drunk with *demagogie;* Sardinia is under the control of the demagogues, and her whole influence is thrown into the scale of heathenism; the other Italian states, no longer what they were in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, have at least as much as they can do to protect themselves from the ravages of red-republicanism; Russia, a schismatic power, advances slowly, but surely, as the representative of the old Byzantine despotism, or monarchical absolutism; and our own country, losing its constitutional character, advances as surely, and far more rapidly, as the representative of demagogical absolutism; and where, if not in Austria, is, under God and his church, the hope of the Christian freeman?

Speaking with an eye to the immediate future, there are but three great powers of the first order in the world,—the United States, Russia, and Austria. These are three great representative nations, each representing a distinct and peculiar political system. The other states of Europe and America, owing either to internal dissensions or to external weakness, become important in the political order only in the direct or indirect alliances they respectively form with some one or another of these three. Russia represents the

old Byzantine monarchy, and her progress is the progress of monarchical centralism, or absolutism. The other northern kingdoms of Europe must revolve around her as their centre, and throw their influence into her scale. The United States, having practically abandoned English constitutionalism, after which their own institutions were originally modelled, represent centralized democracy, or democratic absolutism, and head the demagogical revolutionary movement of the age. Great Britain does and must act in concert with us, and throw her influence, be it more or less, on the side of American democracy. English constitutionalism, which has for over a century played a conspicuous part in the policy of the world, and which seems still to be the idol of many statesmen, is after all as good as defunct; for in all, except perhaps a few minor states and principalities, the balance between the three estates, the king, lords, and commons, essential to its harmonious working, has been lost, and cannot now be restored. Constitutional monarchy is now in reality but the dream, and the very silly dream, of a past age. Modern revolutions have rendered it impracticable. In all the great states of Europe, either the king is too strong for the lords and commons, or the commons are too strong for the king and lords. The balance has been lost even in England herself, and the British constitution may, before one thinks of it, cease to exist. Great Britain, then, really represents no system of her own, and must ally herself with us. She is not able to subsist within herself, and could not hold her present rank a single year if she were to lose her trade with the United States, while we could lose our trade with her, not indeed without inconvenience, not indeed without much individual suffering, but without any permanent detriment to our national strength or national prosperity, for we are able to subsist entirely within ourselves. England cannot afford to break with us, and if she were to do so, and to refuse to join us, avowedly or unavowedly, in furthering the designs of continental red-republicanism, she would speedily fall a prey to a red-republican revolution herself. She, then, can remain politically important only by uniting with us, and throwing her influence on the side of democratic absolutism. These two absolutisms thus represented and supported, the Russian and the American, are the two aggressive powers of the age, and they threaten ere long to meet in China or India, and, on the plains of that old Asiatic continent, to

dispute the empire of the world, and the triumph of either will be the triumph of heathenism, and the oppression of the church of God.

Between the success of one or the other of these two absolutisms, or despotisms, stands Austria, with the other Catholic states of Europe, and the hope of social order and of Christian freedom, under God and the church, rests now on saving her from throwing herself into the arms of either despotism, and of so strengthening her by union within and alliances without that she can resist and repel both the American absolutism and the Russian. Austria properly represents what remains of feudal Europe, and from the federative character of her empire, uniting, as it does, under one sovereign many nations, differing in language, manners, customs, and local institutions, she is naturally the representative of centralism tempered by federalism,—the very system with which we, under a republican form, professedly set out, but which we have hopelessly abandoned for democratic centralism,—and by her central position in Europe, and her vast resources, she is naturally fitted to take the lead in resisting and repelling the two advancing despotisms. She should therefore be supported by all the Catholic states of Europe, for their liberties and salvation are bound up with hers. We wish, therefore, to see her enter into the Germanic Diet with all her non-Germanic states, that she may be able to protect all Germany both from Russian and demagogical centralism; and we quite agree with M. de la Tour, that France should lay aside her hereditary policy of humbling Austria, and form with her an intimate and honorable alliance. Such an alliance would secure to social order and Christian freedom the firm support of both the Spanish and Italian peninsulas, and put a stop to the further advance of despotism under either of its forms. It would protect Austria and the other German states; it would neutralize the demagogical influence which the United States and Great Britain might attempt to exert on continental affairs, and enable France herself to reëstablish order, to recover from her demagogical *delirium tremens*, and reassume her rightful rank among the nations of the earth. Such an alliance is evidently for the interests of both France and Austria, of Catholic Europe, and therefore of the whole world.

The great crime, nay, the great blunder of modern politics was the monarchical revolution against the feudal mon-

archy and nobility of the middle ages, and which prepared the way for the democratic revolution of our times,—in some sense necessarily involved it. Kings and ministers, not the people, were the first revolutionists of modern Europe, and the people are now only making revolutions against them, as they had made revolutions against the feudal barons. The true policy for all the friends of order and liberty is now to attempt by safe and honorable alliances to check both revolutions, and to repair, as far as possible, the wrongs inflicted by both, by restoring, as far as the altered circumstances of the times will admit, the old feudal order, that is, under some form, as we express it, centralism tempered by federalism. This order has certainly been greatly weakened in Austria, but its elements are preserved there with more life and vigor than elsewhere, and therefore is she best fitted to assume the lead in reconstituting fallen Europe. Assisted by all the Catholic states of Europe she can easily do it, and with advantage to their separate independence and internal prosperity. Let these states, then, all form a league with Austria, and with one another, to resist both the Russian and the American despotisms, and to repair the wrongs of past revolutions, and let them recognize anew the Holy Father as the divinely appointed abitrator between sovereign and sovereign, and between the sovereign and his subjects, and something like order and liberty may flourish again on the earth. Will they do it? We know not. Very likely they will refuse to do it, and if they do refuse, all that remains certain is, that heathenism will triumph anew, and the church will be obliged to take refuge once more in the catacombs.

But it is time to draw our somewhat desultory remarks to a close. The reader will find much information and much food for useful reflection in M. de la Tour's unpretending little work, and we very sincerely thank the author for the pleasure and profit we have derived from it. We have had no intention of giving it a regular review, and have merely used it, as our readers will have perceived, as a peg on which to hang some disconnected but matured reflections of our own. France has inundated the world with bad books, and worse theories, but her Catholic sons seem now laboring in earnest, and we trust not without effect, to repair the wrongs she has done to literature, politics, and religion; and although Catholic Germany is awaking from her long sleep, and beginning to make energetic war on paganism, and al-

though even Catholic England shows some symptoms of returning life, and appears to suspect that there is something else to be done than to show that Catholicity, after all, is about as good as Anglicanism, it must be owned that our ablest workmen and our most effective soldiers are Frenchmen, who are sure to be foremost in every battle, whether against the armies of the city of God or against those of the city of the world. Singular people, that old Franco-Celtic race, always preëminent alike in good and in evil! Well has it been said that for a Frenchman there is no purgatory, and that when he dies he either goes straight to heaven or straight to hell. Well, better be either cold or hot than lukewarm.

The chief point we have wished to bring out is, that there are only two systems in the world, Catholicity and heathenism. All that is not of the one is of the other. There are but two causes that we can espouse, but two masters that we can serve. Disguise it as you will, all who are not Catholics are heathens, and all who are not heathens are Catholics. Heresy and infidelity may assume a thousand shapes, but always at bottom are they heathenism, and nothing else. Catholicity asserts the supremacy of the spiritual order, and allows the secular order to be sought only in subordination and subserviency to it, in like manner as it asserts the supremacy of the spirit, and commands us to subject the flesh to it, and to deny and modify it in so far as it cannot be so subjected. Heathenism asserts the independence of the secular order, proposes it as an end to be sought for its own sake, and finally declares it supreme and exclusive, the only end to be sought, or that can be conceived of as worth seeking. Here are the two systems, the two causes, the two cities, old as the prevarication of Adam, and always disputing for the empire of the soul of man. The dispute between these is the only dispute there ever has been or ever can be. Our situation is no novelty. The thing that has been is, and shall be, and there is nothing new under the sun. We have no new enemies, no new controversies, and for us, as for the old patriarchs, as for the synagogue, as for the apostles and early Christians, the battle is with gentilism, heathenism, or carnal Judaism. In the individual the battle is between the spirit and the flesh, in the intellectual order it is between orthodoxy and heresy, in society between the church and the state, order and anarchy, liberty and license. It is always the same controversy in principle, always the parties to the combat are the same.

Heathenism is natural; Christianity is supernatural. To be heathens demands no training, no self-denial, no effort; we have only to follow nature, and, as we have said, act out ourselves; to be Christians demands supernatural grace to elevate us above nature,—instruction, discipline, self-restraint, self-denial, constant vigilance and effort. All natural action tends to heathenism. Hence all men are naturally heathens, and naturally heathenism always triumphs over Catholicity. As nature survives in all men, even in the saint, all men, even though Catholics, have a natural tendency to lapse into heathenism, and are held in the Christian order only by supernatural grace and supernatural effort. It is easy, then, to comprehend why in all ages and countries heathenism more abounds than Christianity, and evil gains the victory over good, save when supernaturally prevented. In no age or nation has the victory of Christianity over heathenism been complete, and in the individual Christian it is never complete, save in the moment of his death. Only in dying do we conquer. Hence our life is called a warfare, and the church in this world the church militant; and hence, too, the true Catholics are always in the minority, in a worldly sense, the weaker party, and always oppressed, and the high places of the world are occupied by their enemies. The power, the dominion, and the honors of this world, whether in the political, the military, the literary, or the scientific order, are never theirs. Their enemies are of the world, and the world loves them, and bestows on them its dignities and honors. True Catholics the world knows not, for their life is hid with God. The day for them to reign never comes in this world. As far as the world heeds them, it hates or despises them. Their glory commences only when this world and the fashion thereof pass away. "Then shall the just stand with great constancy against those who have afflicted them, and taken away their labors. These, seeing it, shall be troubled with terrible fear, and shall be amazed at the suddenness of their salvation, saying within themselves, repenting and groaning for anguish of spirit: These are they whom we had sometime in derision, and for a parable of reproach. We fools esteemed their life madness, and their end without honor. Behold how they are numbered among the children of God, and their lot is among the saints. Therefore we have erred from the way of truth; and the light of justice hath not shined unto us; and the sun of understanding hath not arisen upon us. We wearied our-

selves in the way of iniquity and destruction, and have walked through hard ways; but the way of the Lord have we not known. What hath pride profited us? or what advantage hath the boasting of riches brought us? All those things are passed away like a shadow, and like a post that runneth on, and as a ship that passeth through the waves, whereof when it is gone by the trace cannot be found, nor the path of its keel in the waters. . . . . So we also, being born, forthwith ceased to be; and have been able to show no mark of virtue; but are consumed in our wickedness. Such things as these the sinners said in hell. For the wicked is as dust, which is blown away with the wind; and as a thin froth, which is dispersed by the storm; and as smoke, which is scattered abroad by the wind; and as the guest of one day that passeth by. But the just shall live for evermore, and their reward is with the Lord, and the care of them with the Most High. Therefore shall they receive a kingdom of glory, and a crown of beauty at the hand of the Lord; for with his right hand will he cover them, and with his holy arm he will defend them." (Wisdom, v. 1—17.)

Such is the fact. The two systems stand opposed one to the other, the one triumphing naturally and in this world, and the other supernaturally and in the world to come. We must take Catholicity, and with the grace of God struggle as we can, triumph in dying, and reign with the just forever hereafter, or take our side with heathenism, flourish for a moment here, and be depressed hereafter with sinners for ever in hell. There is no other alternative. We must make our election and take our side. There is no compromise possible, no neutral position conceivable. He who is not on the side of the church, let him call himself by what name he may, is by that fact a gentile, a carnal Jew, and on the side of heathenism. Let us understand this, and thus understand that the only enemy we have to fight is paganism, the old enemy which the early Christian saints and martyrs fought before us, and also that, if we take the side of the church, we must do so bravely and unreservedly, and be prepared at all times and in all things to assert her supremacy, and therefore that of the Holy Father, the representative on earth and the personification of the spiritual order.

The real test of a man's Catholicity, the criterion by which to determine whether he is a true Christian, or at best following heathen tendencies, is his position with re-

gard to the pope or the papacy. "Where Peter is, there is the church," and where the church is, there is God our Redeemer. Whoso disregards the papacy, or stints his love and reverence for the pope, has little reason to count himself one of the elect of God; and whoso, embracing the cause of the church, yet postpones her claims to those of the world, or seeks to effect a compromise between the spiritual and the secular, is very far from having fought the good fight and won the victory. If we take the Lord's side, we must take it and look to the Lord for support, and trust that he will sustain us while we devote ourselves to his service. We must cease to lust after the flesh or the world. We must trample the world and all its promises beneath our feet, and live for God alone. It is only in this way that we can carry on our war with heathenism successfully, and in dying obtain the crown of victory. If we do so, the world, no doubt, will hate us; the men of the world, the lukewarm, and the liberal, will jeer or denounce us; the strong will persecute us; and the secular will seek to destroy us; but so let it be. The soldier of the cross has no promise of peace in this world, and he is a poor soldier who fears the face of the enemy. His business is to fight, and to fight bravely, and to die with his harness on,—only the weapons of his warfare are spiritual, not carnal.

Several correspondents, some of them highly esteemed friends and most worthy clergymen, and some of them Protestants or *liberal* Catholics, have taken exceptions to our statement that "we have yet to see full evidence that any pope, after he became pope, was a very bad man," and have referred us to the concessions to the contrary of certain Catholic historians. The concessions we are referred to we were well aware of, and we protested against them as unwarranted by the facts in the case. We expressly asserted that they were uncalled for, and that they constitute the only real embarrassment of the Catholic in his controversies with the enemies of the church. We therefore refused to accept them as authority, and consequently there was no use in citing them against us. Their justice was the point our correspondents should have proved.

Our readers are requested to bear in mind that we did not say that we had seen *no* evidence, but that we had yet to see *full*, that is, conclusive evidence, &c. Nor did we pretend that every pope had been a *good* man; we simply said, that we had yet "to see full evidence that any pope, after he became pope, was a *very bad man*." Here is a point which our correspondents appear to have overlooked, and yet it is a point of some

importance. A man may not be very good, may not be a saint, and yet not be very bad, that is, very wicked. The Chevalier Artaud de Montor, in his *Histoire des Souverains Pontifes Romains*, has given us the history of every pope down to Pius VI., and proves, not indeed that every one was a saint, but very clearly that not one of them is proved to have been a very bad man. Instances of weakness he enumerates, but never of great crimes. He shows us many popes, according to human modes of judging, who committed mistakes, and through weakness or love of peace yielded too much to the tyranny and rapacity of temporal sovereigns, but none who were governed by an unjust ambition, or who were grasping or oppressive. He refutes the calumnies circulated against some of them, and especially those alleged against those particular popes mentioned by our correspondents. He is a respectable authority, and far more reliable than Reeve. We have read him for the first time since we wrote the article to which exceptions have been taken, and are well pleased to find him sustaining us.

We have found in our historical reading that Catholics have not always been just to the sovereign pontiffs, and that popular Catholic historians have been too ready to concede charges preferred by the enemies of the church. They seem always to have written on the principle, that, where there is a doubt, the benefit of that doubt belongs to the enemies of the popes. But as the popes are the party accused, this is to reverse the well-settled rule of both law and justice. The accused is always entitled to the benefit of every doubt, on the principle that every one is to be presumed innocent till proved guilty. These authors throw upon us a burden that we are not bound to bear, and, instead of compelling the accuser to prove his charges, they require us to disprove them. This is being generous to a fault, and carrying candor to an excess. No doubt the concessions we refer to may be made without impeaching the sanctity or the infallibility of the church ; yet they embarrass the Catholic controversialist, for the enemies of the church will recognize no distinction between the concession of an unimportant fact and the concession of an essential dogma. Moreover, these concessions, being made by Catholic historians, pass into history, form the popular judgment of history even among Catholics, and thus lead the faithful themselves to regard the facts of history as less creditable to them than they really are, which operates in many to weaken their faith, to diminish their charity, and to damp their zeal. Our rule is to dismiss every charge against either the official or private conduct of a pope that is not fully proved, and we ask other proof than the fact that some writer, who professes to be or really is a Catholic, concedes it. We find concessions even in Baronius that we are far from accepting.

In this same article we said in substance that the popular histories circulating among Catholics, especially in England and this country, have been written by unbelievers, heretics, Gallicans, or lukewarm Catholics. This charge our correspondents deny, though in most respectful

and courteous tones. They refer us to Rohrbacher's popular history of the church recently published in France, as a refutation of our statement. Our statement, if taken literally, may be too sweeping. But we had reference, as was obvious enough, not to the works which have been written and which are known only to scholars, but to the works which circulate among the people, and form the popular judgment of historical persons and events. In this sense we have no reason, when asserted specially of England and United States, to doubt its accuracy. We have not indeed read Rohrbacher's history, but we were aware of its existence, and of its general character. It vindicates the sovereign pontiffs, we are told, and is ultramontane in doctrine, spirit, and tendency. As much, too, may be said of the *Ecclesiastical History* by Baron Henrion. But, excellent as these works are, they are not in general circulation in England and this country, and have as yet done comparatively little in forming the popular judgments of ecclesiastical and papal history in any country.

It was far enough from our intention to ignore or underrate these and many other recent publications of a similar character. These works we regard as among the first fruits of the reaction which has commenced in our times against the heathenism which has prevailed more or less for the last four centuries, and which we conceded had commenced. We did not suppose it had commenced with us; we did not suppose that we had made a new discovery, that we were telling the Catholic public something no one else had told it, and were to be the father of a new movement. We regarded ourselves merely as engaged in a work with others, and as laboring to help on a Catholic reaction which had been commenced, under the providence of God, by choice spirits in all Catholic countries, and commenced, too, long before we had left the ranks of heresy. We lay no claim to originality, even where a Catholic may be original, and our highest ambition is to be a feeble echo of what we hear from others, at whose feet it is our pleasure and our glory to sit and learn. We are but an humble laborer in a great work in which all good Catholics are engaged, and whoever, from the earnest and positive tones in which we sometimes speak, imagines that we claim to be any thing more, or that we look upon ourselves as destined to start or to effect something new, does us no ordinary injustice. Our article was written to help on the Catholic reaction against paganism in modern society, and, if we failed to give full credit to the labors already accomplished by others, it was because our mind dwelt on the tendencies still predominant among the mass of the people, and because we are accustomed to count nothing done as long as any thing remains to do.

We have departed from our usual policy in making these remarks, because we have felt that something was due to the correspondents who had in a kind and courteous manner called our attention to certain statements which they regarded as unsound. The sneers and denunciations, the cavillings and misrepresentations of the newspaper press, we sometimes glance at, but we make it a rule to let them pass for what

they are worth. But hints and suggestions from friends, or even from those who are not Catholics, made in a courteous manner and with serious aims, are always welcome, and will never be suffered to pass from us unheeded, whether we formally acknowledge them or not.

For ourselves, in looking around us and striving to form a just estimation of society in its relations to the church, we see much to afflict us, much that needs amendment, even in the tone and manners of Catholics; but we are far from believing that we of this generation have fallen upon peculiarly evil times. We know no epoch in the world's history in which, had the choice been left to us, we should sooner have chosen to have our lot cast, than the present. The church in this world is always the church militant, and the Christian's life here below is always a warfare. Not till we die can we put off our harness or lay down our arms. But we verily believe that the reaction of heathenism, which broke out in the fifteenth century, has been arrested, and that a decided Catholic reaction against it has commenced, and is proceeding with no little rapidity and force. There is no country where this reaction is more needed, where it has a freer field, or may be encouraged with fairer prospects of success, than our own. It is needed here, as elsewhere, for the salvation of souls; it is also needed to mould our people into a uniform national character, to preserve good government, to secure freedom, and even to save society itself.

A noble field opens here to our young Catholics. Here is a spiritual work to be done worthy of their noblest ambition. Hundreds and thousands of them are now wasting their genius and talent, their enthusiasm and strength, in idleness and sensuality, or in the ignoble pursuit of mere worldly wealth or honors. Let them aim higher, and open their eyes and their hearts to the great, the noble, and the enduring. Let them, each according to his own gifts and calling, give themselves up heart and soul to the work of banishing heathenism from our society, and of rendering this country, if the youngest, the most beautiful and best beloved of the children of the church. Never was there a nobler work, never did a more honorable or glorious career open to ingenuous youth. This country must be won to the church. To win it we must labor constantly to cultivate a high and uncompromising, but sweet and gentle Catholic tone among ourselves, and by our prayers and our examples, our words and our deeds, to bring all with whom we have any relation under the pure and hallowing influences of our holy religion. Would that we could speak a word that would reach the heart of every Catholic young man in the country, and make him feel that to this noble work is he called, and that in it he may find an object equal to the largest ambition, and a good that will fill his soul with sweet joy and peace! We are growing old now, and our hair is turning white, and, young men, we look to you to enlist in the grand army of the living God, and to march forth with brave hearts to the battle against ignorance, superstition, heresy, infidelity, irreligion, the implacable enemies of the church, and always in arms against the Lord and his Christ.

WILLITOFT, OR PROTESTANT PERSECUTION.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1853.]

We have read this little work with much pleasure, as an interesting and valuable contribution to our American Catholic literature. The author has a cultivated mind, a high order of ability, and a dash, at least, of real genius. His style, though slightly inclining to the florid, and sometimes deficient in flexibility and naturalness, is that of a practised writer, and not surpassed in force and beauty by that of any of our popular writers. In its graver parts it is marked by a calm and subdued strength, which is refreshing in these days, when almost every writer scorns repose, and is perpetually striving to appear stronger than he is.

The work is dedicated by an American, we are told, to the Catholics of England, "to remind them of the constancy of their forefathers in the midst of persecution." It is a tale of tragic interest, designed to show the persecutions to which Catholics and their Protestant friends were subjected in the days of James I. of England, and the evil passions which combined with the laws to harass them. It portrays in lively colors the labors, sacrifices, and martyrdom of the devoted clergy, who braved the laws and the hostility of the people to bear to the faithful the succors of religion, and to keep alive the embers of faith in once Catholic England.

A considerable portion of the book is taken up with an account of the conversion, labors, and martyrdom of William Scott, a real historical personage, we are told. He was an Anglican law-student, but, being converted to the Catholic faith, became a Benedictine monk, was placed on the mission in England, and finally hanged, drawn, and quartered for daring to exercise in the land of his fathers the functions of his ministry.

The polemical portion of the work is given in the form of conversations between Scott and Father Tichbourne and young Alton, who tries to persuade him to give up all religion. The conversation with Alton is brilliant, and the ar-

* *Willitoft, or the Days of James the First. A Tale.* Baltimore: 1851.

gument for infidelity is put with great eloquence and force ; but, we are sorry to add, is not very thoroughly refuted. Scott, indeed, exposes one of Alton's sophisms, but he is far enough from meeting the real point of the argument. It strikes us that, in these times of doubt, when the tendency is not to simple heresy, but to the rejection of all religion, the author would have done well not to have put the argument of the infidel so strongly, unless he had allowed himself more space, and undertaken more seriously to refute it ; for n the minds of more than one of his readers that argument will tell as much against all religion as against Protestantism. Few men in these days, unless orthodox and devout Catholics, are much shocked by the grossest infidelity, and there are few Protestants who would not renounce all religion sooner than become Catholics. Indeed, the tendency of the age is to approve Protestantism precisely because, in principle, it is the rejection of every thing the Catholic understands by religion. Believing firmly ourselves, we very naturally suppose that, when we have shown that Protestantism involves the total rejection of Christianity, we have offered what in Protestant minds must weigh heavily against it; but, unhappily, we have only offered what not a few of them will regard as a capital argument for it. It seems to us, then, that when we put the infidel's argument in its strongest form, and its most dazzling light, we should at the same time point out clearly to even ordinary capacities its utter fallacy.

The controversy between the young student and Father Tichbourne is, upon the whole, more satisfactorily conducted. Father Tichbourne's argument is unhackneyed, ingenious, and perfectly conclusive against the Anglicanism professed by Scott; but that, we apprehend, is an Anglicanism seldom, if ever, found in an Anglican mind. Anglicans are Protestants, and as really Protestants as Puritans or Unitarians are, and, with all their talk about the church, no more admit the church, in the Catholic sense, than does any other class of modern Protestants. Some of them may affect great respect for the church's teaching, but it is all affectation. No Anglican believes in a church teaching. The very essence of Anglicanism, under the point of view from which we must here consider it, is to make doctrine the test of the teacher, and not the teacher the test of doctrine. It obtains somewhow or nohow, without the church, what it calls orthodoxy, and then calls this

or that the true church because it professes to believe it. It is always a great mistake to suppose that the real question between a genuine Anglican and the Catholic is ever, as the author supposes, whether the Anglican or the Catholic is the church our Lord instituted. No Anglican is so great a simpleton as to rest his cause on the decision of that question. The Anglican's radical conception of what the church is, and was designed to be, is fundamentally different from the Catholic conception, and till you have compelled him to admit the church in the Catholic sense, it is idle to enter into any discussion with him as to which organized body is the true Catholic Church. The truth is, Anglicanism never acknowledges that our Lord instituted a teaching church, in the proper sense of the term ; and hence evidence of the identity of our church as a corporate body with the apostolic church is no evidence to him that it is the true church, out of which salvation is impossible. It is not till the Anglican is more than half converted from his Anglicanism, that arguments tending to identify our church as a corporation, or an organic body, with the church of the apostles, will have any real weight with him. Father Tichbourne's reasoning, it strikes us, is, therefore, much bettter adapted to those who are nearly prepared to abandon Anglicanism than to Anglicans in general.

The author's good Anglicans, his conscientious Anglicans, seem to us, also, to be adorned with more Christian graces and virtues than we can reasonably expect in the adhering members of any heretical establishment. Does the author award to Anglicanism the note of sanctity, and hold that all the change a true Anglican needs is a change of belief on a few points of doctrine? We are at a loss to understand why the author, and, indeed, our English and American Catholic popular writers generally, are accustomed to manifest a respect for Anglicans which they never show to those whom Anglicanism denominates dissenters. All our author's good Protestants, and especially all his converts, are Anglicans, while all his villains are either renegade Catholics or Puritans. For ourselves, we confess that we have less respect for Anglicanism than for Puritanism. The Puritan, of course, has always a bad minor, but he sometimes has a good major, and his conclusion is generally logical; the Anglican, on the contrary, has a bad major as well as minor, and his conclusion never follows from his premises. Anglicanism is the most absurd and ridiculous, as well as the most

haughty and cruel *ism*, to which Protestantism has given birth. Puritanism in New England was never so intolerant as Episcopalianism was in Virginia and Maryland, and if Puritans persecuted us in England, the laws they put in force against us were all enacted by Anglicans. It is idle, however, to draw comparisons between sect and sect, and the proper course is to regard all Protestants, taken generally, as gentiles, or as apostates, and to predicate of them only such virtues as are possible in the natural order. Hence it would not, perhaps, be amiss if our novelists, who can convert whom they please in their romances, should convert some wicked people as well as those good and pious souls who are only innocently in error, and insist on conversion to Catholicity as the conversion of sinners, not merely as the conversion of the just. They would thus do something to check the pride of us who are converts, and bear some slight testimony against the Pelagian tendency of the age.

In one instance our author raises a delicate question, which, we think, he had better not have done, unless he was prepared to answer it differently.

"'I would know first,' a new idea starting up in his mind as he was about to warn the priest of his danger, 'whether you hold that the pope can absolve citizens and subjects from their allegiance to their king and country.'

"'*As I live, it is no doctrine of the Catholic Church,*' said Father Tichbourne, solemnly. 'Popes have stood up as umpires between the sovereign and the people,—but they have ever been found upon the side of liberty. They have excommunicated the licentious tyrant,—they have proclaimed the point where obedience ceased to be a virtue. And there,' continued the old man, rising up to his full height, 'there the duty of obedience ceases.'

"'Whilst you are discussing this point with me, a danger hangs over you;—perhaps the officers of the law, of our common sovereign, are seeking you as a violator of that law,—as a traitor to your country. Will you submit to that law, or will you avoid or resist it?'

"'I am a man of peace,' replied Father Tichbourne, calmly, 'I can resist no force. I may well avoid the hand of unrighteous violence. The law of God is more binding than the law of man; therefore the law of man forbids me in vain to obey the law of God. I will suffer its penalty without complaint, that is the only obedience I will yield to it'" (pp. 43, 44).

Father Tichbourne comes very near being forsworn, and saves himself only by a special pleading more ingenious than

satisfactory. The popes, in some circumstances, *can* depose sovereigns and absolve subjects from their allegiance, for they have frequently done so, and the argument *ab actu ad posse*, we believe, is allowed to be valid. An author may, if he chooses, observe the *disciplina arcani*, and no doubt sometimes should, for we live in a wicked world, in which we are to be as wise as serpents, while we are as harmless as doves; but he has no right to raise a question and give it an untrue or only a partially true answer. His duty is to answer truly. How far the power of the pope extends, it is for the pope himself, not for us, his spiritual subjects, to determine. We know he has exercised the deposing and absolving power, and we cannot reconcile it to our Catholic conscience to say that he has exercised that power without possessing it. That he has ever deposed a sovereign or absolved subjects, except in accordance with the law of God, or ever will, or ever can, we do not believe, for he does not make the law which binds sovereigns and subjects, he only keeps and administers it. That he always in regard to sovereigns and subjects exercises the powers with which God intrusts him on the side of right, of justice, and therefore of liberty, we, of course, firmly believe, for we hold him to be the vicar of Christ on earth, and under the especial protection of the Holy Ghost, and because we have, and can have, no better evidence of what is right and just than his decision. The author himself says the popes "have excommunicated the licentious tryant and proclaimed the point where obedience ceased to be a virtue, and there the duty of obedience ceases." What more do we say? What is the use of quibbling on terms? Do the popes proclaim or declare with judicial authority for the Catholic conscience where obedience ceases to be a virtue, and therefore where the duty of obedience ends? If no, then all you say is mere verbiage; if yes, then he does absolve the subject from his allegiance, and has authority to do it, and you might just as well have said so in so many words, as to have begun by solemnly denying it, and to have ended by explaining away your denial.

We know how offensive the Catholic doctrine on this point is to statesmen and men of the world, but nevertheless, if we mean to be Catholics, we must stand by it. We did not make the doctrine, and are not responsible for it. God will take care of his own doctrine; all we have to do is to be faithful to it through good report and through evil

report, in life and in death. Catholicity asserts the independence and supremacy of the spiritual order, and its right to resist the secular order whenever it encroaches on that independence, or by its acts denies that supremacy, and it personifies that order on earth in the supreme pontiff, the successor of St. Peter. This is the simple fact, and there is no use in shrinking from saying so, or in timidly seeking to disguise it. We should be neither afraid nor ashamed of God's truth, or of God's institutions. Martyrdom is an evil only to those who inflict it; for their sakes, from charity to them, we should seek to avoid it as far as we can conscientiously, not for our own sakes. Why praise we the martyrs, if we think martyrdom an evil? We cannot serve two masters, and we cannot, as good Catholics, serve the state any further than it conforms to and subserves the spiritual order; and what conforms to and subserves that order the church is established to teach us, and does teach us, through her pastors, more especially her chief pastor, the pope. He is no loyal Catholic who denies this in word or deed, and he is a very timid Catholic who seeks to disguise or explain it away. It is the truth, and are we afraid to stand by the truth, and take the consequences? What have English Catholics ever gained by their denials, equivocations, or special pleadings on this point? They have never gained a moment's credit with their Protestant enemies, and they have been stripped of their estates, imprisoned, exiled, or hung, drawn, and quartered, just as they would have been if they had proclaimed the supremacy of the pope in the fullest and least equivocal terms. The history of English Catholics—who for three hundred years have done all they could do, but absolutely give up their faith, to prove their loyalty to Protestant princes, and who have during all that time been punished as traitors to the government — should teach us a lesson, and make us refuse hereafter to burn one single grain of incense to Cæsar, that is, the temporal power. If we must suffer persecution, let us at least have the consolation of knowing that we have not in the least prevaricated; it is too bad to sacrifice a portion of God's truth to please the state, and to be persecuted into the bargain.

As the subject of the work before us is Protestant persecution, we are naturally led to ask why it is that Protestants, wherever they have had the power, have invariably persecuted Catholics. The fact is notorious, and the history of Catholicity in all Protestant countries is only a reproduction

in substance of the history of the church under the pagan emperors. Some ascribe Protestant persecutions to bigotry and fanaticism, and these may have had their influence; our author hints that they were not unfrequently owing to the desire to get possession of the estates of Catholics, and in this he may be right; but we are inclined to think the principal cause lies in the very fact that Catholicity asserts the independence and supremacy of the spiritual order, and teaches that the secular in all things should be subordinated and made subservient to it. Protestants have, indeed, sometimes persecuted Protestants, but only in the heat of passion, from the love of power, or to save themselves in the eyes of Catholics from the reproach of being divided into sects, and unable to maintain even the appearance of unity. But persecution of Protestants by Protestants has long since virtually ceased. Sects the most widely separated from each other in doctrine and rites are very good friends, and meet together in a world's convention, not in perfect harmony, indeed, but without cutting each other's throats. Laws against Protestant dissenters have nearly everywhere been repealed, or have fallen into desuetude, and the struggle between sect and sect has dwindled into a mere worldly rivalry. But the hostility of Protestants to Catholicity has hardly suffered any abatement. To the genuine Protestantism of the age Catholics are as much an object of hatred and of persecution, so far as it has the power to persecute, as they were in the days of Elizabeth and James I. In the early colonial days, Massachusetts set a price on the head of Father Rasle, and sent out an armed band that shot him down at the head of his flock. If similar things are not done now, it is not because Protestantism has grown one whit more tolerant of Catholicity. Our Irish friends complain, and often justly, of the prejudices they have to encounter, and suppose it is because they are Irishmen. It is no such thing. Their being Irishmen is nothing against them in the eyes of the American people. Their offense is that they are Catholics. Though Catholics in this country outnumber the most numerous Protestant sect, they are hardly recognized publicly as an existent body. Little attention is paid to their bishops and clergy, and in public measures seriously affecting them, no public authority thinks of consulting them, as would be the case if they were Protestants. Secretly every thing is done that it is supposed can be done with prudence to oppress us, and

to prevent Catholicity from becoming naturalized in the country. This secret hostility is preparing to become, and assuredly will become, open and even violent persecution, the very moment that the Protestant community becomes convinced that Catholicity has really taken root in our soil, and, if suffered to grow in freedom, must become the dominant religion of the country. If it has been heretofore tolerated, it has been because it was despised, because it was supposed to serve the purposes of a police for Irish laborers in our towns and on our public works, and because it was not believed to be capable of making any serious inroads upon the native American population.

Now whence comes this inveterate hostility of Protestants of all sects and classes, sorts and sizes, to Catholicity? Why is it that Protestants are more hostile to us than one Protestant sect is to another? It certainly is not from purely religious motives, for Protestantism does not care, and never did care, enough about religion, properly so called, to persecute anybody for its sake. It is not because Protestants feel that our souls are in danger, for they have always conceded that salvation is attainable in our church; and all they contend for, as any one may see by reading their great English defender, Chillingworth, is, that Protestantism is a safe way of salvation; that is, that a Protestant may be saved as well as a Catholic. They only claim, in regard to the world to come, to be as well off as we, and never as a body think of questioning our chance of eternal salvation. It is not zeal for the honor of God, or profound love of truth, for we see them fraternize with infidels, and men who scoff at all they call truth. The English government, which persecutes Catholics, contributes, or lately contributed, to the support of Hindoo idolatry in India, and we have never heard of its persecuting Hindooism and its adherents, or Mahometanism and its professors. The most numerous class of British subjects are pagans, and the next largest class are Mahometans; and yet she enacts, as far as we are aware, no ecclesiastical titles bill against them. It surely, then, is not zeal for the honor of God, or the love of religion. What, then, is the cause?

The cause is undoubtedly secular. This, in fact, is always the cause alleged. Protestantism always denies that it persecutes for religious causes. In England it executed the clergy as traitors, and prohibited the ancient religion because dangerous to the state. Lord John Russell, in his recent legis-

lation against Catholicity, professes to respect religious liberty, and to legislate only to protect the prerogative of the queen. In this country, what is the great argument against us? It is, that we owe allegiance to a foreign potentate, and cannot be loyal to the republican institutions of the country. In England, Catholicity is said to be opposed to the prerogative of the crown; here, to the prerogative of the people. Always and everywhere are Catholics burnt, massacred, hung, drawn, and quartered, their estates confiscated, or the profession and practice of their religion subjected to vexatious restrictions in the name and alleged interests of the secular order. This is the uniform pretence of the Protestants themselves, and we may well take them here at their word, and believe that in this they are honest.

There must, then, certainly be something in the Catholic religion, essential to Catholicity, that is repugnant to the Protestant view of the rights of the secular order; for, if it were not so, Protestants would finally have softened towards us, and become as willing to tolerate us as they are to tolerate downright infidels. Protestantism may vary its forms, but it cannot change its essential nature and live. It professes to be an uprising of the human race in behalf of liberty. This profession, in any respectable sense of the word *liberty*, is ridiculous, for it is notorious that Protestantism everywhere favors despotism, now of the throne and now of the mob. Yet there must be a sense in which what it professes is true. Catholics must not suppose that Protestants use our terms in our sense. Protestantism was an uprising in favor of what Protestants mean by liberty; but they meant by liberty, not freedom from all restraints not imposed immediately or mediately by God himself, but freedom from all religious authority, from all religion except that which man concocts for himself. In politics, as against us, they mean by liberty the absolute independence and supremacy of the secular order, and the subordination and subjection of the spiritual. Protestantism, therefore, was an uprising in favor of liberty, indeed, but of the liberty of the flesh, the world, and the devil,—the three powers which Catholicity labors incessantly to restrain and reduce to subjection.

The hostility to Catholicity is not that it is, as some pretend, incompatible with this or that form of civil government, but that it holds civil government in every country, whatever its form, as much bound to obey the law of God as the meanest of its subjects. It is not merely that it teaches

this, for nearly every Protestant sect teaches the same, so far as words go; but it is that Catholicity is a church, a corporation, a kingdom, extending through all nations, with its centre of unity and its supreme chief. If the church had no visible centre of unity, if it had no supreme ruler on earth, if it were broken into national churches, each confined to a particular nation, and complete within itself, it might teach all the doctrines and observe all the rites it now does, without ever being the object of fear to Protestant governments, or the subject of Protestant persecution. Hostility is excited against it, and the secular order strives to extirpate it, because, having such visible centre and supreme ruler on earth, it has the power, when the people of any particular nation sincerely and firmly believe it, to render its teaching effectual, and to force the government to regard it, and desist from its attacks on the spiritual order, or its acts against the law of God. It is the papacy that is dreaded, and we are persecuted, not because we are supposed to believe error, but because we are *papists*. Catholicity without the papacy, if such a thing were conceivable, would be no object of persecution, nay, would be even acceptable to almost every secular government, as an auxiliary to the civil power. The war is against Peter, on whom Christ founded his church, because Peter is the keeper and administrator of the supreme law of nations as of individuals. As long as Peter sits in his chair at Rome, no state is free to practise injustice, to violate the rights of its neighbors, to oppress its subjects, or to trample on the law of God with impunity. Peter must, then, be dethroned, and war to the death be declared against him, and all who own him as the vicegerent of God on earth. Here is wherefore Protestant governments and people wage such deadly war against us, and wherefore they never tolerate us, or leave us to enjoy our rights, when they are predominant, and we are, or are likely to be, strong enough to exert any important influence on public affairs.

Here is the main secret of that unrelenting hostility with which Protestants pursue Catholics. And what is our remedy? How are we to disarm this hostility? By denying the supremacy of the spiritual order, and asserting the absolute independence and supremacy of the state, that is, sacrificing to Cæsar? In the first place, to do so would be to give up our faith as Catholics, and to become to all intents and purposes Protestants; and in the second place, were we to do so, and still profess to be Catholics, it would concili-

ate us no favor, for no Protestant would believe in the sincerity of our disavowal of the hated supremacy. Shall we solemnly protest that we are loyal subjects, and are bound in conscience to obey the civil authority in all things not repugnant to the law of God? To what end? Protestants care nothing for our protestations; for they have a theory that a Catholic will stick at no lie where his religion is concerned. Moreover, what we solemnly protest, in so protesting, is precisely what they object to us, and in protesting it we only aggravate our offence. Protestants entertain no doubt of our loyalty as subjects, that we will always uphold the constituted authorities in all things not repugnant to the divine law; but this is precisely what they do not want us to do, and what they oppose us for. What they want is the power, when they have the state, to do what they please with it, and when they have not, to make a revolution in order to get it,—two things which our doctrine of loyalty to the powers that be, and of the supremacy of the law of God, directly forbids them. It is not because Catholicity does not favor wise, just, and stable civil government that Protestants oppose it, for that they know it does, but because it condemns both civil despotism and revolutionism. Protestantism in power is civil despotism,—the despotism either of the monarch or of the mob; and Protestantism out of power is revolutionism. When we limit our obedience to the state to those things not repugnant to the law of God, and add, with the apostles, We must obey God rather than men, we deny the civil despotism it would establish, and assert the principles of civil and religious liberty; when we assert our duty to obey the powers that be, our obligation in conscience to demean ourselves as quiet citizens and loyal subjects, never resisting authority save when it commands us to do what the law of God forbids, we deny the right of revolution, we condemn "the sacred right of insurrection," which Protestantism asserts when out of power. Catholicity interposes and protects the subject when the prince attempts to tyrannize, and also interposes and protects the prince when his subjects are disposed to rebel; precisely what Protestantism wars against, for it must always have either despotism or anarchy.

It is clear, then, let us do our best, we cannot commend ourselves to the Protestant world, or convince them that, if we are good Catholics, we are not the enemies of the supremacy of the secular order which they always assert. The

truth which we must as Catholics hold, and the virtues which we must insist on, are necessarily at war with what they as Protestants do and must seek as the supreme good; and if we are strong in a country, the church through us will prevent civil tyranny on the one hand, and rebellion on the other, keeping both prince and subject, both the state and the citizen, within the sphere of their civil rights and duties, and therefore will be able to defeat them. What Protestantism uniformly seeks is intrinsically false and unjust, and therefore in proportion as we are faithful to our religion we must be odious to Protestants, and in a greater or less degree be persecuted by them. Protestantism cannot afford to leave us in peace. It is for this world, and makes men live for this world alone; it is, as we have shown in the foregoing article, essentially heathenism, and as such asserts necessarily the supremacy of the secular order. Catholicity, on the other hand, asserts the supremacy of the spiritual order, and makes religion the only real business of a man's life. How, then, can we commend ourselves to Protestants, or remove their objections to us, without abandoning our religion? How, then, can they ever regard our prosperity otherwise than as dangerous to them?

It is always labor lost for us to attempt to prove to Protestants that we are their very good brothers, and, *in their sense*, as good as they are. We are even disgusted when we find Catholics in one country urging their religion because favorable to monarchy, and in another because favorable to democracy; citing the examples—quite too numerous—of the uncatholic conduct of our ancestors in disobeying the church in order to satisfy the civil tyrant, whether king or people, that in a conflict between church and state we may be relied on to side with the state, and plunge our sword into the heart of our spiritual mother. It is to such conduct on the part of our Catholic ancestors, it is to their readiness to side with the secular against the spiritual authority, that we owe the despotism and anarchy, the schism and heresy, of our times, and the almost universal lapse of the modern world into heathenism. To approve this conduct is as useless as it is uncatholic. The true policy for Catholics is not to seek to commend themselves to the lovers of this world, but to calculate always on being persecuted. All who will live godly in Christ Jesus must suffer persecution. If we are good Catholics, our home is not in this world, and this world does and must hate us. There is no help for us.

Heresy will persecute orthodoxy, error will persecute truth, and the secular will persecute the spiritual. It has always been so from the beginning, and will be so unto the end. All we can do is to love our enemies, pray for them who persecute us, and bless them that curse us, and proceed on our way in the path marked out by our religion, without turning to the right hand or the left, looking for no peace on earth, and seeking none till we arrive in heaven, our home. Our business here is to prepare for heaven, to love, obey, and bear witness to the truth, and therefore to that which condemns the world. There is no compromise or conciliation practicable, or to be thought of. We must either be true to our religion, and thus have all who are not of it for our enemies, or we must be false to it, and have God for our enemy, and hell for our doom.

We know we are told that the age of persecution is past, that advanced civilization has rendered it henceforth impossible to renew old penal laws, and to disturb a man for his religion. Even some Catholics, and Catholic journals, join in the disgusting cant as to religious liberty, toleration, and the liberality of the age. Where are our eyes? Have we forgotten the arrest of the archbishop of Posen, and the imprisonment of the archbishop of Cologne, a few years since, by the king of Prussia? Have we not seen, within the last four or five years, the Jesuits and other religious orders persecuted in almost every country of Europe, the Holy Father driven into exile, pious and devoted priests and religious massacred or assassinated, and are not the illustrious prelates of Luxemburg, Lausanne and Geneva, Turin, and Cagliari still in exile, and their flocks a prey to the spoiler? What age was more civilized, in your sense of civilization, than that of Nero, Domitian, and Diocletian, or what people in modern times have come up in civilization to that of the people of the Roman empire under the pagan emperors? Who so ignorant of history as to rely on what is called civilization as a protection against persecution of the true religion? Who knows not that the more advanced that civilization is, the more hostile it becomes to the church, and the more cruelly does it persecute the true believers? Do not deceive yourselves. The age is not one whit more tolerant of religion than was that of Nero, or Decius, and the religious liberty which Protestants talk about is, as we have often told you, only the liberty of heresy and infidelity, freedom from religion, and the liberty

to oppress it, to subject it to the state or the mob. Open your eyes, and see the whole so-called liberal party throughout the world mad against religion, and combining to destroy its organization, and to deliver men to the tender mercies of the unrestrained despot or the lawless mob, and then repose in the liberality of the age, and our enlightened civilization, if you can. The age claims to be philanthropic and who knows not that the characteristics of a professed philanthropist is to have a heart harder than the nether mill-stone? No, my brethren, join not in the cant of the day; trust none of the professions of religious liberty you hear, come from what quarter they may; and above all, put no confidence in our cold, material, selfish, heartless modern civilization. Read the New Testament, read your tract on grace, and rely no longer on the liberality of heresy or infidelity, on the world or its children. Recall what you have seen in England during the last two years, and learn that your sole reliance is on the truth your church teaches you, and on her celestial Spouse. We are persecuted, we shall be persecuted, and we must make up our minds to be persecuted, and to thank God we are accounted worthy to suffer for his sake; for, if we suffer with him, we shall reign with him.

These considerations explain why it is Catholics are always the object of Protestant persecution, and why they always must be, as long as Protestantism in any form survives; they should also serve to show how idle it is, by any prevarication or disguise of Catholic truth, even if it were not sinful, to attempt to conciliate Protestants. Catholics and Protestants stand opposed to each other as the spirit and the flesh, and there is and will be war betwixt them, as long as the world stands. We cannot help it, and all we have to do is to cling fast to the faith, stand by the church with true and heroic courage, and suffer without complaint whatever we may be called on to suffer, trusting that our good God will abundantly reward us hereafter for all we may suffer for his sake here.

We have been carried away so far by this discussion that we have well-nigh forgotten our author. He has written his book to show the folly of attempting to put down Catholicity by persecution. We agree perfectly with him that it is folly, because the wisdom of the world is always folly with God. But the world cannot reign unless it can put down Catholicity, and therefore it must always attempt

to put it down, either by seducing or forcing Catholics from their allegiance. It can never succeed, for it fights against God; yet never will you persuade it that it is not wise, or induce it to desist from its folly. It is in its nature to fight against God, for it hates him, and it always will renew its bootless war. But we wish our readers here to bear in mind that it is not religious bigotry, that it is not zeal for religion, that chiefly lights the fires of Protestant persecution, but zeal for the world and determination to subordinate religion always and everywhere to the secular power. And therefore we lose all the breath we expend in declaiming against bigotry and intolerance, and in favor of religious liberty, or the right of every man to be of any religion or of no religion, as best pleases him, which some two or three of our journalists would fain persuade the world is Catholic doctrine. Such declamations only tend to render Catholics indifferent to their faith, or to inoculate them with a false and fatal liberalism, as experience every day proves. They produce no effect on Protestants, save so far as they may be regarded as indications of a tendency amongst us to abandon our religion, and turn Protestant or infidel. It is always folly to talk or reason of Protestants, taken as a body, as if they had religion, or cared a pin's head for religion of any sort. Set them down always as modern heathens, and go and preach to them as the fathers did to the gentiles, or you will never touch them. They will persecute you, if they have the power, and regard you as of sufficient importance to be persecuted, until you succeed in convincing them that Protestantism is false and Catholicity is true, and that they are to live for heaven and not for earth. The great error into which we fall is that of considering Protestantism as a form of religion, and adhered to from religious motives. If such was ever the case, it is not now. With here and there an individual exception, Protestants constitute not a religious, but a political and social party, and what they say in reference to religion is said only in furtherance of their secular movements or desires, whether they themselves are distinctly conscious that it is so or not. We do it too much honor when we condescend to dispute with it as a form of religious error; and the great reason why we do not dispute it more successfully is, that no small portion of us sympathize with it in its political and social views, that is, are ourselves Protestants without knowing it. The atheistical politics which are the essence of Protestantism have pervaded the

modern Catholic world, and are nearly as rife amongst us as among Protestants themselves. Our first work should be to unprotestantize ourselves,—a thing we shall not very readily do, if our popular writers take care to deny or suppress Catholic truth as applicable to the secular order. Atheistical politics are well-nigh universal, and till we abandon them ourselves, we shall make poor headway against Protestantism. When we ourselves are afraid to assert the supremacy of the church, and the subordination of the state, and to maintain that the secular is for the spiritual, and not the spiritual for the secular,—when we are afraid to acknowledge the supremacy of Peter in his successors, and deem it the part of prudence to explain away or half deny the papacy,—what have we got to say to Protestants? We yield every thing to them that they care for, and what have we to oppose to them? We tell our readers, again and again, that the theological matters discussed between Protestants and us are not the real questions at issue. They care nothing, as a body, for doctrines. They have no doctrines that they cannot give up at a moment's warning, if necessary to secure their secular success. The whole question turns on the unity and catholicity of the church, as the means of maintaining the supremacy of the spiritual order. As that unity and catholicity are effected and secured by the papacy, the real object of attack is the pope and his spiritual authority, under God, over the whole secular order. The whole question is here. Give up or deny that authority, and you give up or deny all that Protestantism really opposes, and embrace practically all that is living in it, and are Protestants in the only sense in which Protestants are worth counting. We must, therefore, if we mean to be Catholics, be truly—we like the word—Papists, and fearlessly assert the papal supremacy. We shall then get rid of our Protestant, heathen, or atheistical politics, and have a Catholic ground on which to oppose Protestantism. This is the first thing necessary for us. This done, we become politically and socially, as we are in faith and worship, a united body, able to move in one solid and unbroken phalanx against Protestantism, and to produce some effect on the minds and hearts of Protestants. The question will then be discussed on its merits, and we may hope that God will bless our efforts to persuade our Protestant brethren that they should no longer abandon themselves to the world which satisfieth not, but make it their sole business to live for God and heaven.

However, we must never forget that every age is a martyr age, and that the martyr spirit is the only spirit worthy of the true Catholic. We like, therefore, the little book before us, as showing how men can even in modern times die martyrs. It is well fitted to make us love the faith for which our fathers suffered so much, and to strengthen us to endure whatever persecutions for it the enemy shall be permitted to institute against us. Notwithstanding the few criticisms we have ventured on it, it is an excellent little book. Our objection to it is, that it takes too favorable a view of Anglicanism in regarding it as a form of religion, and is not quite ultramontane enough to suit our taste. Aside from these objections it is a good book, written with great power, serious intention, and in the true Christian spirit. We thank the unknown author for it, and hope he will not let his pen lie idle. These are times when none who can speak for the truth are permitted to be silent, and especially none who can speak so well as our author.

PROTESTANTISM AND GOVERNMENT.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1852.]

During the last winter, the editor of this journal, at the invitation of the Catholic Institute of St. Louis, gave in that city a course of five lectures on Catholicity and Civilization, in which he endeavored to maintain that all true civilization is of Catholic origin, and that all nations in the ancient world became barbarous in proportion as they departed from the patriarchal religion, and that all modern nations tend to barbarism in proportion as they recede from the Catholic Church. He did not maintain this thesis precisely as an argument for the church, for he contended that the church is spiritual, instituted not for the civilization of nations, but for the glory of God in the salvation of souls; he maintained it because it is historically true, and because it is a conclusive argument against the carnal Judaism into which the world

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*A *Course of Five Lectures, delivered in St. Louis, on Protestantism and Government.* By Hon. Hugh A. Garland. St. Louis, 1852.

has lapsed, and which proposes simply material civilization and temporal well-being as its sole end. His lectures were nothing but a running commentary on the sacred text, "Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added unto you."

The conclusions of the lecturer were neither flattering nor acceptable to the carnal Jews and gentiles who listened to them. If his conclusions were sound, and nobody pretended that they did not follow irresistibly from his premises, and if what he alleged to be facts were really facts, the boasted progress and intelligence of the modern uncatholic world could be regarded only as false intelligence, worse than no intelligence at all, and a progress towards barbarism, if not arrested, destined to end in savagism. The secular and sectarian press, with one or two honorable exceptions, kept up during the delivery of the lectures a continual fire against the lecturer and his assertions, and even sought to crush him beneath the weight of his own shameful writings prior to his conversion, and which he had long since retracted. But this was not enough. The lectures were listened to by large numbers of the most respectable and influential classes of the city, with deep interest, almost with enthusiasm. Nowhere had the lecturer ever found a more intelligent audience, or been listened to with more manifest respect and sympathy. Something was necessary to be done to counteract the influence of his decidedly anti-Jewish and anti-gentile lectures. So, at their close, a number of anti-Catholic citizens of St. Louis invited Hugh A. Garland, a Virginian, and formerly clerk of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States, to deliver a course of lectures in reply to them, and to tell the people what they were to believe as to the compatibility of Protestantism with civilization and good government. Mr. Garland accepted the invitation so far as to consent to give a course of lectures on the same subject, or at least some branches of it, and the pamphlet before us consists of a phonographical report of his course.

The author does not profess to *reply* to the course by the editor of this journal, but professes to go over the same ground, and, save in the correspondence between him and the gentlemen who invited him to lecture, he makes but a single allusion to him, and that, save as to its too complimentary character, one to which we can take no exception. We might, therefore, very well regard ourselves as under no

special obligation to notice the pamphlet; but as the correspondence which occasioned it is published at its head, and as it was no doubt intended to be a vindication of Protestantism against the Catholic lecturer, without the responsibility of a direct answer to his arguments, and as our silence might be misconstrued by the enemies of our faith, we have concluded not to let it pass without making it the subject of a few brief comments.

With the author personally our relations have long been friendly and affectionate, and we remember with great pleasure the intercourse we enjoyed with him, in the bosom of his own family and elsewhere, during our late visit to St. Louis, the great city of the West. We confess we were not prepared for such a course of lectures as he appears to have given, from a gentleman of his character and intelligence. Surrounded as he is by Catholics, in daily and hourly intercourse with them, and to some extent familiar with Catholic doctrines and treatises, we did not expect from him arguments against us which would hardly have been creditable to a Dowling or a Sparry. We speak of the arguments as to their substance, not of the language in which they are clothed, which for the most part is that of a gentleman, and unexceptionable.

The precise purpose of the author in his lectures he nowhere distinctly states, and we are at a loss to determine what general thesis he means to maintain or to refute. His lectures as a course appear to lack unity of design and distinctness of aim. The author has read a good deal on various subjects, has thought intensely, and has made many just observations; but he does not seem to have digested his materials, or to have worked out his thoughts, and reduced them to a system. He does not appear to have determined his principles and doctrines, and become able to state them clearly and distinctly, so as to bring his reading and observation to bear directly on their illustration and defence. His lectures are to us, though eloquent and high-wrought in passages, confused, indeed chaotic, and successfully defy our powers of analysis. We cannot reduce them to unity, and test their soundness or unsoundness by testing them in their principle. In a word, the author is far more of a Protestant than we had taken him to be, and, like all Protestants, argues and draws conclusions in general without any major premise, or, when he has a major premise, without any middle term. The only way of thoroughly reviewing such an

author is to take him up sentence by sentence, and examine each sentence by itself. This is not precisely the author's fault; no Protestant can write otherwise, without writing himself out of his Protestantism. Protestantism is essentially illogical and unintellectual, repugnant to the fundamental laws of reason, and the Protestant who should undertake in his writings against Catholics to conform to those laws, would at every step refute himself. We have neither the space nor the time to take up these lectures at length, and point out all that we judge unsound in them, and the author must expect from us only a few brief remarks on such statements of his as appear to us deserving of animadversion.

The author very properly, in his first lecture, denies and refutes the doctrine, popular in our times at least, that man began in the savage state; and consequently he denies and refutes, whether he intends to do so or not, the whole modern doctrine of the progress of the species, or the perfectibility of human nature. He also asserts a spiritual order, and maintains that it is above the temporal, or, in other words, he maintains the supremacy of the spiritual order. Thus far he has done well, and done much. His admission that man began in perfection, that is, in perfection as a man, not in imperfection, and his assertion of the supremacy of the spiritual order, contain in themselves the refutation of all his Protestantism, and substantially all that he alleges against the church. But though he recognizes a spiritual order, he does not recognize, properly speaking, the supernatural order, or at least, that God has not only given us a religion supernaturally, but also a supernatural religion. "Besides the faculties of understanding, and the passions, and the appetites, which belong to nature or this outward material order, man is endowed with reason, conscience, and high moral faculties, which teach him truth, what is right and what is wrong,—the great guides given him by his Creator to accomplish the ends of his creation here. These faculties are the highest qualities that man possesses, and that distinguish him from the material world around him. These moral faculties, properly educated and properly instructed with the truths which God, his creator, has revealed to him *by means of these faculties*, can keep in subjection the animal appetites, and guide man to reason and justice. The spiritual quality, being supreme, should govern and control the whole man." We will not press the language here em-

ployed as far as it would bear, because even the best reporters are seldom to be relied upon for strict verbal accuracy; but it is clear from it, that the spiritual recognized by the lecturer is the higher faculties of the soul, which are evidently in the order of nature, since they pertain to the nature of the human soul, and that these higher faculties, without supernatural revelation and without the grace which enlightens, elevates, and sanctifies, are adequate to teach us the truth, and to enable us to attain to our destiny; for the only revelation assumed to be necessary, or to have been made, is the revelation which God makes to us by the means, that is, through the medium, of these faculties, which, as they are natural, must be natural as to its medium, and therefore as to its substance, for no natural faculty can attain to truth that lies in the supernatural order.

The author, whatever he may believe himself, is therefore in his principles really a rationalist or a transcendentalist. Here is his fundamental error, and the source of all his other errors. Revelation with him means only the man arriving through his higher faculties at a higher order of truth than is perceptible by his senses; that is, God has made man capable of attaining to supersensible truth, and as man does attain to it by means of a higher order of faculties than those of the senses, God is said to reveal it, simply because it is not revealed or presented to our apprehension by the external world, to which the author improperly restricts the word *nature*. But this is no proper revelation at all, and gives apprehension of nothing that transcends the natural order. Hence religion according to the author is natural, and is only the educator or the education of our higher faculties. It develops the moral faculties, draws out what is in them, and directs them to their proper objects; but it neither gives to them, or presupposes in them, as supernaturally communicated to or infused into them, any thing above nature, fitting them to perform what surpasses the natural light and strength of man. "Religion," he says, "*taken in its broad and comprehensive sense, as teaching man to live, and bringing forward and making predominant in all his acts that moral and spiritual faculty which belongs to him*, is the most essential and important principle in the training and education of society." Religion in its broad and comprehensive sense must comprehend all that is essential to religion. But as the author here defines the term, it is only the cultivation of human

nature, and implies no grace,—nothing that lifts nature above itself. This is evident from what he immediately adds in the same paragraph:—"How is this to be done? has been the great problem of history from the beginning down to the present day,—has been the difficult question *that has never yet been solved*, and of which it has fallen upon us, in our country, to attempt a solution. I trust that during the present course I shall be able to show that there has been a revelation to man of all those great truths, and that they must be taught to the individual and the community,—must be enforced and impressed on them, *so as to bring out and make predominant in all man's acts those moral faculties the nature of which has been revealed to man by his Creator*"; that is, a revelation by means of these faculties themselves. The end of religion is, therefore, not to raise man above his nature and enable him to attain to a supernatural destiny, but to develop and render predominant in himself and society the higher faculties or quality of his nature. This clearly brings religion within the natural order, and entirely neglects at least the supernatural.

But there is another point involved in this extract, not without difficulty. The author contends and proves that man began in the perfection of his nature, a fully developed and perfect man. Of course in the beginning the higher nature predominated, the spiritual ruled the carnal. He tells us also that the moral faculties, educated and instructed by the truths which God reveals to us through them, are adequate to teach us truth, what is right and what is wrong, to enable us to keep our animal appetites in subjection, and to guide us to reason and justice. But in this extract, how the moral and spiritual faculty which belongs to man is to be made predominant in all his acts, individually and socially, he alleges, has remained unsolved from the *beginning* down to the present time, and the task of solving it has fallen upon us at this late day in this country. So up to the present, all the revelations of God and all our moral faculties have only enabled us to know that the spiritual faculty *ought* to predominate in all our acts, whether as individuals or society, without teaching us in any respect how or by what means it can be made thus to predominate! Man began with that predominance, has always been able through his faculties to know what it is, and to effect it, and nevertheless, how it is to be done has never yet been ascertained, and remains for us in this country to find out!

We mean no disrespect to the author, who is really a man of fine abilities, and, where not cramped or blinded by his Protestantism, a good reasoner and a pleasing rhetorician. We call his attention to this inconsistency into which he has been betrayed, for we believe he honestly means to be a Christian, and is one of the few Protestants who would sooner give up private judgment than the Gospel. No doubt man has the moral and spiritual faculties the author contends for, but we respectfully suggest to him that the cultivation of these does not place a man in the Christian order, nor advance him a single step towards the kingdom of heaven. Christianity is a new creation, above the primitive creation, and holds from God as supernatural creator, as the latter does from God as the creator of nature. It differs as to order from nature. It is the kingdom of grace, and demands of its subjects that they act from God to and for God in a sense unintelligible or superintelligible to any of our natural faculties. Man considered in his natural powers and capacities can no more grow or develop, no matter what the instruction or cultivation he receives, into a Christian, into a citizen or subject of the kingdom of grace, than an alder-shrub into an oak, or a dunghill fowl into the eagle that gazes with undazzled eye on the noonday sun. The most upright and perfectly developed man in the natural order can no more enter into the Christian order without being born again, regenerated, made a new creature, than the foulest sinner, the most revolting criminal. As to live a natural life it is necessary that the child should be born, so to live the Christian life is it necessary that he be born again, supernaturally regenerated. No acts are in the Christian order, or meritorious in relation to heaven, except those that proceed from grace as their principle, and are done for God as the end of grace in the supernatural order, either as the supreme good itself, or as our supreme good. This is what Christianity teaches us, and it discloses the grand mistake of all who make Christianity nothing but a means, natural or supernatural, of cultivating our spiritual faculties.

There was one great fact to which the lecturer to whom the author was requested to reply called the attention of his audience, and on which he insisted at great length; namely, that our nature has been so corrupted by the fall, the understanding so obscured, and the will so attenuated, that left to itself the inferior nature, the appetites and passions, uniformly predominates, and thus man falls in his natural life

even below, so to speak, the plane of his nature. Hence, left to the light and strength of his nature alone, he not only cannot gain heaven, but cannot institute and maintain true civilization. Civilization he defined to be the supremacy of reason, or the freedom of man's higher faculties; and barbarism, to be the predominance of appetite and passion, or of man's lower nature. The former he contended could not be secured except by Catholicity, or true religion, not only as a revelation, not only as a teacher, but as a repairer, as infusing into man a supernatural power to subject the lower, and maintain the freedom and supremacy of the higher, faculties of his nature. Here was the whole doctrine of his five lectures, and all else that he said was brought forward solely to elucidate and defend it. The author, considering that he was, if not expressly, yet in some sense, replying to the Catholic lecturer, and endeavoring to set aside his conclusions, should not have passed over this in silence, or quietly, almost surreptitiously, assumed the contrary, and reasoned from it as an admitted truth. The great fact is, that men under the law of nature alone, without the aid of supernatural religion, of Catholicity, cannot in their present fallen state fulfil the law of nature, and have a perpetual tendency to run into barbarism; for barbarism is in society only the dominion of the flesh in the individual. No training, no cultivation in the order of nature alone, can save a people from barbarism, for it is only by grace that men can in their present state keep the law of nature even, and maintain the freedom and predominance of what the author calls the moral faculties. This is not speculation or theory; it is fact, proved to be such by all experience.

This being undeniable, the conclusion that all true civilization, and therefore all true liberty, are the products of Catholicity, and that all nations lapse into barbarism as they recede from it, follows inevitably, unless there be included under the name of Catholicity other than the true religion. If the alleged Catholicity be the true religion, the conclusion is certain, and the Catholic lecturer proved it *a posteriori* to be true of what he called Catholicity; that is, the one religion which has been transmitted to us from the beginning, through the patriarchs, the synagogue, and the Catholic Church, or church in communion with the see of Rome. He proved, or at least attempted to prove, this historically, and the author had no right to assume the contrary, with-

out at least some attempt to answer the arguments of the Catholic lecturer, or some attempt at independent proofs. He was not, in a *quasi* answer to the Catholic lecturer, at liberty to assume as a conceded truth, that religion in any other sense than that of mere education of man's natural faculties is not needed, and that man is abundantly able without supernatural grace to keep the law of nature, and institute and maintain true civilization. Till he had refuted his Catholic opponent, and established the fact that civilization is practicable without Catholicity, as the lecturer defined it, he was not free to attack the Catholic Church; for that was virtually to deny civilization itself. The Catholic proofs that civilization is impossible without Catholicity were conclusive so long as unanswered, and to attempt, without answering them, to disprove Catholicity, was not to prove that there can be civilization without Catholicity, but, if any thing, that there never has been and never can be any true civilization at all, assuredly not the thesis the author wished to defend. The author has thus signally failed. The corruption of our nature is a fact that cannot be denied, and equally undeniable is it that nature left to itself tends inevitably to barbarism, for we receive the seeds or germs of true civilization only as supernaturally deposited in our hearts. We bear the seeds or germs of barbarism in our very natures, and we have only to act out our corrupt nature to be genuine barbarians.

The author makes no account of this fact, and proceeds, on the assumption of the natural origin of civilization, and of the capacity of nature, without supernatural light and strength, to sustain the most perfect civilization. Overlooking the necessity of grace to enable us to keep even the natural law, he attempts to prove historically that the Catholic Church is false, and that Protestantism and society well governed are compatible with each other. But he has failed in both respects, for his proofs rest on the misreading or the misinterpreting of history on the one hand, and the surreptitious change of the terms of his proposition on the other, as often as necessary to meet historical facts which he can neither misread nor misinterpret. He does not keep steadily to one view of civilization, and his conception of good government is very much that of no government at all, or of a government that leaves men a prey to all the barbarous elements of our nature. Man started, he concedes, with all he needed, a good government, and proper teachers and guides,

but soon fell from the right way, lost his good government, lost his light and freedom, and became a degraded, ignorant, superstitious slave. Through the corruptions of human nature? O, no! But through the cupidity and grasping ambition of the priesthood. Indeed, the author seems disposed to charge all the evils of society, and nearly all the faults of individuals, upon the priesthood, the heathen priesthoods in the world before Christ, and the Catholic priesthood since. Religion has always been perverted and man corrupted by his spiritual guides. Of antiquity, only the Jewish people were preserved in a state of true civilization, and they only by the frequent and miraculous interposition of Almighty God; that is, they were protected and prevented from falling into all the barbarism of the gentiles only by the supernatural grace of God,—precisely the doctrine maintained by the Catholic lecturer. In the world before Christ the author finds himself obliged to concede, and apparently without being conscious that he does concede, the practical inadequacy of nature to sustain good government and true civilization. What becomes now of his doctrine of the sufficiency of nature, of the sufficiency of our moral faculties to tell us what is right and what is wrong, and to keep our animal appetites in subjection? If this were so, how came your ancient priesthoods so corrupt, and how could they so corrupt the people and degrade them to the lowest barbarism?

If the author may be credited, prior to the coming of Christ true civilization was maintained only by the continued supernatural intervention of Almighty God, and all nations tended to barbarism in proportion as they receded from the patriarchal religion and polity. This is precisely the doctrine the Catholic lecturer himself asserted and defended in his lectures at St. Louis, and thus far the author, consciously or unconsciously, agrees with him.

But since the coming of Christ it has not been the same. By the Christian revelation "man found that which had been lost and forgotten, and was once more restored to himself." Nevertheless, only a short time elapsed before he, in part at least, lost himself again, and fell anew into ignorance, superstition, and slavery. His spiritual guides proved unfaithful, his faith was corrupted, and his manners and morals were debased. Whence and by what means? Whence and in the same way in which the gentiles lost the patriarchal religion and polity. Menes, king of Egypt,

"brought all the priesthood into subjection to him, and associated them with him for the purpose of enslaving and degrading the people." In the same way Christianity was corrupted. Under paganism the emperor was not only supreme civil lord, but also *pontifex maximus*, or supreme head of the pagan church. When the emperor became converted, he "placed himself at the head of the church, in the same position which he had previously occupied with respect to the pagan church, and was now as before *pontifex maximus*." This is inferred from the conduct of Constantine and Theodosius, who are alleged to have imitated Menes of Egypt, especially Theodosius, who as *pontifex maximus* took upon himself to decree what is orthodoxy. In this way the clergy were subjected to the prince, made civil functionaries, and employed to pervert religion, and to corrupt and enslave the people.

An ingenious theory, only it does not happen to be supported by a single fact. But suppose it to be true, what does it make in favor of the author's thesis, if thesis he has? Suppose it, it only proves that the subjection of the church to the state, and the usurpation of ecclesiastical functions by the civil power, are fatal to religion and civilization,—precisely what the Catholic lecturer at St. Louis alleged. What does this say in favor of Protestantism, or against the position assumed, that modern nations in proportion as they recede from the Catholic Church tend towards barbarism? Surely there can be no greater departure from the church than to subject her to the civil authority, and to convert her clergy into civil functionaries. Then, again, this very absorption of the church into the state, of which the author complains, is the characteristic of Protestantism. Protestantism was sought as the emancipation of sovereigns from subjection in spirituals even to the spiritual authority, and of giving them supreme authority in both spirituals and temporals. Every Protestant sovereign claimed to be *pontifex maximus* in his own dominions. Henry VIII. of England assumed for himself all the powers that had previously been attributed to the pope, and caused himself to be declared supreme head of the church in his realm. The present queen of England is the sovereign pontiff or papess of the Church of England, and all the bishops hold from the crown. The same is true of the Protestant sovereigns of the Continent, and here, where democracy prevails, the great boast of Protestantism is that it emancipates the people from

all subjection to spiritual authority, and gives them the control of their pastors, and the power to determine their religion for themselves. On the author's own principles, then, Protestantism is a departure from primitive Christianity, and tends necessarily to destroy true civilization, and barbarizes the nations that submit to it, by absorbing the spiritual power in the temporal. Why, when really reasoning from the principles of the Catholic lecturer, did the author put on the air of reasoning against them?

But the author has misread history. It is not true that Constantine or any other Christian emperor ever claimed to be in relation to the Christian church *pontifex maximus*, or supreme head of the church. Constantine expressly disclaimed the character, and recognized in its fullest extent the independence and exclusive jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical authorities in all things spiritual. When he entered the holy Council of Nice, he remained standing till invited to be seated by the bishops, and even then took his seat on a low stool at their feet, acknowledging that they were sovereigns, not he. Theodosius never pretended to any ecclesiastical powers, and in the decree referred to he only promulgated as the law of the land the decisions and canons of the church, made by the proper ecclesiastical authorities. That some usurping emperors, both in the East and the West, sought to encroach on the liberties of the church, and in doing so caused incalculable evil, is no doubt true; but they were resisted by the church, and never succeeded in subjecting the spiritual authority to themselves, save in heretical or schismatic countries. The Catholic Church always asserted her independence in face of the temporal power, and she is the only church that has uniformly maintained the freedom of the spiritual order. Schismatics and heretics have always been ready to surrender spiritual liberty to the prince, on condition that he would protect them in their heresy, or their schism, against the church. One of the reasons alleged by the Catholic lecturer why she and she alone could preserve civilization was because she and she alone asserted and was able to maintain freedom of religion, the liberty of conscience, in face of the temporal power.

But the author tells us that subsequently the popes themselves destroyed the purity and efficacy of the Christian religion, by absorbing the state, and making themselves supreme in both orders. "The second or third successor of

Hildebrand completely triumphed over the emperor, and established himself as supreme head of both temporal and spiritual affairs, and was now *pontifex maximus*." The pope "now placed himself on the throne of the Cæsars, and was supreme in all things, both spiritual and temporal,—was emperor and *pontifex maximus*, as Constantine and Theodosius before him had been, and was like them the supreme object of adoration to his subjects." Unhappily for the author, this is all pure theory, or pure imagination. It is false as a whole, and in all its parts. The second successor of Hildebrand, or St. Gregory VII., was Urban II. He proclaimed the crusades, indeed, and excommunicated Philip I. of France, for a scandalous adultery, but did not completely triumph over the emperor, or exercise supreme authority as emperor any more than his predecessors. The third successor was Pascal II., whom Henry V. of Germany caused to be imprisoned, with many cardinals, bishops and nobles who adhered to the Holy See, and forced to concede to the emperor the faculty of investiture. This was no triumph over the emperor, but for the moment a triumph of the emperor over the pope. The fact is, none of the popes, in their struggles with the emperor, ever completely triumphed; they saved the principle at stake, but were often obliged to concede to the temporal authority in practice the faculties it claimed. There is no instance on record of a pope who was in himself both pope and emperor. The two powers have always been, under the church, distinct, and, saving in the ecclesiastical states, not only distinct, but separate; and the struggle of the popes with the civil power has never been to place themselves on the throne of the Cæsars, to absorb the imperial authority and dignity in the pontifical, but simply to maintain the freedom and independence of the spiritual order, and prevent that very union of the two powers which the author regards as the source of all spiritual and temporal evils. All the power the sovereign pontiffs have ever exercised, or pretended to exercise, over temporal sovereigns, is that of declaring the law according to which they are bound in the sight of God to govern; of subjecting them, as Catholics, to the discipline of the church for their sins, crimes, and moral offences, in like manner as if they were private individuals; and, as the highest recognized court of Christendom, to judge the causes between sovereign and sovereign, and a sovereign and his subjects, submitted to them for adjudication. The pope's right to decide judicially causes thus sub-

mitted is unquestionable, though whether he holds it *jure humano*, or *jure divino*, may not be defined; and whether he has or has not the right to execute by physical force the sentence he pronounces, is a question of no practical importance, because as pope he has never the physical force for the purpose at his command, and cannot have it without the consent of secular sovereigns. He has in the secular order for enforcing his commands, or for executing his sentences, whether upon private individuals or upon public persons or authorities, practically, at least, only moral means, and can have no other.

That the pope ever was "*the supreme object of adoration* to his subjects" is a charge which the author should never have suffered himself to bring. The supreme object of adoration to all Catholics was always, and is, and always will be, God, and God alone, and the author disparages his own understanding, rather than ours, when he supposes that any of us are incapable of distinguishing between God and the pope. The author is wholly unwarranted in his assertion that Constantine and Theodosius were the supreme object of adoration to their subjects, especially if he means their Christian subjects. The pagan emperors were adored by their pagan subjects, but no Christian emperor has ever received divine honors from his Christian subjects. Charges so foul, made without the shadow of authority, by men so respectable in their station and general character as our author, are in the last degree unpardonable, for such men cannot be ignorant that they are unfounded and utterly false. In Mr. Garland's particular case, the charge, we doubt not, was made without deliberation, and from a habit acquired when he was a transcendentalist of substituting theory for fact, and his own gloss for the text.

The author has much to say of the doctrine which he ascribes to St. Gregory VII. We have no space to follow him through his commentaries; but the whole amount of what he alleges, taking it in its fullest sense, is, in principle, that the spiritual authority is supreme, and that kings are no more exempt from the power of the keys given to St. Peter than are their subjects,—in their public than in their private conduct. Supposing the power of the keys, this is nothing to which the author can object, for he himself says the spiritual is supreme and ought to rule in the individual and the community; and it would be ridiculous to pretend that sovereigns are not as much bound to obey the law of

God in their official as in their private conduct. If you concede to the church the power of binding and loosing at all, that is, any power of spiritual discipline, you cannot without gross inconsistency and absurdity subtract all public persons in their public capacity from its operation. Hildebrand, even according to the most the author makes out, asserted only the principle that the spiritual is supreme and ought to rule in the individual and the community; that is, that princes and states as well as individuals are bound to conform to the law of God, and are subject to spiritual discipline when they violate it,—a principle no Christian, and no well-conditioned pagan even, can have the folly to deny.

The author has conjured up a phantom and is frightened at it. He seems to suppose that in the Catholic world the two powers, spiritual and temporal, have been identified, first by the emperor making himself pope, and secondly by the pope making himself emperor. All this is fancy. The church, and therefore the pope, or the pope, and therefore the church, teaches that the two powers are distinct, and she neither claims the imperial purple for herself, nor accords the tiara to the emperor. But in admitting the two as distinctly subsisting powers, she does not therefore admit them as equal in rank or authority, as two coördinate and in all respects mutually independent powers, for she asserts the supremacy of the spiritual order, and the obligation of the temporal power to rule in secular affairs in obedience to the law of God as defined by the spiritual authority instituted by Almighty God, and supernaturally assisted and protected for that purpose. Here is no identification of the two orders, no absorbing of the one by the other, but here are two distinctly subsisting powers, each with its own constitution, only the one is inferior and subordinate to the other, as the body is inferior and subordinate to the soul. This is only the doctrine the author himself asserts in principle, and therefore is a doctrine to which he has no right to object, and to which none but a political atheist can object. The only thing here to be objected is, that the Catholic Church is not the divinely constituted representative of the spiritual order on earth. If she is, the author must concede St. Gregory's doctrine; if not, he is where he was when he began, and obliged to end, not with the conclusion that Protestantism and good government are compatible, but with the conclusion that how true civilization and good government are to be secured is, as he says in the outset, an unsolved

problem, and reserved for the future to solve. This in fact is the author's conclusion. His church is in the future, and so is his civilized order. He takes refuge in hope, and sings,

"There is a good time coming, boys,"

but when or how he confesses himself ignorant, as must every Protestant.

PROTESTANTISM NOT A RELIGION.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1853.]

Since their utter defeat in the seventeenth century by the great Bossuet, Protestants have hardly made any serious attempts to defend Protestantism as a religion, and they seem now very generally prepared to abandon its defence, save as a political and social order. If we may judge from their words and actions, their discourses and their writings, the great majority of them not only hold Protestantism as a form of Christian doctrine and worship to be indefensible, but are disposed to reject all theological doctrines, articles, dogmas, or propositions of faith as addressed to the understanding, and to resolve Christianity itself into a vague and indeterminate sentiment, common to all men,—a universal fact in the natural history of man, coalescing alike with any or all forms of faith and worship, and as acceptable to God when coalescing with one form as with another. They who pass for the more enlightened among them say with Pope, or rather Bolingbroke, whom Pope versified,—

"For modes of faith let graceless zealots fight,
He can't be wrong whose life is in the right."

They quietly assume that faith has no relation to life, and that one's life can be right in any form of faith, or in none; thus entirely losing sight of Christianity as a supernatural life into which no one can be born without faith, or advance without faith perfected by charity.

We say only what the facts in the case warrant, when we say that Protestants everywhere virtually concede that ours is truly the church of God, if it be a fact that our Lord founded any church, or visible organization with authority

to keep, witness, teach, declare, and apply his law, and out of which there is no salvation; and that Catholicity is unquestionably the true and only form of Christianity, if Christianity be any thing more than a collection of moral precepts and curious philosophical speculations, or a general principle of political and social amelioration, to be developed and applied according to the special wants, tastes, and convictions of the people in each successive stage in the progress of mankind through the ages. Grant Christianity as a supernatural law, as a positive religion, as a fixed and determinate form of faith and worship, and they will none of them hesitate in their hearts, hardly in their words, to pronounce it and Catholicity one and the same thing. They oppose Catholicity in reality, not because it is not, but because it is religion, and insist upon Protestantism, not because it is, but because it is not religion, or because, while it has the name and appearance of religion, it is in reality as good as none,—imposes no restraint on their reason or will, their fancy or their passions, emancipates them from all religion as law, and leaves them free to be of any religion, except the Catholic, or of none at all, as they please.

Hence Protestants even attempt to defend their system, if system it can be called, only on secular grounds, and as lying wholly in the secular order. They urge in its defence against us, that it is more favorable than Catholicity to the independence of temporal sovereigns, to thrift, to trade and manufactures, to social progress, to mental activity, and to civil and religious freedom, that is, to the freedom of the temporal order from the restraints of religion. Save for the sake of appearances, or as the effect of old Catholic habits not yet lost, they oppose Catholicity and defend Protestantism only by secular reasons. No doubt they still adhere as tenaciously as ever to their Protestant movement, and boast of their "glorious Reformation"; yet certainly not because they regard it as the only true way, or even as a way, of salvation in the world to come,—certainly not because they regard it as best meeting the religious wants of the soul, and the best fitted to strengthen and console one on one's death-bed; but because, in their judgment, it imposes the least restraint on reason and will, is the best thing for man as an inhabitant of this world and devoted to its transitory goods, and the most convenient for those who would live a free and easy life here without any

grave reproaches of conscience,—because it relieves them from the necessity of submitting their understandings to a law, and from the performance of good works, and leaves them to indulge their own carnal nature, and to follow unabashed their own corrupt passions and inclinations. This is the solemn fact, and in vain will they attempt to deny or disguise it.

This should not surprise us, for Protestantism never was a religion at all. No matter what may be the self-complacency of Protestants, the lofty airs they assume, the great, swelling words they use, or the grave tones in which they speak of their pure, unadulterated evangelical religion, the fact is, Protestantism, considered in itself, is not and never was a religion, true or false, never had a single religious element, never was sought and has never been upheld from any strictly religious motives. Men may have combined some fragments of religious truth with it; they may have retained in spite of it some religious observances, but never were they moved to embrace it, or to contend for it, by any considerations of religion. With the dissolute among the clergy and religious it was embraced because it emancipated them from the discipline of their superiors, freed them from their vows of chastity, and permitted them to marry; with kings, princes, and nobles, because it freed them from subjection to the church, especially the pope, enabled them to reign without any restraint on their will from the spiritual authority, and gave them the rich spoils of the churches and the monasteries; with the laity generally, because it emancipated them from the clergy, and gave them the power to select, teach, commission, and govern their pastors and teachers; and with all, because it freed them from the good works and almsdeeds, the fasts, penances, and mortifications, insisted on by the Catholic Church. Its chief and in reality its only charm for those who embraced it was, that it asserted the dominion of the flesh over the spirit, and of the temporal over the eternal. It had its root in man's fallen nature; it was engendered by that spirit which everywhere and at all times works in the children of disobedience, and was fostered and sustained by ungodly civil rulers, who wished to reign supreme over God and his Christ. The impious emperors of Germany, and faithless kings of France, who in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries made war on the rights of the church, and sought to make the pope their slave, their tool for op-

pressing their subjects, prepared the way for it, and it is only the development and generalization of that doctrine of the independence of the temporal order, which is even yet held by many Catholic politicians, courtiers, and demagogues under the name of *Gallicanism*, which is far older than Bossuet and Louis XIV., and the fatal consequences of which they are far from foreseeing.

Assuredly Protestants do not avow this in just so many words; assuredly they have a theory that their movement originated in a sincere and ardent attachment to Christian truth, and an earnest desire for religious reformation. To hear some of them talk, when in a romantic mood, one would be led to think that they really believed that the brutal tyrants steeped in crime and lust, the apostate monks and renegade priests, who effected their so-called reformation in the sixteenth century, were firm believers, the meekest and gentlest of men, peaceable and holy men, filled with the milk of human kindness, and animated with an ardent love of God, inoffensive in their lives, free from all turbulent passions, laboring only to preach the pure word of God, or the pure doctrines and morals of the Gospel, to win sinners back to their duty, and to induce all to love God supremely, and each his neighbor as himself. How beautiful! What a pity that it is all fancy, romance, formed of such stuff as dreams are made of, with not the least conceivable approach to reality!

Protestantism, save in name and outward form, did not originate in the sixteenth century. We find the first traces of it in Christendom, as far back as the time of the Arians, in the Byzantine court, with the eunuchs, courtiers, and flatterers of the emperors of the Lower Empire, persuading them to usurp the pontifical power, and to make themselves supreme alike in temporals and in spirituals. It is of pagan origin, and displayed itself in all its glory under those pagan emperors who claimed to be at once emperors, sovereign pontiffs, and gods. It was revived in the Byzantine court as a reminiscence of the pagan empire, and maintained for the purposes of that centralized despotism which disgraced and finally ruined the Lower Empire of the Greeks of Constantinople.

In its essence, it is the substitution of the temporal for the spiritual, and man for God; in its original form, it was the union of the temporal and spiritual sovereignties in the hands of the temporal prince, that is, the conversion of the

spiritual into a temporal authority. From Constantinople it passed into western Europe, first under the German emperors, then under the kings of England, France, and Spain. Henry IV., king of the Germans, whom St. Gregory VII. excommunicated and deposed, Frederic Barbarossa, Louis of Bavaria, Henry Plantagenet and Edward III. of England, Philip the Fair of France, and Peter of Aragon, were at least incipient Protestants, as is evident from the sympathy they call forth in every Protestant breast, and the fact that Protestantism honors their memory as its early sons and saints, and denounces as monsters of insolence and rapacious ambition the popes, their contemporaries, who sought to curb their licentiousness and to repress their brutal tyranny. Yet neither in the East nor the West was Protestantism in principle asserted or defended from religious motives, or for religious reasons. The Byzantine emperors had no reference to the interests of religion; they sought only to enlarge their own power, and to make religion their tool for enslaving their subjects. It was not religion that moved the emperors of the West, the kings of England, France, and Spain, to resist the sovereign pontiffs, and to seek to rob the church of her rights and her possessions. They did not seek to extend the empire of religion, and to bring all into subjection to the law of God; on the contrary, their precise, and to some extent even avowed object, was to restrict the province of religion, to enlarge that of the state, and to bring religion itself into subjection to the prince as an instrument of temporal tyranny. In the very nature of the case, even without supposing the truth of the church, if that were possible, their movement was irreligious; for it was against what they held to be religion, and avowedly in favor of the supremacy of the temporal order, which is the denial of religion, and in principle the assertion of atheism. Under any supposition possible, the whole movement was purely in behalf of the secular order for its own sake, and such a movement, we need not say, is not and cannot be called a religious movement. The best thing you can say of it is, that it is a purely secular movement, and the truest thing is, that it is a diabolical movement, instigated by the devil in his ceaseless warfare against the Eternal.

The history of the introduction and establishment of Protestantism, in the sixteenth century, in what are now the Protestant nations of Europe, fully confirms the asser-

tion that Protestantism has no religious character, properly so called. The contrast between its introduction and establishment in Catholic Europe, and the introduction and establishment of Christianity in the Roman empire and the pagan world, is a most striking proof of it. Christianity went forth poor, without staff or scrip in her hand; Protestantism stepped at once into the rich possessions of the Catholic churches and monasteries, and found itself provided with temples, schools, colleges, universities, hospitals, founded and endowed by Catholic piety and charity; Christianity had to make its way, not only against the old religion, but also against the corrupt nature of man, and the whole force of the temporal authority; Protestantism in every country where it gained a footing had the temporal authority and the corrupt nature of man on its side, as its unwavering supporters; Christianity had to encounter physical force, plunder, and murder; Protestantism wielded physical force, plundered, and murdered. The Christians suffered persecution from the old religion, whether Jewish or pagan; the Protestants persecuted the Catholic religion. The Christians demanded of the state the freedom of the Christian religion; the Protestants demanded the civil establishment of Protestantism, and the suppression, under the pains and penalties of high treason, of Catholicity. The apostles in propagating Christianity became martyrs themselves; the reformers in propagating Protestantism made martyrs of others. The apostles and their associates gained the world to Christ by their preaching and their virtues; the reformers gained the nations they did gain to the reformation by the sword, fines, confiscations, imprisonments, exile, death, —by their tyranny, persecution, vices, and crimes. What can better prove that Protestantism is not Christianity, is not religion, is purely an affair of the flesh, excited and strengthened by hell, and led on by ungodly rulers, bent on destroying Christianity, and reigning supreme over God and his Christ?

Of course we do not mean to be understood that Protestantism was actually concocted by civil rulers, or that the primary motive of its invention was to favor the temporal sovereign. After Satan, its authors were lawyers, courtiers, demagogues, dissolute priests, and apostate monks, and their motive was emancipation from the restraints of Catholicity, and the promotion of their own temporal interests and pleasures, their ambition, their cupidity, or their lusts.

This end could not be gained without breaking the power of the church, and treating her as *non avenue* in all the affairs of this world,—a thing then not possible without the aid and the supremacy of the temporal power. But what we do really mean to assert is, that Protestantism made its way in the world only under the protection of temporal princes, by violence against Catholicity and Catholics, and that wherever it gained an establishment it gained it by the sword, civil or military. Luther was protected in his movement against the church by the elector of Saxony and the landgrave of Hesse, and indirectly even by Maximilian I., and his grandson, Charles V., emperors of Germany, who wished to make use of him to force the pope to yield to the iniquitous demands they might have occasion to make. His cause triumphed only in those states whose princes supported it with their policy, their arms, and their penal enactments against Catholics. The reform in Switzerland gained an establishment only by first getting a control of the temporal government, and then using it to suppress by force the old religion, to imprison, banish, or massacre its adherents. In England it was introduced and forced upon a reluctant people by the arts and tyranny of the king or queen and parliament, and it was the same in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. All this is notorious, and may easily be collected from Protestant historians themselves, by any one who knows how to read.

No doubt Catholics sometimes fought and fought hard against Protestants, for there cannot well be war where there is only one party; but they did so only in self-defence. They were not, and from the nature of the case could not be, the aggressors. They were in legal possession, and had been for ages before the reformers were born, and could have no occasion to make war on Protestants, if Protestants made none on them. The Protestants were necessarily the first aggressors, and therefore responsible for all the errors and bloodshed which have followed. They were needy adventurers, intruders, who had and could have nothing save as they unjustly and illegally dispossessed Catholics. They could gain a footing in the world only by displacing those already in legal and rightful possession, by robbing Catholics and plundering the church. No other way was open to them; and this way they took. They began by assailing Catholics in their faith, which had also been their own, in which they had been reared, to which they

were indebted for their science and learning, their culture and civilization, and which they had vowed and sworn to hold and to uphold even to death. They assailed it with falsehood and ridicule, even while professing to hold it, and to acknowledge the authority of the church; and as soon as they became powerful enough in any particular place, they appropriated the Catholic churches to their own use, suppressed by violence the Catholic service, and installed a profane service of their own concocting. They usurped the churches and monasteries, appropriated their revenues, forced the recognition of their innovations, proscribed the Catholic faith and worship, insulted, mobbed, plundered, imprisoned, exiled, or massacred those who would not curse their spiritual mother, and forsake the God of their fathers. What more serious aggression could be offered? What less strange than that such frightful sacrilege, such brutal tyranny, such wholesale robbery and violence, should provoke resistance and drive Catholics to arms in defence of their faith, their church, their liberties, their possessions, their lives, and all that makes life worth possessing? Who can blame them? Who blames the traveller for resisting, even to death, the highwayman, who, with pistol in hand, bids him "stand and deliver"?

Certainly we do not pretend that Protestantism in the sixteenth century was all included in the assertion of the supremacy of the civil power, or the authority of princes over the church. To do so would be to take a very narrow and one-sided view of what by way of courtesy we call the reformation. The reformers certainly preached many heresies in opposition to Catholic doctrines, besides that of the independence of sovereigns, and the principal controversies of the time turned on these. But none of these heresies were new; they were all old, and had all been refuted by Catholic doctors and condemned by the church. The only novelty Protestantism could boast was that of reproducing and combining in one general heresy all the particular heresies which had hitherto appeared and been anathematized separately. But however much these heresies were insisted on by the reformers, they were not insisted on for their own sake, and were contended for at all only inasmuch as they tended to abase the spiritual and to exalt the temporal order—to enslave the spirit and give dominion to the flesh. There is not a single one of the so-called Protestant doctrines, in so far as it differs from the Catholic doctrine

on the same subject, that does not depress the moral and religious order, diminish the authority of the spirit, supersede the necessity of good works, and enlarge the freedom and dominion of man's carnal nature. Such is undeniably the case with the doctrine of justification by faith alone, the inamissibility of grace, the serf-will preached by Luther, and the priesthood or pontificate expressly claimed for each individual Christian by all the reformers. Such, too, was the rejection of the sacraments, the denial of the merit of good works and almsdeeds, penance, fasts, and mortifications. The heresies were not valued for themselves, but for the end they favored; and whoever examines them will find that the end they favor is in all cases the emancipation of the temporal order and the subjection of the spirit to the flesh, the soul to the body. It was this end, though probably not always—and with the mass perhaps seldom, if ever—clearly apprehended, yet in some manner apprehended, that lent the reformation its peculiar charm, and created that wild and frantic enthusiasm in its favor, which marked the great body of its promoters and adherents, and which for a time, like that of the Saracens, swept every thing before it.

No man can doubt this now, however it might have been doubted in the beginning. The reformation, in so far as it has had free scope, has been true to itself, and its variations have only served to place its real and essential character in a clearer light. Its history is its best commentary. In no instance has it deserted itself. Yet it has, at one time or another, abandoned all its special doctrines. The confession of Augsburg, drawn up by its authors, and approved by Luther, abandons not a few of the doctrines which Luther began by calling the church the whore of Babylon and the pope Antichrist for not holding, and in Melanchthon's apology for that confession, the reform, on most doctrinal points, is made to speak almost like a Christian. Refute any Protestant doctrine, save the denial of submission to authority, and you affect no one's Protestantism. The Protestant may abandon the doctrine refuted as indefensible, and strike it from the list of genuine Protestant doctrines; but he is no less, in fact he is even more, of a Protestant than before. Protestants have given up, one after another, all the points principally discussed in the outset between them and Catholics, but they are just as well satisfied with their Protestantism as ever they were, and as ready to proclaim the transcendent merits of their glorious reformation. All this proves

that the peculiarly Protestant doctrines, the theological doctrines, the special heresies, at first promulgated and insisted on, were mere accidents in the movement, and by no means essential elements of Protestantism. Protestants did not break from the church for the sake of liberty to hold and preach their heresies, but they held and preached their heresies as the means of enabling them to break from the church; or to crush the church that they might revel in freedom from all spiritual authority, and live as they listed, without any one to call them to an account.

The supremacy of the civil government, or the union of the royal and pontifical authorities in the person of the king or temporal prince, was a necessary consequence of the reformation in the sixteenth century, as the necessary consequence of a similar reformation now would be to unite the political and pontifical authorities in the hands of the people, or rather of the demagogues who control the people. Kings in the sixteenth century were strong, and could turn any weakening of the spiritual power to the strengthening of their own; the people are now strong, and can appropriate to themselves whatever they may succeed in wresting from Peter. The reform operates now in favor of democracy, so far as democracy seeks to render itself absolute; but it will operate in favor of the "higher-law" gentry, and help on individualism, just in proportion as individuals rebel against the despotism of the mass. As we say by its aid, "People-king" and "People-pontiff" to-day, we shall say by its aid to-morrow, each for himself, "I am king, I am supreme pontiff." "I am my own king, my own priest, my own pope, my own church," we have heard men say in sober earnest, and men too who pass for intelligent, and even great men. The essence of Protestantism is the absolute independence and supremacy of the temporal as opposed to the spiritual; and it is the same in principle, whether it manifest itself in the form of despotism or anarchy, of the despotism of the king or the people, of slavery or licentiousness. But without the aid of the secular authorities desirous of emancipating themselves from the authority of the church, and appropriating to their own use the wealth of her churches and monasteries, it is as certain as any historical fact of the kind can be, that the reformation never would have been attempted, and never could have succeeded if it had been.

We think, and we never cease to repeat it, that too much has been made of Protestantism under the theological

point of view, and too much importance has been attached to the refutation of its attempted doctrinal statements. It was not at first easy to see that Protestants had not some kind of attachment to the particular theological doctrines which they from time to time professed, and it was not unnatural to suppose that they made war on the church because she anathematized their heresies, and would not permit them to hold them in her communion; but it is clear from the historical developments of Protestantism, that the reformers did not oppose the church because she opposed their Evangelism, but that they adopted their Evangelism for the sake of opposing the church. They cared not a pin for their Evangelism any further than it furnished them arms against the church, especially against the pope. The destruction of the papacy and of all spiritual authority was the primary motive of their movement, and any thing that would contribute to this end was welcome, was seized hold of with avidity, and wielded with satanic energy. They did not ask what doctrines were true, but what doctrines would best serve their purpose in the particular circumstances in which they found themselves, which would least revolt the people, and which Catholics would find the most difficulty in refuting to the popular apprehension;—what doctrines would be most likely to command the sympathies of the people, and whose denial could be most easily construed into a denial of what the people had always believed to be essentially Christian. Hence they insisted strenuously on justification by faith alone; and when the Catholics maintained that faith without works is dead, and cannot justify, they set up the cry, that the pope and cardinals denied the necessity of faith, and taught that we are justified by our works without the grace of Christ. Hence, too, they insisted on the Bible as the rule of faith, and when the Catholics replied, that the Bible, to be the rule of faith, must be taken as interpreted by the church, by the fathers, by popes and councils, they cried out to the people: "See the arrogance of the pope and cardinals! They set themselves above the Bible, and deny the authority of the word of God!" Then they quoted Scripture, as Satan did to our Lord in the wilderness, and poured forth streams of burning eloquence in praise of the Holy Scriptures. But all was for the one purpose of demolishing the church; and to effect that purpose we have seen them in later times ready to shift their doctrines and set up contradictory cries; thus proving that their whole Evangelism

was adopted merely as a means to an end, and in no sense as the end itself. It is all, except with a few old women of either sex, now abandoned, and now the cry is, Social progress! The rights of man! Civil and religious freedom! Earthly felicity!

In Great Britain Catholicity must be put down because it encroaches on the prerogatives of the crown, and is incompatible with the civil and religious freedom of—her Majesty as the depositary of the royal and pontifical authorities, and of the laity to rule the clergy; in these United States it must be put down, or at least opposed, because incompatible with our political institutions, with democratic freedom, and because its progress would destroy our free republic and bring us into hopeless civil and religious bondage to a foreign potentate. What does all this prove, but that specific Protestant heresies are of minor importance even with Protestants, and that the real object of their hostility is the church herself, as claiming authority from God to keep, interpret, and apply his law; and that they seek to destroy her because she asserts and maintains, where free, the supremacy in all things of the spiritual order, or the rightful dominion of God and his Christ? "Why have the Gentiles raged, and the people devised vain things? The kings of the earth stood up, and the princes met together, against the Lord, and against his Christ [saying], Let us break their bands asunder; and let us cast away their yoke from us." (Ps. ii. 1 – 3.) This is the secret of the whole movement, and say what you will, the whole of Protestantism is here condensed in the inspired words of the monarch-prophet: "The kings of the earth stood up, and the princes met together, against the Lord, and against his Christ: Let us break their bands asunder; and let us cast away their yoke from us." They would not bear the yoke of Christ and learn of him, although his yoke is sweet and his burden is light.

A glance at the men and the means by which the reform was introduced into what are now the Protestant nations of Europe will fully confirm all this. Of the men little need be said. They were all either renegade priests and apostate monks, or princes notorious for their vices, their crimes, and their brutal tyranny. There is not one of the prominent leaders of the reformation in whom you can discover a single redeeming moral feature. Luther, Melanchthon, Zwinglius, Farel, Calvin, Beza, Cranmer, as well as the princes who protected them and supported their cause by

their arms and their policy, were men who exhibited in their lives, at least from the moment of their revolt against the church, not a single Christian, and scarcely a heathen, virtue. Those princes were all perjurers; they were all guilty of sacrilege and robbery; some of them were gross gluttons and drunkards, wallowing in the mire of sensuality; and all of them were brutal tyrants, and both as men and princes the successful rivals of the worst emperors in the worst days of pagan Rome. Not Nero, Decius, Diocletian, Maximian, Galerius, and Maximin were more cruel persecutors, or persecutors on a larger scale, than not a few of them. John the elector of Saxony was one of these princes. He was the greatest glutton of his age, and was obliged to support his protuberant belly, stuffed with wine and viands from early morning, by means of an iron hoop. We may well understand his infatuation for a reformation that abolished Lent, fasts, and abstinence on Fridays and Saturdays. His cupboard was more richly garnished than any other in Germany with vases of all sorts, stolen from the refectories of the monks and the sacristies of the churches. His son Frederic exhausted his time and health at the table, or in the chase, and, like him, devoted to wine and good cheer, scarcely knew his catechism. The landgrave, Philip of Hesse, was proverbial for his lewdness. A shameless adulterer, who, to resist the assaults of the flesh, after a while demanded and obtained from Luther and his associate reformers permission to sleep with two wives. Wolfgang of Anhalt was so grossly ignorant, it is said, that he had never been able to make the sign of the cross, and Ernest and Francis of Lunenburg, though they would not suffer their servants to pillage the churches, took care to rob them with their own hands.* These were the best of the lot, against whom we have the least to say. The Protestant princes of Germany generally, while their private characters were as corrupt as need be, were obliged to observe some measure in their public conduct, through the influence of the emperor and the faithful princes of the empire. The character of Henry and Elizabeth of England is well known, and needs not to be dwelt upon. Our friend Paul Peppergrass, Esq., save that he is too favorable to the queen regnant, has done enough for the latter in his *Spaewife, or the Queen's Secret;* and M. Audin, with all his admiration for the former, and depreciation of

* Audin, *Hist. de la Vie de Luth.*, tom. II., p. 402.

Clement VII., has furnished evidence sufficient that he had no loyalty, that he was a brutal tyrant, and the slave of his lusts. Christiern and Frederick of Denmark, Gustavus Wasa of Sweden, both as individuals and as sovereigns, fall far below the common heathen standard ; and no Protestant, acquainted with their history, can have the effrontery to claim for them, even in his eyes, any other merit than their unprovoked and brutal hostility to the church of Rome, and their successful defence of Protestantism.

Christiern, or Christian II., in 1513, succeeded his father, John II., king of Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, by the Union of Calmar united under one crown, since 1397. He was crowned the following year by the archbishop of Lunden, and took a solemn oath to maintain the Catholic faith, and the privileges of the clergy and nobility, privileges which very much restricted the royal power. The estates also made him promise that he would do nothing, during his life, to procure the throne, which was elective, not hereditary, for any one of his children, or for any other person. He was of an ambitious, despotic, cruel, and perfidious nature. He removed the grandees from the administration of the kingdom, and committed the management of affairs only to persons of low birth and mean condition. His principal counsellor was a Netherlandish woman, whose daughter was his concubine. He was devoted to the pope and the Roman church, indeed, but only inasmuch as he could turn his devotion to his own interest. He permitted, in 1517, the Papal nuncio, Arcimbold to preach the indulgences in the kingdoms of the North, but only in return for a present of eleven hundred florins ; and as the nuncio did not satisfy him with regard to certain political intrigues in Sweden, he took from him the following year a much larger sum collected for the basilica of St. Peter.

Sweden was then divided into two parties, the one, having at its head Gustavus Trolle, archbishop of Upsal, and *ex officio* president of the senate, supported Christiern ; the other, having for its chief Sture, administrator of the kingdom, demanded a national king, contrary to the Union of Calmar. This last party deposed the archbishop, razed his castle, and imprisoned him in a monastery,—an illegal proceeding certainly, but which, it is said, was approved by the nuncio, who engaged the archbishop to submit to it. But in 1518, Christiern arrived before Stockholm. Being repulsed by Sture, he had recourse to artifice, and proposed

an interview with the administrator in the city, and obtained six hostages selected from the first families. These hostages, among whom was Gustavus Wasa, having come on board the Danish fleet, were treated by the perfidious monarch as prisoners, who departed with them for Denmark. In 1520 he returned to Sweden with an army; the Swedes were defeated, and Sture mortally wounded. The archbishop of Upsal presided over the Swedish estates, and proposed the recognition of Christiern, which was done. A general amnesty was proclaimed. Stockholm, whither had retired Sture's widow, resisted for some little time. Christiern himself came with his fleet, and anchored before it. Almost all the clergy, and a portion of the nobility, went on board to render him their homage. The city at length consented to receive him. He made his entry into the city, September 7; promised to preserve to Sweden her liberties, to give the widow of the administrator an establishment in Finland, and to forget the past. He deferred his coronation to November 2, convoked the estates for that day, and departed for Denmark.

On his return to Sweden, near the end of October, he demanded of the bishops and senators an act recognizing him as hereditary monarch, and caused himself to be crowned by the archbishop of Upsal two days after. There were on this occasion feasts and rejoicings, in which he showed himself attractive and affable, but only the better to conceal his wicked designs. Under pretext of executing the bull of the pope against those who had deposed the archbishop, but in reality to pluck down the best heads in the kingdom, and to inaugurate his despotism by their blood, he caused them, in spite of the amnesty, to be dragged before a judicial commission, and, according to some historians, without even waiting for any sentence, sent the executioners to announce to them their last hour, refused them the consolation of confessing to a priest, and had them executed publicly,—senators, lords, and bishops, in one and the same day, to the number of eighty or ninety. Not content with the murder of so many noble personages, he abandoned the inhabitants of Stockholm, without distinction of age or sex, to the fury of his troops. As a tiger, when he has once tasted blood, Christiern seemed insatiable. In his return from Sweden to Denmark he caused scaffolds to be erected in all the towns through which he passed, especially in Wadsten, the land of St. Bridget. In the monastery of

Nidal, though he had been received there with great honors, he caused the abbot and the monks to be seized, on coming out from Mass, and cast into the river, with their hands tied behind their backs. The abbot, having broken from the cords, attempted to save himself by swimming, when the tyrant caused his head to be smashed with the blow of a lance.

With such instances, we shall not be surprised to find that this Nero of the North had a natural sympathy with the god and the religion of Luther,—a tyrant-god, who punishes us not only for the evil we cannot help doing, but even for the good we do, and do the best we can,—a god without faith, who breaks his word, and abandons his church, after having promised to be with it all days to the consummation of the world;—a religion which makes man a machine, good works so many crimes, and crimes so many good works,—which gives in principle every man himself for his only law, but in fact to all for their only rule artifice and force, otherwise tyranny. Thus, in 1520, he himself demanded a Lutheran preacher, and assigned him a church in Copenhagen, whence he might retail his new gospel. The following year he prohibited the university of his capital from condemning the works of Luther. The archbishopric of Lunden possessed in property the island of Bornholm; he claimed it for the crown, and the archbishop resigned in order to withdraw himself from embarrassment. As the canons refused to accede to the good pleasure of the king, he sent them to prison, and took possession of the island in 1521. He nominated his old barber and favorite, Schlaghoek, archbishop of that metropolis, then, in the following year, 1522, caused him to be hung and burned for having counselled the massacre of the bishops and lords at Stockholm. In his code of laws he prohibited every bishop, priest, or monk from acquiring any property, unless he was married. He also prohibited all ecclesiastics from appealing to Rome, or having their causes judged in the Roman courts, and he ordained that all ecclesiastical causes should be terminated within the kingdom before a tribunal instituted by himself.*

Christiern, though always professing himself to be a Catholic, as enabling him to work more effectually for the

* Schroeck, *Hist. de la Reformation*, tom. II., p. 67; and Rohrbacher, *Hist. Univ. de l'Eglise Cath.*, tom. XXIII., pp. 292–295.

destruction of the faith and the liberties of his subjects, was succeeded in 1523, in the Danish throne, by his paternal uncle, Frederic, duke of Sleswig and Holstein. He on his coronation also, though a Lutheran in his heart, swore to maintain the Catholic faith and the rights of the bishops. Dissimulation was necessary to prepare his people for apostasy. But in 1526 he took under his protection a Lutheran preacher, an apostate monk, and named him his chaplain. In 1527, in the diet of Odensee, he announced that he should not keep his oath, for Luther had discovered many abuses in the ancient religion of Denmark, Sweden, and the Christian world; consequently it was his royal will that the two religions, the new of Luther and the old of St. Anscarius, should be placed on a footing of equality, till the convocation of a general council. But he did not stop there. In spite of the opposition of the bishops and a part of the nobility, the king made the diet resolve,—1, that the bishops shall no longer seek confirmation of the pope, but henceforth of the king; 2, that the clergy, the churches, and the monasteries shall preserve their actual goods, till dispossessed by the laws of the country; and 3, that ecclesiastics and monks be permitted to marry.* Thus this Protestant king did not blush to break the oath of his election, to rob his people of the faith of their fathers, the church of her goods, the pope of his primacy, the bishops of their divine mission, so as to make of them and other ecclesiastics mere civil functionaries, *employees* of the police, consoling themselves for their apostasy and degradation, in the arms of a wife who was not and could not be theirs. Christiern III. finished the apostasy of Denmark by violence, in 1533. He cast the bishops into prison, and liberated them and restored their goods only on condition that they renounced the goods of the church, and desisted from all opposition to the Protestant innovations. These kings purchased the consent of the nobles by giving them a large share of the plunder of the goods which Catholic faith and piety had dedicated to God. Similar measures forced Norway into apostasy in 1537, and Iceland in 1551.

The reformation was introduced into Sweden very much in the same way. Gustavus Ericson, or Wasa, whose father fell in the massacre of Stockholm in 1520, escaped, in 1519, from the Danish prison in which he was detained. During

* Schroeck, *apud* Rohrbacher, *ubi supra*, pp. 295, 296.

his sojourn at Lubeck he imbibed a taste for the religious revolution of Luther, and kept up a secret correspondence with that apostate monk. Having, under various disguises, entered Sweden, and being sustained by the peasants of Dalecarlia, who were zealous Catholics, he beat in several encounters the Danes who occupied the kingdom, was chosen administrator in 1521, and king in 1523. The Swedish kings were elective; and they possessed only limited powers and very moderate domains. The nation was jealous of its liberty, and would not suffer its kings to be too powerful. Gustavus availed himself of the present occasion to change this state of things. Lutheranism seemed to him an admirable means to enrich himself with the goods of the churches and monasteries, to confiscate the liberties of his subjects, and to subject conscience itself by breaking the spiritual independence of the bishops, and making himself pope, and imposing himself and his future descendants on Sweden as hereditary kings and popes. What Gustavus could comprehend, he could ably execute. Three priests returned into Sweden preaching the heresies of Luther; he favored them, seconded them in every way, only recommending them to act with prudence, so as not to divulge his secret and stir up public opinion against him; for the mass of the nation were as yet sincerely attached to the religion of their fathers. Of these three sectaries, he appointed one professor of theology in the University of Upsal, the second preacher in the great church of Stockholm, the third chancellor of the kingdom. He deposed the bishop of Westeras and Canute, archbishop of Upsal, under the pretext that they were engaged in a conspiracy, and for the latter substituted John Magnus, or Store, who, however, persevered in the Catholic religion, as did also his brother Olaüs Magnus, archdeacon of the cathedral of Strengnes. Among the Dominicans charged with the inquisition in Sweden there was a prior who was secretly a Lutheran; Gustavus gave him a commission to visit all the monasteries to sow in them the seeds of the reformation. The strongest opposition he found was among the religious of his own order. Gustavus threatened to expel them from the country, and forthwith deprived them of their power as inquisitors. In 1525, Olaüs Petri, a priest, one of the three sectarians, whom he had established as preacher at Stockholm, was publicly married, and Gustavus, far from being displeased, was himself present at the nuptials; this scandal was im-

mediately imitated by many monks and nuns. Gustavus seized the monastery of Gripsholm, and expelled the religious. The people showed signs of discontent, but to seduce and enslave them, it was necessary to destroy the power of the bishops, and the best way to do this was to disunite or separate them, and promise their spoils to the nobles. The archbishop of Upsal was primate of the kingdom and legate of the pope. Gustavus sent him into Poland, ostensibly to negotiate his marriage with the princess royal, but in reality to deprive the clergy of Sweden of their head and centre. Having thus deprived the Catholic clergy of their chief, he proceeded to strike them a severe blow. The two deposed prelates, Canute, archbishop of Upsal, and Sunanveder, bishop of Westeras, had sought refuge in Norway; Gustavus contrived to draw them back into Sweden, accused them of sedition, and put them to death in 1527.*

After going through the farce of resigning and reaccepting the crown, Gustavus proceeded with a bolder step, and made the estates resolve that the revenues of the crown should be augmented by the goods of the bishops, churches, and monasteries, and that the bishops should have for their support what it pleased the king to give them, who would have full power to govern the churches and monasteries; that the nobles should have also the right to resume the goods given, sold, or pledged by their ancestors ; that no one should be permitted to say that the king wished to introduce a false religion ; on the contrary, all the inhabitants of Sweden must hold in the highest esteem the pure word of God as taught by the Evangelical preachers.† Thus the estates of Sweden denied the faith of their fathers, embraced the new heresies, and declared their king infallible, on condition that the nobles pillaged, robbed, the churches and monasteries with him. Cicero said, indeed, that "unjust decrees no more deserve to be called laws, than the plots of thieves."‡ Plato, in his *Minos*, holds the same language. But they were pagans.

Over thirty monasteries were suppressed in Sweden, and plundered by the king and nobles. One of the first three sectaries was Lawrence Petri. In 1531, Gustavus caused him to be elected archbishop of Upsal, which see was not

* Schroeck, tom. II., p. 36.
† Ibid, p. 42.
‡ Cicero, *de Legibus*, lib. II, n. 5.

vacant; and as the intruder was unwillingly received by the chapter, he gave him a guard of fifty men, and substituted Lutherans for the faithful canons. However, the three sectaries, the two brothers Petri and the Chancellor Anderson, were not sufficiently submissive to the caprice of the monarch, and incurred his disgrace. In 1540, he compelled Lawrence Petri to preside over a commission that condemned Olaüs Petri and the chancellor to death. The same year the king-pope succeeded in causing the Swedish royalty and papacy to be declared hereditary in his family. Thus a nation, hitherto Catholic and free, lost at once its faith and its liberty, by the artifice and violence of an able usurper. Modern philosophy calls this usurper by the title of Great, which shows what both the title and modern philosophy are worth.*

These scraps of history, which we translate from the Abbé Rohrbacher's excellent History of the Church, will show by what sort of men, and by what means, the reformation was introduced into the Scandinavian kingdoms. It was introduced by civil tyrants, who established it by artifice and force, and suppressed the Catholic religion by violence, plunder, and civil enactments. In a similar manner, by similar agencies, was Protestantism introduced and established in every country in which it became or is even now dominant. Not only was Protestantism introduced by the arts, the violence, and the brutal tyranny of the civil rulers, who espoused it, but it has maintained itself only by the aid of the civil power, which ordained it to be received, and suppressed the Catholic worship by the most severe system of civil pains and penalties. Till quite recently, it was not lawful to exercise the Catholic worship, or for a Catholic even to live in any one of the three Scandinavian kingdoms; and even now it is not lawful for a Dane, a Swede, or a Norwegian, to abandon the state establishment, and become reconciled to the church. No Catholic has, or can have, any civil rights in those kingdoms, and for a Lutheran to become a Catholic is confiscation of goods and perpetual banishment from the kingdom. We are aware of no Protestant state on the Continent of Europe in which it is not against the civil law either to reconcile a member of the state religion, or for him to become reconciled, to the church. If there be any exception to this remark, it is of a very recent date.

*Rohrbacher, tom. XXIII., pp. 206–300.

In several of the German Protestant states, Catholics are, indeed, not punished simply for being Catholics, and the Catholic worship is tolerated for the Catholic portion of the population; but we know of none in which Protestants have the legal right to become Catholics. The Prussian government recently complained of the Catholic missionaries for receiving converts from Protestantism to Catholicity.

The sketch we have given of the introduction and establishment of Protestantism in Denmark and Sweden is substantially the history of its introduction and establishment in England. It was first introduced by the king and parliament. Henry VIII. was an artful as well as a despotic prince. With the mass of the Lutheran heresies he had no sympathy; he had profited by his early theological studies too much not to reject them with contempt; but he was from his coronation opposed to the papacy, except as vested in himself. This is evident from the alterations he made in his coronation oath, the day after he had taken it. For a time, however, he lived on good terms with the pope, and even sustained his cause against France and the Emperor Maximilian I.; but partly because he found it for his interest to do so, and partly, no doubt, through the influence of Cardinal Wolsey, not indeed one of the best, but one of the greatest, men England ever produced. As soon as the cardinal fell, Henry broke through all restraints, and gave free scope to his own brutal and despotic nature. It is a great mistake to suppose that the divorce case was the cause of Henry's schism. It was only its occasion; and there can be no doubt that he would have broken with Rome on occasion of the least contradiction from the pope. He only waited a pretext for declaring the independence of the crown, and for usurping the spiritual authority. The refusal of the divorce gave him this pretext. In executing his purpose, he proceeded with art as well as tyranny. He did not shock his people by at once proclaiming the new heresies and suppressing the old Catholic faith and worship. He maintained the general Catholic faith, the sacraments, and the mass, and hung or burnt those who taught any thing against them. He levelled his blows at the papacy and labored only to throw off the power of the pope, in order to claim it for the nation, that is, for himself. He flattered and won over all his bishops, already his creatures, save the bishop of Rochester, Cardinal Fisher, by releasing them from their depend-

ence on Rome, and gained the nobles by distributing among them the spoils of the rich abbeys and monasteries. He worked upon the fears of the clergy through the terrible writ of *præmunire*, and by bribery, cajoling, force, and the axe of the executioner, he broke their power. Having broken his kingdom from Catholic unity, and made the king pope as well as king, he prepared the way for Somerset, the protector during the reign of the boy Edward, to introduce Protestantism and to suppress the Catholic worship.

The English people, deprived of faithful shepherds, and shaken in their faith, were still attached at heart to the religion of their fathers; but the short reign of Mary, the best sovereign England has had since Edward the Confessor, and one whom we, as of English descent, delight to honor, did not suffice to consolidate the reaction, and place the papal supremacy on a firm footing in the kingdom. Mary's unfortunate marriage with Philip of Spain, added to the hatred of the pope that of the Spaniard; while her still more unfortunate consent to Philip's declaration of war against the sovereign pontiff, interrupted the blessing of God on her exertions to restore permanently the Catholic religion. The cause of Catholicity became allied in the popular mind with that of Spanish dominion, and a new and more legitimate national feeling was thus aroused against the old religion, and in favor of the reformation. Yet Elizabeth, who succeeded Mary, and consummated the apostasy of England, ascended the throne as a Catholic, professed herself a Catholic, and swore to maintain the Catholic religion. Had she avowed herself a Protestant, she never could have been crowned. She and her counsellors all dissembled their Protestantism till they had obtained the power, and then only little by little threw off the mask. She first severs her kingdom from communion with Rome, and thus knocks out the keystone of the English hierarchy; she then expels all the faithful bishops from their sees, and intrudes creatures of her own; then abolishes the mass, establishes a new service, prepared from the old, and commands all her liege subjects to assist at the new-fangled worship, under the most severe pains and penalties. Thus, whether we speak of Henry, Edward, or Elizabeth, the reform was introduced into England and established by the temporal authorities, by perjury, fraud, sacrilege, robbery, and brutal tyranny,—all for the purpose, not of promoting religion, but of freeing the government from religion, and uniting in the crown

the royal and pontifical authorities. It has also been maintained in the land of our ancestors by the most shameful penal laws that ever disgraced the code of any nation, civilized or barbarous, and by the most cruel and unremitted persecution of Catholics. The penal laws were to some extent repealed in 1829, but the first step to their revival has been taken in the recent Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, and the spirit of persecution is revived with almost its old ferocity. The late trial of Dr. Newman, for an alleged libel on the renegade Achilli, has proved that no Catholic can in any case that touches Protestant prejudice hope for justice from an English court and jury.

If from England we turn to Zurich, Berne, and Geneva, pass to the Dutch Netherlands, or cross over into Scotland, we have, in principle, only the same sickening story to repeat. Everywhere the reform is the work of perjury, fraud, sacrilege, robbery, imprisonment, exile, and massacre. In France and Ireland all these were attempted, but happily in vain, and both kingdoms have remained substantially Catholic. Now are we to be told, "in the middle of the nineteenth century," that the motive which inspired the actors in the tragedy, and induced the employment of these base and criminal means, was a religious motive? Are we to be so mocked? Are our understandings to be so insulted? No. The men who adhere to Protestantism, if ever they investigate their own motives, know perfectly well that they adhere to it only because it emancipates them from all religion, by subjecting religion now to the state and now to the individual judgment or caprice.

This is the only solution of the problem. The reformation in principle was not an attempt, though a mistaken or unlawful attempt, to get a purer and better religion than the Catholic; it was simply a rebellion against God, prompted by the flesh, incited by the devil. It was born of hell, and hence it is that we seldom affect or disturb it by refuting its heresies. Hence the reason why we everywhere and at all times object to treating it as a form, though a false form, of Christian doctrine and worship, and insist that it shall be treated solely as a sin. Protestants in defending themselves only on political and social or secular grounds concede that they have no religion to defend, and that it is not as a religion they adhere to the reformation. We must oppose Protestantism, not as a false theology, but as a revolt of the flesh against God,—as the mad attempt of

men to set themselves up above their Maker, and to live as they list.

No doubt many Catholics will think this too severe, but it is because we apprehend that there are some who will so think that we say it. We wish our friends to be fully aware of the enormity of Protestantism. We are not wholly ignorant of the infinite tenderness of the Gospel, and we can admire, as well as others, the beauty of Christian charity. We know, too, that many, very many, Protestants are amiable in their social relations, are faithful to their engagements, and honest in their dealings, and so far very superior to their Protestantism itself; but not therefore are we to confound their purely human or gentile virtues with the supernatural virtues of the true Christian. We know what allowances also to make for ignorance and for prejudices early instilled in the minds of Protestants; but we are speaking to Catholics, who are always in danger of thinking too favorably of those who are involved in the Protestant rebellion against God. We have no wish to be severe; we speak not in wrath; we would willingly lay down our life to bring Protestants into the church of God; but we believe it true kindness, true charity, to strip off the mask from Protestantism, to expose its real features, and to compel it to bear its own appropriate name, so that all the world may see that there is no medium between Catholicity and no religion, any more than there is between virtue and vice, truth and falsehood, Christ and the devil. If this offends, then let it offend; if it do not offend God, we shall remain at our ease.

CARDINAL WISEMAN'S ESSAYS.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1853.]

We are very glad to see these admirable essays of his Eminence Cardinal Wiseman, the greater part of which were originally published in *The Dublin Review*, collected and given to the public in these three handsomely printed volumes. They constitute one of the richest contributions that have recently been made to our English Catholic literature. They bear to us the marks of a varied and extensive erudition, which we seldom look for out of Italy or Germany; are written in a style of singular freshness and beauty, vivacity and force, ease and dignity, which may well be studied as a model.

These essays are divided into three classes. The first, which fills the first volume, consists of Scriptural essays, and papers designed to bring out the beauties of the Catholic ritual, of Catholic practices, and of Catholic devotions. The second class, making up the second volume, with the exception of the last article, is entirely devoted to the high-church question, or, as it used to be called, the Oxford controversy. The third class is made up of essays of a more miscellaneous character,—historical, artistical, archæological, and controversial; but all are subjects of great interest and importance to every Catholic. It is difficult to speak of these essays in language which to those who have not carefully read them will not seem to be exaggerated. They are marked by great clearness of apprehension and expression, depth and originality of thought, a rich imagination, a cultivated taste, and a tender devotional spirit. They are in style and manner genuinely English, admirably adapted to the tastes and peculiarities of the English mind, but rigidly orthodox and even ascetic in their soul. We have in them great artistic beauty, high appreciation of the æsthetic, and a strong disposition to press into the service of religion

**Essays on Various Subjects.* By his Eminence Cardinal Wiseman. London: 1853.

sensibility, taste, and imagination, but we have nothing weak, morbid, or fanciful, and all is strong, healthy, and robust, under the regimen of good sense and enlightened devotion. We are pleased, delighted, charmed, as we read them, and at the same time enlightened, elevated and invigorated. The illustrious author seems to us with rare felicity to have hit the proper medium between the dry, formal, and stiff scholastic form, repulsive to all but the very devout or those very much interested in the subject treated, and the weak and sentimental tone, affected phraseology, and literary claptraps, which offend us in such writers as Chateaubriand, Orsini, and other well-meaning but not very healthy Frenchmen, who seek to arrest the attention of modern society by their literary capers, and by means of a pious romanticism to cheat their readers into a weakly faith and a sickly devotion, which wilt in the first hot summer's day, and expire in the first autumnal frost. These essays in style and manner are modern, adapted to the cultivated taste of the better classes of modern society, and may be commended as models to all our young men who aspire to make any valuable contributions to our Catholic literature. By studying them they will escape the dry and bald, the flashy and the sentimental, the turgid and the bombastic, the weak and the sickly, and above all, the coarse and vituperative, which some of our Catholic journalists even seem to delight in, and which seems to have arisen from their excessive admiration of Cobbett, whose *History of the Reformation in England* appears, strangely enough, to be regarded by many Catholics as a standard Catholic work. Cobbett wrote an idiomatic, racy, and nervous English style, but his spirit was coarse, pugnacious, and savage, and whoever undertakes to imitate him is in great danger of catching and exaggerating his spirit without attaining to the excellence of his English. For ourselves, we cannot read any thing of Cobbett, without calling to mind Peter Porcupine, of the Philadelphia *Political Register*, the high Tory in America and the Radical in England, the nominal Anglican but real unbeliever, who made a sort of pilgrimage to the grave of Tom Paine at New Rochelle, for the purpose of translating the relics of that arch-infidel and drunken blasphemer to England, although, it is said, the bones he carried back with him were those, not of Tom Paine, but of a poor old negro who had been buried in the same grave; and we confess we cannot listen with patience to any thing he says, even when what he says

is not reprehensible, The main facts of his History, which we are surprised to find the excellent Rohrbacher citing as his chief authority for his account of the reformation in England, are, we believe, as far as they go, substantially correct, but the spirit that pervades the work is that of an infidel scoffer. We always regret to see any alliance of Catholics with vulgar radicals, whose proffered aid should be spurned rather than accepted. No good can ever come of alliances with those who war against society and blaspheme God.

We are glad that his Eminence suffered himself to be prevailed upon to include in this collection the masterly papers published in *The Dublin Review* on the Oxford controversy. The Oxford movement was in its day a very remarkable movement, and the manner in which his Eminence met it, and followed it step by step, till most of the extraordinary men who commenced it were reconciled to the church, is full of interest and instruction. These essays, indeed, touch only a special phase of Protestantism, and by no means meet the general question between us and non-Catholics; but we can conceive nothing better adapted to the special purpose for which they were written. Their illustrious author evidently felt a deep interest in the movement and hoped much from it; he evidently had a sincere affection for the men engaged in it, and was most anxious to conciliate their goodwill to the church. He formed a very high estimate of their learning, their ability, their sincerity, and their honesty of purpose, but he made no concessions to them, and while he treated them with genuine courtesy, and cheerfully gave them credit for their good intentions, he met their errors with uncompromising firmness, and refuted them in a calm, dignified, and manly manner. There is, however, running through these remarkable essays, a gentleness, a sweetness, an affectionateness, which we greatly admire, and should wish to see far more common in our controversial writings.

We cannot read these essays on the Oxford controversy without something like envy of their illustrious author,—not, of course, for his talents, his genius, his erudition, his courteous manner, and his graceful and dignified style, for these are far above our humble aspirations, but for his public, for the men he had to refute, and to bring within the pale of the truth. He had a great and important movement setting towards the church to deal with, conducted by men of mistaken views indeed, advocating, in itself consid-

ered, an absurd and ridiculous theory, but sincere, honest, and loyal, well-bred, cultivated, eminent for their abilities and learning, who were too much in earnest to be cavillers, numerous enough to make it an object to address them specially, and respectable enough to enable one to address them in gentle and hopeful terms. To one who understood the Oxford movement, and knew something of the men engaged in it, there was much of interest and promise. One could so treat these men as to refute their errors and retain their respect, and even secure their affection. Some such there no doubt are in our own country, but their number is small, and they scarcely ripple the surface of the main current of Protestant life. They bear too small a proportion to our whole population to be made much account of in our public controversies. They do not succeed in determining the form which the controversy between us and non-Catholics must take, and we can avail ourselves of none of their concessions. The great mass of our Protestants are simply non-Catholics, and we are obliged to discuss the question with them very much as if we were discussing it with gentiles, and with gentiles engrossed with their foul superstitions, or laughing at their gods, light and flippant, and apparently incapable of treating any religious questions with seriousness and candor.

Protestantism here refuses to meet the Catholic question either on the field of erudition or on that of reason and common sense. It refuses to discuss it in a form in which it can be brought to an issue. We have conducted our *Review* as a Catholic review now for full nine years, and have during all that time been publishing quarterly elaborate essays on the most momentous subjects that can engage the mind or the heart of man, and during all this long period in only one single instance have we obtained a response from a Protestant author who seemed serious, and to be governed by honesty and sincerity of purpose. The answers which Protestantism has had to offer to us have been some worn-out sophisms too puerile to be urged by any grave reasoner, palpable misstatements of what we maintain, newspaper squibs, and pointless jokes about our alleged frequent changes of opinion when a Protestant. And to Catholics at large she replies with literary forgeries, falsifications of history, unsupported assumptions, the filthy lectures of a Leahey and a Giustiniani, the declamations of noisy demagogues, the ribaldry and tirades against our

clergy and our religious of a Gavazzi, all brought forward in that loose and disjointed manner, that no human patience can work it into a shape that admits of a reply, and all supported by no authority but the ignorance and prejudices of the multitude. It renews against us the policy of Voltaire and his associates against Christianity. "Lie, lie boldly, lie stoutly, lie constantly; some of it will stick." Regular controversy is thus out of the question, and we have no opportunity to display, if we had them, those traits of gentleness and consideration for our "separated brethren" that we so much admire in Cardinal Wiseman's Essays. The only thing we can do is to plant ourselves on our rights as Catholics, and continue our attacks on Protestantism, not as a form of heresy so much as a form of gentilism. This seems harsh and uncourteous, nay, as some say, uncharitable; but we can do no otherwise, till we have compelled Protestantism to become serious, and to enter earnestly and gravely on her defence. The mode of address we are obliged to adopt in order to make any impression on the mass of our countrymen is by no means that most agreeable to Catholic feeling, but it is here and now necessary, for all except a small minority, who are lost in the multitude of non-Catholics.

The questions to be discussed in different times and places are different, and the Catholic controversialist must meet them in the form in which they come up in his own time and place. His Eminence met them as they needed to be met in England from 1836 to 1844, and has written what is necessary at all times and places to meet that form of Protestantism assumed by the tractarians; and nothing can be better adapted to the wants of those who still adhere to it in our own country. But the controversy with high-churchism is ended in England, and a very different class of questions there have now to be met, in reality the same that we have had to meet here from the first. It is there no longer a question of dogma, of forms, or of ecclesiastical policy, but is first a question of politics, and afterwards a question between religion and no religion, Christianity and heathenism. His Eminence has settled the question as to high-churchism, and shown that every high-churchman denies the Catholic Church only at the expense either of his conscience or of his logic. Frightened by his success in argument, Protestantism calls upon the civil authority for assistance, and, after her old instincts, seeks to entrammel and restrain by force what she is impotent to check by reason.

It is probably too late to do more by force than to vex and annoy, and soon Protestantism must take a new ground of defence.

This new ground, if new it is, is already beginning to be assumed amongst us, and will soon be assumed in Great Britain; for such is the intimate relation of the two countries that the opinions of each act and react on the other with surprising rapidity. As yet, here, as in England, we are opposed principally in the name of civil and religious liberty; but this sort of opposition, when liberty is understood in its proper sense, is too ridiculous to continue for any great length of time, and must soon be abandoned. The new ground of defence Protestantism is to assume is one we are very glad to see making its appearance. The attacks we and others have made on the sects, though made without hope and as if beating the air, are beginning to tell, and we see in various quarters the concession made, that, if it be admitted that Christ founded a church at all, we must accept the Catholic Church, and therefore, to escape going to Rome, it must be stoutly denied that our Lord founded any church, or instituted any ministry of his word. This is what Evangelical Protestantism is now undertaking to prove, and the question now comes up, as simply a question between Catholicity and no church,—the very form in which it always presented itself to our own mind. How men of common sense and common honesty could reject the Catholic communion, and still contend that our Lord instituted a ministry or founded a church, was to us as great a puzzle when we were a Protestant as it is now. To us it always seemed that Protestantism in its very essence was the rejection of every church and every sacerdotal principle. We had hardly commenced our career as a Protestant minister, before we began preaching against every thing that implied a church, on the very ground that, if we admitted a single church idea, we must, if consistent, go back to Mother Church. The thing seemed to us as plain as that two and two make four. Hence the tractarian movement was one with which we could not sympathize, and the sincerity and honesty of the tractarians seemed to us most difficult to be believed, and we could believe in them only on the ground of the perversion of the English mind which had resulted from its long study to find a *via media* between truth and falsehood. How a tractarian could honestly admit so much and not admit more, could say two and

two, and refuse to add—make four, we could not understand, and we should never have understood it had we not become a Catholic. But all our Protestant sects are in reality, though not so glaringly, as inconsistent, as illogical, as high-church Anglicans.

The discomfiture of the high-church party has finally opened the eyes of a large number of Protestants, and compelled Protestantism to abandon all pretensions to be a church and to fall back on no-churchism. But it will be discomfited on this ground also, for if any thing is certain in Christianity, it is that our Lord did establish a church and instituted an external ministry of his word. This was proved to complete demonstration in our article entitled *The Church against No-church.** Protestantism must then fall back on the ground of "no external authoritative revelation," a ground already assumed by the modern spiritualists, the more advanced party of Protestants. Discomfited on this ground, it must and will fall back on the ground of no religion, and on this ground the great battle between Catholics and Protestants in the United Kingdom and the United States will have to be fought. All the engagements previously are only preliminary skirmishes, and really decide nothing. But though we see this very clearly, and can have no doubt whither Protestantism is tending, there is little to be gained by anticipating its developments. We must follow it step by step, and meet it on each new ground, as it assumes it, only too thankful to find it assuming any ground at all. The great difficulty in dealing with Protestants is and always has been in making them understand their own Protestantism. They do not understand, they have never understood it, and they never fairly accept either its principles or its consequences. They never will till driven to do so by their own experience. But the pressure from without and from within is every day increasing, and they find it less and less satisfactory and availing to continue their old practice of saying yes and no in the same breath to one and the same proposition. They must ere long make up their minds to say either the one or the other only, either to abandon Protestantism or else to accept and abide by it in its essential principles and its logical consequences. In the meantime, though we cannot expect to gain over the main body of Protestants, we must meet each phase

* Vol. V., p. 331.

of the movement as it is developed, each special controversy as it arises, and if we meet it fairly, wisely, firmly, with the uncompromising yet gentle and hopeful spirit of our religion, we hope to reap at each successive stage a rich harvest of such as are to be saved.

His Eminence has never, any more than we, supposed that all Protestantism is concentrated in high-churchism, and that the great body of Protestants will consent to accept the issue between it and the church. He of course regarded it and treated it as a special question, and as a special question, though a very interesting and important one, he has treated it so as to leave us nothing to desire. Wherever the controversy with high-churchism is not out of date, his essays offer us the best models and afford us all the assistance we need. They are worthy of the serious consideration of the catholicizing party among Protestants everywhere, though not especially adapted to the form which the question assumes out of the Anglican church. But nowhere is the question his Eminence has discussed the only question of the day. We have other controversies than that with high-churchmen, and questions to be solved which but few among us have studied thoroughly and completely mastered, although we have of course in our church and her teaching the principle of their solution. But if we have the principle, we do not always understand its application, and to understand its application we must understand well our own times. We must not look only at the surface of things, and take them as they may present themselves at first sight. Error has a genetic history as well as truth, only the genesis of error is negative, and that of truth is affirmative. Error is never pure; it is always a mixture of truth and falsehood; the truth it holds tends always to eliminate the falsehood and become pure truth, and the falsehood tends always to eliminate the truth and become pure falsehood. This double process of elimination is always going on in the bosom of Protestantism, and explains, as we have elsewhere shown, its tendency on the one hand to a return to the church, and on the other hand to absolute unbelief.

But in all parties starting with an error, the great body always adhere to the false, and aid in carrying on the elimination of truth. The great majority of Protestants are here and everywhere more wedded to their Protestantism in what it has that is infidel, than in what it has that is coincident with Christianity. Hence they are more ready to

carry on the work of eliminating and rejecting the truth hitherto retained, than they are the elimination and rejection of the falsehood adopted by the reformers. The sects are by their errors thrown back on corrupt human nature, fallen anew under the dominion of Satan; and corrupt human nature under his dominion is open to every illusion, and is sure to mistake falsehood for truth. It is thus we see in the mass of the Protestant world the false principles of the reformers becoming every day more and more exclusive, and developing more and more distinctly their legitimate consequences. The same human nature which led the reformers to adopt their false principles, we must remember, is also in ourselves, and in us, though it may be restrained by grace, and effectually resisted by constant vigilance and prayer, it is never annihilated. The greatest saint, who has led a life of the highest and truest sanctity, may fall at the last moment, and be lost for ever. Hence it is that errors in a subtle form, not directly and immediately opposed to faith, so disguised as not to alarm the true believer, have a perpetual tendency to make their way, from the non-Catholic world without, among Catholics themselves, to the undermining at first of their piety, their virtue, and finally of their faith.

Protestantism has developed its denial of authority till it has become completely revolutionary, and its doctrine of individual independence till social order and society itself are threatened with utter dissolution. The error with Protestants began in the religious order, and was directed solely against the church; but it subsequently passed into the political and social order, and is now passing into the domestic circle. But under its political and social character it found its way in the last century among the Catholic populations of Europe, and it is now no uncommon thing to find Catholics who are thoroughly Protestant, that is, thoroughly atheistic, in their political and social doctrines and tendencies. It is in this fact that the revolutionism or the radicalism of our age finds its chief support; and it is worthy of note that the war against political authority, social order, and religion is carried on to-day almost exclusively under the lead of apostate Catholics. The most influential and depraved radicals that the convulsions of Europe have thrown into the United States, as well as the most violent and energetic antipopery lecturers, are almost without exception apostates from the church. Without these apostates, Protestantism could no longer hold up its head.

These apostates are of course all infidels, at least men who have lost all respect for religion, who have made up their minds to live and die for this world alone. They despair of heaven and they welcome hell. They consequently give to their Protestant followers their own character and animate them by their own spirit. Caring nothing themselves for doctrine or morals, animated solely by love of the world on the one hand, which they call *patriotism*, and by hatred of the church on the other, which they call *liberty*, they make war against us professedly in the name of liberty and patriotism, but really in hatred of all restraint, and in devotion to the world, the flesh, and the devil. And this is the form in which we have to meet the question of religion or no religion. At bottom it is, as we so often say, the old question between the flesh and the spirit, the church and the world, Christianity and heathenism.

It seems to us, therefore, that our great work at present is to be for those within rather than for those without; and looking to the whole of Christendom, it consists precisely in bringing the faithful themselves to see and understand the great principles of our religion in their application to the great radical, socialistic, and revolutionary movements of our age. Past ages have shown the distinction between the temporal and spiritual, and even the union of the two as external governments; we are called upon to go a step deeper, and show the unity of all power in its origin and principle, and that in a deep internal sense the assertion of the independence of the temporal is virtual atheism. We must not revive the theocratic form of society or of government, but reassert the truth that was embodied in that form, and make it familiar again to the minds and hearts of the faithful. It is only as we weed out all radicalism, socialism, and revolutionism from our own minds, and comprehend that they are damnable errors, and incompatible with religion, the teachings and the spirit of the church, that we can place ourselves in a position to carry on successfully the controversy demanded by our age.

In this work we can obtain less assistance from the great controversialists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries than in almost any other, because the questions in the form we have to meet them are modern. Bellarmine, Suarez, the brothers Wallenbruch, Bossuet, and the noble old English Jesuit fathers, who did their work so well in their day, cannot serve us here, except so far as the enunciation of prin-

ciple is concerned. Nor can we be much profited in this work even by the mediæval divines, or by those learned and enthusiastic writers in our own day, who are so nobly repairing the injustice so long and so generally done to the middle ages by Protestant, and to some extent even by Catholic, historians; for the questions of our times were seldom mooted in those ages, and when they were, as in the fourteenth century they began to be, they were summarily disposed of by authority, not by discussion. The middle ages had much to be admired and honored, but they have passed away, probably never to return. We are not to look to them for our models, nor for our ideal of a Christian society. The world was baptized then, but it was far enough from ceasing to be the world. The notion which some entertain, that the church in those ages had organized society to her own wishes, and that we must take the state of things which then obtained as the ideal we are to strive to realize, is one we cannot accept. We like on this point some remarks of Count Franz de Champagny, which we trust he will permit us the liberty to quote:—

"We are accustomed in our times, in consequence of a reaction fully justified by the injustice of the last century, to seek the perfection of Christian life and Christian works exclusively in the middle ages. We can no longer comprehend a Christian hero unless he has a cross on his breast; Christian prayer seems almost impossible elsewhere than under Gothic ogives. The middle ages, or more strictly, the thirteenth century, are supposed to have been the grandest epoch of the church, her apogee, her moral era, before which there had been only a laborious infancy, and since which there has been only a rapid decline.

"I do not believe, I avow it, either in this maturity so tardy, or in this decline so rapid. The thirteenth century, great and glorious as it was for Christianity, does not appear to me to have been her only epoch of glory. I render it justice and admiration; I do not think that I owe it an exclusive worship. I bow with reverence before the genius of a St. Thomas or a St. Anselm, without believing myself for that obliged to treat St. Augustine, St. Basil, St. Chrysostom, as pagans. I meditate in admiration and prayer under the magnificent ogives of the thirteenth century, without forgetting, however, those Romanesque churches of preceding centuries which the taste of our age still neglects, without ceasing to love and respect those venerable basilicas of the city of Rome, marked still with the seal of the early Christian times. I recur with a loving curiosity to the natural and devout paintings of the middle ages, but I comprehend and appreciate none the less those paintings so beautiful of the Catacombs, where art, Grecian in its form, is already thoroughly Christian in its thought. I sacrifice not one Christian epoch to another, and above all do I refuse to admit that Christianity had in

the thirteenth century, or in any other century, reached a culminating point, to the height of which it could never before attain, and after which it could do nothing but descend.

"I go even further; when I study our age, it seems to me that the first ages of the emancipated Christian church are those which it is the most useful to be recalled to our memories. We are no longer in the conditions of the middle ages. That infancy of Christian Europe, that uncivilized state of new peoples, against which the church struggled laboriously and gloriously, has had its day. We are an adult, too adult, society, and if there is in the past any thing that we should remember, it is the attitude of the church, in face of a society whose infancy, as ours, had long since passed away, and which suffered, as we suffer, from the excesses and vices, not from the want, of civilization. We are by our manners, unhappily perhaps, the Romans of Constantine, rather than the Franks of Clovis; and the fathers of the church who lived in the fourth and fifth centuries have written what is better adapted to our age, than the legendaries and scholastics of those centuries which are called, a little too absolutely, the ages of faith." *

We are much nearer in our manners, our moral habits, and our modes of thought, to the Romans under the earlier Christian emperors, than we are to our ancestors of the middle ages, and modern society, especially in our own country, is far more Roman than feudal. We live, too, all through Christendom, in an old and crumbling society, and our vices and errors are those of the Roman empire, from Constantine to Augustulus, rather than those of the middle ages. In the study of dogma, of morals, in seeking systematic arrangement, precision of thought, and exactness of expression, we must undoubtedly give our days and nights to the great mediæval doctors, but in studying how to deal with a civilization in its decrepitude, with a society that crumbles around us, how to meet the errors which spring from pride, refinement, excess, and sordid worldliness, we must leap over the middle ages and make ourselves masters of the great writers of the fourth and fifth centuries, and of the history of the Roman world from the time the church emerged from the catacombs to the downfall of the western empire. The ante-Nicene period has been studied with a great deal of care and success, as has lately been the period from the barbarian conquests to the revival of the classics in the fifteenth century; but the fourth and fifth centuries —so rich in the great names of the church, so remarkable for Christian activity and beneficence, for the new character given to legislation, and the new efforts for social amel-

Revue Contemporaine, tome VIII., pp. 5, 6.

ioration, and so disastrous by Arian astuteness, tyranny, and persecution, and by the venality and corruption of placemen, the insupportable burdens imposed upon property, and barbarian invasions and conquests—are, after all, only imperfectly known, and have seldom been consulted for the lessons they afford applicable to our own age. We do not know a single intellectual, moral, or social question which comes up to-day, that was not raised and solved during those centuries; if not in the precise form in which we have to meet it, at least the same in substance. When you read St. Chrysostom, you feel that you are reading a contemporary author, and the question discussed by St. Augustine in his *De Civitate Dei* is really the great question we have to discuss to-day. The non-Catholics of his time declared the decay and fall of the empire were owing to the introduction and spread of Christianity, and the non-Catholics of to-day tell us the decline of Spain and Portugal and the Italian republics from their former grandeur is owing to Catholicity. In the time of St. Augustine they charged to the church the political and social evils endured, and they charge the political and social evils of our times to the same cause. Then and now the real charge against our religion is, that she does not save the world from temporal ills, or create a paradise on earth. It is in the name of the world, at both epochs, that she is arraigned. To the great fathers of that epoch we must then recur for instruction as to the best mode of dealing with our own.

But we have no space to develop this subject as we could wish, and we must content ourselves with the few hints we have thrown out. We think the fourth and fifth centuries will help us to understand our own times far better than the twelfth and thirteenth, and we are sure that the first want of our Catholic controversialists is to understand the real character of the present age. We do not in saying this imply any want of this understanding on the part of his Eminence; indeed, his essays prove that he does understand both his age and country. We only say that the high-church controversy is a specialty, and by no means the great controversy of our times. We, however, cannot conclude without expressing our deep gratitude to the illustrous author for the pleasure and the profit we have derived from his admirable essays. We only wish there were more of them; and long may he live to instruct and edify the faithful, to refute heresy, and to elevate the tone of Catholicity, both in his own country and in ours.

LUTHER AND THE REFORMATION.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1855.]

The life of Luther is the first of four very interesting and important biographies published by the late M. Audin, and which taken together form a passably complete popular history of the Protestant reformation, admirably adapted to counteract the bad effects of such publications as M. Merle d'Aubigné's widely circulated romance on the same subject. These biographies, after that of Luther, are the lives of Calvin, Leo X., and Henry VIII. Of these, that of Pope Leo X., is generally regarded as the best, and we are surprised that it has not yet been translated into our language. In composing these works the author had access to the original documents preserved in the archives of the Vatican and the libraries of Florence and Bologna, to the historical collections of Strasburg, Lyons, Mayence, Cologne, and Wittenberg, and to almost any number of German and Latin pamphlets of the time. He made a diligent and conscientious use of the materials at his disposal, and has cleared up many obscure passages in the history of the period, and presented many of the actors in the movement, Catholic as well as Protestant, in a new light. He has robbed the chief reformers of the unmerited glory with which their partisans had invested them, and presented them to the world in all their native weakness and deformity. He has vindicated the Catholic party of the time, and rescued the principal Catholic opponents of the reformers from the aspersions cast upon them by their unscrupulous adversaries. He is candid and impartial, and, so far as we are able to judge, has produced a very reliable, as well as a brilliant and interesting, popular history of the more prominent characters and events of the terrible Protestant movement in the sixteenth century. We hope the whole four works, making nine volumes octavo in the last edition as revised by the author, will be translated into our language, and circulated

**History of the Life, the Writings, and the Doctrines of Luther.* By M. Audin. Translated from the last French edition, by William B. Turnbull, Esq. London: 1854.

widely wherever it is spoken. They will make an important addition to our meagre English Catholic library, and contribute much to a right appreciation of the reformers.

M. Audin, born at Lyons, 1793, originally studied for the priesthood; but not taking orders, he turned his attention to law, and was admitted to the bar. He does not appear, however, to have practised his profession, and he devoted his life to literature, as an author and a bookseller, till his death, which took place February 9, 1851. He was a sincere and earnest Catholic, and has rendered no mean service to religion and historic truth by his works on the reformation. No man out of Germany, even if in Germany, has done more to separate or disentangle in the popular mind that mingled yarn of history and romance, of truth and fiction, which Protestant authors for these three hundred years have palmed off upon the credulous, not of their own communion alone, as the authentic history of the Protestant movement. He is conscientious and painstaking, but we cannot regard him as very sagacious or profound; and under the relation of style and manner he is not sufficiently grave and dignified to suit our taste or to inspire us with full confidence in his judgment. He takes too much pains to be striking and brilliant, and appears to weigh the phrase more than the thought. One feels that he was writing in the bosom of a frivolous community, for readers who draw their instruction from the saloon, the theatre, or the feuilleton, and are to be arrested only by a *tableau* or a dramatic representation of historical events.

Regarded as popular works, as they probably were designed to be, we esteem very highly Audin's biographies; but regarded as *studies* on the reformation, they are deficient in philosophical depth and comprehensiveness. They take, in our judgment, quite too narrow and too superficial a view of the great Protestant movement, and afford us very little aid in understanding its real causes and internal character. The author has rendered a tardy justice to the Catholic party of the time, and proved its immeasurable superiority in solid and polite learning, in civilization and refinement, in virtue and manners, to the party of reform, and has shown to the last degree of evidence that the reformers were coarse and brutal, false and hypocritical, proud and selfish, lustful and ambitious, who shrunk from no baseness, and scrupled at no arts or falsehood that seemed likely to serve their purposes against the church. This, no doubt, is much,

but it is not all that we have the right to expect in times like ours from a Catholic historian of the Protestant reformation. It is far too little and too superficial to enable us to explain that event. These reformers had all been reared in the external communion of the Catholic Church, and were many of them priests who had served at her altar. Whence came it that they were capable of such baseness and iniquity? Whence came it that their baseness and iniquity were capable of detaching nearly half of Europe from the faith in which they had been reared, and of founding a party which for three hundred years has been able to dispute the dominion of the world with Catholicity? Here is a grave problem to be solved, and which M. Audin does not solve, or furnish us the means of solving.

Indeed, taking the reformation as M. Audin leaves it, it must have been an impossible event,—an event which never happened, because it never could have happened. We can find in his pages no sufficient reason for it, no adequate means of effecting it. The reformers were inadequate to the work ascribed to them; all the elements of success were against them. Authority, tradition, learning, culture, talent, habit, manners, customs, all were against them. They were worsted in argument by their Catholic opponents; they had no clearly defined system of doctrine, no well-concerted plan of action; they were unable to agree among themselves, were torn by intestine divisions, were compelled to blush at the licentiousness and impurity of their disciples, and rendered ridiculous by their continual variations and self-contradictions. There was nothing in their speculations or opinions calculated to impose upon the understanding of a moderately instructed Catholic, or in their practice to win the affections of a single really Catholic heart. Their preaching and writings were fitted only to shock sincere and earnest Catholics, or to disgust and repel them. How then could they succeed? Yet succeed they did. They baffled princes and nobles, kings and Cæsars, popes and cardinals, bishops and doctors, and gained over the multitude in more than a third part of Europe. How explain this fact? By the depravity of the reformers? But that depravity itself needs accounting for; and, moreover, on what principle explain its tremendous power? We know that evil naturally triumphs over good, but how can evil joined to weakness triumph over virtue joined to strength, and that even supernatural strength?

It is clear to the philosophical historian that we cannot explain the Protestant reformation by the baseness, the iniquity, the corruption, or the ability of the reformers themselves. No result of such magnitude could have been brought about by some scores of apostate priests and renegade monks. The reform must have sprung from deeper, broader, and mightier causes. It must have already been prepared in the public mind and heart, and Luther can be regarded only as its leading representative, not as its author or founder. He simply gave expression to what was already a general thought or sentiment. Without the preëxistence and prevalence of that thought or sentiment, he and his associates would, with all their efforts, hardly have produced a momentary ripple on the surface of European society. There must have been a preparation earlier even than that effected by the quarrels of the schoolmen and the humanists, and the labors of those whom Protestants call "the Reformers before the Reformation," such as Reuchlin, Erasmus, and Ulrich von Hutten. Some of the humanists became Protestants indeed, but the more distinguished leaders and the bulk of the party, as M. Audin proves, remained faithful to the communion of the church. The Greek language never fell under the anathema of the church; she had always accepted it, and consecrated it by using it in celebrating throughout the East her sacred mysteries. It was the official language of the Greek Church before the Greek schism, and is used now in celebrating mass by the United or Catholic Greeks, as well as by the schismatic. Latin is not, and never was, the only official language of the church. How then could Reuchlin, by insisting on its study, favor the Protestant movement?* What was it that pointed the wit of Erasmus, that Voltaire of the sixteenth century, and enabled him to cover the monks with ridicule, and to destroy their character in the public estimation? What was it that rendered effective the dull, filthy, and disgusting *Epistolæ Virorum Obscurorum* of Ulrich von Hutten?

* Reuchlin also was the great patron of Hebrew. The study of Hebrew, however, meant in his mind not so much the study of the Hebrew language as intercourse with the Jews and study of the Jewish writings, which were antichristian in their doctrine and tendencies. It is not impossible, moreover, that the Jews and the occult heretics of the time had a very good understanding with one another. Were not the *viri obscuri* of Ulrich von Hutten so called, to intimate to the initiated a relationship to the secret heretical organizations?

The public must have been previously prepared for these, as well as for the reformers themselves.

Nothing is more unphilosophical than to ascribe great events, whether good or bad, to petty causes. The effect cannot exceed the cause, any more than the stream can rise higher than the fountain. There must have been operating in the sixteenth century some cause of the Protestant reformation adequate to its production,—equal in magnitude to the effect produced. What was it? In our judgment, while the magnitude of the reformation is not overrated, we are too apt to overrate the magnitude of the work done by the reformers. It is a mistake to suppose that Protestantism in any of its essential features was a product of the sixteenth century. That century was by no means as Catholic in its beginning as is commonly imagined. Luther found, he did not create or introduce, his Protestantism. Protestantism, if analyzed, may be reduced to four elements:—1. The rejection of the papacy; 2. The rejection of the Christian priesthood or sacerdotal order; 3. The denial of all dogmatic theology; and 4. The adoption of religion as a mere sentiment of the heart, called by some love, by others faith. We do not, of course, pretend that all Protestants go the full length of these four elements, but these four elements embrace all of Protestantism. Luther did not formally reject all dogmatic theology, but he did reject the papacy and the Christian priesthood; for his principal spite was directed against the pope, and he maintained, as the great body of Protestants do now, that under the New Law every believer is a priest and a king. His doctrine of justification by faith alone is the virtual rejection of dogmatic theology; for it is with him the essential element of the Gospel, and faith in his sense is simply a sentiment of the heart. Some Protestants go further, much further, in the developments of Protestantism, than Luther and his brother reformers went, but none of them go further than the four elements we have specified, and these elements may therefore be said, though not embraced by all Protestants, to embrace all Protestantism.

Now all these elements were held in Christian Europe by vast multitudes, many of them in the external communion of the church, passing themselves off as Catholics, though in fact occult heretics, centuries before Luther was born. At no period was Christian Europe, in point of fact, as Catholic as first appearances indicate, and at no period were

all the real heretics outside of the external communion of the church. Protestants cannot, indeed, maintain for their party or doctrines an apostolic origin, but they can trace their succession from the apostolic age. Through the Bohemian Brethren, Lollards, Beghards, Cathares, Patarins, Albigenses, Bulgarians, Paulicians, Manicheans, and Gnostics, they can ascend to the very times of the apostles. These sects were all of the same family, and were all essentially Protestant. They were all condemned, indeed, by the church, but by means of secret organizations and outward conformity to Catholicity they always contrived to maintain themselves to a fearful extent in her external communion. From the twelfth century to the sixteenth, Europe to the superficial observer was, save in the East, exclusively Catholic; but in point of fact she was little more Catholic than now. Catholicity was indeed the official religion, but even in the thirteenth century, regarded by a modern school as the culminating point of the Ages of Faith, virtual Protestantism was hardly less rife than in the sixteenth, and there was, we verily believe, more real Catholicity in the seventeenth century than in either the fourteenth or the fifteenth. Whoever would explain the origin and causes of the Protestant reformation must study profoundly the heresies, political movements, and social changes of the last three centuries of the middle ages. They will find its origin and causes in these heresies, and in the growth of nationalism and royalism, or absolute monarchy, more especially in Germany, France, and England. These heresies, essentially Protestant, were then, it is true, openly professed by a smaller number than in the sixteenth century; but there is no lack of evidence that they were professed in a secret society, which spread over a large part of Europe, and to which belonged kings and emperors, princes and nobles, bishops and presbyters, courtiers and bards, lawyers and counsellors of popes and of monarchs,—nominally, sometimes ostentatiously, Catholic in public, before the church and the world, enjoying her honors, fattening on her revenues, and using their position to undermine the papal authority, and to render Catholicity odious. So were organized, and so acted, the formidable body of heretics known in history as Patarins, Cathares, or Albigenses, now conceded to have been Manicheans, and therefore a branch of the old Gnostic family, and whose abominable doctrines and abominable practices are still far in advance of the great body of modern Protestants.

We regard modern Protestanism as the lineal descendant of the Patarin or Albigensian heresy of the thirteenth century; in fact, as only a continuation, with various modifications, of ancient Gnosticism, which at different epochs showed itself openly, and at others concealed itself in the bosom of the church as an occult heresy, wearing the external garb of Catholicity, and speaking its language, though with a sense of its own, as in the *Divina Commedia* of Dante, the sonnets of Petrarca, the lays and roundelays of the troubadours of Provence, and the poems of the Ghibelline poets generally. It was obliged to conceal itself during the middle ages, because nationalism and royalism were too weak to permit them to set at defiance the public law and the Catholic organization of Europe. In the sixteenth century this ceased to be the case, and they could openly avow themselves. Through their own secret exertions, the natural course of events, the efforts of the German emperors, and the sacrilegious attacks on the papacy in the person of Boniface VIII. by Philip the Fair of France, who appealed to the French nation and invoked the states-general to sustain him, nationalism, that is, gentilism, was revived, and royalism, or centralized monarchy, was introduced and consolidated. Royalism became independent, and the way was prepared for monarchy to become absolute. The emperor and the Ghibelline princes rendered Italy a scene of anarchy and confusion, of rapine and bloodshed, and compelled the popes to seek security by deserting Rome and taking up their residence at Avignon. This brought the Roman court under French influence, filled the sacred college with French cardinals, and prepared the way for the great western schism, which greatly impaired the power of the Holy See, depreciated the papacy in the popular estimation, and gave to nationalism and royalism the predominance throughout Christendom. We see this in the Council of Constance, where princes and their ambassadors play so distinguished a part, and where in the earlier sessions the unheard-of anomaly is introduced of voting by nations. The papacy, it is true, was not without lustre under the pontificates of Martin V., Eugenius IV., Nicholas V., and Calixtus III.; but it never, till after the reformation, if even then, recovered its former splendor, and Julius II. is obliged to place himself as an Italian prince at the head of his troops, to defend the patrimony of St. Peter against the professedly *Catholic* invaders. Nationalism was so strong and royalism so much

in the ascendency in 1517, the date of Luther's thesis against indulgences, that heretics, as to this world, had little to fear from any source except the temporal prince—in his heart anti-papal, and supporting Catholicity, if at all, only from policy—and the national sentiment, always, in so far as national in spiritual matters, anti-Catholic. They were then in most places free to throw off the mask, and to do openly what they had long been doing, not without success, in secret; and it is probable that the open position assumed by Luther really weakened their power, and served, instead of injuring, the cause of Catholicity.

The Protestant reformation, as we regard it, was not so much a falling away from the church of those who were really Catholics, as the coming forth from her communion of those who had previously been in it without being of it; and we must explain the rapid and almost marvellous diffusion of Protestantism as soon as publicly proclaimed, by the occult heresy, more or less developed, with which the population that voluntarily embraced it were already infected. Whether the secret organization of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries continued down to the sixteenth, we are unable to say; but that it did to some extent is probable, and hence, perhaps, the reason why the reform broke out on so many points of Europe almost simultaneously. But be this as it may, the enemies of the church certainly had not decreased in number during the wars and revolutions of the fifteenth century, and this much must be conceded, that Luther found a large part of Europe either totally ignorant of the Catholic religion, or but feebly attached to it. The intelligent Catholic of to-day can see nothing in the doctrines or the practices of the reformers calculated to make a favorable impression on a Catholic mind or heart, and he is unable to believe that they ever gained one real convert to the reform. Protestantism promised something to the licentious, to populations impatient of restraint, weary of fasts and vigils, of works of mortification and penance, and who wished to find an easier road to heaven than that of self-denial and the crucifixion of the flesh, or that of inward purity and sanctity, sound faith and true charity; but its doctrines, together with the arguments by which the reformers sustained them, never could have produced any serious effect, or served any other purpose than that of shocking or disgusting the Catholic who understood and was attached to his religion. Indeed, sincere and intelligent Cath-

olics were shocked and disgusted, and in no instance attracted or captivated by the reformed religion. They could hardly believe the reformers to be serious, or be brought to put forth their full force in combating them. This is evident from the conciliatory policy pursued towards them by Pope Adrian, and which, if we were to judge the policy of the vicar of Jesus Christ after our human modes of judging, which we do not allow ourselves to do, proved so disastrous. It is therefore quite evident to us, that the mass of those who joined the reform movement of their own accord, without being forced to do so by the civil authority, were already heretics, or heretically inclined,—were already anti-papal and anti-Catholic.

The remote causes of the Protestant reformation were of course in the general causes of all heresy, as well as of ancient gentilism; but its proximate and more special causes, regarded simply as an anti-Catholic outbreak, are, we think, to be found historically and philosophically in the growth and ascendency of royalism and nationalism from the twelfth to the sixteenth century, or, in one word, in what in more recent times is called *Gallicanism*. The Christian religion is catholic, cosmopolitan, and takes its stand on an elevation above all particularism and all nationalism. It has no distinctive nationality, and the believer, as a disciple of Jesus Christ and member of his mystical body, has no national character, and no country, no *patria* but heaven, from which he regards himself as an exile, and to which he longs to return. On this earth he has no home, no abiding-place. He is a pilgrim and a sojourner here, seeking a city whose builder and maker is God. Catholicity rising thus above all national distinctions, and thus condemning all nationalism whenever that nationalism would rise above the temporal order and interfere with things spiritual, has naturally for its enemies all in whom the spirit of nationality predominates. We see this in the Jews who appealed to the sentiment of Jewish nationality against our Lord, saying, "If you let this man go on, the *Romans* will come and take away our name and nation." Every nation is by its own national spirit exclusive and tyrannical. It seeks to render all that concerns it national, and labors incessantly to be a world in itself, to have a religion, as well as laws and institutions, manners and customs, of its own. We see this in the history of gentilism, in which each nation had its peculiar national religion, and every one was required to conform to the religion of his

nation. Nationalism, through the influence of the church, the kings and emperors of the Carlovingian race, during the centuries commonly called the "Dark Ages,"—so called because religion took precedence of politics, and Catholicity of nationalism,—was kept subordinate, and was unable to exert any controlling influence on politics or religion. But as the irruption of barbarians ceased, and the nationalities long held in abeyance began to declare themselves, and national governments were formed throughout most of Europe, it escaped from its subjection, and became in some sense, as it had not been before, the basis of the political order.

In the governments organized under the auspices of the church after the downfall of the Roman empire of the West, monarchy indeed had a place; but not monarchy in its modern sense. In them all, it was tempered by estates and corporations. It was in all cases elective, and restricted in its powers by the rights of the municipalities, and by the nobles or vassals of the crown, often in wealth and power hardly inferior to the suzerain himself. We pretend not that this constitution was perfect; no political constitution ever yet existed without its imperfections. The barons often, no doubt, oppressed the people, often were turbulent and abused their power, while the monarch was too weak to restrain or to punish their violence. But if it did not guard against the evils of weakness in the crown, it did avoid those of a centralized royalism. In no instance under that constitution could any sovereign say, with Louis XIV., "I am the state." But in the thirteenth century we see a movement on the part of the sovereigns to get rid of this constitution, and to centralize the power in the crown. This movement in France begins with the reign of Philip Augustus, the real founder of the French monarchy. A similar movement is made by the German emperors, which only partially succeeds, and by the English kings, which succeeds only under the Tudors in the fifteenth century. The aim was to centralize and consolidate the monarchy, and to render the monarch absolute, after the model of the Byzantine or eastern emperors.

The chief obstacle the monarchs, as well as nationalism, had to overcome in this enterprise, was in the papal constitution of the church. To attain to their end, they must trample on vested rights, rights of the church herself, rights of their vassals, and rights of the municipalities, and the church always and everywhere insists on the inviolability of all

rights, whether natural or acquired. The first thing to be done was therefore to break the power of the church, which could be done only by destroying or abasing the papacy. Hence the sovereigns, for centuries, with varying success, but with little relaxation, carried on a war against the papacy, the divinely instituted guardian of all rights, and thus gave to royalism an anti-papal character, and made the temporal sovereign the antagonist of the pope. In this sacrilegious war they appealed to national pride, national jealousies, prejudices, ambition, and intolerance, to sustain them. They placed the nation before the church, and studied to make themselves national. They appealed to the sentiment of national independence, national power, and national glory, and made of royalism, as representing the nation, a species of popular idolatry. Courtly prelates held their peace, or smiled assent, and courtly lawyers searched the Institutes, Pandects, and Codes, and turned over Ulpian and Papinian to find, which was not difficult, maxims favorable to the royal power. Whoever refused to bow down and worship the new idol that was set up was declared disloyal, an enemy to the king, and worthy of exile or death. *Quod placuit principi, id legis habet vigorem*, became the fundamental maxim of the new cæsarism, as it had been of the old, and the pleasure of the prince was to be done, let the church say what she might to the contrary. The church was in the royal and popular mind subordinated to the nation, and the pope to the temporal monarch. The head of the church must give way to the pleasure of the head of the state, and the good citizen or subject, in case of conflict, must obey the king in preference to the vicar of Jesus Christ. The lawyers and courtly prelates and doctors even found out that a Catholic, at the command of the king, might lawfully bear arms against the visible head of his church! The person of the king was sacred and inviolable, but not that of the pope, at least in the estimation of the degenerate grandson of St. Louis and his courtiers, as was proved in his treatment of Boniface VIII.

The monarch, in carrying on his war against the papacy, used both the lords and the commons. The feudal lords, being in their own feudal territories petty sovereigns, imagined that their interests and those of the monarch were the same, and they sustained him, till he felt himself strong enough to attack them in their privileges, and then they found that they were too weak to resist him. The people,

finding often a protector in the king against their more immediate masters, and being the depositaries of all that is exclusive in nationality, supported him with right good will, —their time to set up for themselves, and to treat him as he treated the pope, not having yet come. Thus aided, royalism emancipated itself from all spiritual direction, and supplanted in the national mind and heart the papacy. Those who adhered to the party of the pope against the party of the king were, as a term of reproach, called *Papistæ* or Papists. Royalism encroached everywhere on the spiritual power. The king obtained the nomination of bishops, and filled the sees with his creatures; he passed statutes of *præmunire* and against *provisors*, and dictated the terms on which he would tolerate the church in his dominions. He denied the authority of the church over her own temporalities, and, as far as was possible without open schism, deprived her of all external authority. He made her all but national in his kingdom, and himself her external head, very nearly her *pontifex maximus*. It would seem that in all, save mere form, the bishops depended on the sovereign, and in no case were they to obey the pope without the royal permission. Hence the church in each nation seems to hold from the temporal lord, and to be bound to consult the royal pleasure. It is royal, not papal, and it is only by the royal condescension that the pope is permitted to interfere in its affairs. The people look no longer to Rome for direction; they look only to their sovereign, and care little what they do or believe, if sure of his approbation or connivance.

Such was the state of things throughout no small part of Europe at the epoch of the reformation. Luther hesitates not through fear of the pope, or dread of spiritual censures, at which he mocks, but only through fear of his temporal sovereign; and he speaks out boldly as soon as he has made sure of the protection of the powerful elector of Saxony.

The great majority of European sovereigns for three centuries had been anti-papal. By the centralization and consolidation of royalism, and the control they usurped in spiritual matters, they had succeeded in making large numbers of the people virtually Protestant, and formally Gallican. It is to be remarked, that, though the very soul of Luther's movement was hostility to the papacy, his Catholic opponents hardly attempt its defence. They seem willing to let

controversy turn on dogma, to be decided by an appeal to the Scriptures. It was the Gallicanism of the secular courts, that is, the ascendency of royalism and nationalism, that prepared the way for the Protestant movement, and rendered it feasible for the occult heresies of ages to throw off all disguise and to avow themselves openly; as it was the Gallicanism, the royalism and nationalism, of Louis XIV. that emboldened Jansenism, that subtlest form of Protestantism, to declare itself. Even the great Bossuet, who drew up the Four Articles, while he leaves no stone unturned to procure the condemnation of certain inaccurate expressions in the *Maxims of the Saints*, writes a preface to a new edition of the *Moral Reflections*, and treats the Jansenists with great consideration and tenderness, though himself no Jansenist.

We agree with Protestant historians, that society in the sixteenth century was in a most wretched state, and that, though not in their sense, there was a loud call for a reformation. The ascendency of royalism, and its anti-papal tendency, had interfered with ecclesiastical discipline, had favored false and dangerous modes of thought and expression, and prevented the church from applying in the proper place and at the proper time the appropriate remedy. Rome taught one doctrine and the courts another, and the latter were believed instead of the former. The people to a fearful extent were taught only a mutilated Catholicity, because the temporal authority would tolerate no other, because pastors neglected their duty; bishops and priests turned against the pope, and found in their royal masters a ready support in their opposition. The mass of the people throughout no small part of Europe knew hardly the simplest elements of the Catholic religion. They may have been able to recite the apostles' creed and a prayer or two, but beyond they knew little or nothing. Even in the theological schools of Germany theology could have been but imperfectly taught, if we may credit at all Luther's own account of his doubts and scruples. His doctrine of justification by faith alone betrays an ignorance of Catholic theology as great as that which it betrays of the Holy Scriptures. So far as Catholic doctrines are concerned, all religiously-minded Protestants to-day would pronounce them infinitely more solid and reasonable than the opposing Protestant doctrines, if they only thoroughly understood them. The faithful and the great body of the clergy seem to have

been taken by surprise, and not to have known how to meet the reform movement; and, notwithstanding all M. Audin says to the contrary, we cannot help thinking that the controversy, at least in the beginning, was to a great extent blunderingly conducted on the side of the Catholic party. Evidently there was a great ignorance of Catholic doctrine at the time upon the part of the clergy, or a great want of belief in Catholicity. In Germany they were lamentably defective. Many of the bishops even suffered themselves to be carried away with the movement, and of those who remained faithful, not one whose name has reached us proved himself equal to the emergency. In England all the bishops, save one, the bishop of Rochester, yielded to the demand of the lustful Henry, and even he at first gave his assent to the royal supremacy,—an assent which every tyro in Catholic theology knows could not be given without a virtual renunciation of Catholicity, a renunciation never for a moment contemplated by the noble bishop, as his subsequent conduct amply proves. His assent, though subsequently retracted, shows how little even the better class of Catholics in that age were accustomed to study the papal constitution of the church, and how far they were from regarding that constitution as essential to her existence, and to her unity and catholicity. The truth is, the mass of the Catholics in the sixteenth century, and even long before, had ceased to be genuine papists; they were royalists, preferring, save in the internal order, royalty to the papacy, and therefore, where royalty commanded them to break with the Holy See, and throw off its external authority, they either obeyed, or remained at a loss to know on what ground to defend their disobedience.

This state of things, so disheartening to the Catholic and so favorable to the reformers, we attribute, after the depravity of human nature, to the growth of nationalism and the ascendency of royalism, which prevented the church from duly instructing her children, and from freely and fully exercising her spiritual discipline. St. Liguori somewhere says, that from the tenth century to the sixteenth, those who received Holy Communion even once during their whole lives were rare exceptions. Very few except religious ever approached the sacraments. We may judge from this in what moral and spiritual state the monk Luther found the Catholic world. And yet these were called the Ages of Faith, as Dante, Petrarca, and the Provençal trou-

badours are called *Catholic* poets and bards! All went wrong as soon as kings undertook to be fathers of the church, and began to support her, if at all, from state policy, instead of honest principle and pious affection; and precious little gratitude does the church owe to royalism, which has often oppressed her, often persecuted her, and never rendered her any real service. There never was a greater mistake than that committed by modern liberals in alleging that royalty and Catholicity are natural allies. For these six hundred years scarcely a European court has rendered the church any service but at the price of some concession from her, which weakened her power and strengthened that of her royal rival. To the officious support and officious interference of royalism, as well as to its arbitrary measures against her, we owe most of the scandals which stand out on the canvas of her history, and which are so often and so maliciously cited against her. In a spiritual as well as in a temporal point of view, royalism for six hundred years has been the curse of Europe, and that it has not been a still greater curse is owing to the superhuman struggles of the papacy against it.

In relation to what went before it, we can hardly regard the Protestant reformation as an untoward event. In it the peccant humors which had long infected the Catholic body came to a head, broke, and were carried off. From the day that Luther, amid the crowd of his students and followers, burnt at Wittenberg the papal bull, the heart of the Catholic began to beat more freely. The class who had impeded the exertions of the church went out from her, and sound doctrine and holy discipline became once more possible. They who would not become heretics, were forced to take the Catholic side in downright earnest. Royalism itself, as after 1848, became frightened at the revolutionary character of the reformation, as exhibited in the insurrection of the Westphalian peasants, and felt it necessary to allow the church, for a time at least, a freedom of action which it had hitherto denied her, and to suffer her to teach the faithful a sound and unmutilated Catholicity. The holy Council of Trent, that great fact of modern history, was convoked, and a Catholic reaction commenced, and, aided by the brave and persevering sons of Loyola, continued without interruption, till checked by nationalism, represented by that unfaithful prince of the church, Cardinal Richelieu, who dragooned the Protestants into submission in France, and

aided them with his policy and troops to subject Catholics in Germany, and by royalism in Louis XIV., who opened the way for Jansenism, infidelity, and the revolution of 1789.

The whole history of the church proves that there is little to fear from heresy, when unaided or unprotected by the civil power. Every heresy that has made much progress has been a heresy that enlisted on its side either royalism or nationalism, and found some temporal prince or authority to protect it, if not openly, at least secretly. The history of the reformation proves that heresy is formidable only when it assumes the form of royalism or nationalism, and appeals to national exclusiveness and temporal supremacy. Nearly all heresy seems to know this by instinct, and hence the point first attacked is not the church in her dogmas, her sacraments, or her worship, but the church in her polity, as the visible kingdom of Christ upon earth, instituted by him for the government of all men and nations in all things pertaining to eternal salvation. The papal constitution of the church gives unity and strength to to the spiritual authority, and makes the church one and universal, and in all that is highest and best obliterates all national distinctions, and disregards all the prejudices of blood and diversities of race. Royalism—by which we mean not precisely the monarchical constitution of the state, but the assertion of the monarch as the state—and nationalism are by their own nature hostile to it, and consequently are the two things against which the Catholic must always be on his guard. Without the papacy the church cannot be maintained as one and catholic. Destroy the papacy or reduce the primacy of Peter to a mere primacy of order, and you cannot prevent religion in any particular nation from becoming a purely national religion, and therefore the slave either of the state or of the national sentiment. It was the national pride of England, wounded by belonging to a church whose visible chief resided out of the realm, that led her into schism. The church in England, yielding to this national pride, became a national church, a snug little English church, as if there had been a particular English God, and an English Jesus Christ, and in so doing lost her independence, and became the slave of the state, and her chief function is to wait upon gentlemen's younger sons, and provide them with fat livings. Wherever the church throws off the papacy it becomes national, and wherever it becomes national, it falls under the secular

authority or the tyranny of public opinion. Nationalism and royalism gained the ascendency in the eastern empire, and induced the Greek church to deny the supremacy of Peter. From that moment the Greek church became the slave or the tool of the Byzantine court,—as infamous a court, perhaps, if we except that of Russia in the eighteenth century, as ever existed in a nominally Christian country. Wherever a non-papal religion is established, it is bound hand and foot by the secular order. So it is in Russia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Ireland, England, Scotland, Holland, Prussia, the Swiss cantons, and the smaller Protestant states and principalities of Germany. Catholics themselves do not seem to us to be always sufficiently aware of the absolute necessity of the papacy to the maintenance of the unity and catholicity, and therefore the freedom and independence, of the church. They hold, of course, that the church is papal, for they could not be Catholics if they did not; they admit that the papacy is highly useful in maintaining unity of doctrine and worship; but many of them do not seem to us to perceive that it is essential to the very being of the Catholic Church, and to the freedom and independence of religion in its conflicts with the powers of this world. Yet they should infer this from the fact that every heresy instinctively makes war on the papacy. All the great heresies which have prevailed began by disregarding the papacy, or by attempting to deprive the Holy See of the affection due it, or of some of its prerogatives; and we ought, whenever we meet a disposition to restrict the papal power, whether in favor of the episcopacy or the presbytery, the secular authority or the brotherhood, to suspect it of an heretical tendency. Our Lord founded his church on Peter, and Peter lives in his successor. *Ubi Petrus, ibi ecclesia.* We cannot conceive how, without the papal constitution maintained in its full right and vigor, it would be possible to preserve the church as a polity, as the visible kingdom of Christ on earth, or the natural supremacy of the moral order in the government of the world.

We have nothing here to say of what is called the temporal power of the popes, but it were to deny us the right to assert Catholicity itself, to command us to refrain from asserting on all occasions the independence and supremacy of the spiritual order, which is nothing else than asserting the freedom of religion and the supremacy of the law of God. The Lord God omnipotent reigneth, King of kings,

and Lord of lords, and his will is the supreme law for all persons and dignities, for all men and nations, and in all the relations of life. The pope and the believer, the bishop and the presbyter, the prince and the subject, the nation and the individual, are alike under this law, and bound to obey it in all things whatsoever. We were false-hearted atheists, we were base recreants to Almighty God, and miserable cravens, if we denied this eternal truth, or feared to assert it. No power, no man, no body of men, has the right to forbid this assertion, for in making it we do but assert the supreme and universal dominion of God, the basis of all authority, of all duty, and of all religion. Even heathen morality itself asserted as much, and it is a sad day if a Christian may not assert as much for the supremacy of the moral order as was asserted by a Socrates, a Plato, a Confucius, or a Cicero. We must assert as much, or assert no morality, no moral obligation at all. The moral order is a real order, it is by its own nature supreme, for neither men nor nations have the right to do wrong. The church, in regard to this world, was introduced and constituted to assert and uphold the supremacy of the moral order, and without her that order cannot be effectively asserted or upheld. As long as the church stands in her freedom and independence, there is one friend to the soul of man, one protector of moral ideas, one shelter to which they who would follow the spirit and live for God can flee from an all-invading, an all-absorbing materialism. We, who have been reared in the world outside the church, feel, perhaps, as those who have been Catholics from their infancy do not and cannot, the incalculable value of this. We have known by bitter experience how the world mocks all our finer and nobler moral aspirations; we know how it chills the soul, and reduces us to a dead and deadening material life. How have we in our non-Catholic days mourned over the hollow morality of the non-Catholic world, its low and unspiritual aims, its want of disinterestedness and love! How have we been frozen by its heartlessness, and its indifference to all that constitutes the true dignity and glory of man! The body and its wants in our non-Catholic world engross every thought, and the soul and its wants are only subjects of pleasant or bitter mockery. In the church we find all our nobler aspirations respected and cherished, our moral wants are met, our souls are quickened and invigorated by a supernatural spiritualism. We find the supremacy of the moral

order asserted, practically asserted, and a man's spiritual worth made the criterion by which his rank is to be determined. All men and things are judged either by the great law of charity or by the eternal law of right and wrong. All the factitious distinctions of rank and race are discarded. All men are brothers, and the poor African slave stands on a level with the most lordly kaiser, if his equal in spiritual worth. Right and goodness are honored in the lowest, wrong and iniquity are condemned and denounced in the highest. Humble virtue has a friend and protector; haughty vice a stern and inexorable censor. Conscience is respected, and he who acts from it is honored, not scorned or jeered.

We hear in our days much about religious liberty, but few in the non-Catholic world seem to have any understanding of what it means, or of the conditions in God's providence of its maintenance. Religious liberty, if it means any thing, means the freedom and independence of the moral order, its emancipation from materialism,—freedom of religion, that is, freedom to worship God and to do in all things what he commands, without let or hindrance from kings or kaisers, princes or nobles, sects or parties, nations or individuals. In this sense we claim religious liberty as the indefeasible right of all men. It is our solemn duty to assert it for every man, and to maintain it against all odds for ourselves. We hold this liberty from God; it is implied in our obligation to worship him, and no human power has the right to restrict it, or in any way to intermeddle with it. It is the right of rights, the liberty of liberties, and we can never consent to part with it. We will carry it with us in poverty and exile, in the dungeon, to the scaffold or the stake; but surrender it we will not. It is the only thing we can call our own, and with it we have all riches, as without it we have nothing. This is the religious liberty which makes martyrs and confessors, and hallows the earth with the blood of the righteous. It is true religious liberty, and the Catholic who will not assert it, and die for it, is a moral coward or a moral traitor,—a Protestant or a Know-Nothing in his heart. As a Catholic, we disown him.

But on what conditions can the external practice of this liberty in such a world as ours be secured? The world, the flesh, and the devil are opposed to it, princes and secular authorities hate it; for it is something above their power,

which they cannot bind by their enactments or subdue by their arms. The flesh detests it, for it is its crucifixion; the world abhors it, for it tramples on the world; the devil is enraged against it, for it scorns his temptations and defeats his wiles. We can die at its bidding, and conquer them all, and gain a more than royal crown, even the crown of eternal life, bestowed upon us by the right hand of him who is Lord of all. But, nevertheless, all these make war upon it, and seek to deprive religion of external freedom, that is, *to prevent the maintenance of the moral order in the affairs and government of the world.* To be able under this point of view to withstand them, religious liberty needs an external organization. Conscience must have a visible polity, that is, the church, the visible kingdom of God on earth. Now, how without the papacy, with all its rights and prerogatives, can you maintain the freedom and independence of the church? and how without the freedom and independence of the church as the organized protector of the rights of conscience, are you to maintain the freedom of religion in the external affairs of the world? We do not forget that the church is episcopal as well as papal, and that ordinarily it is through the episcopacy that the papacy speaks to us; but the episcopacy without the papacy were a mere rope of sand. The bishops having no head, no political bond of union, would be obliged to succumb in the first conflict with the secular authority, or with the prejudices of the nation, and would be reduced to the necessity of teaching what the state or nation dictated, and of doing what the state or nation chose to command. Bishops are equal, and each, without the pope, would be supreme in his own diocese, and exposed to be influenced, even controlled, by the national spirit and character. Who would then call him to account if he was, or if he encroached on the rights of his spiritual subjects? Or where would be the protection of religious liberty against his spiritual tyranny? Who, moreover, would protect him against the lawlessness or rebellion of his flock, and assist him to maintain his proper episcopal authority? Shall he appeal to the temporal power as the proper judge in the case? That would be to subordinate the spiritual to the temporal, and to deny religious liberty in its most essential principle. Certain it is, that religion under the episcopacy, without the papacy binding together in one polity all the bishops of all nations, forming thus a universal spiritual kingdom superior in dig-

nity and broader in extent than any earthly kingdom, and organizing through them all the faithful of all nations into one vast spiritual union, as under presbyterianism, congregationalism, or individualism, could have neither the moral nor the physical conditions requisite to the maintenance of her freedom and independence. Without the perpetual intervention of miracles, the church, by ceasing to be catholic, would become enslaved to the temporal order. She would, as the race, be broken into nations, each nation would have its snug little national church, and we should have, as in the ancient gentile world, as many religions as nations. This is evident from what we see in those European nations that have cast off the papacy. In those nations there is no religious freedom, except the freedom to die, as under the pagan emperors, for religion. Let the national church of any Protestant nation attempt to assert the freedom of religion, or the supremacy of the moral order, against the national sentiment or the secular authority, and it would soon be made to feel the chains, all gilded as they may be, which bind its limbs. Who has forgotten Queen Elizabeth's letter to her bishop of Ely? "Proud prelate, I made you, and if you do not stop your insolence, by God, I will unmake you." Let the Anglican, the Prussian, the Danish, Swedish, or Russian church, dare take a stand in favor of outraged right against the queen, king, or emperor, and it would soon receive a rebuke from royal or imperial lips that it would long remember. Having no support above or beyond the national authority, it has and can have no power to resist that authority, and maintain its freedom in spite of it, unless it be when the secular authority itself has lost its hold upon the nation, and the national sentiment is against it, as was the case in England under James II. When the national church can ally itself with the national sentiment against the prince, it may, no doubt, maintain itself against his authority, but it only changes masters; for it then becomes the slave of that same national sentiment which it has invoked to its aid.

It would be the same in Catholic states and nations without the aid derived from the papacy, and even with all the aid thus derived, it is often very nearly the same. Let the church in France assert the freedom of religion and the supremacy of the moral order against the French sovereign, and it would be obliged to succumb to the state, and do his Imperial Majesty's will, if it had no reliance on some power

out of France. Nothing but the papacy, strengthening the hands of good Catholics, and thundering its anathemas against the constitutional church and clergy, saved Catholicity in France during the old French revolution.

In this country, we have no royalism in name, and no national church so denominated, and so far we have an advantage over others. The laws and the national administration recognize true religious liberty. But the laws and administration are for the most part impotent with us against popular sentiment, which can change them at will. Religious liberty here, as a matter of fact, lies at the mercy of the mob. We are a very religious people in our own way, almost every man having a religion of his own; but the predominant religion, being non-papal, with no chief and no support independent of the country, is obliged to follow instead of leading, much less resisting, popular sentiment or caprice. All religions are tolerated in so far as they are considered matters of no importance, and in so far as they are by their constitution flexible to public opinion, but no further. None of the sects is able to assert with any effect the inflexible moral law against the caprices of public opinion, or a public opinion hostile to it, and they all sustain themselves by their suppleness, and extend themselves by adroitly availing themselves of some local or general popular excitement. Against popular opinions, though in favor of truth and justice, the most powerful of them are impotent, and their denunciations are a mere *brutum fulmen*. There is outside and independent of them a power greater than theirs, which says to them, "Thus far you may come, but no further." Democracy with us takes the place of royalism in the Old World, and *the people* usurp the functions of the church. The people make the laws. Any religion may be professed which does not deny their supremacy; but none which by its own constitution and laws is beyond their control. They will permit no church that is incapable of becoming a national church, or that receives its constitution and laws from another or a higher than an American source. Hence their peculiar hostility to the Catholic Church. The madmen leading on the war against her do not know how to state their own objections. They oppose her as anti-American, and as incompatible with the republican form of government, which is ridiculous and absurd. They pretend that we Catholics cannot be loyal citizens. As if our obedience to the pope was incompatible with our allegiance to

the state! Poor fools! they only echo the worn-out allegations of royalism, under cover of which it trampled on all rights, human and divine, natural and acquired, and established pure centralized despotism. The real ground of their opposition to us is, that our church, being papal, and therefore essentially one and catholic, cannot be a particular national church, independent of all extra-national ecclesiastical authority. Such is the character of our religion, that it is and must be independent of every national authority, and inflexible before public opinion. It is not that our religion is anti-American, or hostile to the political institutions of the country, but that it is not and cannot, without losing its identity, be made the slave of the popular will, and alterable at its caprices. It is above the popular power, and does not derive from popular sovereignty. It asserts boldly in the face of the sovereign people, of statesmen, politicians, and demagogues, that God is God, and to worship the king or the people as God is foul idolatry. This is what gives offence and excites the Know-Nothing, or so-called American, movement against us. We are members of an invincible and inflexible Catholic church, teaching all nations and subject to none. We cannot, then, be flexible to all the variations and caprices of "progressive democracy," and we have a criterion of duty not founded by the people,—a standard of right and wrong not alterable by the variations and changes of sects and parties. It is because we are papists that we are opposed. If we would give up the pope, or reduce his primacy to a mere primacy of order, the Know-Nothings would have no serious objection to us, and would count us nearly as good Americans as the Mormons, the Methodists, the Presbyterians, or the Universalists. But the assertion of the pope as visible head of our church would excite no hostility against us, did they not see that, as long as we adhere to the pope, we maintain the supremacy of the moral order, the freedom and independence of religion. They see that our religion cannot be subject either to the national government or the national sentiment; that it is above all secular control, and cannot be reduced to slavery. As their opposition to us is avowedly to us in our character of papists, it should teach us that the papacy is the grand support of religious liberty, and that its preservation is the only condition of maintaining the ascendency of the moral order in the government of the world, or of practically asserting the supremacy for all men and

nations of the law of God. This should be enough to bind us to the Holy See, and to induce us in all cases and under all circumstances to rally around the successor of Peter.

The assertion of this doctrine may be offensive, and tend to increase, rather than abate, the hostility already raging so fiercely against us. But the truth is the truth, and it is strong enough to sustain us. We must assert religious liberty, we must assert the independence and supremacy of the moral order. We must assert catholicity against nationalism, if we would assert our religion at all, or any thing above the materialism of the age. If ever there was a time when it was necessary to make this assertion, it surely is now, when materialism pervades every thing, and popular idolatry supersedes the worship of God. Shall God have no voice in this land to speak out in clear and fearless tones for him? religious liberty not a single heroic defender amongst us? A persecution, a bitter persecution, no doubt, awaits us. We have long foreseen and predicted it; but Catholic truth is worth dying for. We are not disposed to court maryrdom, but if it comes, we hope we shall have the grace to meet it at least with resignation. Never yet did the church flourish in a country till its soil was well watered with the blood of martyrs. The Christians conquered the Roman world not by slaying, but by being slain; and it is only in the same way that the cross will ever become triumphant in this country. Let the Know-Nothings burn our churches, desecrate our altars, mob or massacre our religious, deprive us of our political rights, reduce us to the condition of bondmen, or shoot us down in the streets or in our houses; they will only hasten, by so doing, the day of our triumph and of their discomfiture.

We might as well be Protestants at once as to waive the church as a spiritual kingdom or polity, and attempt to escape persecution by explaining away the papacy into an inoffensive primacy. To do so were to betray the moral order, and to prove ourselves unworthy of the Catholic name. There is little merit in asserting the truth when nobody questions it, or in boldly defending what no one assails. The merit is in defending what is assailed, and in being always ready to assert, if need be with our lives, that precious truth which is the most strenuously denied. It is precisely where the enemy seeks to make a breach that we should take our stand. We are Americans indeed, but we are also Catholics; and as Catholics we are members of a common-

wealth broader than that of Massachusetts, than that of the American Union, than all the nations of the earth joined together,—a spiritual commonwealth superior to all others, and to which is due our first and deepest love. Religion is the supreme law, and represents the highest and best. In this spiritual commonwealth we are all members of Christ's mystical body, and members one of another. Not one of those members can suffer without all the members suffering with it. In this order, this spiritual kingdom, we are not at liberty to think, debate, or vote by nations. We are Catholics, not nationalists. We are not to consult what a narrow and exclusive nationalism demands or would impose, but what is due to our brethren in all countries of the world and in all times, and especially what is due to our Lord who has redeemed us. Everywhere the church, whose function it is to introduce and sustain the supremacy of the moral order in the government of the world, has to struggle against nationalism and royalism, or the tyranny of the temporal order, which would oppress and enslave her. Everywhere, then, it is necessary to assert and sustain for Catholics the authority of Peter in all its plenitude; for just in proportion as that authority is impaired in the convictions or the affections of the people, is impaired the power of the church to maintain her independence, and to vindicate the supremacy of right. It is the good of Catholics, the interests of Catholicity everywhere, not merely in our own or any other particular nation, that we are to consult. We are in religion, in all that belongs to the moral or spiritual order, to consider all Catholics as constituting one people, and to know no diversity of race or distinction of nation; for true religion is one for all men, and truth and justice are the same in all ages and in all quarters of the globe. In religion we are and must be Catholics, as our very name asserts, not Americans, Englishmen, Irishmen, Frenchmen, or Dutchmen.

If this offends American nationalism, it is not our fault; for the moral and religious order is above and paramount to every nationality, and what we thus give to our religion never was and never can be due to any nationality whatever. If a Know-Nothing nationalism takes umbrage at this, and persecutes us for not being national in our religion, it may do so, we cannot help it. Our religion is older and broader than Americanism, and we know no peculiar *American* religion, unless it be Mormonism,—the only religion we

know of that can boast an American origin. Catholicity is worth living for and worth dying for. If we are persecuted for asserting it, let it be so, and let us rejoice and be exceeding glad that we are counted worthy to suffer for our Lord Jesus Christ, who gave his life for us. They who persecute us wrong us, and it is better to receive wrong than to do wrong. If we desert Peter, we lose all our support, and can expect no divine protection; if we adhere firmly to him, with a loving heart, with filial affection and obedience, we know that we are in the way of our duty, and that nothing whatever can harm us; for the words of our Lord are true: "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock will I build my church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." All ecclesiastical history proves that the divine protection never fails those who rally around the vicar of Jesus Christ, while they who desert him, or depreciate the papacy and seek to deprive it of its prerogatives, are abandoned to the tender mercies of the enemies of God and his church.

Neither here nor elsewhere is it possible to conciliate the opposition to Catholics. The pretence is here and everywhere that Catholics cannot be loyal subjects, because they are obedient to the pope, who must when he commands be obeyed in preference to the state. It is of no avail for us to seek to refute this charge by loud professions of our loyalty, by abusing the pope hypothetically, or by ransacking history to find instances of Catholics disobeying papal mandates. These instances our enemies are sharp-sighted enough to see are not Catholic precedents, and were in violation of Catholic principles. Our enemies do not doubt our loyalty to the state in so far as the state commands nothing contrary to the law of God as interpreted by our church, that is, in all things temporal. They know that our religion itself commands us to be loyal thus far; but that is not enough for them. Our very offence is, that we do and must make a reservation in favor of spirituals, for they will have the state supreme in all things, and suffer no citizen to recognize in any order any law higher than that of the state, or any authority that does not emanate from the state or is not subject to it. We cannot as Catholics and friends of religious liberty, we cannot as men who understand the rights of the moral order, make the concessions they demand. We must deny the competency of the state in spirituals, and assert the freedom and independence of religion. We do not owe, and cannot honestly profess, our unqualified alle-

glance to the state, and till we can, we cannot conciliate our enemies. We may think to do it by professing extreme Gallican views, but the history of the church proves that Gallicanism, if we so explain it that it remains Catholic, contains the offensive reservation of the freedom and independence of the spiritual order. If we so explain it as to yield that reservation, we explain away our Catholicity itself. Conciliation is therefore impossible, and the opposition must remain and be faced till the state consents to retire within its own sphere, and is content to be supreme in its own order only. This lies in the nature of the case, and as the state will never do this, as it will always be encroaching on the rights of the spiritual order, the life of the church in this world, as that of the individual Christian, must be an incessant warfare. Here she is and must be the church militant. She can throw off her armor and find repose only as she becomes the church triumphant in heaven. The only Christian, the only wise or manly course for us, is to stand firm to our principles as Catholics, to be ready to confess Christ whenever called upon, to put our trust in God, and never to fear what an arm of flesh may do to us. God will sustain his church. He will protect Peter, and reach forth his hand to save him, if apparently sinking in the waves of persecution; he will protect us too, if we bind ourselves to Peter by our filial love and unreserved obedience.

We believe there is to be a trial for Catholics in this country which there is no way of escaping; but we do not fear it. If God be for us, what is there for us to fear? In our patience, let us possess our souls. Persecution will try our faith, but it will bind us Catholics together in a more ardent charity. It will render us less worldly, make us more sober, more devoted to the things of God, and less to the things of sense. It will serve to obliterate the distinctions of race which now produce divisions and uncharitableness among us, and detach us from the debasing world of politics, which has held too prominent a place in our affections. The cold and tepid will be warmed into new life, and demagogues will cease to be rivals of the clergy in their influence over us. Under every point of view we shall gain by what is intended to ruin us, and when the storm of Know-Nothingism, or a despotic nationalism, passes over, which it may do much sooner than most of us expect, the church will be more firmly established here than ever. It may be that we need chastisement, and that nothing but a

severe chastisement can remove scandals from amongst us, and prepare us to exert that moral weight in the community to which our numbers entitle us.

But we have been betrayed into a line of remark which is somewhat foreign to our main purpose, which was to throw out some suggestions as to the origin and nature of the Protestant movement in the sixteenth century. We certainly have not read all that has been written either by Catholics or Protestants on that movement; but as far as we have read, we think the deeper philosophy of it has not generally been seen, and that a real philosophical history of the reformation is a desideratum in our literature. We think that it has been regarded too exclusively as a theological movement, and not enough as a movement of royalism and nationalism against the papacy and the unity and catholicity of the church as a polity or kingdom. It was an attack on special dogmas, indeed, but still more an attack on the essential and fundamental constitution of the church, as the divinely instituted kingdom for the assertion and maintenance of the supremacy of the moral and spiritual order in the government of the world, and therefore was, in so far as it succeeded, as Heinrich Heine, that Protestant of the Protestants, has most truly said, "the triumph of sensualism, or the sanctification of the flesh." Regarded in this light, the Protestant movement becomes only a special phase of the general war of the temporal against the spiritual, the flesh against the spirit, the world against God, which has raged from man's first disobedience, and will end only with his last, as we have on so many occasions endeavored to prove.

We have wished also to show that Protestantism was only a development of the anti-papal doctrines held by nearly all the European sovereigns and court lawyers, whether nominally Catholic or avowedly heretical, from the reign of Philip IV. down to the sixteenth century; and therefore for Catholics to defend those doctrines, or to cite the examples they authorized as precedents, is only to play into the hands of our Protestant adversaries, and deprive us of our principal means of support. In the long contests, often severe and bloody, between the popes and emperors, between the Holy See and the European monarchies, it should be seen and felt that the popes were simply the assertors of the supremacy of the law of God, or of the moral order, and defenders of the freedom and independence of religion,

that is, of true religious liberty. They warred for the freedom and independence of the soul against the tyranny of the body, of spiritual liberty against material despotism, and therefore are entitled to the gratitude and love of all who have any just conceptions of what it is that constitutes the true glory and dignity of man. Hence we, as Catholics, instead of being half ashamed of their deeds, apologizing for them, or timidly defending them, should exult in them, and appeal to them as our titles to the gratitude of mankind. Instead of sympathizing with the materialism, the royalism, and nationalism which opposed them, and finally carried away half of Europe from the church, we should look upon these things as the most dangerous enemies of mankind, as well as the individual soul, and oppose to them a hearty love to the Holy See, and a steady and persevering obedience in all things spiritual to the successor of Peter.

PROTESTANTISM IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1856.]

The Abbé Poisson is known to us only as the author of this brief essay on the causes of the success of Protestantism in the sixteenth century. He writes with ability, but evidently appertains to the class of "candid Catholics," as a writer in the *Dublin Review* denominates them, who so often force us to exclaim, "Save us from our friends." He has, however, the merit of understanding that Luther and his associates did not make the so-called reformation,—a reformation that reformed nothing,—and that its success was owing to causes quite apart from their genius, ability, learning, audacity, or wickedness. The apostate monk originated nothing, and, at most, only gave expression to the sentiments and passions of his age, especially in the Germanic nations, then the least cultivated and enlightened

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**Essai sur les Causes du Succès du Protestantisme au Seizième Siècle.* Par l'Abbé Poisson, Prêtre du Diocèse de Chartres. Paris: 1839.

portion of Europe. He did not destroy the faith of the people who joined the Protestant movement; he only revealed to them the fact that they had already lost it, and ceased to be Catholics. He brought, as the Germans would say, the age to self-consciousness, and induced those not of the church to go out from her communion, and to set up a religion, or a no-religion, for themselves.

Taking this view of the case, the Abbé Poisson, in this brief essay, seeks the explanation of the rapid spread of Protestantism in the sixteenth century, in causes which were in operation for the most part, long before the reformers appeared on the stage. These causes he enumerates and develops with great freedom and boldness, with considerable depth of thought and vigor of expression. He has evidently thought beyond his books, and for himself; and he writes from his own mind, without embarrassing himself at all with the bearing what he says may have on the sanctity and infallibility of the church. The causes of the success of Protestantism in the sixteenth century he divides into two classes,—extrinsic and intrinsic. The extrinsic causes, he tells us, were: "1. The rash pretensions of the court of Rome to authority over the temporalities of kings; 2. The unhappy issue of the great schism of the West; 3. The imprudent conduct of the bishops assembled at Basel; 4. The disorders of the court of Rome; 5. The establishment of tithes; 6. The multiplication of religious orders; 7. The abuse of indulgences; 8. The rigors of the inquisition; 9. Negligence in correcting abuses; 10. The ignorance in which the people grovelled; 11. The fondness for subtilties; 12. Too little care in arresting the first movements of the reform; 13. The mischievous policy of Charles V.; and 14. The persecution of Protestants." The intrinsic causes, or those supplied by Protestantism as soon as it made its appearance, were: "1. The passions loosened from all restraint; 2. Absolute independence in matters of faith; 3. The impunity, the security even, afforded to incontinent clerks; 4. The temptation presented for one to make a noise in the world, by establishing himself as a chief of the new doctrines; 5. The opportunity offered for one, without too much shame, to take possession of the goods of the church."

These are the causes assigned, and some of them, no doubt, really existed and actually contributed to such success as Protestantism obtained; but some of them also are imagi-

nary, and those that are not, were not, with one or two exceptions, peculiar to the sixteenth century. They are in general only the old enemies of the church, such as she has at all times and places to combat, and present very little to explain why Protestantism was able to succeed in the sixteenth century rather than in the fifteenth, or even the fourteenth.

That the reform was marked by bitter hostility to the papacy, and was chiefly a revolt against the papal authority, we certainly hold; but we cannot agree with the author, that it was "the rash pretensions of the court of Rome to authority over the temporalities of kings" that provoked that hostility, and led to that revolt. By the court, he means the church, of Rome, including the pope, as is evident from the following:—

"Let us not seek to dissemble the fact, that the church of Rome, on becoming independent of every civil government, lost a little of the charm of primitive simplicity, although she gained somewhat in éclat and splendor. Her divine authority, indeed, was always venerated, but the very veneration she received, joined to the glory of commanding, gave her, perhaps, too high an opinion of herself. Having become accustomed to see sovereign princes and nations abase themselves before her, she imagined that she held in her hands the two swords. True, she did not declare it an article of faith, that she is supreme in temporals as well as spirituals, for this is an error, and the church of Rome, mother and mistress of all the churches, does not err. It was a simple opinion, which, unhappily, several popes entertained and tried quite too strenuously to make prevail. I do not accuse them; I only see in some of them short-sighted views and mistaken zeal, and in others a little of that general ignorance which then oppressed the world. Certainly the maxim of these popes was not precisely the sort to win the affections of temporal sovereigns for the papacy, and kings very naturally were not sorry to see it from time to time attacked. They took pleasure in humbling Rome, who arrogated to herself the right to confer or to take away their crowns, and when strong by the sword, they despised her fulminations, and taught their subjects to do the same. However, not sufficiently instructed to deny the maxim itself, which had gained currency under favor of ages of ignorance, they went further, and sought to destroy even the spiritual power of the pope, so as to have nothing to fear from him; for it was from their spiritual power that the supreme pontiffs deduced the power they claimed in temporals. But this was an attempt to get rid of one evil by introducing another and a far greater one, since the destruction of the spiritual authority of the pope would be the destruction of that economy which Jesus Christ has established in the government of his church. I think, therefore, that if Luther had

appeared before the struggles of the popes for temporal power, he would not have been able to excite that horror of Rome, which is so striking a characteristic of Protestantism. When he called the papacy a tyranny, there was exaggeration in the expression, but there was also a semblance of truth in what he said, sufficient to allow him to undertake to abolish it, which is the great aim of Protestantism. Sound minds, however, will readily comprehend the injustice of confounding what is divine in the papal authority with what, through ignorance, mistaken zeal, and a false idea of true greatness, the popes, preoccupied with their imposing charge as common father of the faithful, mingled with it."—pp. 11, 12.

The Abbé Poisson, when writing this, must have been too preoccupied with making out his case to reflect that he could not consistently write thus of a church, which, as a Catholic, he is bound to believe holy, and even concedes to be infallible. He has, of course, the right to relate historical facts as they really were, let the consequences be what they may; but, if the facts in the case warrant the conclusion he here draws, it seems to us that he ought not to profess himself a Catholic. A church which loses her charm of simplicity, is dazzled by her own greatness, puffed up with pride at the veneration she receives, entertains and seeks to establish an erroneous opinion of her own powers, claims and exercises an authority prejudicial to the temporal prince which has not been granted her by her founder, can hardly be the church of God. If what the Abbé Poisson has allowed himself to say of the church of Rome, including the supreme pontiff, be true, she should, in our judgment, be regarded as the synagogue of Satan rather than the church of Christ. Luther was coarser and less civil in his expressions, but we recollect nothing in his diatribes against Rome really more injurious to her than what we have here faithfully translated from the "Priest of the Diocese of Chartres." Surely, if this may be said of her with truth, it could be only in bitter irony that we could call her the immaculate spouse of the Lamb?

The church of Rome, it seems, "in becoming independent of every civil government,—*de tout pouvoir humain*, —lost a little of the charm of primitive simplicity." Does the worthy abbé consider it a damage that the church became, or is thus independent; and would he have her dependent on the civil government, and therefore the slave of the state? But when was the church of Rome dependent on any civil government? Was it when the apostles

refused to obey the magistrates, who commanded them to preach no more in the name of Jesus of Nazareth, alleging in their defence, that they must obey God rather than men? Was it when she took refuge in the catacombs, and sent her children to be torn by wild beasts in the amphitheatre, or to suffer death in the most excruciating forms, rather than offer one grain of incense to Cæsar? Whence, we would respectfully ask, has the Abbé Poisson learned that Rome has lost any thing of her primitive simplicity? Is it characteristic of an affectionate son to tell his mother to her face, that she is growing old, and has lost the charms of her youth? Rome, in consequence of the spread of Catholicity, the conversion of nations, multiplied relations with states and empires, and the failure of the great patriarchates of the East, has had, no doubt, a vast accumulation of business to attend to, and has had to organize various courts and congregations for its despatch, and also to observe various forms in her intercourse with kings, emperors, and princes, which were not demanded, nor indeed practicable, when Peter first erected his chair in the Eternal City; but she has, we are bold to say, never lost any thing, as the church, of her primitive simplicity, and not a single pope has ever used language more imperial than that used by St. Peter himself to Ananias and Saphira, or to Simon the Magician. In a Protestant, this cant about the primitive simplicity of the church is natural enough, and to be looked for; but in a Catholic, it is any thing but edifying. The church of Rome, if what she professes to be, and what every Catholic, who understands himself, believes her to be, never grows old, never loses a single charm or grace with the lapse of time, or the changes which take place in the world around her; and is as young, as fresh, as blooming, as vigorous, and as charming to-day as she was when she went forth from Jerusalem to convert the nations, or when, emerging from the catacombs, she planted the cross, the symbol of man's salvation, on the capitol of the Cæsars. If the learned abbé, in his historical researches, has discovered any facts which prove that she is not so, he ought, as a conscientious and consistent man, to abandon her communion, and cease to own her for his mother.

Will the Abbé Poisson allow us to ask him, by what authority he tells us that the church of Rome "formed, perhaps, too high an idea of herself"? We had supposed that it was from her, and from her alone, that we are to learn

what is too high or too low an idea of her,—what she is, what are her powers, her position, her office, her authority and her merits. We have supposed that it would be at least rash for us to accuse her of ignorance, rashness, arrogance, putting forth unfounded claims, entertaining and seeking to establish an erroneous opinion, and pretending to an authority in temporals to which she had no right. Who are we, to sit in judgment on the church of Rome, and to summon the sovereign pontiffs to our tribunal? If the authority of the church of Rome is divine, if she is the mother and mistress of all the churches, and if she never errs, but is infallible, as the learned abbé confesses, it is for her to teach us what are her powers, what are her rights, and what the extent and the limits of her authority, and not for us to teach her. She is our judge, not we hers. It belongs to her to define her own powers, and we must accept her definition, whether it includes more or less, or forfeit our Catholic character. She alone is competent to decide, whether her pretensions are rash or not, whether she holds, or has ever held, an erroneous and dangerous opinion or not, and whether she does or does not possess the two swords—temporal and spiritual.

The Abbé Poisson says that the church of Rome, "having become accustomed to see sovereign princes and nations abase themselves before her, imagined that she held the two swords in her hands." This he maintains is an error. But if she so imagined, how does he know that it is an error? Whence has he learned that she does not hold the two swords? Has she, has any pope, or any general council, disclaimed the doctrine, or censured it as erroneous? It was not an article of faith, he says, and, though an error, the church of Rome did not err in holding it, because she held it not as faith, but as an opinion. We do not understand this reasoning. It is too fine for our gross conceptions. She has, he asserts, held it, sought to make it prevail, claimed and exercised the powers it would give her if it were true. If so, and it be an error, it strikes us, that she has erred, and as grievously erred, as if she had formally declared it to be of faith. According to the abbé, it was "a simple opinion with some popes, unhappily, entertained and tried quite too strenuously to make prevail,"—some through short-sightedness and mistaken zeal, and others through ignorance and a false idea of true greatness. Now we do not assert that the pope, in matters of mere administration,

which depend on simple human prudence, may not misjudge, though we are not prepared to say that he can, far less that even in these matters he ever has misjudged, or ever failed to adopt, at the precise time and place, the precise policy or measure, all circumstances considered, the best for the interest of the church and the salvation of souls; but we must have some higher authority than our own or that of our learned and independent author, to prove to us that the supreme pontiff ever did or can err as to the extent or the limits of his own powers,—ever was or ever can be so short-sighted, so ignorant, so mistaken in his zeal, or so preoccupied with the imposing nature of his charge, as to claim and attempt to enforce for the papacy a power, either in spirituals or temporals, not possessed by it through the concession or authorization of Jesus Christ, whose vicar on earth he is.

But we must tell our worthy author that we doubt his being right in saying that the church held a maxim as to her authority in regard to the secular order, which she did not define to be of faith. All the power that it can be proved the pope ever claimed, as representative of the spiritual order, in temporals, was actually defined to be of faith, by Boniface VIII. in the bull *Unam Sanctam*, which has never been and never can be abrogated, if we may believe Clement V., who, when Philip the Fair demanded its recall, answered that he could not recall it, because it contained a dogmatic definition. We say not that it was ever defined to be of faith, that the pope possesses all the power which the Abbé Poisson says certain popes arrogated to themselves; but we do say that all the power in regard to temporals, which it can be proved from history, any pope ever claimed as the representative of the spiritual order, was so defined. The distinction between faith and opinion resorted to by the author, cannot, therefore, in this case avail him. He must, then, either concede that the church of Rome possesses by divine right all the power the popes have ever claimed for her on the ground of that right, or concede that she has erred in matters of faith. But is it not quite as likely that St. Gregory VII., Innocent III., Boniface VIII., John XXII., and Sixtus V., were as well informed as to the rights and powers of the papacy, quite as free from mistaken zeal, and quite as far-sighted as the simple priest of the diocese of Chartres? By what authority does he tell us that these great popes put forth rash preten-

sions, and tried to make prevail a false and dangerous opinion? Has the church ever declared those pretensions, whatever they were, to be rash, and declared that opinion an error? Has she ever abandoned any claim that these great pontiffs put forth for her as flowing from her spiritual authority? Has any one of the successors of St. Peter declared, that through ignorance, mistaken zeal, short-sightedness, and too exclusive preoccupation with their imposing charge as common father of the faithful, they put forth claims to a power not rightfully theirs? Assuredly not. What authority, then, will the author adduce? Will he appeal to the public opinion of Catholics at the present day, and allege that it is opposed to the maxims of the popes in the middle ages? But even if such an appeal were allowable, it could avail him nothing; for at the furthest, the public opinion of Catholics of to-day is not more opposed to it, than the public opinion of Catholics was favorable to it then; and since the church is catholic in time as well as in space, it would be difficult for him to prove that the public opinion of Catholics is worth more in the age of Pius IX., than it was under Gregory VII. or Innocent III., and the attempt to do so might possibly involve still greater difficulties.

But we are far from accepting the statement that the church of Rome "arrogated to herself the right to confer or to take away the crowns" of kings, when made without any qualification; for that would imply that kings hold their crowns, or civil government its rights, at the pleasure of the supreme pontiff, which no pope ever pretended, and which Boniface VIII. expressly disclaimed. Whatever authority the pope has ever claimed over Catholic sovereigns by divine right, he has claimed it as representative of the spiritual order, and therefore it can be only that which the spiritual inherently possesses over the temporal. This, the Abbé Poisson cannot deny, for he says expressly, that the popes deduced the power over temporals, which they claimed, from their spiritual authority. The pope has, in spirituals, all the authority which Jesus Christ has not reserved to himself, and it extends, undeniably, to all questions or matters that do or can come up in the spiritual government of the faithful; but it extends to temporals only in so far as they are involved in the spiritual. Kings are as much bound to obey the law of God, whether the natural or the revealed law, as are their subjects, and in their public as much as in

their private capacity; and the pope is the divinely appointed guardian, interpreter, and judge of that law for them as much as he is for any other member of the church. He has, by virtue of his spiritual authority, the right to decide for all Catholics, without exception, whether a given civil enactment does or does not contravene the natural or the revealed law, and in case it does, to forbid them to obey it, for we must obey God rather than men. He has authority to judge every spiritual question which arises, or can arise, between a Catholic prince and his subjects, and therefore to determine whether the prince has or has not forfeited his trust, or whether his subjects are or are not absolved from their allegiance: for these are spiritual questions, although they may have temporal consequences, since they are questions which regard conscience. But no pope ever claimed, as an inherent right of the papacy, temporal authority over princes, or power to interfere with their temporalities. In the case of the Holy Roman Empire, revived in the person of Charlemagne, the pope had, by the constitution of that empire, the right to elect and crown the emperors, and under the feudal system the Holy See became the suzerain of several European kingdoms, states, and principalities, through their own solicitation and cession; but the maxim, that the supreme pontiff may confer or take away crowns at his own pleasure or arbitrary will, no pope ever adopted, no Catholic doctor ever taught. Civil power ordinarily derives from God through the people, and we know of no authority, spiritual or temporal, that can rightfully dispossess it, so long as it answers its end, or does not forfeit its trust by its own tyrannical and oppressive acts.

There is no doubt, as the Abbé Poisson maintains, that hostility to Rome was the characteristic of the Protestant movement, as it is the only thing in which all Protestants are or ever have been agreed; and there is just as little doubt that the reformers attempted to justify this hostility by accusing the popes of rash pretensions to temporal authority over the state, and of usurping powers incompatible with Christian liberty; but that the facts were as they alleged, or that their charges were well-founded, we have never seen proved, and do most explicitly deny. Whoever has read history sufficiently to be competent to form a judgment on the subject, knows perfectly well that in their long and often terrible struggles with the empire, or with Cæsar, the popes have never claimed or attempted to do

more than vindicate the independence of the church and the freedom of the spiritual order. The rash pretensions, the aggressions, the usurpations, have in all cases been on the side of the secular power, never on theirs. In the struggle between St. Gregory and Henry IV., king of the Germans, the holy pontiff attempted only to carry out the discipline of the church, to recover for her the right of investiture, which the secular power had usurped, and to put down simony and irregularities among the clergy, which that power encouraged and protected. The hostility, in all cases, was provoked by emperors, kings, or princes, who wished to bring the ecclesiastical as well as the civil administration in their respective states under the control of the secular authority. They disliked the independence of the church, and her supreme authority in managing her own temporalities; they disliked, too, the presence in their states, of a power not held from them, nor amenable to them, and which governed the souls of their subjects, while it left them only their bodies. It was not that the pope interfered, or claimed the right to interfere, with the temporal administration of their states, so long as they restrained it within the temporal order; it was the presence of a divinely instituted authority, asserting and maintaining the independence of the spiritual order, and pronouncing the state incompetent in spirituals, that provoked the contest; because where such an authority is present and exercising its rights, absolutism, or despotism, is impracticable. It was not the arrogance of the successors of Peter, but the arrogance of Cæsar, wishing to embody all power in himself, and to reign absolute monarch on earth, that provoked that terrible struggle between the church and the empire, which fills so large a space in the annals of Christendom, and which is not yet terminated, and which will not entirely cease till the consummation of the world, and time is no more. It is inexcusable ignorance, or base ingratitude, for a Catholic to throw the blame of this struggle on the Roman pontiffs, and thus to hold the church herself responsible for it; or to characterize it as a contest on the part of the popes for authority over the temporalities of kings. It was, and is, and will be, simply a contest on the part of the Roman pontiffs for the freedom of religion, the liberty of conscience, and the legitimate independence of the church of God.

The great schism of the West, the second cause enumerated by the Abbé Poisson, had unquestionably an important

influence in preparing the way for the success of Protestantism in the sixteenth century. The existence contemporaneously of two or three claimants to the papacy, each followed by what was called his *Obedience;* the officious part taken by secular princes in producing or healing the schism; the discussions in regard to the ground and authority of the papacy to which it gave rise, and the inept opinions and schemes offered for putting an end to it, tended not a little to the abasement of the papacy in public estimation, and to confuse the minds of many good Catholics even as to the papal constitution of the church. Good, peace-loving people, when there is a quarrel, are usually disposed to throw the blame of its continuance on the party in the right, or the least in the wrong. Not a few, really well-disposed towards the church, shocked at the scandal of the schism, charged it all to the pope, and were so indignant at him that they passed from the discussion of the merits of the rival claimants, to the discussion of the papacy itself. In this latter discussion some adventurous minds dared broach the opinion, that it were better to have no pope at all than to be liable to the scandal of two or three rival popes at the same time. Such an opinion contained in germ the whole Protestant movement of the sixteenth century.

To us who live at this day, and have studied with some diligence and care the various questions involved in that schism, which lasted nearly forty years, and was concluded by the election of Otto Colonna, or Martin V., by the Council of Constance, the matter then in controversy is plain enough; and it was so, we doubt not, in the beginning to the principal parties concerned. We have not the least doubt that the Roman pontiff, Urban VI., was legitimately elected, and was true pope; that his successors, Boniface IX., Innocent VII., and Gregory XII., were legitimate popes, and that Robert of Geneva, Peter de Luna, Peter Philargi, and Balthazar Cossa were antipopes. The council of Constance is for us a legitimate council only after its convocation by Gregory XII., and what it did before we count as *non avenu*, save so far as subsequently ratified or approved by Martin V. The acts of Balthazar Cossa, or John XXIII., though he called the prelates of his obedience together, and of Peter de Luna, who sent his nuncios to the council, add nothing for us to its legitimacy. It was the act of Gregory convoking it, and authorizing it to proceed as a council, before resigning the papacy for himself, that

rescued it from the character of a mere assembly of cardinals and bishops without any authority whatever. It is, also, worthy of remark, that till the act of Gregory legitimating it, nothing in the council proceeded smoothly and according to rule, and that afterwards there was comparatively little difficulty. Perhaps the events of this schism, if profoundly studied, especially the acceptance at Rome of Peter Philargi, elected by the cardinals and prelates assembled at Pisa, might throw some light on the opinion of those, who, like Fénelon and Dr. Döllinger, attach the indefectibility and infallibility of the apostolic see to the *sedes* rather than to the *sedens*, and prove that it is necessary to say with St. Ambrose, *Ubi Petrus, ibi ecclesia.*

But, however this may be, it is very certain that in the actual state of men's minds, and the all but inextricable confusion in which the question was very soon involved, there was a serious difficulty even for able and conscientious prelates in determining how the schism was to be healed, and the normal state of things restored. The question which of the two, after Pisa which of the three, claimants was pope, and which were the antipopes, could not easily be settled to the satisfaction of the obedience or obediences rejected, and it was thought to be necessary, as matters had gone so far, and all the parties were so obstinate, to devise some way of terminating the schism without deciding or even touching that delicate question. The peaceable, legal, and effectual method of doing this, was for the claimants to unite in convoking, by a joint or an individual act, a general council, and each resigning his own claims, be they well-founded or not, and authorizing the council, on that occasion, to proceed to the election of a new pope. This is the course intended to be taken. The obstinacy of Peter de Luna rendered it only partially practicable. But as the Council of Constance professed to act by papal authority, and actually had that of the true pope, the election of Otto Colonna was legitimate and compatible with the papal constitution of the church. The presence in the council, and the part taken in the election by the cardinals and prelates of the two antipopes, could not vitiate either the election or the council, because they were present and took part by the authorization or assent of the pope and of those in whom vested for the time being the authority to hold the council and elect a new pontiff. The authority given by the true pope, who, as we say, was Gregory XII., and the assent of

the cardinals and prelates of his obedience, sufficed to make the election legal, because through them it was virtually made by a papal constitution.

But all at the time did not defend the legitimacy of the Council of Constance and the election of Otto Colonna, who took the name of Martin V., on the ground we have here indicated. During the continuance of the schism, the failure of repeated efforts to heal it, and the protracted controversy as to the means of terminating it, the opinion was finally broached by some rash minds, perhaps enemies of the papacy itself, that there is in the church a power above the pope, and that in cases of schism, when it is doubtful which is the true successor of St. Peter, the cardinals and bishops may depose the claimants, and proceed without any papal authorization to elect a new pope. This opinion soon gained no little currency. It was only on the ground that there is in the church a power above the pope, which in emergencies may be called into exercise without and even in spite of the papal authority, that the cardinals and prelates of the two obediences assembled at Pisa deposed both Gregory XII. and Benedict XIII., and elected Peter Philargi, who took the name of Alexander V. It must have been on the same ground, though opposed by the more eminent French theologians and canonists, that the French court hoped to justify its withdrawal of France from the obedience of Peter de Luna, whom it had recognized as true pope, and its refusal at the same time to submit to his competitor, Gregory XII. The cardinals and prelates of Pisa adopted this opinion apparently with trembling, and seem to have lacked full confidence in the legality of their proceeding. The fathers of Constance evidently had at first more confidence in it, and wished to erect it into a Catholic dogma, as appears from the acts of the fourth and fifth sessions,—acts, however, which have no authority for us, because those sessions were held before the council had been convoked by Gregory XII., and, therefore, before the assembly was a legitimate council; and also because they were not approved and confirmed by Martin V., who only approved and confirmed what had been done *conciliariter*.

This opinion assumed by Pisa, asserted by Constance before it was a legitimate council, and repeated by the subsequent assembly of Basel, would be very sound in the political order, because in the political order power is ordinarily derived from God through the people, and there always per-

sists in the people a power to dispossess its actual trustees, and to vest it in other hands, whenever it is necessary to do so, in order to preserve the state. But we cannot transfer the same principle to the church, because it denies her essentially papal constitution, and the immediate divine institution of the papacy, and asserts that the pope derives his power from God only through the church, and therefore that he is accountable to her, and may be judged by her. It implies that the pope is secondary, not primary, and supposes that the church can exist in her integrity and in her essential faculties, and perform her essential functions as the church of Christ, without and even in opposition to the pope. We do not believe that the majority of those who adopted this opinion were aware of its reach, and we doubt not that the prelates who favored it did so, for the most part, with a laudable intent, as the only ground—considering the persistence in regarding himself as true pope of each of the claimants—on which an end could be effectually put to the schism; and we presume its assertion by the assemblies of Constance and Basel was made with a desire of providing a regular and legal method of avoiding or getting out of a similar *imbroglio* in the future. But, whoever examines it must see that it is fatal to the papacy, and contains the whole antipapal doctrine of Luther. The pope, according to it, was no longer essential to the church; and after it had been widely diffused, as, thanks to kings, princes, courtiers, and factious spirits, it was long before the appearance of the reformers, it was, as the Abbé Poisson well remarks, an easy matter to persuade simple, well-meaning people, that so long as they remained submissive to their bishops they were in the fold of Christ, whether these bishops submitted to the pope or opposed him. They knew of the pope only what their pastors taught them, and if these taught them that the pope is not essential to the church, and that he may be rejected and she still remain intact, what wonder that they so believed? This opinion makes the church radically and essentially episcopal, and only accidentally papal; and from episcopalianism to presbyterianism, asserted by Luther and Calvin, there is but a step, and a step quite easy to take—

Facilis descensus Averni.

But though we fully coincide with our author as to the fatal influence of the great western schism in preparing the way for the success of the Protestant movement, we cannot

agree with him that it did so by the manner in which it was terminated; for we maintain that the manner in which it was terminated was legal, was by virtue of papal authority, and without asserting any authority in the church superior to the pope, or prejudicial to him as supreme pastor and governor of the church. The mischief was done not by the issue of the schism, but by the opinions and speculations broached as to the means of terminating it. Our Lord was, as ever, present with his church and took care that no blow should be officially struck to the authority of his vicar; and, humanly speaking, it was owing to the so-called obstinacy of Gregory XII., the legitimate pontiff, and his refusal to submit to the assembly of prelates at Pisa, that the papacy came out from the trial unscathed, and the dissensions were healed without the recognition in the church of a power above it. But the anti-papal and revolutionary opinions which were broached during the protracted controversy, and which, amidst the obscurity and confusion in which passion and scholastic subtilty had involved the question, were favored by many well-disposed and even learned prelates, and by large numbers of the inferior clergy, continued to circulate widely even after the Council of Constance, and found a ready and hearty support in the courts of sovereigns, in the parliaments, with the turbulent nobles, with the jurisconsults, and indeed, with all who looked to the state for their advancement, and were impatient of the restraints imposed by the papacy. Though condemned by the Council of Florence, they were insisted on by the factious prelates remaining at Basel, and formed the basis of the pragmatic sanction, the work of Charles VII. of France. They floated in the minds of the people, especially in Germany, and parts of France, and day by day gained strength, till at the appearance of Luther, they had become the common belief of the people, at least of the governments and nobility, of nearly all the countries that finally became Protestant. Indirectly the assembly of Pisa introduced Protestantism.

We cannot agree with the author in holding the popes in any degree responsible for the schism itself. That fatal schism was the work of the sovereigns aided by national rivalries, and its chief, almost its sole, responsibility rests upon the author's own country. We would not speak lightly or disparagingly of France; we cheerfully acknowledge the true Catholic faith, piety, and zeal in all ages of

a large portion of her people, as well as the important services her government has on numerous occasions rendered the Holy See. She falls below no nation in Europe, in her devotion to religion, or her contributions to its diffusion. We are indebted to her for the planting and growth of Catholicity in our own beloved country in a far greater degree than many among us are aware. The church in the United States has to a great extent been founded and built up by French bishops and clergy, and hardly could the monuments of Catholic zeal and piety, becoming so numerous in the land, have been erected without the liberal contributions of our brethren in France. The revival of Catholicity in England, dates from the presence and labors of the French clergy, driven from their own country by the temporary ascendency of the Jacobins. Always must English and American Catholics cherish the warmest gratitude to Catholic France, to whom we, as an American citizen, owe another debt, for it was by her aid, her treasures, and her blood, that we were enabled to gain national independence, and to take a place among the nations of the earth. If any foreigner has a special right to feel himself at home in these United States, it is the Catholic Frenchman; and base must be that American Catholic heart, whether of English, Irish, or German descent, that does not beat with lively affection for France and the French people. Yet it cannot be denied that France made the western schism, and thus became, unintentionally no doubt, the chief originator of Protestantism. The encroachments of Philip the Fair, the grandson of St. Louis, on the rights of the church, his uncatholic and unfilial conduct towards that great Pope Boniface VIII., and the support he gave to the Italian enemies of that pontiff,—a band of robber nobles and princes,—drove the popes from Rome, and compelled them to take up their residence for seventy-two years at Avignon on the borders of France, surrounded by French influences and French cardinals; and that residence was, as is conceded on all hands, a proximate cause of the schism. They were French cardinals, backed by the French court, if not indeed instigated by it, that took the lead in the revolt from Urban VI.,—whom they had elected and for four months acknowledged,—and in electing Robert of Geneva antipope, and thus creating the schism. France, too, was the first to recognize Robert of Geneva, a Frenchman, as the legitimate successor of Peter, and none but she and her clients ever did so recog-

nize him. But for her the schism would have died in its birth, if indeed it had ever been born at all. Any time before the affair of Pisa it was in her power to put an end to it by returning to the obedience of Urban VI. The other countries who pertained to the obedience of Robert and his successor Peter de Luna, would have readily followed her; for the opposition came from the courts rather than from the theologians and canonists. The difficulty was not in the uncertainty of the French court as to who was the true pope, but in the fact that it wanted a French pope, and would rather have a false pope or none at all than a Roman or an Italian pope, as it proved by withdrawing France from the obedience of Benedict XIII., and submitting to no other. France made it a national question. From her too, came most of those antipapal maxims which, adopted by Basel, and supported by Charles VII. in his pragmatic sanction, and by the Emperors Sigismund, Albert, and Frederick III., prepared the minds and ears of the people for the coarse denunciations of the pope by Luther, without being shocked or disgusted.

The imprudent conduct of the bishops assembled at Basel, undoubtedly, as the Abbé Poisson maintains, was one of the leading causes which prepared the success of Protestantism in the sixteenth century. They improved upon Pisa and Constance, and showed from the first a settled determination to revolutionize the church, and to change her constitution from the papal to an episcopal, or perhaps, a presbyterian constitution. Their aim was, so to speak, to destroy the monarchical constitution of the church, and to substitute the council for the pope, and to make him, if retained, the nominee of the council, its simple executive officer, deriving his power from it, and amenable to it for his conduct. They labored to develop and to erect into Catholic dogmas the maxims acted on by Pisa in deposing Gregory XII. and Peter de Luna, and in electing Peter Philargi pope, and which the assembly at Constance had guardedly asserted in its fourth and fifth sessions. Certainly no little responsibility in regard to the introduction and success of Protestantism in the sixteenth century rests upon the factious prelates who persisted in calling themselves the council after it had been transferred by Eugenius IV. to Ferrara and subsequently to Florence. Their revolutionary spirit, their factious proceedings, and their antipapal definitions, were more than a prelude to Protestant-

ism; and Luther himself hardly went further in his hostility to the papacy than the Cardinal of Arles, their principal leader. They made the church by their definitions episcopal as against the papacy, and by their conduct, presbyterian as against episcopacy; for they permitted the inferior clergy to sit and vote in the council, and to vote even on questions of doctrine. The definitions touching the authority of councils over the pope, their right to judge him, to depose him, and to elect a new pope in his place, were carried by the vote of simple priests against the majority of bishops present.

But after all, these prelates acted under the influence of the secular princes, and chiefly under that of Charles VII., of France, and Sigismund, emperor of Germany. They were chiefly French and German prelates. Out of twenty prelates, a majority of whom, by the way, were not even bishops, who were present in the thirty-third session, in which were adopted the antipapal definitions, eighteen belonged to France and Germany. It was principally the support which Charles and Sigismund, more especially the latter, gave to these factious prelates, that created the embarrassment of the pope, in bringing them to a sense of their duty, and that encouraged them in their scandalous disobedience. The officiousness of the king and the emperor induced the pope to abandon his first resolution to dissolve the council, and to come to a compromise with them, in which he yielded to the last limit of lawful concession,—all that he could yield and save the essentially papal constitution of the church. Both the emperor and the king sustained the assembly till the pope made them see that the principle it contended for, if applied to politics, would make the monarch the subject of the states-general, and abase his power and dignity. But they continued to the last to sustain the antipapal maxims of the assembly. So that, however imprudent was the conduct of the bishops who sat in it, and however great its influence in preparing the success of Protestantism, the chief blame rests on the sovereigns, who were laboring to extend and consolidate their power, and to subject to it the ecclesiastical as well as the civil administration in their respective states.

We know from history that the sovereigns took great pains to circulate the doctrines of Basel among the people of their several states. On the eve of the reformation, Maximilian I. and Louis XII., in their war on Pope Julius

II., appealed to them, and set up a council of five traitor cardinals against him. Louis, in his antipapal madness, compelled the French clergy to excommunicate the sovereign pontiff, and forbid all communication with him. It was then the supporters of the chair of Peter were stigmatized as papists. Rome was denominated Babylon, and from the royalist camp went forth the threat that she should be destroyed even to her name. In Germany it was, if possible, still worse. The antipapal doctrines of Basel were almost universally diffused, and the grossest calumnies of the Roman pontiff were listened to with pleasure in the castle and the cottage. Luther had not much to do when he appeared, and he only used a language already familiar in Germany and many parts of France. The sovereigns, through Pisa, Basel, and other instruments, had deprived him of all originality, and accomplished the greater part of his work.

The other causes of the success of Protestantism assigned by the Abbé Poisson we pass over for the present. In developing and commenting on them, he says many things both true and pertinent, and many things, we grieve to add, which a Catholic cannot say without calumniating his spiritual mother. In general he does not go to the root of the matter, and is far more ready to say hard things of the sovereign pontiffs than of the secular princes, and of the ecclesiastical than of the lay society of the time. He does not make enough of the political and social causes of the success of Protestantism, and seeks too exclusively its causes in the ecclesiastical society, the arrogance of popes, the corruptions of the court of Rome, and the vices, faults, and blunders of churchmen. Several of the things he mentions came too late to serve his purpose, and actually tended to arrest the success of Protestantism, and others had no existence, or if existence, no influence on the result. He too often forgets that Protestantism was essentially a political and a social movement, having its motives in worldly hopes and passions, and was only accidentally a religious or theological movement. Had it been primarily and essentially a religious movement, an effort to introduce new doctrines in opposition to the dogmas of the church, it would have started with a fixed and determinate confession of faith, with which it would stand or fall. It would, moreover, have been confined to a limited area, and proved short-lived. Its strength, as the Abbé Poisson remarks with equal truth

and profoundness, lay precisely in the fact that it had no doctrines, but held itself free to ally itself with any doctrines that promised it success. Such it was in the beginning, and such it is now. It has by turns taken up and cast off nearly all conceivable heresies, and has been uniform and invariable only in its relentless hostility to Rome and the papal constitution of the church. Heretical as well as schismatic, of course, it was in the outset, but its heresies were adopted as accessories, not as principles, and save those which appealed to the ambition of princes laboring to become absolute, to the insane hatred of Rome, which the princes had themselves excited, to the envy or jealousy of the inferior clergy, and to the love of license on the part of the laity, they were not of a nature to draw away from the church any considerable number of her children.

It has always been our opinion that our Catholic controversialists have made too much of the reform as a religious movement, and treated it too exclusively as the result of an effort to innovate in matters of dogma. There never has been a moment since Luther posted his theses against indulgences, that any effect in recalling the mass of Protestants to the church could be produced by a refutation of the so-called Protestant doctrines, or by proving, beyond the possibility of reply or cavil, the teachings of the Catholic Church. The tie which binds them to Protestantism is therefore not doctrinal, is not attachment to any system of doctrine, or form of worship.* Protestants have never

* We do not mean, by denying Protestantism to be a religious movement, to assert that Protestants have no religion, or that they associated nothing of religion with their movement against the church. The Protestant people generally profess to have some sort of religion, and the great body of them always have been and are, in their way, a religious people. Nor do we mean to say that they have no religious truth, or that their religion is utterly worthless. But in so far as they have religious truth and Christian piety, they are not Protestants; and what of truth and piety they have, they have not by virtue of their Protestantism, but in spite of it. They have not in all cases cast off all Catholic doctrines, or lost all sense of Christian faith and duty. They believe themselves, for the most part, religious, and we doubt not there is to be found among them much genuine piety, as far as it goes. Christ is in the church to save; he is also out of the church by his grace to draw men to the church, and this grace which reaches those outside, draws towards the church, and gives strength to enter it, is not to be severed from the grace of the sacrament, but is really to be included in it, at least as a preamble to it. We are never to regard the piety, say of a Mother Seton, while yet a Protestant, as an illusion, or as merely natural piety. It was no doubt the beginning of that piety, and of the same

held a single doctrine that they were prepared to stand by, let come what might. Luther changed his doctrines on important points several times, and it is conceded on all hands, that, when he commenced his career, he had no clearly defined, no logically drawn out, system at all. There is, probably, not a single Protestant living who holds on any fundamental point the doctrine either of Luther or Calvin. And yet all Protestants claim Luther and Calvin and their associates as their legitimate ancestors. Enough, we think, and more than enough, has been said against the heresies of the reformation; enough, and more than enough, has been said in the way of accounting for the rise and spread of the movement, of the corruptions of the court of Rome, rash pretensions of popes, laxity of discipline, and abuses among churchmen, that needed reforming; but not enough, in our judgment, has been said or thought of the reformation as the product of a political and social transformation which the European world was then undergoing. In the transformation European society was then undergoing from the feudalism of the middle ages to modern monarchy, we think, are to be sought the origin and success of the Protestant movement. It originated in an epoch of transition, when the old order was broken, and the new was struggling to establish itself, when the past and the present were in mortal conflict, when all was loosened in the social order from its old moorings, when all the passions were unchained, thought was permitted to run riot, and no man was in or knew his place. It was born, in all that it has peculiar to itself, in the effort of secular sovereigns to render themselves absolute, to centralize power and remove from it all restraints, together with the effort of the old feudal society to retain its feudal rights and privileges. In the revolution then going on, in the transformation then in process, we find the principal cause of the success of Protestantism in the sixteenth century. Other causes may have contributed to that success, especially the passion of the learned for classical or pagan literature and philosophy, but this we look upon as the chief

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nature with that piety, for which she became so eminent after her conversion. So we may say of large numbers of Protestants. It is the effect of grace, given it may be in baptism, or at least to bring to the sacrament. The mistake is not in supposing this piety the effect of grace, but in supposing the grace is dispensed by Protestantism, or that it is sufficient to secure salvation to those who do not yield to its attraction and permit themselves to be drawn by it into the church.

cause, or as that without which all the others would have been ineffectual and nugatory.

European society is and has been subject, since the Christian era, to the law of change. Many would say, perhaps not without some truth, to the law of progress. It has undergone periodical transformations, whether for the better or for the worse, we need not now undertake to determine. It underwent an almost total transformation in the fifth and sixth centuries, on the downfall of the western Roman empire, and the establishment of the northern barbarians on its ruins; it underwent another in the eighth and ninth centuries, when was closed the barbarian era, and instituted, by St. Leo III., in the person of Charlemagne, the Christian empire of the West, in place of the pagan already destroyed; it underwent another in the tenth and eleventh centuries, when the empire of Charlemagne was forced to give place to feudalism; it underwent another in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when feudalism was supplanted by modern monarchy, an attempted revival of the ancient pagan cæsarism; and it is undergoing another, and has been since the middle of the last century, from modern monarchy to republicanism or democracy. The first three of these transformations have left deep traces of their influence on the social position and relations of the church, and on the measures and methods she found it necessary to adopt in order to meet the peculiar wants of each period; they, no doubt, had much to do with bringing about a rupture with the East and occasioning the Greek schism; but they seem to have given rise to no particular heresies, and to have occasioned no systematic war on the papal constitution of the church,—probably, because the church was then less intimately connected with the state, and less mixed up with the existing social order than she was afterwards. The fourth transformation, or that from feudalism to monarchy, appears to have far more deeply affected the social relations, position, and external economy of the church than any of the preceding. During the four centuries that feudalism reigned in the European world, the church had come into new and more intricate relations with the political order. Many of her prelates had become feudal barons and princes, and as such were not only prelates owing obedience to the pope, but vassals owing allegiance to a temporal suzerain. The majority of the kingdoms and states of Europe at one period placed themselves under the protection of the pope, and be-

came vassals of the Holy See, and the Roman pontiff acquired over them the rights and powers of temporal suzerain, in addition to those which he always has, in regard to the faithful, as spiritual head of the church. Through the piety of her children, and the munificence of kings, princes, and nobles, as well as through the necessities of the times, the church acquired numerous and large vested rights and interests, which made her, aside from her strictly spiritual character, an integral, and at one time, perhaps the most powerful element in the feudal society of Europe. It is evident, then, that the transformation of this feudal society into modern monarchy, a transformation that transferred all the rights and privileges of the fiefs to the crown, could not be effected in the lay society, without seriously affecting the temporal position, relations, and possessions of the ecclesiastical society.

Monarchy was from the first hostile to feudalism, because under feudalism it could not be absolute. The feudal nobles, whether lay or ecclesiastical, held their fiefs as vested rights, of which they could not be dispossessed, unless they forfeited them by acts specified by public law as working forfeiture, and only by due process of law. If their fiefs were originally conferred by the crown, they did not hold them at the pleasure of the crown, and were, when once invested with them, as free and as independent as their suzerain, and sometimes far more powerful. They did not depend on the monarch for their rights and privileges, but held them by a title as high and as independent as that by which he held his crown. His authority over them was clearly defined, and was often in fact merely nominal; and he was oftener obliged to court them than they him. This could not be pleasing to his pride or ambition, and it no doubt frequently gave rise to grave disorders in the state, which it left him impotent to suppress. It is easy, then, to understand why, whether well or ill disposed, whether seeking to repress their turbulence and maintain order in the state, or ambitious of usurping all power in his own hands and rendering the monarchy absolute, he should have wished to diminish the independence of the feudal lords and enlarge the power of the crown. As the church, in her external economy and relations, was an integral part of the feudal society, it is just as easy to understand why she, as well as the lay lords, became the object of his hostility, and the pope, as head of the ecclesiastical society, and guardian of its rights both

spiritual and temporal, became the more especial object of that hostility.

Monarchy seems to have made its first systematic efforts towards autocracy, in the thirteenth century, under the Emperor Frederic II. It renewed its efforts at the beginning of the fourteenth century under Philip the Fair, and again, a little later, under Louis of Bavaria, but though backed by the Ghibellines of Italy, those traitors to their God and their country, found the papacy and feudalism too strong for it. The long residence of the popes at Avignon gave the sovereigns an opportunity to revive and strengthen nationalism, and through the western schism, which, aided by nationalism, they had effected, to deprive the papacy of the greater part of its temporal power and support. The papacy thus weakened, monarchy was free, as the fifteenth century advanced, to carry on its war against the feudal society. Calling to its assistance the commons irritated by the oppressions and exactions of the nobles, and hoping to be free and less oppressed under the king, it crushed the larger vassals and annexed their fiefs to the crown. The astute and unprincipled Louis XI., aided by the rashness and blunders of Charles the Bold, duke of Burgundy, succeeded in doing this in France; the wars of the Roses and Henry VII. did it for the time in England, and Maximilian I. made some progress in the same direction in the empire. This was the more easily done in consequence of the nobles having made common cause, for a time, with the monarch against the pope, the head of the ecclesiastical society, and rendered him unable to protect them, now that they needed his aid. Monarchy thus during the struggles of the fifteenth century gained the upper hand, and there remained no power in society strong enough to resist its onward march towards autocracy. At the opening of the sixteenth century, the world in other respects had changed. The discovery of the passage to India around the Cape of Good Hope, together with the discovery and colonization of this western continent, began to affect injuriously the commerce of the Italian republics, already suffering much from the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottoman Turks and the naval supremacy of the sultan in the Levant, and the pope could no longer derive from republican Italy that aid which had served him so effectually in previous conflicts with the emperor and his Ghibelline supporters.

Now it is in these commercial changes, these political and

social transformations, so rapidly developed and approaching their conclusion in the sixteenth century, we must seek the causes which explain the sudden success of the Protestant reformation,—as is evident again, from the historical fact that Protestantism was arrested, made no further progress, and acquired no new territory, from the moment order, or some approach to order, in the political and social world was re-established. At an earlier period Luther's movement would have proved abortive; at a later period, it could not have been attempted, for there would have been no elements to favor it, and the monarchs themselves would have thrown all their power and influence against it. But coming just when it did, near the end of the transition from one political and social order to another, when all the passions were in ferment, when all was unsettled, and all classes of society were seeking either to restore the past or to seize the future, all favored it, and nothing remained for the moment strong enough to resist it. Maximilian, wishing to humble the pope, or to extort concessions from Rome, protected Luther and his party as an instrument favorable to his policy; the lay electors and princes of the empire supported the Protestant movement as a power to be played off against the emperor, who was attacking their privileges, seeking to reduce their rights and powers, and to enlarge and consolidate the power of the imperial government. The people supported it because they thought they saw in it the means of emancipation from the rapacious and insolent lords who oppressed them. Charles V. was obliged to treat it tenderly, for he needed the support of the princes of the empire who favored it, to sustain him against the rivalry of Francis I., king of France, and his precious allies, the Turks. In France, it was seized upon, first by the king against the pope and the emperor, and when abandoned by him, by the higher nobles, as a means of enabling them to recover the independence and power which they had lost under Louis XI. In England, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, it was supported by the sovereigns as the surest means of rendering the monarchy absolute, by uniting in the crown both powers, the temporal and the spiritual. In Scotland, it was introduced as a means of sustaining the English faction, and detaching her from her hereditary alliance with France, which had made her a sort of French dependency, deeply prejudicial to her political and material interests, as it exposed her to perpetual hostility with her

more powerful southern neighbor. Finally, in the Netherlands it was taken up as an element of liberty against the cold-hearted despot, Philip II., who everywhere labored to identify the cause of tyranny with that of Catholicity. Indeed, we may say that the relapse of England, after the death of Mary Tudor, was owing far more to hatred of the Spanish sovereign, who aimed at universal monarchy, and who used Catholicity as a means of realizing his ambitious dream, and to a just sense of national independence and liberty, than to any hatred of Catholicity or sympathy with Protestantism. At first monarchy was everywhere the promoter of Protestantism, but in several countries, having sufficiently humbled the papacy, it fancied that it would be more for its interest to take Catholicity under its protection, and use it as the means of consolidating the power of the crown; and it is doubtful whether monarchy injured the church the more by its opposition or by its protection; for it granted its protection only on conditions that weakened her external power, and by ostensibly espousing her interests, it enlisted all its own enemies against her, not a few of whom, but for it, would have been her friends. But be this as it may, it is certain that the Protestant movement owed its success to the disorders, confusion, and passions necessarily attendant on a great political and social transformation. It succeeded in one place by allying itself with monarchy, in another by allying itself with the national spirit, and a commendable love of liberty; by seeking here to crush the feudal nobles, rights, and privileges, and there by seeking to restore or sustain them.

Even if we assume that the transformation of the political and social order in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was really desirable and necessary for the progress of civilization, we can easily conceive that it could not have been accomplished without affecting very unfavorably, for a time at least, the interests of Catholicity, and that too, without supposing that the church herself has or had any particular fondness for the feudal *régime*. There is no evidence that the church ever had in the abstract any partiality for feudalism. She did not introduce it, nor, as far as we have been able to discover, favor its introduction, and certainly she suffered from the disorders incident to it, the rapacity, lawlessness, and turbulence of the feudal nobles, even more than the monarchy. But she had accepted it and conformed to it. Whenever any political and social order has become

fixed and remained for a considerable time in force, it acts on the minds of churchmen as well as laymen, and casts them in its mould. A multitude of forms and interests grow up under it, and become so inwoven with it, that it is no easy matter for people brought up under it, to distinguish between changes in it and changes in the church herself. The forms of thought, the habits of life, the modes of proceeding, the routine of affairs, and the secular interests of the church, become so shaped to it, and so dependent on it, that its transformation can hardly fail to appear to the majority, whether they favor or whether they oppose it, to be a transformation of the ecclesiastical society no less than of the lay society. Few in any age or country are capable of making the proper distinctions.

In the church, taken in the concrete, as she actually exists in the world, and performs her mission in the spiritual government of its affairs, there are always two elements, the one divine, the other human,—or, the church in her divine constitution, offices, and powers, and the social medium through which she places herself in relation with the age and country, acts on them, and meets their peculiar wants and necessities. In all that is supernatural, in all that pertains to her essential constitution and authority, in all that belongs to the mysteries of faith, the sacraments, or the dispensation of grace, she is divine, immediately divine, the same in all ages and nations, and acts on individuals and society, without being reacted on by them. But her members live in the world, form society, and, to a great extent, are formed by it. The various institutions, charitable, educational, or pious, which the church founds, the various modes she adopts, the vested rights she acquires, for acting on external society, guarding against its dangers, and meeting its wants,—what we may call the exterior economy or prudential system of the church,—are human, and may and must be varied so as to be adapted to the existing political and social changes which from time to time take place. Any great transformation of the political and social order necessarily carries along with it a corresponding transformation of the exterior economy or prudential system of the church. This system naturally opposes, and with all its force resists, all such transformations as long as resistance is possible. The system was good, was useful, was necessary, and in every sense legitimate in its time. Churchmen who have been formed under it, feel this, and heroically

defend it even after social and political changes have rendered it no longer useful, or practicable. Hence we not seldom find enlightened and good men, men of the noblest character, the firmest faith, and the most lively charity, resisting with true heroism changes which have become inevitable, and which, in regard to the future, are even desirable; and with equal heroism, rushing to the defence of a system of human prudence, which is doomed, and could not be retained without arresting the onward course of things, and suspending the progress of civilization. We see this at every period of political and social transformation. It was seen in a striking manner in the transition of society from feudalism to monarchy; not, indeed, because the church had any natural fondness for feudalism, but because during the four centuries it ruled the world, her own exterior economy or prudential system had been shaped to it, and the temporal or secular interests of churchmen had become bound up with it. Herein lay the secret of the success of Protestantism. It drew its strength from the fact that the exterior economy of the church had ceased to be in harmony with the passions, sentiments, and wants of the age, and was adapted to a state of things which was passing and must pass away. The world had changed since that system was adopted, and churchmen, by still adhering to it, and devoting themselves heart and soul to its defence, turned the opposition to it into opposition to the church herself. Hence the anticatholic character which the movement assumed.

The church could not at once change her exterior economy, for vast interests and vested rights were involved,—interests and vested rights of the ecclesiastical society, and to have sacrificed these interests and abandoned these rights without a struggle, or till they who profited by them became fully aware that they must go, would have excited even churchmen, since they are men, to resistance, and, to no inconsiderable extent, led them to rebel against the sovereign pontiff. We have only to call to mind the French bishops, called *La petite Eglise*, who refused to accept and conform to the concordat concluded between Pius VII. and the first consul, to be assured of it. Rome saw and comprehended at a distance the political and social revolution in progress, and was prepared to make all the concessions and changes in her exterior economy really necessary to meet it; but weakened by the great schism and by the antipapal

maxims which had been so widely circulated and entertained, she was obliged to use great forbearance towards the members of the ecclesiastical society, who opposed all changes or concessions that involved their secular rights and interests,—rights and interests, which both the canon law and the civil law held to be spiritual, inasmuch as they were the rights and interests of spiritual persons, and of which the Holy See was the divinely appointed guardian. These embarrassed the church hardly less than the members of the lay society who were carried away by the revolutionary spirit of the time. No blame attaches to Rome, and less to individual members of the ecclesiastical society than might be supposed, for the rights and interests they were loath to give up were legally, honestly, and religiously acquired, and under the safeguard of the sovereign pontiff. Not comprehending the revolutionary spirit of the time, not perceiving that no human power could arrest it and save their rights and interests, they not unnaturally felt that there was no need of abandoning them, and that they owed it to the church to defend them to the last.

Now these rights, interests, and possessions of the church, spiritual, inasmuch as held by a spiritual person, but in themselves of a temporal nature, and quite distinguishable from the church in her divine constitution, office, and authority, were the more immediate cause of the hostility the church incurred. It was the pope as guardian of these, or as the supreme lord of the temporalities of the church, rather than the pope as the representative of the spiritual order, or his rights and prerogatives in matters instrinsically spiritual, that the secular princes in reality opposed. The rights and powers of the popes during the middle ages were of two classes. The one class was held *de jure divino*, the other *de jure humano*. The really learned and able M. Gosselin in his work on the *Power of the Popes in the Middle Ages*, sees this very clearly, and proves it with rare erudition and sagacity. The only fault we find, or have ever found, with his work, is, that it restricts too much the former class, and includes in the latter some things which the pope holds, undeniably, by immediate divine right. The pope was the suzerain of England, Russia, Hungary, Naples, Sicily, Aragon, and several other European states, if not, indeed, of the holy Roman empire itself. This right of suzerainty was a temporal possession, legally acquired, and lawfully held by the Holy See, but not by immediate

divine right. The baronies, principalities, fiefs, held by ecclesiastics, and the seat of prelates of the church in the royal councils, the cortes, diet, states-general, or parliament, —tithes, landed estates, &c., were lawful acquisitions, vested rights, but held by divine right only in that mediate sense in which every proprietor is said to hold his property by divine right. The church was not forbidden, but was authorized by her divine constitution, to be a proprietor. The faculty of holding property is given her by immediate divine institution, but the particular property acquired is held by human right, deriving, however, from the divine right.

Under feudalism,—and this is its grand feature,—all rights and powers follow the law of property, in fact are property and treated as such,—a reminiscence of the early Roman law; for in early times the political and civil power in Rome was attached to the sacred territory of the city, surveyed and bounded by the god Terminus, and hence in cases of transfer the land was held to seize the man, not the man the land. Whatever rights and powers the church acquired through the piety of the faithful, the munificence of kings and princes, the labors of her religious, or the feudal constitution of society, she held them as property, and by a title as valid, and as sacred as that by which any other proprietor holds his property. As proprietor she had the right to control and manage her own property. Her title was good, but in this particular form, it was not by immediate divine right, and therefore she could survive its loss. It was this property, we repeat, which the church held, and which brought her, in some sense into the category of temporal lords, but which she very naturally, and very justly, placed under the safeguard of her spiritual authority, that excited against her the hostility of the lay chiefs of the secular society. The church in that age, when all power was property, and followed the law of property, needed to be a feudal proprietor, in order to hold her rightful position, and exercise her rightful influence in the administration of affairs. But there was, if we look deeper, involved in the controversy which grew up between the popes and the secular sovereigns, a principle which is of vital importance to civil liberty and social well-being. The secular sovereign maintained, that, in regard to property, he held the *summum dominium*, that his right was paramount to that of the particular proprietor, and therefore that the

proprietor held his property subject to the pleasure of the prince or the state, the doctrine which we see acted on now by Spain and Sardinia, in their secularization of church property, and which is the basis of all the oriental despotisms. The church did not recognize this doctrine. She took the higher ground, that property once lawfully acquired, is held by a title which the state is bound to recognize and protect; she asserted the inviolability of property, and thus placed the right of the proprietor above the lawful action of the state, and under the protection of the natural, or divine law itself,—the principle recognized everywhere by our American jurisprudence. Here was a principle which the church was the first to introduce into society, and it is the basis of all civil liberty. It was not only on the ground that property consecrated to religion, or to pious and charitable uses, is sacred and inviolable, but also on the ground that all property is sacred and inviolable, that she visited with her spiritual censures and thunders the violators of her possessions. The hostility of the sovereigns to the papacy, was in the first instance, to it, if we may so say, as a feudal proprietor, and extended afterwards to it as a spiritual institution, only because it availed itself of its spiritual authority to protect its temporal possessions, and the sacred right of property. Undoubtedly, the church could be despoiled of those possessions without touching her divine constitution, for she does not depend on them, and can do her spiritual work without them; but she cannot be despoiled of them by violence, without her consent, and in spite of her excommunications, without denying her spiritual authority, and striking a mortal blow to the sacred and inviolable right of property itself.

But society in revolution rushes on to its end, trampling in the dust every right, human or divine, that would impede its progress; and hence we need not be surprised that the rights of proprietors, whether lay or ecclesiastical, opposed to the absolutism of the prince, were disregarded and violated without scruple. We will not say that feudalism, as it finally became,—through what causes it matters not to inquire,—needed no modification, that the kings were wholly wrong in opposing it, or the people wholly mad in wishing to substitute the monarch for the feudal baron; we are willing to concede that social order often suffered from it, and that grave evils prevailed under it, which it furnished not the means to cure; yet it contained the great

principles of civil liberty and personal independence. It consecrated the principle of the inviolability of property, and the sacredness in presence of the state of vested rights. Our own genuine American system, which unhappily so many are laboring to convert into that of the ancient pagan republicanism, is, if we did but know it, only a development of feudalism, by which every man is authorized to be a proprietor, and every proprietor is a baron or feudal lord. We will not however deny, as we say, that feudalism needed a modification in order to correct the abuses that grew up under it; but its modification by violence, and in favor of modern cæsarism, was as undesirable as it was unjust. All necessary changes might have been peaceably, legally, and usefully effected, if the lay chiefs had been willing to consult and act in concert with the pope, the head of the ecclesiastical society. But to this they were too proud, too thoughtless, too violent, or too ambitious to consent. The violence commenced, and must have its course. All we would now say is, that the revolution was primarily hostile to the church in her character of a feudal proprietor, and was only accidentally hostile to her in her divine and immutable character as representative of the spiritual order. She was attacked certainly on her divine side, but only because her external economy was identified with her internal, and because she spread her divine authority as a protection over the right of property in the way of the irresistible passion for monarchy which possessed the age.

After the sixteenth century European society settled down under absolute monarchy, a monarchy borrowed from the Greek empire. The seventeenth century saw extinguished throughout nearly all Europe every spark of its mediæval freedom. In Protestant Europe, the state became absolute, and the monarch united in himself the royal and pontifical authority; in Catholic Europe, the church was *protected* by the sovereigns, and sighed for the freedom of the martyr ages. Bishops turn courtiers, and the king's mistress nominates to vacant sees, and bestows the rich livings of the church. The nobles, save as officers of the army, forget the old maxim, *noblesse oblige*, lose their old chivalric sentiments and sense of independence, fawn round the monarch, and become base and servile. The people, without political rights, without social importance, overloaded with taxes, poor and grovelling in ignorance, almost forget that they were created in the image and likeness of God, and that

for them the Son of God has died. This cannot last for ever, and by the middle of the last century we see that a new political and social transformation has commenced. This transformation, completed with us, but still in process in the Old World, is from modern or absolute monarchy to republicanism, but to a republicanism, we hope, more in accordance, in principle, with the republicanism of the middle ages, than with that of Græco-Roman paganism, now so earnestly contended for by our red-republicans and radical democrats.

In this new transformation the church again suffers, and is violently opposed by the same party that opposed her in the sixteenth century, though now as humanitarians or infidels, not as simple heretics. She had adapted her external economy to monarchy, as she had previously adapted it to feudalism, and hence she came to be regarded as identified with the monarchical *régime*. For several generations, no doubt, her children were cast in a monarchical mould; their social interests and vested rights so depended on it, and were so linked with it, that its ruin seemed to them to carry with it that of religion itself. This made the Catholic more anti-republican, and the republican more anti-Catholic. Churchmen felt it their duty to oppose the movement in the interest of religion, as well as in that of society, and many even yet, on both sides, imagine that the throne and the altar must stand or fall together.

But for ourselves we have no fears for the church. The revolution will go on till the new transformation is effected. Monarchy in the old pagan sense, or as understood by Louis XIV. and the unfortunate Stuarts, whether for good or for evil, must go down before the republican movement of the age. The struggle may be longer or shorter, more or less fierce and destructive, but the republican order will sooner or later triumph in the Old World, as it has triumphed already in this country. But the church will survive it, as she has survived all previous political and social transformations. Her whole history proves that she is indissolubly wedded to no particular political and social order, but can adapt herself to any that leaves her free to pursue her divine mission. She suffers, indeed, in every period of transition, but she has that within her which enables her to survive the transformation, and to repair her losses, when once a settled order is reëstablished. When the transformation to republicanism is once effected, she will accept it,

adapt her external economy or rudential system to it, and, perhaps, find it even more favorable to her free and divine activity, than any political and social order with which she has hitherto come in contact.

The practical lesson these considerations should enforce on Catholics is, that the time when it was safe, if ever there was a time when it was safe, to link the interests of the church with absolute monarchy, has gone by, and our great study, after the salvation of our souls, should now be, both in this country and Europe, to avoid binding ourselves to an order of things that has passed, or is passing away, and to prepare ourselves for the future which is advancing. We must accept, both for the sake of religion and of society, the new order as it comes up and establishes itself. We do not, of course, ask the Catholic to throw himself into the revolution, and help it onward, for that, in its present character, would be both unlawful and imprudent. We felt it our duty in 1848, to oppose the revolutionary movements in Europe, and we have seen no reason to think that we were wrong; we opposed, and still oppose the principles on which those movements were based, as well as the principles on which our own countrymen defended their sympathy with them. But this does not necessarily prevent us from foreseeing that, in some shape, the democratic transformation of Christendom is sure to be effected, or render it less necessary for us to anticipate and prepare for its success. We hail with pleasure the new concordat between Austria and the Holy See, and the apparent, we would fain hope real, respect of Napoleon III. for the church; but we do not believe that these things can save the monarchy of the seventeenth century, though they may ease its fall. Neither Napoleon nor Francis Joseph seem able to arrest the revolution in Spain or Sardinia, or disposed to attempt to separate the cause of constitutionalism from that of spoliation of the church. Both, we apprehend, labor to force the love of religion and devotion to the church to ally themselves with cæsarism, and the love of freedom to join the infidel or humanist camp; but they will fail, because their policy is to use the church to uphold their power, and Almighty God will never suffer his church to be thus used, or made a tool of. The revolution, in some form, will go on, and while we refuse to join it, or in any way to aid it, it would be madness as Catholics to bind ourselves to the cause of the monarchs against it. We must prepare ourselves to accept

in good faith the new political and social order as it comes up, and establishes itself. We must distinguish sharply between religion and monarchy, and train ourselves and those dependent on us to be good Catholics under a democratic *régime*. The modes of thought, the habits of life, and the methods of education formed under monarchy and specially adapted to it, we must be prepared to modify, as the occasion demands, and cease to insist on them as essential to our Catholic character. As Catholics we are and must be always and everywhere the same. But every Catholic, taken in the concrete, has a two-fold character; one derived from the church, the other from society; and changes as changes the society in which he lives. To insist that this latter character shall be in a democratic state of society, what it should be in a monarchical, is to drive our generous youth, especially susceptible of social influences, out of the church into infidelity or irreligion. In this country the democratic order is established, and so far as it leaves the church free to carry on her divine work, it has the right to reign; and hence, in this country, in all that comes within the sphere of human prudence, it is our duty as well as interest to conform to it. If any of us have monarchical or aristocratic prejudices, they are out of place here. In religion we must bow to authority, but in all else we must cherish the spirit of freedom. We owe this even to our religion, for not otherwise shall we preserve our youth, and fill our churches after the present adult generation has passed off. This, too, is in perfect accordance with the spirit of the church, who makes herself "all to all."

LIBERALISM AND SOCIALISM.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1855.]

We have brought these two works together because, though published at distant intervals, and differing almost as widely as it is possible to conceive, they are on the subject treated the two profoundest works to be found in the whole range of modern literature. Both treat the same subject, Donoso Cortés from the point of view of Catholicity, Pierre Leroux from the pantheistic or humanitarian point of view, and each needs to be read and studied by whoever would understand, either in their truth or their falsity, the liberalism and socialism which have made so much noise and stirred up so many commotions throughout the civilized world during the last fifteen or twenty years.

Pierre Leroux has hardly been heard of since 1850. Whether he is still living or not is more than we know; but we remember the time when he was one of the great men of France, and the representative of an important school in philosophy and politics. He belonged originally, we believe, to the Saint-Simonian school or sect, and distinguished himself at a later day as a most bitter enemy of the French eclecticism founded by the eloquent and erudite Cousin. He is decidedly the great man of the modern socialistic school, and the only one with whom we are acquainted who has succeeded in giving it any thing like a philosophical basis. He possesses rare philosophical genius, and, though not the soundest, he is the greatest metaphysician that France has produced in modern times, and may as to his genius and erudition take rank with the late Vincenzo Gioberti, who has had no equal since Leibnitz, for we cannot rank very high such men as Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Immanuel

*1. *Ensayo sobre el Catolicismo, el Liberalismo, y el Socialismo, considerados en sus Principios Fundamentales.* Por Don Juan Donoso Cortés, Marqués de Valdegamas. Madrid: 1851.

2. *De l'Humanité, de son Principe, et de son Avenir, où se trouve exposée la Vraie Définition de la Religion, et où l'on explique le Sens, la Suite, et l'Enchaînement du Mosaïsme et du Christianisme.* Par Pierre Leroux. Paris: 1840.

Kant is the only distinguished German metaphysician in recent times that we should be willing to name, unless one or two Catholics of Germany are to be excepted.

It may be that we attach an undue importance to the writings of Pierre Leroux, because our acquaintance with them marks an epoch in our mental development, and we owe to them more than to those of any other modern writer. They revolutionized our own mind both in regard to philosophy and religion, and by the grace of God became the occasion of our conversion to Catholicity. But we must be permitted to say, that, though his system as a system does not and never did satisfy us, it contains certain great cosmic and metaphysical truths, more distinctly recognized and more clearly and energetically stated than we find even in the ordinary works on theology, and almost wholly wanting in our ordinary systems of philosophy. His grand error is in his having misinterpreted and misapplied the Catholic doctrine of the Incarnation, in confounding the two natures in the one person of our Lord, and in failing to distinguish properly between the natural and the supernatural orders. He starts with the Eutychian heresy, or the confusion of the human and the divine, and really, though perhaps unconsciously, explains the divine by the human, and thus reduces Christianity to pure humanism or naturalism. The Catholic theologian understands at once the reach of this fundamental error, which vitiates and must vitiate the author's whole system. But, after all, there is a human side of truth, for man is made in the image and after the similitude of God. God is, in the language of St. Thomas, *similitudo rerum omnium*, and hence in all nature there is and must be a certain reflection, so to speak, of the Divinity. God is in some sense mirrored by his works. In man and nature we must find, not the elements of Christianity indeed, for they are superhuman and supernatural, but certain analogies or correspondences, which in human language are expressed by the same terms, and through which the Christian mysteries are rendered in a measure intelligible to us. Leroux certainly confounds these analogies or correspondences in the natural and human order with the superhuman and supernatural dogmas of Christianity; but he certainly has studied them profoundly, and tells us, not unmixed with error, some great and important natural truths,—truths recognized and accepted, indeed, by all the great scholastic divines, but which these divines do not set forth in that

distinct and prominent light in which we find them in the earlier fathers, or in which it is necessary, perhaps, to set them forth in order to meet the characteristic errors of our age.

The Marquis of Valdegamas has studied the same subject with equal industry, with equal mental strength and acuteness, and with a higher order of genius. He understands it far better, and treats it far more profoundly; for he knows and accepts Catholic theology, which places him in the position to comprehend the natural truth in its true relations with the supernatural, and prevents him from giving a mutilated or distorted view of either. But he writes mainly for the Catholic mind, and is more intent on showing the errors, absurdities, and fatal tendencies of humanitarian or pantheistic socialism to the understanding of the faithful, than he is on distinguishing for the benefit of its adherents the grain of truth in their system, and using it to lead them up to the Catholic doctrine which accepts and completes it. Nothing in the world can be better than his book to guard the faithful against the errors of pantheistic or humanitarian socialism, or to inspire them with a hearty love of Catholic doctrine and morals; but it is not precisely adapted to the wants of the socialists themselves. Ignorant of Catholic faith and theology, they will not always be able to find in his Catholicity the truth they are groping after, and which gives to their speculations a value in their own eyes. We, who happen to know both sides by our own experience, can see that he accepts and vindicates in its true light and place what they really value, and which they erroneously conclude cannot be held in the church, and persuade themselves can be realized without her, and must be, if realized at all.

The noble marquis also takes M. Proudhon as the best representative of socialism, and confines himself mainly to the refutation of the Proudhonian theory. Here we must be permitted to differ from him. If we would study the socialistic contradictions and negations, Proudhon is our man; but if we would study socialism in its affirmations, in what it has that is positive, in its truths, or half-truths, we must, we think, take Leroux. Proudhon is by turns a deist and an atheist, a pantheist and a Manichean, but generally a denier, whose business it is to break with the whole past, to reject all that has hitherto been regarded as sacred, in a word, to destroy all that has been or is. Would we know whither all false theories, religious, political, and social, lead,

we must study Proudhon, who under this point of view is the great man of the socialistic and revolutionary world. But Leroux has some religious instincts, is not the veritable Apollyon, and attempts to give the positive and affirmative side of socialism. If we would know the truth which misleads the socialists, which they misapprehend and misapply, but which nevertheless is the element which commends to their own judgments and hearts their socialism, Leroux, not Proudhon, in our judgment, is the great, "the representative man."

We say not this to depreciate the work of the lamented Spanish nobleman. We have heretofore expressed our opinion of his remarkable essay, than which, we are assured by those who are more competent than we are to judge, there is nothing more eloquent in the noble Castilian tongue. We are not, we confess, of his political school. We have more confidence in constitutionalism or parliamentary government than he appears to have had. We hold that parliamentary or constitutional government, though by no means perfect, though not all we could wish, and far enough from being all that its partisans pretend, affords the only political guaranty of liberty, civil or religious, which, after so many social changes, and revolutions, is now practicable. Certainly it is to it, not to absolute monarchy, that Catholicity owes the immense progress it has made in Europe during the last fifty years. We have seen nothing in the revolutionary developments during late years to shake our early faith in representative and parliamentary government, and we are satisfied that the Spanish statesman rendered no service to his country by his war against constitutionalism and parliamentary discussion. The great error of the European liberalists is not, in our judgment, so much political as religious. We find no fault with them for seeking what are called checks and balances, or attempting to found government on compromises; for government is a practical affair, and cannot be carried on without an adjustment of opposing interests, which more or less offend theoretic unity. We censure them not for this, but for supposing that these compromises, these balancings of principles and interests, and playing off of one against another, can alone suffice for the maintenance of authority on the one hand and individual freedom on the other. We accept them as far as they go, but we expect no valuable results from them when substituted for religion, or even when intended to operate with-

out it. We do not, therefore, agree with the illustrious author, whose loss the Catholic world justly deplores, in his anti-parliamentary politics and monarchical theory.

But aside from his politics, in which he was more Spanish than American, we have had in modern times no Catholic writer more free and bold in his speculations, more original and brilliant in his genius, more comprehensive in his thought or spirit-stirring in his eloquence, or in general more remarkable for his depth and soundness. He formed himself by the study of the Holy Scriptures and the great fathers, rather than the modern theological compendiums, or the great scholastic doctors; and while for that reason he speculates more freely, and writes with more freshness and vigor, he is less exact in his doctrine and less accurate in his language. There are expressions in his essay, which, if detached from their connection and understood without reference to the obvious intention of the author, are certainly inexact, and perhaps even heretical, as has been shown by the Abbé Gaduel; but if fairly and honestly interpreted by their context and the general scope of the argument, by a liberal-hearted criticism which seeks to unfold the large and comprehensive thoughts of a writer rather than to display its own microscopic accuracy, no very grave objections under the point of view of Catholic doctrine can be sustained against the book. In this essay the author has attempted and executed a work that was much needed in the present time, that of carrying back the faithful to the deepest and most living mysteries of the Catholic faith, and showing the origin and support of human society in God. Starting with the principle already asserted, that God is *similitudo rerum omnium*, or the likeness which all created things copy, and therefore that all things have their ideas or archetypes in his divine essence, he shows that true human society has its origin in the divine society of the ever-adorable Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, three persons in one nature or essence. In this divine society, whose characteristic, as he not very accurately expresses it, is unity in diversity and diversity in unity, he finds the original type of all society, and therefore all true human society must reflect this divine society, as all creation reflects the Creator. Here is the fundamental conception, the leading thought, of the *Essay on Catholicity, Liberalism, and Socialism*. This thought, which is profoundly Catholic, as well as profoundly philosophic, reproduces what

is deepest and truest in the Platonic philosophy, although it is perhaps foreign to the Aristotelian. We find it in the Holy Scriptures, we find it in the early fathers, we find it in Catholic theology of all times, but we do not find it always in what passes for philosophy in the schools. The Platonic philosophy is no doubt exposed to dangers from which the Aristotelian is free. It is less rigid in its method; it is more daring in its scope, and opens a wider and richer field to speculation. It gives more play to our emotions, affections, and imagination, and therefore exposes us to greater mental aberrations. It brings into play the mystic elements of our nature, and opens us on that side on which Satan can best approach and seduce us. But there can really be no question that it is far profounder than the Aristotelian philosophy, and penetrates to an order of ideas to which Aristotle was a stranger, and which cannot be brought within the comprehension of a rigid peripateticism. Peripateticism, considering every thing under the form of abstract thought, loses sight of life, of the real living universe, and therefore is unable to detect in the natural order the analogies, resemblances, copies, or reflections, without which the supernatural would be in every sense inapprehensible to our intelligence. Hence it never enables us to connect the intelligible and the superintelligible, and embrace the natural and the supernatural as one harmonious whole, having its unity in the divine essence. Donoso Cortés has done a noble service to religion and society by reviving, what was almost lost sight of in popular philosophy, the profound thought of the fathers and the great scholastic doctors, and showing us that even the natural order demands its complement from the supernatural, and that the profoundest mysteries of our faith are the source of all that is true and good, sound and healthy, in our natural life, or, in other words, that the natural has its root in the supernatural, and derives its sap from an order deeper and higher than itself. He thus connects human society with the mystery of the Trinity, which is its norma or type. As all in Catholicity has its origin in the mystery of the Trinity, so all true human society must have its origin and type in Catholicity. This thought reaches far, and must be fully recognized and well understood before we fully comprehend Christian society, and are able to oppose it successfully to the refutation of humanitarian or pantheistic socialism, so rife in our times. Those who seek to do this must study profoundly the essay of Donoso Cortés.

But our purpose at present is not precisely that of the illustrious Spaniard. We have already discussed in our pages the errors and dangerous tendencies of liberalism and socialism; we have pointed out what they have that is opposed to Catholic faith and theology. We wish now to draw attention to what they have that is true. All systems, however erroneous or false, have an element of truth, because the human intellect, being created in the image of the divine, and made for the apprehension of truth, can never operate with pure falsehood. To rightly comprehend a system is not simply to detect its errors. We understand not even an erroneous system till we understand its truth; and its real refutation lies not so much in detecting and exposing its fallacies, as in detecting, distinguishing, and accepting the truth which it misapprehends, misinterprets, or misapplies. Socialism commends itself to the intellect of its adherents only in the respect that it is true, and to their hearts only in the respect that it is good; for the intellect, St. Thomas teaches, can never be false, nor the will will evil. Both falsehood and evil are privative, neither is positive. Error is in the defect of truth, and evil in the defect of good. We must say this or assert falsehood as a real entity and evil as a positive principle, and thus fall into Manicheism. We must beware of the Calvinistic doctrine of total depravity, or total corruption by the fall of human nature. If man cannot embrace pure falsehood nor will what under some aspect is not good, it follows that in every erroneous or mischievous system there is and must be an aspect of truth and goodness, and it is only under this aspect that the system is dear to its adherents. If we wish to produce a favorable effect on them, and to refute their system for their sake, we must begin, not by denouncing their error, but by showing them that we recognize and accept their truth.

Our own views of both liberalism and socialism have so often been expressed in these pages, that none of our readers can suspect us of any undue bias in their favor. We have, as it is well known, no sympathy with them or the movements they have inspired. No one has denounced them in stronger terms, or more strenuously opposed them. But our pages bear ample evidence that we have never denied, or pretended to deny, that each has something true and good in its order. We are not unfrequently accused of being one-sided, narrow-minded, and disposed always to push the prin-

ciple we may have happened to adopt to extremes. Nothing is more untrue. An opposite charge might with far more propriety be brought against us. In our war against the red-republicanism of Europe, we were never known to push our defence of order and authority so far as to express an opinion favorable to absolute monarchy, or to deny the natural equality of all men. We have always made it a point, in combating erroneous or mischievous systems, to recognize the fact that they contain something that we should be sorry to combat, and if we are or have been to a certain extent unpopular with our countrymen, it is precisely because we have never shown ourselves exclusive. But when erroneous systems are in arms or arming themselves against society, we do not think it the proper time to draw attention to their side of truth and goodness, for it is then a more urgent duty to defeat them, and save society from the ruin they threaten, than it is to labor to convert their adherents from their errors. One course is proper when conversion is the end to be sought, another is proper when it is necessary to guard people against falling into error. To have dwelt in 1848 on what there is in liberalism and socialism that may be accepted, would have tended to give the people a false direction. We could not then stop to analyze and distinguish. An imperious duty made it necessary to expose the dangerous errors and tendencies of the revolutionary systems and movements. But in 1855, when the danger comes from the opposite quarter, we are free to labor for the conversion of those whom these false systems have misled, by distinguishing and accepting the truth or half-truth which they misapprehend and misapply. There is a time for all things, and our motto should be, Every thing in its time.

The liberalists and socialists are not true Christians, but it would be unjust to deny that there are individuals among them who have generous, noble, and even spiritual aspirations, which Christianity teaches us to accept and respect. Much at least of what is most living, least grovelling, least servile, most manly, and most elevated, outside of the church, is found to-day in their ranks. We are never to judge individual members of political and social parties by their mere doctrinal formulas, for men's heads and hearts are often far apart, and sometimes strongly opposed one to the other. Liberalists and socialists are to be judged, under the point of view we wish now to consider them, not solely

nor chiefly by their abstract doctrines, but by their sentiments, their cravings, affections, and aspirations. Liberalism and socialism, like all false systems, end at last in pure gentilism, and yet in their modern form they could have originated only in a community which had once been Christian, and which still retained a tradition of the Christian doctrine of love. They originate in philanthropy, the love of mankind, the form, and the only form, which what is purest and best in religion can assume outside of the Christian church.

We condemn as heartily as any man the liberal and socialistic revolutions of Europe during the last sixty or seventy years, but we cannot deny that those revolutions have to some extent had a philanthropic origin, and have all been prosecuted with the intention of doing for this world by the state through philanthropy what the church has done or shown she can do through Christian charity. All these movements to popularize government, to mitigate penal codes, to redress political and social grievances, and to elevate the poorer and more numerous classes, although for the most part failing in their object, have originated in benevolent sentiment, though perverted to base, selfish purposes by their chief managers. In their writings at least, in their speculations, the philosophers of the last century overflowed with generous sentiments, and if they attacked old systems, and demanded radical changes in social or religious institutions, in laws, manners, and customs, it was always in the name of virtue, and always for the purpose of realizing, as they pretended, often believed, something better for the nation or the race. No small number of the friends and supporters of the old French revolution were moved by a warm and diffusive benevolence; and we envy not the man who can see nothing not bad in the generous enthusiasm of a very considerable portion of the French people in the early days of that revolution. The state of things which obtained in France prior to the revolution was not so bad as that which the revolution itself introduced, but it was such as no man of a sound mind and an honest heart can approve. The evils may have been exaggerated, but no one can deny that they were great and deplorable. The court and upper classes were corrupt either in their principles or their manners, and the great body of the people were oppressed with burdens too heavy to be borne, and looked upon as born only to minister to the wants and pleas-

ures of the idle and luxurious few. How could men who have the hearts of men be otherwise than indignant, when people were sent to the bastile for venturing to attack the king's lackey or the king's mistress,—when the king abandoned himself to the most debasing and criminal sensuality, and a painted harlot, a Pompadour or a Dubarry, was virtually the first minister of state, and dispensed the favors or determined the appointments of the crown, while the toiling multitude were overloaded with taxes, reduced to penury, to absolute destitution, and received in answer to their petition for bread "a new gallows forty feet high"? Revolutions are serious things, and no people can be stirred up to make a social revolution against all that they have been accustomed to hold sacred, till they feel the pressure of want, and see gaunt famine staring them in the face. Nations, humanity at large, must bear some traces of that divine similitude which all things more or less faithfully copy, and can no more act without some aspect of truth or shadow of good than individuals; and though it may be generally more in accordance with the fact to say, *Vox populi vox diaboli*, than *Vox populi vox Dei*, yet there is a sense in which it will not do to deny that "the voice of the people is the voice of God." The old French revolution found at least a pretext in the vices of the court, in the corruption of the noblesse, in the dissoluteness of a portion of the clergy, and in the general neglect and distress of the people. And things were not much worse in France than in other European countries at the same time, if indeed they were so bad. It were idle to deny the existence of the evils, or to hold it to have been criminal, or otherwise than praiseworthy, to attempt to redress them. It was a sacred duty, imposed alike by charity and philanthropy, to undertake their removal, though of course not by unlawful means, certainly not by a revolution, which could only make matters worse.

Of course we have no confidence even in philanthropy, when acting alone, to effect any thing good, for it seldom fails to make matters worse; but we have very little sympathy with the ordinary shallow and selfish declamation of conservatives against modern revolutionary movements. The only conservatism we can respect is that which frankly acknowledges the wrong, and seeks by proper means to redress it wherever it finds it. It is, after all, less against revolutions that we would direct the virtuous indignation of

our conservative friends, now that the reaction has become strong, than against the misgovernment, the tyranny, the vices and the crimes, the heartlessness, the cruelty, the neglect of the poor by those who should love and succor them, or the wrongs inflicted on them, which provoke revolutions, and give Satan an opportunity to possess the multitude, and pervert their purest sentiments and their most generous enthusiasm to evil. Revolution was no fitting remedy for the evils which the system of secular government, attained to its full growth in Louis XIV., had generated. It was the remedy of madness or wild despair. But the evils had grown beyond all reasonable endurance. They outraged alike natural benevolence and Christian charity. Let not the friends of religion and order have censures only for those who sought madly to remove them by revolutions, and none for those whose vices and crimes caused them, lest they render religion and order odious to all men of human hearts.

Philanthropy is a human sentiment, and by no means Christian charity. We know it perfectly well. But it corresponds to charity as the human corresponds to the divine, copies it as nature copies or imitates God, and we never need persuade ourselves that what is repugnant to it is pleasing to charity. *Gratia supponit naturam.* How often must we repeat, that grace does not supersede nature? St. Ignatius Loyola did not seek to destroy the natural ambition of young Francis Xavier; he accepted it, and sought simply to direct it from earthly to heavenly glory. No wise master of spiritual life ever seeks to root out nature; his aim is always to accept it, and direct it in right paths towards God, the true end of man. Calvin and Jansenius, those subtle enemies of Christ, have done more injury to religion, a thousand times over, than Voltaire and Rousseau, for they placed nature and grace in opposition, and denied nature in order to assert grace. Not enough have been appreciated the services rendered to religion and humanity by the sons of Loyola, in combating as they did, in the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth, the degrading and demoralizing, though specious, heresy of the Jansenists. Nobly did they defend the freedom, the dignity, and the glorious destiny of human nature. The infamous *Maxims* of La Rochefoucauld, once so celebrated, were Jansenistic, not Catholic, and were conceived in the spirit of Port Royal, not of the church. They could have

been inspired only by a heresy that places grace in opposition to nature, and thinks to exalt the one by degrading and annihilating the other. The Catholic honors nature, and asserts for it a more glorious destiny than do they who madly assert that man in his developments may grow into God. No, we repeat it, God is the similitude of all things, and the human has its type, its exemplar, in the divine. The divine is mirrored, reflected, by the human; grace, therefore, by nature. The natural sentiments of the human heart are below the infused graces of the Christian, but they are not opposed to them. Philanthropy, or the natural benevolence of the human heart, cannot rise to the elevation and power of Christian charity, or aspire to its eternal reward; but charity no more opposes it, and can no more dispense with it, than revelation opposes or can dispense with reason. What is opposed to benevolence is even more opposed to Christian charity. It is a great mistake to suppose that simple human benevolence or philanthropy is sufficient of itself to redress either social or individual grievances; but it is a still greater mistake therefore to condemn it, to neglect it, to make no efforts to redress the grievances, or to deny them to be real grievances, because they can be effectually redressed only by benevolence exalted to Christian charity. Not all the works of infidels are sin. Works of humanity, of genuine human benevolence, which are not always wanting in non-Catholic society, cannot indeed merit eternal life, or even the grace of conversion, for *gratia est omnino gratis;* but they are not sinful; they are good in the natural order, and merit and shall receive in that order their reward. The men of our times, who have lost the sense of Christian charity and seek to substitute philanthropy for it, do yet honor that charity in its pale and evanescent human reflex, and so far have just sentiments, and are unchristian rather than antichristian.

The doctrine of equal rights, so energetically asserted, a few years since, by "the working-men's party," insisted on under one of its aspects by abolitionists, and by the democratic party throughout the world, is not all false nor all antichristian, and after all faintly mirrors the Christian doctrine of the unity and solidarity of the race. There is truth in the Jacobinical doctrine of "fraternity," and in Kossuth's doctrine of "the solidarity of peoples." The working-men's party is dead now, and buried in other parties which have absorbed it, but it had a great truth for its

basis. It asserted the natural nobility of all men, the nobility of human nature itself, as worthy of our reverence in the humble artisan or laborer as in the titled noble.

> "The king can make a belted knight,
> A marquis, duke, and a' that;
> An honest man 's aboon his might,
> Guid faith! he maunna fa' that."

There is something that it will not do to sneer at in that free and noble spirit that seeks to break down the artificial barriers which separate man from man and nation from nation, and melt all into one grand brotherhood. If there is any one thing certain, it is that the church has always asserted the unity of the race, and the natural equality of all men. Man equals man the world over, and hence, as Pope St. Gregory I. teaches, man, though he has received the dominion over the lower creation, has not received dominion over man, and princes are required to govern as pastors, not as lords; for since all men are equal by nature, the governed are as men the equals and brothers of the governors.

We are a little surprised to find the historian of the United States, in his earlier volumes, disposed to regard Calvin as in some sense the champion of equal rights, and to give Calvinism credit for the principle of political equality on which our American institutions are based, for his own doctrine is as repugnant to the Calvinistic, as light is to darkness. Calvinism asserts only a negative equality. It reduces all to a common level, we grant, by asserting the total depravity of nature, and therefore the nullity of nature in all men; but this is the equality of death, not of life. All are equal, because all are nothing. But it does not elevate all to a common level by the assertion of a positive equality, an equality founded on what all men are and have by nature. Moreover, Calvinism is unfavorable, nay, decidedly hostile, to that doctrine of equality which Mr. Bancroft so strenuously maintains. By its doctrine of the nullity of nature and particular election and reprobation, whereby only a certain definite number can be elevated by grace, it founds an aristocracy, the aristocracy of the saints, or the elect. Asserting the moral nullity of nature, it necessarily founds the political order on grace, as it did in Geneva and the early colony of Massachusetts, and excludes from all political rights all whom it does not count among

the saints. Maintaining the total depravity of nature, it must deny to nature all rights, and can assert rights only for those who are assumed to be in grace; and hence only the saints have or can have the right to govern,—one of the heresies of Wycliffe, condemned by the Council of Constance. Nature being null, there can be no rights under the law of nature, and if no rights, no possessions. Consequently, they who are counted among the non-elect have nothing which the elect are bound to hold sacred and inviolable. They are at the mercy of the saints, who may at pleasure despoil them of all they call their own, and take possession of their political and civil powers, their houses and lands, their goods and chattels, their wives and children, and even their very persons. Logically and consistently carried out, Calvinism therefore founds, not monarchy indeed, but the aristocracy of the saints, that is, of Calvinists, the most absolute and the most odious aristocracy that it is possible to conceive.

Undoubtedly the regenerate, those who are in grace, alone have rights in regard to eternal salvation, for certainly no man can have a natural right to supernatural beatitude. We are saved not by our natural merits, or merits under the law of nature, but by grace merited for us by Christ our head. The error of the Calvinist does not lie in founding our titles to eternal life on grace and grace alone, but consists in denying the natural law, that man retains all his original rights in the natural order, and that in the natural order all men have equal rights, which even the elect or those elevated by grace must respect as sacred and inviolable. God in promulgating the law of grace does in no respect abrogate the law of nature, nor in the least modify the rights or obligations of men under that law. Hence the apostle recognizes the legitimacy of the temporal power of his time, and bids the faithful to obey for conscience's sake the Roman emperor, though a pagan, in all things temporal. Hence the church recognizes and always has recognized the rights of infidel and even heretical princes to the temporal obedience of their subjects, even when those subjects are Catholics, who can be absolved from their allegiance only in case their princes forfeit their rights *by the law* under which they hold. Hence the church forbids infidels, Jews, or persons who have not come under her spiritual jurisdiction, to be forced to accept the faith. Hence, too, she recognizes the natural rights of life, liberty, and property as fully in infidels and heretics as in the faithful themselves. Here

is the grand difference between a positive and a negative natural equality, between the natural equality asserted by Catholicity and that favored by Calvinism. Calvinism asserts the natural equality of all men, by denying alike to all men all natural rights, assuming all rights to have been forfeited by the fall; Catholicity asserts the natural equality of all men, by asserting that all have equal natural rights, and denies that any natural rights were forfeited or lost by the transgression of our first parents. The rights lost by the fall were supernatural, not natural rights,—rights held under the law of grace, not rights held under the law of nature; for it was by grace, not nature, that man was placed prior to the fall on the plane of his supernatural destiny. Hence Catholicity recognizes in nature something sacred and inviolable, which even the church must respect. Hence Catholicity must always respect the natural liberty of man, and can no more tyrannize over the infidel than over the believer,—must, in fact, as to the natural order, place both on the same footing of equality. Calvinism begins by denying all natural rights, nullifying nature, and therefore all natural liberty, and asserts rights for the elect only. Hence it is free from all obligation to the non-elect, that is, to those who are not Calvinists, and is at liberty to play the tyrant over them at pleasure.

This is not mere speculation, or a simple logical conclusion from the Calvinistic premises. It is a conclusion practically drawn by Calvinists themselves, and written out in the blood of non-Calvinists, wherever they have had the power. Never have Calvinists held sacred any liberty except liberty for Calvinists. You may verify the fact by the history of Calvinism in Geneva, by that of the Puritans in England, that of the Covenanters in Scotland, and that of our own Puritan ancestors. Liberty for the elect, but no liberty for the non-elect, is the Calvinistic motto. To the saints belongs the earth. Do you not see this in the Know-Nothing movement against Catholics in our own country? Unbelievers, Unitarians, Universalists, and non-Evangelical sects, may engage in that movement, but its informing and controlling spirit is that of Calvinism, just now galvanized into a sort of spasmodic life. Its very language betrays it. It professes religious liberty, and its very aim is to deny it to Catholics, who in its view, we suppose are reprobates.

We may see here, again, the title of the Jesuits, as true Catholics, to the gratitude of mankind, for the noble energy

with which they vindicated the rights and dignity of nature against insidious Jansenism, that improved edition of Calvinism. "Nature," as some one remarks, "is not good for nothing." It is not good for every thing, yet it is good for something, and in its place is no more to be denied than grace itself.

That Calvinism has accidentally served the cause of equal rights in this country we are not disposed to deny. It led our Calvinistic ancestors to assert equal rights for the elect, that is, for Calvinists, and to make provisions for protecting them. When Calvinism lost its sway, and had become, as it practically had at the time of the revolution, a dead letter, these provisions were without much difficulty extended so as to apply equally to all citizens, elect or non-elect. But no thanks to Calvinism for that, for they were so extended and made to protect equal rights, not as rights of the elect, but as the rights of man. We think, if Mr. Bancroft had studied more thoroughly the Calvinistic system, he would have seen that, of all conceivable systems, it is the least favorable to that liberty and equality which he so eloquently and so energetically asserts. The equality that results from the equal depravity of nature can never be the basis of the equal rights of all men. To obtain this basis you must assert with the Catholic the inherent freedom, dignity, and nobility of human nature in every man, which requires the assertion of the unity of the race, and the recognition of that great fact, so seldom reflected on, so little understood, and so seldom practically applied, that God made man in his own image and likeness, and therefore man in his very nature must copy, imitate, or mirror his Maker.

The working-men were right in asserting the natural equality, or equal natural rights, of all men, and even in asserting the equal natural rights of all men to means and facilities for acquiring; for they did not, as it was alleged, assert the natural right of all men to equal acquisitions. The inequality they complained of was the unequal condition in which men are artificially placed in regard to acquiring, whether it be riches or honors, power or profit. Their error was in seeking to remove this inequality by social or political action. This inequality is, no doubt, in regard to the temporal order, a real grievance; but the difficulty is that it cannot be redressed by society, or if it can, not without striking at the right of property, and thus producing a far greater evil. There are many things very desira-

ble, very proper to be done, which exceed both the ability and the competency of the state to do. The state alone is not competent to all the wants of even natural society. It must protect acquired as well as natural rights, and therefore the right to hold as well as to acquire property; and if it does this, it cannot secure to every man equal means or facilities for acquiring. It is obliged by its very nature to content itself with maintaining the equal right of all to acquire, and to hold what they acquire; when more is needed, we must look to a power of another order,—the moral power. The working-men committed a mistake analogous to that committed by our ultra-temperance people. Intemperance is a sin, a vice, which every man ought to avoid, and temperance is a virtue which every man ought to practise. But the state is competent in the case only to leave full freedom to the virtue, and to punish the intemperance only in so far as it deprives some one of his rights. In that it is a sin or a vice, the state is not competent to deal with it, either by way of prevention or of punishment; it can take cognizance of it only in that it is an injury, or deprives some one of his rights, natural or acquired. The state cannot punish the simple vice of drunkenness; it can punish drunkenness only when it interferes with the rights of others, or disturbs the public peace. Hence the principle of the Maine liquor law is indefensible. A man has a natural right to drink wine, beer, cider, gin, rum, brandy, or whiskey, if he chooses, and can honestly procure it. He has a right to use intoxicating drinks so long as he does not abuse them. That right is and must be sacred and inviolable for the state. The state can have the right to deal only with the abuse. But the Maine liquor law proceeds on the principle that the state has the right to guard against the abuse by prohibiting the use, or by declaring the use itself an abuse. This, as it assumes for the state the right to alter the moral law or to introduce a new principle into morals, cannot be admitted, unless we are prepared to assert civil despotism. The office of the state is not to teach morals, or to interpret the moral law, but to execute it; not to define right, but to protect and vindicate it. To teach morals, to define what is or is not right, is not within the competency of the civil power. That belongs to the spiritual or moral power, distinct from the civil power, and moving in another orbit. The equality, if the working-men had understood it, which they wanted, they would have sought from love, not

law, and by means of the church, not the state; for the church alone can introduce equality in the matters of acquired rights, by teaching the doctrine of love, and bringing home to the consciences of rich possessors, that they are stewards, and not absolute proprietors, of their estates, and therefore are to use them for the good of their neighbor, not for their own private good alone, on the principle that each is bound for all and all for each, or that all are members of one body, and members of one another, and that the body cannot suffer without the members, nor a member without the body. It was on this principle that St. Chrysostom told the rich of Constantinople that they were murderers of the poor who died for the want of the means wherewith to live. But it would be perfect madness to attempt to carry out this principle by political organization or legislative action. The right to acquire and to hold property independent of the civil power must be recognized and protected, or the whole community will die of starvation. The evil which the state must tolerate for the sake of the good, the moral power operating on conscience and love must redress.

The doctrine of the solidarity and communion of the race, which Leroux makes the basis of his socialism and the principle of his explanation of Christianity, has something which, perhaps, a Christian may, and even must, accept. If we may be permitted to refer to our personal experience, we must say that it was through that doctrine, as set forth by Leroux in his work on *Humanity*, that by the grace of God we were led to the Catholic Church; and we may add, that the same was true of several of our friends, one at least of whom is now a most worthy member of the Catholic priesthood, and one of the most indefatigable and successful Catholic missionaries in the country. We thought we saw a great and important truth in the doctrine, but also that, as Leroux laid it down, it was incomplete; and if theoretically and practically completed anywhere, it must be in the Catholic Church. We seized the doctrine with our accustomed ardor, and, developing it in our own way, found ourselves knocking at the door of the church, and demanding entrance. Having been admitted into the church, and commenced the study of Catholic theology in the scholastic authors, in whom we found nothing which seemed to us a recognition of it, we felt that it was our duty to waive its public consideration till we could have time and opportunity of reëxamining it in the light of Catholic faith. We

saw at once that the doctrine pertained to an order of thought far below Catholic dogma, and that we had erred in supposing it to be the explication and expression of the real sense of the Catholic mysteries; but how far it was or was not in harmony with them, we felt unable to say. It was a problem to be solved, and not by us till we had become somewhat more familiar than we were at the time with Catholic theology. The form under which we had entertained it was, in regard to scholastic theology, a novelty, and therefore to be suspected. It might conceal an error, and even a dangerous error. It was certainly prudent, nay, it was our duty, not to insist on it, and to be content with using the language, arguments, and illustrations which we knew to be safe. Hence the trains of thought with which we made our readers so familiar during our transition state, and which had played so important a part in the process of our conversion, were suddenly interrupted the moment we entered the church and began to write as a Catholic. They who have watched our course, and taken some interest in our progress from a low form of rationalism to Catholicity, were unable to trace in our writings any continuity of thought between what was published the day before we entered the church and what we wrote and published the day after. So abrupt and complete a change seemed to them inexplicable on any rational principles, and was of course ascribed to our fickleness, or to our no longer being suffered to have a mind of our own. People outside of the church lost confidence in us, and if they continued to read us at all, it was mainly to amuse themselves with what they were pleased to look upon as our "feats of intellectual gladiatorship." This of course had its unpleasantness and its inconveniences, but it was not unendurable.

But we may say now, after more than ten years of silent thought and reflection on the subject, that, though not free from trifling errors, and much exaggerated as to their importance in our own mind, the principles which we learned from Leroux and developed and applied in own way were substantially true, and we can without lesion to our Catholicity resume the train of thought which appeared to be so abruptly terminated on our entering the church. The views which we set forth in our Letter to Dr. Channing, in 1842, *on the Mediatorial Life of Jesus*,* as far as they went,

* Vol. IV., p. 140.

we can accept now, and not without advantage. They were not what we thought them, and did not attain, as we supposed, to Catholic doctrine; yet they embraced elements of natural truth which help us in some respects to understand the Catholic dogma, and which the dogma may accept as charity accepts philanthropy. The basis of the doctrine we set forth in that letter was, that man lives by communion with God, humanity, and nature, and that his life partakes of the qualities of the object with which he communes. Man cannot live by himself alone, and every fact of life is the resultant of two factors, of the concurrent activity of subject and object, and partakes of the character of each. The individual can live and act only by virtue of communion with that which is not himself, and which we call his object, because it is set over against him. This does not mean that he cannot act without some object, or end to which he acts, although that is undoubtedly the case, but without another activity than his own, which meets and concurs with it. The fact of life results from the inter-shock of the two activities, and is their joint product. The subject is *living* subject, or subject *in actu*, only by virtue of communion with its object. Thus it cannot think without the active presence of the intelligible, or love without the active presence of the amiable, which is really only what St. Thomas teaches when he says the intellect is *in ordine ad verum*, and the will *in ordine ad bonum;* that the intellect is never false, and the will can will only good. Therefore we have frequently brought out the doctrine in order to refute the modern psychologists, and those philosophers who would persuade us that it is not the *mundus physicus*, but an intermediary world, which they call the *mundus logicus*, that the mind in its perceptions immediately apprehends. The mind cannot think without thinking some object, and as to the production of thought, the object must act on or with the subject,—because if purely passive it is as if it were not, for pure passivity is mere potentiality,—the object must be real, being or existence, since what neither is nor exists cannot act or produce any effect. Consequently, either we perceive nothing and perform no act of perception, or the world perceived is the real world itself, not a merely abstract or logical world, or a mere *species* or phantasm.

But thought is an effect, and whoever thinks at all produces or generates something. Every theologian must

admit this, or how else can he hold the mystery of the Trinity, and believe in the only begotten Son of God? In God, who is *actus purissimus*, or pure act, as say Aristotle and the schoolmen after him, as he is infinite and contains no passivity, he enters with his whole being into his thought, the word generated is and must be exactly his equal, and identical in nature, consubstantial with himself. But man, not being pure act, nor intelligible in himself, cannot think without another activity that supplies the object necessary to reduce his passivity to act; and as he cannot enter with his whole being into his thought, he cannot, as God, generate the exact image of himself. Nevertheless, in conjunction with the object, since he imitates in his degree the divine intellect, he generates something, and this something we call a fact of life, or life itself considered as the product of living activity. Now, since to production or generation of thought or the fact of life subject and object must concur, it is their joint product, and must participate of the character of each. Here is the basis of what is called the solidarity of the race, under the point of view of intellect.

But man is not pure intellect. He has a heart as well as a head, and can love as well as think. What we have asserted of thought is equally true of love, as we learn from the same adorable mystery of the Trinity. For the Father, the unbegotten, loves the Son, the begotten, and from their mutual love proceeds the third person of the Trinity, the Holy Ghost. Only like can commune with like, and love properly so called can be only of like to like, and therefore under the relation of love man only can be the object of man. By virtue of the unity of the race every human being is the object of every other human being. But by the law of all communion of subject and object, the result generated or proceeding is the joint product of the two factors, and therefore the life of any one man is the joint product of him and every other man; and thus is produced a solidarity of the life of all men, by which it is one and the same life for all and for each, and for each and for all. But as every generation, so to speak, overlaps its successor, and each new generation communes with its predecessor, the solidarity of the race is not only a solidarity of all men in space, but of all men in time, linking together, in one indissoluble life, the first man with the last, and the last man with the first.

Taking this doctrine, but giving a different application from that of Leroux, in order to escape his denial of the personality of God and the personal immortality of the soul, and to be able to assert the Incarnation in the individual man Jesus, instead of the race, we thought we could bridge over the gulf between the Unitarian and the Trinitarian, and accept and explain the Christian church and Christian mysteries. In this respect our letter to Dr. Channing fails. The thought we developed does not rise to the order of Catholic dogma, and at the highest remains in the natural order. Yet the doctrine is substantially true. It is not the supernatural truth of Christianity, but it is in some sense the truth of the natural order which corresponds to it, and by which it is made apprehensible to us. The error of Leroux and ourselves was not in asserting the natural communion and solidarity of the race, but in supposing them to be the real significance of the Christian mysteries, the Incarnation, Holy Communion, the Church, Apostolic Succession, Tradition, &c., or the great truths held by the early Christians, and symbolized by the Catholic dogmas. The error was in assuming that Catholic dogmas symbolize natural truths; it had been more correct to have said the reverse, that the natural truths symbolize the dogmas, or represent them as the human represents the divine. "See that you make all things according to the pattern shown you in the Mount." The earthly symbolizes the heavenly, not the heavenly the earthly. The dogma is not, as Leroux, Cousin, and others have foolishly asserted, the form with which faith, the religious sentiment, or enthusiasm, clothes the natural or philosophic truth. The natural or philosophic truth, on the contrary, is the symbol of which the dogma is the hidden meaning, the divine reality, or the divine likeness which it copies or imitates.

Although the natural communion of the human race does not introduce us to the principle of the sacraments, as Leroux and we after him supposed, and although the natural solidarity of the race is infinitely below the Christian solidarity effected by the sacraments, there is no opposition between one and the other. We do not by natural communion receive and incorporate into our life that grace which unites us to God and enables us to live the supernatural life of Christ, and the solidarity resulting from it is infinitely below that of the church, that mystic body of Christ, in which he is as it were continuously incarnated;

but it does express the condition of our natural human life, and its assertion, while no disadvantage to the supernatural, is of great advantage to the natural order. It condemns all exclusiveness, whether individual or national, and asserts the necessity to the full development of our natural life of the free and peaceful intercourse of man with man the world over. Man has a threefold nature, and lives by communion with God, man, and nature. He communes with God in religion, with man in society, and with nature in property, and any political or social order that strikes at either of these, or hinders or obstructs this threefold communion, as Leroux well maintains, is alike repugnant to the will of God and the highest interests of humanity; and efforts made to render this communion free and unobstructed, to give freedom in the acquisition and security in the possession of property, to protect the family as the basis of society, and to break down the barriers to social intercourse interposed by prejudices of birth or caste, and to secure freedom of worship or religion, are in principle great and solemn duties, obligatory alike upon all men. Thus far the liberalists and socialists can make a valid defence. The end proposed is just and obligatory. The means they adopt of course we do and must condemn. Philanthropy enjoins what they would effect, and philanthropy here may justify herself by the natural solidarity of the race.

Kossuth, when he was here, had much to say of "the solidarity of peoples," from which he concluded the right of the people of every country, irrespective of their government, to run to the assistance of any particular people struggling for its rights. This solidarity of peoples rests on the doctrine of the solidarity of the race. Man lives his social life only by communion with man, and every man thus becomes every man's object, and all are bound together in the unity of one indissoluble life. Man then can never be indifferent to man; never have the right to ask, with Cain, "Am I my brother's keeper?" Your brother is your object, without which you cannot live the life of love. He is your other self, the objective side of your own life. If this may be said of individuals, why not of nations? There is in some sense a solidarity of nations, as well as individuals. The right of the people without the permission of their government to assist a sister people, we cannot absolutely deny. The race is more than the individual, and humanity more than the nation. There is a great and glorious truth in Senator

Seward's doctrine of the higher law, a truth which every true man will assert, if need be, in exile or the dungeon, on the scaffold or at the stake. I am a man before I am a citizen, and my rights as a man can never be subordinated to my duties as a citizen. Even the church recognizes and vindicates my rights as a man, and the church is higher in the order of God's providence than the state, as much so as grace is higher than nature. There are cases in which the state cannot bind the citizen, as the apostles taught us when they refused to obey the magistrates who commanded them to preach no more in the name of Jesus of Nazareth. We are to love our neighbor as ourself; for in one sense our neighbor is ourself, since he is our object, without which we cannot love or live; there are cases when we must rush to his assistance, at least when we *may* rush to his assistance, at the hazard of life. There may then be cases when the solidarity of the race overrides the solidarity of the nation, and permits a people without the national sanction to rush to the assistance of another people struggling against tyranny for its liberty and independence; but not indeed at the call of every discomfited demagogue. The principle we hold to be true, but it can be of only rare application. The struggling people must have a cause manifestly just, and have adopted means manifestly unexceptionable, and the national permission must have been wrongly withheld, before the people of another nation have the right to interfere; and these things must be determined not by private judgment or caprice, but by an authority competent to decide in the case, otherwise an attack may be made against legitimate authority, and a blow be struck at order, which is as sacred as liberty.

We might pursue this subject further, but it is unnecessary at present. We have thus far been intent mainly on pointing out what a Catholic may accept as true and good in modern liberalism and socialism. What they want, we mean when sincere, earnest, and disinterested, what they are driving at, under certain aspects, is good, and in its place approved alike by charity and philanthropy. We cannot utterly condemn all we did and said as a liberalist or as a socialist, and we find much in liberalists and socialists of the present day to approve. When they are not completely beside themselves, we admit that most of the things they call political and social grievances are grievances, and such as ought to be redressed. But with what they contend for that is true and good, they couple great and dangerous

errors. They err, above all, as to the means by which they seek to gain their ends. In what they for the most part aim at, we can agree with them. We love liberty as much as they do, we are as indignant at wrong as they are; but we see them trying to effect by the state what can be effected only by the church, and by the natural sentiment of philanthropy what is practicable only by the supernatural virtue of charity.

Every age has its own characteristics, and we must address its dominant sentiment, whether we would serve or disserve it. Our age is philanthropical rather than intellectual. It has lost faith intellectually, but retains a faint echo of it on the side of the affections. It does not think so much as it feels, and it demands the gospel of love with far more earnestness and energy than it does the gospel of truth. Charity had exalted and intensified its affections. Despoiled of charity, it is devoured by its benevolent sentiments. It would do good, it would devote itself to the poor, the enslaved, the neglected, the downtrodden. It would bind up the broken heart, and bring rest to the suffering. These are not bad traits, and we love to dwell on the disinterestedness of the Howards, the Frys, the Nightingales, and the benevolent men and women in our own country who so unreservedly devote themselves to the relief of the afflicted. These prove what the age craves, and what it is looking for. Through its benevolence Satan no doubt often misleads it, but through the same benevolence the missionary of the cross may approach it and lead it up to God.

We have wished, in these times, when the church is assailed so violently by the galvanized Calvinism manifesting itself in Know-Nothing movements, to show, by exhibiting the manner in which she regards those movements which spring from natural benevolence or a generous regard for human well-being, that she no more deserves than she fears their violence. What is true and good in the natural order manifested by those outside, though imperfect, she accepts. We have wished, also, in a practical way, to reply to those who are perpetually accusing us of being narrow and exclusive, and a renegade from free principles. What we aimed at before our conversion is still dear to us, and we are still in some sense a man of our age. But having indicated the good side of liberalism and socialism, we shall take a future opportunity to show more fully that it is accepted by the church, and is completed only in and through her communion.

PAGANISM IN EDUCATION.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1852.]

The Abbé Gaume, Vicar-General of Nevers, is one of the more estimable of the present Catholic authors in France. He is not, indeed, remarkably brilliant, or very profound; but he is earnest, and in all his writings aims at practical results of the highest importance. We cannot but applaud the motive of the publication before us, the end sought to be gained, however far we may or may not agree with the author as to the cause of the evil he so clearly points out, or as to the specific means of removing it.

There can be no question that the worm which is devouring the very heart of modern society is paganism. The tendency to heathenism is in our fallen nature itself, and there is no age of the world in which it does not more or less manifest its strength. As long as man exists on the earth he will in greater or less degree manifest this tendency, and the Christian will have in himself and in society to continue the old war against paganism. That in modern Europe the tendency has during the last four centuries been unusually strong, and that there has been in many countries a decided reaction in favor of the pagan world against which the early Christian martyrs so heroically struggled, and did such brave battle, we have on more occasions than one attempted to prove, and it is evident to every intelligent student of history. Heathenism is everywhere rife, and modern generations grow up with heathen notions of life, accustomed to judge men and events by a heathen standard. Professed Christian countries have lapsed into carnal Judaism, another name for heathenism, and look only for a temporal prince in the Messiah, and worldly advantage or prosperity from religion. The church is tried, not by its spiritual effects, but by its assumed bearing on the temporal civilization of nations. Even the people of Catholic countries are more or less influenced in their judgments by pagan max-

Le Ver Rongeur des Sociétés Modernes, ou le Paganisme dans l'Éducation. Par L'Abbé J. Gaume. Bruxelles: 1851.

ims. They place, for instance, a much higher value on the active than the contemplative religious orders, and extol those who devote themselves to active beneficence and the relief of bodily wants far above those who devote themselves to prayer. The heroic devotion of the old monks and anchorites of the desert is termed by many a sublime folly. *Ascetic* is a word in bad odor, and if used will hardly be understood in a good sense. Faith in the reality of the unseen world is weak, and all thought and labor devoted to that world, or not attended by practical, visible results for this temporal life, are looked upon with suspicion, and very extensively as thrown away. So far gone is the age, especially among Protestants, where we see its real character, that its very spiritualism is material. We listened some time since to an oration before a literary society by Mr. Horace Greeley. He began by denouncing the materialism and utilitarianism of the age in good set terms, and with some truth and power, and ended by proposing a greater attention to physical education, or the education of the body, as the only practicable remedy!

That the uneasiness, the insubordination, the revolutions, and the terrible social as well as spiritual evils which afflict modern society, grow out of the prevalence of paganism, or carnal Judaism, no well-informed Christian can doubt, and that it is the one and only enemy to our virtue and to our peace, whether individual or social, is just as certain. That it is necessary to see this, to understand well the fact of the prevalence of paganism in modern society, and the means of banishing it, or of emancipating the young generation from its thraldom, the Abbé Gaume feels deeply and sees most clearly, and so far we sympathize entirely with what he writes. The cause of this paganism in modern society he ascribes to the use of heathen works as class-books in our higher schools, and the remedy, he contends, is to abolish those works, and to substitute text-books written by Christian authors in their place.

He assumes that the difference which obviously exists between modern society and society in the middle ages is due, and due alone, to the difference between the system of education adopted and pursued then, and that adopted and pursued during the last four hundred years. Education, he contends, makes the man, determines not only his intellectual, but his moral character, and that education, too, which is accomplished in the individual during the period between

infancy and youth or adolescence. "The life of man," he says, "is divided into two periods, *perfectly distinct*, that of *receiving* and that of *transmitting*. The first period includes the time of education, that is to say, of development, or of instruction; the second, the rest of life till death. Not having being in and of himself, man receives all, in the intellectual and moral order no less than in the physical order. After having received, he transmits, and he can transmit only what he has received. In transmitting what he has received, he creates family and society after his own image. The truth or falsehood, the good or evil, the order or disorder, realized in the external facts of family or society, are only the reflex and product of the truth or falsehood, the good or evil, the order or disorder, which reigns in the interior of his soul." That is, the child is purely passive, and ductile as wax in the hands of the instructor, and receives the form, whatever it may be, that the instructor gives him. The original nature and disposition of the child, it seems, count for nothing, and never interpose any obstacles which defeat the intention of the instructor!

The opinions and manners of parents, the author maintains, form those of their children, and the opinions and manners of the uneducated classes are formed by the opinions and manners of the educated classes. The opinions and manners of the educated classes are formed by their literary education. This education is principally determined by the books which are placed in the hands of the young during the seven or eight years which unite childhood to adolescence or youth. It is so because these years decide the character for life, because these books are the daily food of the young, who must study them with care, learn them by heart, and thoroughly master them both as to their form and substance, and because this assiduous study is accompanied with explanations and commentaries designed to make the students comprehend the sense of these books, admire their style, their thoughts, and beauties of every sort, —to exalt the deeds, the words, and the institutions of the men and nations whose history they relate,—in a word, to present the authors of these works as the unrivalled kings of talent and genius. Hence all comes from education.

The question opened by the author is a grave question, and is at the present moment exciting no little controversy among Catholics in France. Respectable names are found on both sides. The Abbé Gaume appears to be sustained

by Cardinal Gousset, whose name has deservedly great weight, and also by Count Montalembert, dear to every Catholic, for his chivalric defence of Catholic principles, and his steady devotion to Catholic interests, but who perhaps is a little too enthusiastic in his admiration of the middle ages. We are ourselves incompetent to mingle in the debate. Prior to our conversion, and during the first two or three years after, we entertained to their full extent the views defended by the Abbé Gaume. Maturer reflection, and something of that intimate acquaintance with the tendencies of our fallen nature which is obtained only by the effort to live the Catholic life, have led us to regard those views as somewhat exaggerated, and to the conviction that the disuse in our schools of the Greek and Roman classics as text-books would of itself have comparatively little effect in banishing paganism from society.

We do not question the faith or the piety of our author, but we cannot bring ourselves as a Catholic to believe that a system of education has been adopted and pursued for four hundred years by the most illustrious religious orders and congregations, the most able and learned doctors, and the greatest and most heroic saints, under the supervision of the church, and at least with her tacit approval, which is directly fitted to paganize society. It seems to us that we could hardly say so without impeaching either the vigilance or the infallibility of the church herself. Education is a part, and an important part, of the mission of the church, and to suppose that she has fallen into a grave mistake on the subject, or has utterly failed in her judgment of what is essentially a Christian education, or what is essentially repugnant to it, is in our judgment more than we can do compatibly with our Catholic faith. To do so would be only to follow in the track of Savonarola, who has not yet been cleared of error and proved to have been a good Catholic. Of course we do not mean that it is a matter of faith that heathen text-books should be used in our schools, or that educators are not free to disuse them, or that it is not lawful to maintain that it would be well, or indeed that it is even necessary, to discontinue their use; but we do doubt our right to contend that their use has been incompatible with Christian education, and has been the cause of the paganism in modern society. The Abbé Gaume is free to maintain that it would be well, and that under existing circumstances it is necessary, to banish the ancient Greek and

Latin classics from our schools; but not, in our judgment, that the paganism of modern society has resulted from their use, and that in suffering them to be used the church has acted as unwisely as the artist who, wishing to cast a hero, poured his molten metal into the mould of a horse.

We do not believe, moreover, with the Abbé Gaume, that education is all-powerful, and that the child is as ductile as wax in the hands of the educator. Never is the child purely passive, ready to receive any form you may choose to give it. This is the error of Robert Owen, and of the socialists and communists generally. It is the doctrine of all those who are at war with society as it is, and who ascribe the depravities of individual character to the depravities of the social state in which character is formed. No child is purely passive in the formation of its character. The soul is essentially active, and it acts in receiving as well as in transmitting. Do your best, you cannot cast all children in the same mould, and turn them out good Christians. Some children, in spite of the most adverse influences, nay, it would sometimes seem, in consequence of adverse influences, grow up firm, loyal, devout Christians, whose life is most edifying to study. Others, brought up in the most careful manner, piously educated, and kept for years in ignorance of evil, wilt down before the first temptation, and end in being thorough reprobates. Education is the ordinary means under divine providence of forming Christian character, but it is not infallible, and often fails utterly of its end, even when no objection can be brought against the quality of the education furnished, or against those who furnish it. The same regimen will not produce the same effects in all. Even the blessed apostles were an odor of life to some, and an odor of death to others. In the same family, in the same school, you find some turn out all you could wish, and others turning out the reverse. Always must you make allowance for innate differences of disposition, and for the free will of children.

There is in the author's doctrine on education a latent Pelagianism, and an assumption of the innate goodness or perfectibility of human nature. Education, as he treats it, is merely a human means of forming character, and he, unconsciously no doubt, reasons on the supposition that human nature has the capability by development and cultivation of being elevated to the Christian order. There is in this a forgetfulness of the corruption of our nature by the fall,

and of the necessity of grace to enable us to overcome it. Christianity in all its parts lies in the supernatural order, and neither Christian belief nor Christian character is possible by any conceivable culture which is merely human. We are not born Christians, but infidels and heathen. Nor are we born with the seeds or germs of Christianity in our soul, either as to faith or as to character, and they are implanted in us only by regeneration. The seeds or germs with which we are born are the seeds or germs of paganism, and the more full and thorough the cultivation of our nature, the more complete and thorough pagans do we become. Hence it is that no education, no training, however wise or judicious, orthodox or pious, can infallibly insure Christian faith and character; for as long as we remain in the flesh we have within us the seeds or germs of heathenism, ready at all times to spring up, and which can be prevented from development only by the grace of Christ.

The author, it seems to us, mistakes the effect for the cause. The middle ages, he tells us, were thoroughly Christian, and were so because education was Christian. Would it not be truer to say, that education was then Christian because society itself was Christian? If education was then Christian, whence came, if the character of a generation is determined by it, the generation which in the fifteenth century broke the Christian mould and introduced the pagan? The generation which broke with the middle ages, and sought to revive Greece and Rome, must have been formed under a Christian system of education, and therefore, according to the author, could transmit only the Christian family and society. How, then, did it become so paganized as to substitute the pagan mould for the Christian? Certainly the generation that changed the mould had already become paganized, and paganized, if the author is to be believed, under a system of thoroughly Christian education. How, if by education you can always determine the character of the rising generation, and through it of society, did that generation become so paganized? That generation had not been cast in the pagan mould, yet it had become pagan. How, with this fact staring him in the face, can the author assert the infallibility of education? or that, if the mould was changed, the change was not the effect, but the cause, of the paganism of modern society? It strikes us, therefore, that it would be far more true to say that there is paganism in education because society itself is pagan, than that society is pagan because there is paganism in education.

Finally, so long as paganism prevails in society, the mere exclusion of pagan class-books can hardly be expected to banish paganism even from education. The education which forms character is given far less in schools and colleges than in the family and in society, and far less by the text-books studied than by the personal character of schoolmates, and of teachers and professors. The pagan books usually read in Catholic colleges have very little influence on the young, and the evil influence they are likely to produce is after the student has left college rather than before, and therefore at an age when, according to the author, the character is already decisively formed. We can see no great harm a good-conditioned boy, at the age when they are usually studied in Catholic colleges, is likely to receive from Cæsar's Commentaries, Ovid's Metamorphoses, abating a few dirty passages, Virgil's Æneid, Cicero's Orations, and Sallust's Histories, or from Xenophon's Cyropædia and Anabasis, Homer's Iliad, and, with a few exceptions, the Greek tragedies, read, as they are, not for their principles or doctrines, but for their language and the beauty of their form. If the tone of society, of the college, and of the professors be thoroughly Catholic, the pupils will imbibe very few false notions from these books. The injury that is done by classical literature, we think, is done chiefly at a later age, when read for its principles, or for the instruction and amusement of learned leisure, or at least where the tone and tendency of the family and society are pagan. It is very possible that the classics have amid prevailing heathenism some slight influence in exaggerating the evil, but in general our age is so much more heathen than ancient Greece and Rome, that the study of them not unfrequently has even a corrective tendency. Moreover, we know that some of the most pious doctors and greatest saints of the church have been educated in Latin and Greek through the medium of these books. The author tells us that the sixteenth century was the golden age of the classics, and we would ask him what age has been more distinguished for the number and greatness of its canonized saints? The seventeeth century, again, was a century of powerful reaction against Protestantism, and it too, in France and Spain especially, was eminently distinguished by piety, zeal, and sanctity. Yet it was precisely in these two centuries that the system of education the author condemns was in its greatest vigor, and the most generally adopted. If we come down to the

eighteenth century, we find society fall off in its classical studies almost as much as in its faith and piety. Experience is far from warranting the sweeping censures of the excellent Abbé Gaume.

It is true that the nations of Europe in the last century found themselves pretty generally acting on heathen maxims, and applauding the heathen spirit. You say the generation which prepared and effected the old French revolution was educated in schools exclusively under the control of the clergy. Be it so. So was the generation that prepared and effected the rupture of society with the church in the fifteenth and early part of the sixteenth century; and the fact that the modern system did not prevent men from becoming infidels and incendiaries is no more an argument against it, than the fact that the former system did not prevent them from becoming heretics and revolutionists is an argument against that which you approve and would revive. You are obliged to confess that the system of education adopted in the middle ages did not save society from the Protestant rebellion, every whit as violent and as wicked as the Jacobinical revolution at the close of the last century; but you do not regard that fact as a condemnation of it. You seek the causes of its failure in something else than its supposed defects as a system. Why not be equally liberal and just to the modern system? Why make the Jesuits more responsible for the paganism of the eighteen and nineteeth centuries, than the mediæval educators for the paganism of the fifteen and sixteenth centuries? The argument, *Post hoc, ergo propter hoc*, is not always valid, and we see no reason for counting it more valid in the eighteenth century than in the fifteenth.

Scandals must come, heresies must come, the love of many at times will wax cold, and large masses will detach themselves from the church. It has been so from the beginning, and will be so to the end. It is bad logic to attribute such things, when they come, to the wrong system or mistaken policy pursued by the church, and by no means wise forthwith to demand an entire change of system. No foresight, no prudence, no policy, however wise or judicious, could have prevented them. The fault is not in those who labor to prevent them, and remain faithful to the church, but in those who break away and rush headlong in the mad career of heresy, infidelity, and immorality. The Jesuits and other religious orders in the first half of the eighteenth

century labored assiduously in the education of youth, and yet many came out of the schools infidels, real gentiles. There is no denying it, but the fault cannot be charged to the system they pursued, for they had previously pursued the same system for a hundred and fifty or two hundred years without any such results.

We are not as well pleased with the remarks of M. Bastiat, cited by the Abbé Gaume, as we should like to be. They strike us being neither logical nor true. He represents the state as taking the control of education from the clergy and giving it to the university, because education in the hands of the clergy had prepared actors for the revolution of 1793. This is historically incorrect. It was done solely because the influence of the clergy was adverse to that revolution, and because the state wished to have its children educated for this world, and not for heaven. The parity he seeks to establish between the clergy and the university does not exist, and to maintain it is unjust to the clergy. Neither they nor their system prepared Europe for revolution, and it was evidently so prepared in spite of both. We are not edified by the Catholic priest who cites with approbation an author who places the infidel University of France on a par with the French clergy, and represents both as equally contributing to paganize society. The world to a great extent has relapsed into paganism in spite of the clergy, who have always strenuously resisted it, and it is not in these times, when we have to struggle as for life and death to prevent paganism from entirely swallowing up Christian civilization, that we can afford to bring accusations against them, and hold them responsible for the evils which threaten to overwhelm us. It was they who, aided by the prayers of the faithful, under God first rescued the world from paganism, and it is only they, aided by the prayers of the faithful, who can a second time rescue us. Let us not be so mad, then, as to cut off the right hand on which we must lean for guidance and support.

All these theorizings as to the causes of past calamities, and all these specifics for the cure of prevailing evils, are always to be received with suspicion. They all proceed on the assumption that these calamities might have been prevented, and that these evils may be removed, by human foresight, wisdom, and strength; and hence it is that their authors soon forget the supernatural agency of Heaven, become proud in their own conceit, impatient of instruction,

and, like Savonarola, like the ill-fated La Mennais, like the brilliant Abbate Gioberti, end in losing their faith and their virtue, and in calling down the anathemas of the church and of all good men. Providence has given us our work, he has placed instruments in our hands, and bid us use them, but to give or to withhold success he has reserved to himself. To succeed or not to succeed does not depend on his ministers. When they succeed the glory belongs to him, and when they fail it is not for us to blame them. If they are faithful in the work he gives them to do, they will receive their reward in heaven; and the ill success of their labors, if ill success attend them, must be explained by his plans, inscrutable to us, and into which we are not to pry.

What were the proximate causes of the pagan reaction of the fifteenth century, or of the new outbreak of heathenism in the eighteenth, we do not know. We have no theory to explain the presence of either at the precise time it appeared, or to tell why either might not have just as well appeared a century earlier, or a century later. All we know is, that there was in the fifteenth century a powerful pagan reaction, which gave birth to the Protestant movement and revolt, and that there is now in society a widely prevalent heathenism, affecting Catholic countries in some degree as well as Protestant countries, and to which is to be ascribed our modern Jacobinical revolutions and socialistic movements. At either epoch the real origin and cause of the heathenism are to be sought, not in this or that erroneous policy, in this or that system of social organization, or in this or that system of instruction and education, but in our fallen and corrupt nature. Every man in his fallen state is naturally a heathen, and the paganism which at any time or in any country obtains is nothing more or less than the natural expression of what every one of us without grace is in himself. By whatever causes faith is weakened, and men are led to neglect the means of grace, heathenism is promoted. What these particular causes are, and why they operate at one time more than another, in one country more than in another, is just as difficult for us to explain, as why, of two friends having equal opportunity, one shall be converted and the other shall remain an infidel; why, of two women grinding at the mill, one shall be taken and the other left. We know that it is so, but why it is so we do not know.

The middle ages were not as completely Christian as many modern romanticists dream, but their errors and defects were not in general errors and defects of faith. They transgressed the law of God through pride or passion, but they did not erect transgression into a principle, and, like modern times, invent theories to justify it. Consequently, you had in general only to touch the conscience to bring the sinner to the confessional. Education could then be Christian, for society was Christian,—as to faith in all, as to practice in many, and especially in those intrusted with the instruction of the young. This Christian education no doubt tended to preserve Christianity in the family and in society, and to check the manifestation of the heathen tendencies of our nature. But the education was Christian because society was Christian, and only in a weaker sense was society Christian because education was Christian. After the rupture, society, which in fact never was and never will be thoroughly Christian, but only relatively so, became heathen in its principles and theories, and education, though it remained Christian in school, became to some extent pagan out of school, and unable to resist the pagan tendencies of human nature itself, and the pagan influences of society. It is far less what is studied in school that makes our youth grow up pagans, than the influences of pagan society out of school. Yet these influences acting on the schools may have made them less Christian than they were in the middle ages, and they again may have reacted on society and augmented its heathenism. But except where the state has restricted or denied the liberty of education, and banished, as in France for the last sixty years, religion from the schools, we do not believe this has been to any great extent the case in Catholic countries, though it undoubtedly has been in Protestant countries. However, heathenism is now prevalent in society, and it is not by education alone nor chiefly that we can expel it, for the simple reason, that so long as society remains heathen, whatever your schools, you cannot withdraw your children from heathen influences.

We are undoubtedly to make constant and deadly war on the heathenism of the age. In prosecuting this war it may be found necessary to place the same interdict on the literary remains of pagan antiquity that the church always places upon the literary productions of contemporary heretics, because the prevalence of paganism may have made them in some sense the works of contemporaries. Whether

this will be so or not, we do not know, and happily it is not for us to decide, since we are not in holy orders, and the care of all the churches does not devolve on reviewers. This is a matter for the decision of those whom the Holy Ghost has placed over us. Some whose opinions we are bound to respect, and do respect, appear to think it is necessary to exclude the classics from the studies of the young. Others, equally deserving our respect, think it is not, and till the proper authority decides, we have no opinion on the subject. All we venture to say is, that in our judgment the banishing of the Greek and Roman text-books usually studied by our youth will of itself do little towards checking the evil complained of. It will cut off only a feeble rill, while it leaves the main torrent to pour in the poisonous floods of heathenism.

We have, as we never cease to repeat, no faith in specifics, no confidence in the man who proposes to cure all ills with a "Morrison's pill." All the evils of society, however wide they may spread out their branches, spring from one and the same root, and are really destroyed only as you cut off that root itself, and deprive them of the sap by which they live. This root is our own corrupt nature, and nothing is really remedial, or any thing more than a mere palliative which instead of curing is pretty sure to aggravate the disease, that does not heal this nature itself, or enable us to keep its evil affections in subjection to the law of God. Instruction alone will not do this, for few of us do as well as we know, and a man may know perfectly well his duty, and entirely neglect it. Nothing will do it but God's grace, and our sole instruments are the means of grace. In other words, we must not rely on ourselves, or hope by human means, by any humanly devised schemes, however promising they may appear to our wisdom, to roll back the tide of heathenism, and restore society to Christian life. It is not for us to attempt to raise the dead, to rekindle the vital spark that is extinct. We must rely on God, and feel that the work is his, and his alone. By pious submission, and devout and continued prayer to him to have mercy on mankind, we may coöperate with him in its performance, and rest assured that in his own way and time it will be done.

Some of the objections we have suggested the Abbé Gaume has himself noticed and attempted to answer, though, we must say, not to our satisfaction. We beg our readers, however, not to misunderstand us. Into the real

question as to the propriety, or the necessity, under existing circumstances, of banishing the pagan classics from our schools, we have not entered, because we consider that as a question for the ecclesiastical authorities to settle, not for us. We have only wished to enter our feeble protest against the assumption that their use in our schools has been the cause of modern paganism, and that the church has erred or been culpably neglectful of her duty in suffering them to be used. Nor have we wished to depreciate education, which no man prizes higher than we do; our wish has been to guard our readers against ascribing to it a virtue which it does not possess, against ascribing all the good in society to good, and all the evil to bad, education. Education can do much, and should be encouraged; good education should never be neglected; but it is never able of itself to overcome nature, or to preserve society from all aberrations. The mere cultivation of nature is always an evil rather than a good, for good is not a natural product, is not developed from nature, but is the fruit of supernatural grace and discipline. Our reliance for the reformation of society is not, therefore, on education alone, but on it and all the other means of forming character which God has provided, and especially on his own gracious pleasure. In a word, we have full faith only in prayer and the sacraments as the instruments of salvation, whether for the individual or society; for there is nothing of which we are better assured than that the salvation of either is of God, not of man, and, as we often say, that God will prosper no means the glory of which does not redound to himself. We must never forget that the church is God's church, not man's, and that it is only through the church, his immaculate spouse, whom he loves, and for whom he shed his blood, that he does or will regenerate and bless either the individual or society. Human means, the might of the powerful, and the wisdom of the wise, he brings to naught, save as inspired by his grace and subordinated to his praise.

SCHOOLS AND EDUCATION.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1854.]

We promised some since to notice this work at length, but the special controversy as to the use of the pagan classics in Christian schools, which occasioned it, has in great measure subsided, and it seems to us hardly necessary to redeem our promise. It is now pretty generally agreed, we believe, that the excellent Abbé Gaume carried his doctrine to an unwarranted extreme, that he fell in his historical details into several inaccuracies of some importance, and indulged in severe remarks on the instruction at least tacitly approved by the church, which it is hardly lawful for a good Catholic to make. On the other hand, we think it is very nearly as generally agreed, that the youth in our colleges need to be more early and thoroughly imbued with a knowledge and taste of Christian literature than they have been for the last few centuries.

The evil indicated by the Abbé Gaume we believe to be very real, but we do not believe that it has originated in the use of the Greek and Latin classics as text-books, or that it would be sensibly diminished by excluding them. The evil lies elsewhere. Father Cahours shows in this work, what we have never doubted, that the use of the pagan authors in the instruction of youth was as great, and, so far as the schools were concerned, as exclusive, in the middle ages, sometimes called the ages of faith, as in modern times. But it did not make pagans then; why, therefore, should it make pagans now? The Abbé Gaume can answer the question, in accordance with his theory, only by distorting history, and denying well-authenticated facts. Yet that it did not then, but does now, in Europe, make pagans to a very considerable extent, we believe, paradoxical as it may seem, is undeniable.

If we look to education as it is now in Europe, the first thing that strikes us is the glaring contradiction between

**Des Études Classiques et des Études Professionnelles.* Par Arsène Cahours, de la Compagnie de Jésus. Paris: 1852.

the lessons of the professor and the political and social order under which his pupils are to live. The state of society, under the point of view of liberty, revealed by the ancient classics, as they will be understood in the schools, is in bold contrast to that which the student encounters the moment he goes forth from the university into the world. The study of the classics in Great Britain and the United States has almost invariably a conservative, and rarely an anti-christian tendency; but on the Continent it has as invariably a revolutionary, and not unfrequently an infidel, tendency. It renders youth dissatisfied with the order of things they see established, plants in their minds the germs of revolt, and fills them at a very early age with the spirit of rebellion. Whence this difference?

The answer is not difficult. In Great Britain and the United States there is already established and enjoyed a political and social order far more favorable to liberty than that which is revealed by the ancient classics, and no Englishman or American, under the point of view of freedom, can really envy pagan Greece or Rome. He has already a larger liberty than the subjects of either ever possessed; and hence he is struck in the ancient classics only by their exquisite art, their unrivalled beauty, and their conservative principles. The case is entirely different in most Continental states. The Continental student is most struck by the decided anti-monarchical tone of the classics, by their manifest republican spirit, and their lofty declamations against tyranny and in favor of liberty. These declamations seem to him strictly applicable to his own condition. He feels that monarchy is tyranny, that his princes are tyrants, usurpers, and oppressors, and he burns to be an Harmodius, an Aristogiton, or a Brutus. The fact is, that the classics are republican, and continental Europe is monarchical, and therefore the youth who are trained in them are imbued with principles hostile to the social order under which they live; and, when they become men, must, if they take an active part in society, either be rebels, revolutionists, or else must turn their backs on their childhood's political faith, stifle all their young dreams of liberty, and in most cases enter into public life by an act of insincerity, and become the cold, selfish, and unscrupulous instruments of power. If they remain aloof from public life, and retain their university convictions, having no field for their talents and activity, they waste their lives in dilettantism, become friv-

olous, or mere devotees of pleasure. Finding, as they imagine, the church, in her exterior action, on the side of the monarchical order, they lose their respect for her, lose their piety and their faith, and become pure Epicureans, saying, "Come, let us eat, drink, and be merry, for to-morrow we die."

The cause of all this, after the corruption of human nature, must be looked for in the profound political and social revolution which has been going on in Europe during the last four hundred years. Greek and Roman antiquity, though republican, had little respect for individual freedom. It asserted the majesty of the state, and also its despotism. The city was supreme, and the citizen belonged entirely to her; and never did the political order actually established recognize a natural limit to the power of the state in the natural and indefeasible right of the individual, placed under the guaranty of the divine sovereignty. This unlimited authority of the state, when the republican order was exchanged for the royal or the imperial order, was transferred to the prince, who was in consequence held to be the living law, as expressed by Ulpian, the old Roman jurist, *Quod placuit principi, id legis habet vigorem*, which is the fundamental maxim of cæsarism. While, therefore, the young and ingenuous drew from the study of the ancient classics republican inspirations, and found in them a nourishment for their love of popular liberty, the lawyers, courtiers, and princes drew from the study of the civil law, transmitted by the same antiquity, lessons wholly in favor of arbitrary power, or cæsarism,—what is termed more generally, in our days, absolutism.

Cæsarism passed from the old pagan emperors of Rome to the Christian emperors of Byzantium, and from these to the German emperors of the West, and finally to nearly all the European courts, not excepting the Plantagenets, Tudors, and Stuarts, of England. The church struggled successfully against it till the great schism of the West, and with some effect till the end of the fourteenth century. Down to that time cæsarism had not been able to establish itself anywhere in western Europe, and there was, under the point of view of republicanism, no striking discrepancy between the ancient classics and modern ideas and practices. The scholars of the middle ages enjoyed a greater freedom than was enjoyed in classical antiquity. The hereditary principle, as now understood and acted upon, was not then

recognized; and though the son might, and as a general thing did, succeed to his father, the crown remained, nevertheless, elective, and he could lawfully succeed to it only by the election or assent of the estates of the kingdom. The nation, through its estates, the nobility, the clergy, and the people, or the municipalities, held, under God, the supreme authority, and could and did intervene effectively in the action of the government. The rights of all parties were clearly defined, and placed under the protection of the sovereign pontiff, as the vicar of Jesus Christ and the father of Christendom. These rights the popes struggled with all the powers they possessed to protect against every invasion, let it come from what quarter it might But when the great schism of the West, introduced and sustained by French ambition and national pride, deprived the papacy of much of the respect that had hitherto been yielded it, stripped it of much of its authority over temporals, and gave currency to the anti-papal maxims of Gerson and others, the popes were no longer able successfully to resist the ambition of monarchs, and preserve for the European nations the free and effective voice in the administration they had hitherto enjoyed. The pragmatic sanction of Charles VII., falsely carried back by some unscrupulous historians in several of its provisions to the reign of St. Louis, struck a blow at the papal authority, and therefore at the church, in France, from which it has never yet recovered in that so-called "most Christian" country. Then followed the war of the nobles against the commons, and then of the monarchs against the nobles, and the mediæval society was found in its agony. Afterwards came Protestantism to break the unity of Germany, and to favor the usurpation of princes, and the establishment of absolute cæsarism. From the ministry of Richelieu in France, and the accession of Philip III. in Spain, there has remained scarcely a vestige of mediæval freedom on the continent of Europe. Cæsarism has been everywhere victorious, and almost everywhere triumphant. Hence everywhere we find on the Continent a discrepancy between the actual European world and the republican world of the classics.

Superficial and disingenuous non-Catholic writers ascribe the establishment of this modern cæsarism to the church, and pretend that the freedom enjoyed by Englishmen and Americans is due to Protestantism. But nothing either historically or philosophically is further from the truth. If

the church favors cæsarism, why, when she was so powerful, did she oppose it in the emperors of Germany, in the kings of France and the Plantagenets of England? Why did she struggle with all her power to sustain the political and social order it has supplanted? And why is it that it succeeded only in proportion as she was weakened by the western schism, and subsequently by the Protestant defection, only one of the consequences of that schism? If Protestantism introduces freedom, why has it not done so in Russia, in Sweden, in Denmark, in Prussia, and in the smaller Protestant German states? The simple truth is, that cæsarism has been introduced and established in modern Europe in spite of the church, and against the true Catholic spirit; and she has suffered no less than the state, than the temporal order itself, from it. But the mission of the church is the salvation of souls, and she seeks to fulfil that mission. Whatever the political order that may obtain in this or that nation, she resigns herself to it when she cannot change it, as she resigned herself to the persecution of the old pagan Cæsars. She does not preach revolution, she does not stir up sedition, nor encourage her children to resist the order that is established, although she herself groans under the weight of its oppression. She teaches resignation, peace, order, and calls upon her children to raise their affections from this transitory world to a higher and better world,—to seek the kingdom of God, which they can find under a monarchy, providing it leaves her to exercise her spiritual ministry in freedom, as easily as under a republic. Hence ardent young men and silly old men conclude that she is allied with the sovereigns, that she favors cæsarism and is the determined enemy of republican freedom. Hence, too, modern students in Europe of the Greek and Roman classics find themselves equally opposed to the existing political order and to the religious, at once anti-monarchical and anti-Catholic.

Here, we apprehend, is the source of that great evil which the Abbé Gaume ascribes to the use of the Greek and Roman classics as text-books in our colleges and universities. It is the revolution effected in modern European institutions and society in favor of cæsarism, which has destroyed ancient European freedom, and deprived the people of that effective part in the administration of national affairs which they originally possessed, and ought to possess. We say *and ought to possess*, for however silent we might deem it pru-

dent to be on that point when all Europe was in a state of red-republican insurrection, which struck at all authority, and threatened the very existence of society, we are free now,—since the reaction has commenced and the danger to be apprehended for Europe is cæsarism, not liberalism,—and even bound, to assert the rights of the nation, or, as we say in this country, of the people. The impression, so widely entertained, that the church opposes the revolutionists because they seek liberty, is wholly erroneous. She did not oppose the old French revolution, as we have elsewhere said, till it transcended the temporal order, and encroached on the province of the spiritual. As long as it was simply a movement in behalf of political and civil freedom, she suffered it to go on, made no opposition to it, and censured it only when it transferred the principle of cæsarism to the people, struck at the rights of property, and trampled on the freedom of conscience. The difficulty is, that both the sovereigns and the liberals embrace cæsarism, and are agreed in asserting the absolutism of the state. But let the party clamoring throughout Europe for liberty be really a party in favor of freedom,—let it assert, on the one hand, legitimate authority, and recognize and protect, on the other, the inherent and indefeasible rights of the individual,—and the church will favor instead of opposing it.

However, the evil signalized by the Abbé Gaume remains, and, what is worse, cannot be removed by ceasing to use the Greek and Roman classics as text-books. There is and always will be, do the best we can, a discrepancy between Catholicity and the world; but the particular discrepancy now signalized under the relation of political freedom, between modern society and the order revealed by the classics, we do not believe incapable of being removed, or that we must identify it with that which must always exist between the world and the church. But it is not removable, in our judgment, by any education we can give our children; for whatever the lessons of the school-room, the character of the man is not determined by them, but by the various and complex action of society. It is one of the errors of our age to attribute too much to education. It is strong when supported by the innate instincts and tendencies of human nature, but powerless against them. You may exclude the classics, you may exclude every thing but the most rigid orthodoxy and the most unexceptionable piety, but you can never train a Catholic people, a Catholic nation,

imbued never so little with the free spirit of Catholicity, to be contented with low, degrading, and debasing cæsarism. Harmony between the interior of men's souls and the present abnormal political and social organization of Europe, is out of the question, and to get rid of paganism in society, you must conform your political and social order to the free spirit of the Catholic Church. You must in some form restore to the nations the rights which the sovereigns have usurped, and give to the estates or the people a real and effective voice in the management of public affairs. The evil originates in the cæsarism now everywhere triumphant on the Continent, and which is the joint product of courtiers and Jacobinical revolutionists, and that cæsarism must be abolished, if you would remove it.

The great difficulty in abolishing that cæsarism and in re-establishing freedom in Europe is not in the strength or the ill-will of the monarchs, but in the madness of the liberals. The church cannot favor them, and is obliged to sustain the monarchs, who oppress her and mutilate her power to do good, in order to save society and protect the people from the revolutionists, who would destroy them. It is the less of two evils. The first effort should be to correct this error of the liberals, and this is not to be done by lessons in the school-room, but by reiterated lessons to the adult generation. What seems to us most necessary to be done, just at present, is to disabuse the world of that false impression that the church is leagued with despots, and is hostile to political and social freedom, and to let the truth be known that the discrepancy between the modern world and classical antiquity, under the point of view of freedom, is equally a discrepancy between that modern world and Catholicity. When all authority was everywhere attacked by armed ruffians, it was the duty of every publicist to raise his voice in its defence; but the worst service our Catholic publicists can now render society or religion is to go into ecstasies over the new-fangled cæsarism in which the French revolution of 1848 has resulted, and the first fruits of which is the bloody war waged in support of the licentious, faithless, and indolent Turk, the unrelenting enemy alike of Christianity and civilization. We are, as our readers well know, neither revolutionists nor radical propagandists, and are indifferent to the mere forms of government; but we are and ever have been, and we trust we ever shall be, opposed to arbitrary power, determined enemies to the doctrine that the governed are for the governors,

and in favor of that political order in which the nation has the effective control of its own affairs.

But our intention in citing the title of Father Cahours' learned and deeply interesting work was, not to open a discussion of this sort, but to take occasion from it to offer some remarks on the public or common school system of our own country. We have been charged with hostility to the common schools, and even with having spoken slightingly of them. But there are a great many people in the world who cry out before they are hurt, as well as some who cry out on finding that they are not hurt. Very wise people—in their own estimation—sometimes speak of what they do not understand, and manifest unmatched heroism in encountering and demolishing an enemy that exists only in their own fancy. It is possible for us to think the common school system of the country is not perfect, that it has many grave defects, and under certain points of view is objectionable in principle, without being absolutely hostile to it, or by any means wishing to destroy it, or even to impede its operations. Comparing the system with what should be, or looking at it in the light of the exaggerated boasts an unwise patriotism is accustomed to make of its perfection and its wonderful effects, we might even speak slightingly of it, and yet think very highly of it when the question lay between it and no common schools at all. We may consider the system, inasmuch as it is intended to operate against Catholicity, as avowed by our Protestant countrymen, as designed to detach our children from the religion of their parents, and train them up infidels, or in what we hold to be a false religion; and so considering it, we may well call it an "infernal system," or "a system devised with infernal skill against God's church," for only an infernal spirit, in the judgment of a sincere Catholic, could wish to do any thing of the sort. This sounds harsh in Protestant ears, perhaps; but how does it sound in our ears to hear our church called "Babylon," our Holy Father the pope called "Antichrist," our clergy termed "emissaries of Satan," and our holy religion spoken of as "the *infernal* system of Popery"? Are these terms mild and courteous, charitable and polite? Let our Protestant community observe the rules of ordinary civility, we will say, of common decency, in speaking of Catholics and Catholicity, before they complain of our using harsh terms in speaking of their measures intended to lead our children to apostatize. If in speaking of the common school system

according to the avowed intentions of the Protestant community in sustaining it, we characterize it as a Catholic must characterize it, we only do our duty, and are not to be censured. We have a perfect and indefeasible right before God and man to be Catholics, and to bring up our children Catholics, and we cannot rate the understanding of Protestants so low, as to suppose that they can expect us to be enraptured with any system or measure intended expressly to impede our exercise of this right.

But though we may highly disapprove of the common schools regarded in the light in which it has recently become fashionable among non-Catholics to defend them, we may, nevertheless, be very friendly to the common schools themselves, for it may happen that we have no fear of their being able to corrupt the faith of our children, or to detach them from their devotion to the church. It may be that we believe non-Catholics have exaggerated the evils that these schools can do us as Catholics, and that we believe the faith of our children is sufficiently robust and tenacious to withstand all the sectarianism Protestants can agree among themselves to introduce into them. It may even be, that we see in them something favorable to us, and a chance of turning them to our advantage. It then would by no means follow, because we condemn the avowed intention of non-Catholics, that we condemn the schools themselves, far less that we are opposed to education, or afraid to have our children thoroughly instructed, as if our religion dreaded the light.

It is very true that we believe the common schools are praised beyond their merits; it is very true also, that we believe the power of education to render a people contented and virtuous is greatly overrated; and we are far from believing, even if the whole country were Catholic, and all the schools under Catholic control, all the children brought up in the Catholic religion, by the Christian Brothers, or some other religious order or congregation, whose especial vocation it is to educate the young, that there would be no vice or crime in the country. Education cannot take away free will, or supply the place of the sacraments. If we have exclusively Catholic schools for our children, our children will, nevertheless, not always be what we wish them. Many are called, but few chosen. The ravages of sin cannot be repaired, or the fermentation of concupiscence and the outbreaks of passion prevented, by any education

that can be devised. Education has not to do with a dead or a merely passive subject. No child is in the hands of the educator as clay in the hands of the potter. The educator has to deal with a living subject, endowed with a special nature and a free will of its own. Catholic education was never more general or more thorough in Europe than it was just prior to the outbreak of Protestantism. The children of Italy had received none but a Catholic education, and yet we found the peninsula, in 1848, overrun with Italians ready to war to the death on the pope and Catholicity. Not therefore are we opposed to education, or we would not have Catholic schools wherever they are practicable, but therefore we do not look upon education, not even Catholic education, as alone sufficient to protect faith and insure the practice of virtue, or as really of so much importance as the men of our age, in the plenitude of their Pelagian heresy, would persuade us.

It is true, also, that we have some objections to the present common school system as adopted by most of the states. To educate is not the function of the state, and we do not recognize the right of the state to tax its citizens for the support of schools to which they cannot in conscience send their children, or have no children to send. It is no more the business of the state to educate our children than it is to feed or clothe them, and it has no more right to make the education than it has the support of children a tax on property. Education is the right and the duty of parents, and to take it from them and give it to the state is to strike a severe blow at the sacredness of family, the basis of society. But aside from this, we object to the system, as it has within a few years been modified, its decided centralizing tendency. The great evil of European society is not in the fact that the supreme executive is called king or emperor, instead of president or governor, and succeeds to power by inheritance instead of election, but in the system of centralization of power which has been everywhere introduced. The real curse is the bureaucracy, the concentration of all powers in the central government, to be administered by officials whose constant aim must be to magnify authority, to increase their pay or perquisites, to display their power, and to keep their places. The central government through its officials is every thing, and nothing is left to provincial authorities, to municipalities, to corporations, or to individuals. It affects to be the general and particular providence

of the nation. All must radiate from it, and nothing must be attempted without its permission and its initiation. Commerce, agriculture, industry, art, science, religion, education, are placed under its authority and control. No free, spontaneous movement is anywhere permitted, and the people are disheartened and paralyzed by the official, or rather the officious, intermeddling of the government and its *employés*, even when well-intentioned. The real work for reformers in Europe is to decentralize power, not to revolutionize the state. Something of this was attempted under the late French republic, in the organization of departmental and communal *conseils*, locally elective; whether what was then begun has been continued or destroyed since the *coup d'état* of December, 1851, we are not able to say, but centralism to its fullest extent appears to be the tendency of the empire. The glory of the British constitution is in the absence of this all-absorbing centralization. The mediæval system of Europe was in one sense monarchical, but the power of the monarch was controlled and kept within wholesome limits by local institutions and authorities, which, though subordinate to the crown, did not hold from it. The German emperor received the empire from the pope and the German electors. The German princes and nobles gave him his title and power, not he them their titles and authority. They held their local and inferior powers by an independent title. The principle here implied was at the basis of the whole mediæval political constitution, and no sovereign could say, *L'état, c'est moi.* The king was placed at the summit of the political hierarchy, it is true, but he rested on columns which had a basis of their own, and which were independent and integral elements of the state. In England the great struggle of the Norman kings was to destroy the independence of the estates, and to centralize all the powers of the state in the hands of the central government; and it was this attempt that the barons and commons resisted, and, upon the whole, successfully resisted. But whoever has studied the course of British politics, especially since 1832, must be well aware that centralization is advancing with fearful rapidity in the British empire, not precisely in favor of the crown we admit, at least not so for the moment, but in favor of the commons, who are ceasing to be an estate, and are becoming the people of Great Britain. When a few more reform bills are passed, Great Britain becomes a centralized government, a huge

centralized democracy, with or without an imperial head, as the case may be,—what we may call the Napoleonic democracy.

The same centralizing tendency is even stronger in our own country,—not to centralized monarchy, as in Europe, but to centralized democracy. The original American democracy, the democracy of 1775, retained the best elements of mediæval politics, and studied to distribute instead of concentrating power; but since the "Gallic Era," 1789, the tendency of the country has been to lessen the importance and to break down the independence of local authorities, and to concentrate all powers in the central administration, both in the states and in the union. The radical difference between American and European democracy has never been sufficiently considered by our people. European democracy starts from centralism, from absolutism, and simply transfers to the people as the state all the authority claimed by the absolute monarch, and instead of saying the king, it says the people is the living law. Hence it establishes the same system of bureaucracy which it had rebelled against, and the same despotism under another form. All authorities in the state emanate from the central government, and all affairs are managed by its officials. But the American democracy starts from the distribution of powers, and the independence, each in its sphere, of the local authorities. The state is not all in the central government, but resides primarily in the elements which are anterior to it, and which create or constitute it. The central government of the union is subsequent, not anterior, to the separate states, and in law and fact holds from them, not they from it. They made it, and raised it on their shields, as the old Frank nobles raised their newly elected king. In the states themselves, the central government is not the creator, but the creature, of the state, and holds from the local and self-subsisting authorities which have constituted it. These local authorities, which we in Massachusetts call towns, are subordinate to the central government, indeed, as a part is subordinate to the whole; but they do not emanate from it, and the supreme executive of Massachusetts has nothing more to do with the election or official conduct of the board of selectmen of Chelsea, so long as they keep within the limits of their constitution, than he has with the appointment and official conduct of the *Maire* of Grenoble in France, or the common council of London in England. In

Massachusetts, and in all New England, the elements of the state were originally the towns, as corporations, and these by their votes and representatives formed the central government. In other states the system was variously modified, but in all the principle of distribution was in some form recognized, and precautions taken that the central government should never concentrate all power in itself. Briefly we may say, the study was in the first instance to leave as much to the people themselves, to their individual and spontaneous activity, as is compatible with the maintenance of the public peace and the general welfare; in the second instance, though authority must step in, to leave as much as possible to the towns, municipalities, and counties, and finally to reserve as little as possible to the central authority. This was the original American system, and in principle it conformed to the mediæval, in opposition to the modern European system, whether royal, or imperial, or democratic.

Now every one who is capable of forming a judgment on the subject knows perfectly well that the tendency of the country ever since the old French revolution, which, as it professed to be democratic or republican, engaged our sympathies, is and has been to follow the European system, and to substitute French centralized democracy for the original American system, borrowed in its best features through England from the mediæval system. The tendency has been and is to concentrate all power in the hands of the central government, and to regard all local and subordinate authorities as emanating from it and holding under it. On the continent of Europe the administration seizes upon education as a means of forming the population to its own purpose. The example was set by the French Jacobins in the convention, who sought by a rigid system of state education to rear up all the children of France in the infidel and infomous principles of French Jacobinism. The monarchical governments have borrowed the same policy, and seek to make education the means of consolidating and sustaining their arbitrary power. They place it under the control of the administration, and treat it as an affair of public police, as they do religion. We have adopted the same principle in our turn, and are engaged in carrying it out in the same way. Instead of leaving it to families, to towns, or municipalities, in accordance with our original American system, we now subject it to the central administration of the state.

New York, we believe, took the lead in this bad work, by establishing her regents of the university, after the model of the French convention, and instituting the office of the superintendent of common schools. Massachusetts followed with her board of education; and our common schools are now in a fair way of becoming, what they were not formerly, *state* schools, under the absolute control of the central administration, itself subjected to the irresponsible will of the majority for the time. Soon, as in Prussia, attendance on the public schools will be made compulsory, and the liberty of opening private schools, exempt from state control, will, as in France lately, and perhaps now, be forbidden, without the permission of the central administration.

Now to this centralizing tendency in the administration, and to these centralized common schools, we are strenuously opposed on general principles, and always have been. As editor of *The Boston Quarterly Review*, although then a stanch Protestant, we opposed most strenuously the establishment of the board of education in this commonwealth, and on the same principles we now set forth. We exerted all the influence we had to get it repealed after it had gone into operation, and came within a very few votes of succeeding. We dislike the system, because education is a spiritual affair, and pertains to the soul, and the state is limited in its function to temporals, to what pertains to the body. Nevertheless, it is rather as American citizens than specially as Catholics we now oppose it. We can as easily get our rights as Catholics respected by a central board as by a non-Catholic majority of voters in open town-meeting, and we shall be agreeably disappointed to find the people of New York sustaining the very just decision of Mr. Randall, her able and liberal superintendent of common schools. As Catholics we can live under the system as long as we are in the minority, but Protestants would not find it working agreeably to them if we were in the majority, and chose to continue it.

We object also to the system as established in this country, that it makes no account of the fundamental religious differences between Catholics and Protestants, and requires both to send their children to the same schools to be educated in common. This is not just to either party. France, Austria, and Prussia, where the population, as with us, is divided between the two religions, establish schools under Catholic superintendence for the children of Catholics, and

schools under Protestant superintendence for the children of Protestants. This might be difficult here in the sparsely settled districts, but could be easily done in the larger towns and the more densely populated parts of the country. It ought to be done, and if done would remove all special causes of complaint. It is just, and would be politic. But our non-Catholic countrymen will not consent to it, and no considerations of justice or of good policy will induce them to forego their vain hope of protestantizing our children by means of the common schools.

We complain more especially of our common schools, that they do not practically conform either to the spirit or the letter of the law organizing them. We do not ask nor expect our religion to be taught in the public schools, but we do ask that it shall not be insulted or tampered with in them. The law in all the states, we believe, forbids the introduction of sectarianism into the public schools, and we have the right to insist that this law shall be rigidly enforced. But text-books are used which misrepresent and malign our religion, and in many places the Protestant zeal of the teachers is so ardent, that they cannot forego the attempt to protestanize the Catholic children under their care. It is in this non-compliance with the requisitions of the law, that originates that dissatisfaction with the public schools so widely manifested by Catholics. Let the law be complied with, and the rights of conscience be respected, and the reluctance of Catholics to send their children to the public schools will not be greater than that of the more reputable Protestant sects.

But notwithstanding all these grave objections to the system and to the practical character of many of the schools, we think our non-Catholic countrymen will be greatly disappointed in their expectations. In our judgment they altogether overrate the influence of common schools to root out Catholicity from the country. Religious instruction may be banished from the public schools, but not therefore are we obliged to content ourselves with a strictly godless education for our children. Besides the school, there is the church, and there is home. In this city the religious instruction of our children is very generally attended to. They generally attend the public schools, and are taught the catechism two or three times a week elsewhere; and we are not able to discover that those who go to the public schools are seriously injured in their faith or morals, and so

far as we are informed, few others can be got to learn their catechism. We undoubtedly lose many children, but not more in proportion of those who go to the public schools, than of those who go to the Catholic schools. We lose some when very young, who are kidnapped by the philanthropists; but after these our losses are principally among those who run wild in the streets, who never go to any school, who never hear mass, and who never receive any domestic education,—whose parents are too poor, too ignorant, or too vicious to take any proper care of them; and others after they have been taught their catechism, made their first communion, and have left off going to school. The majority of our losses, we apprehend, are from this latter class; but these losses are due to influences which operate alike on our children, whatever the schools in which they have been instructed. Where the Catholic population is provided with churches and priests in sufficient number, and parents understand and do their duty, there is little difficulty in keeping our children in the faith till their school days are over. After that comes the more serious danger; but it arises from their social position and the social influences to which they are inevitably exposed, and from which no education can effectually guard them.

Protestants render us a service in many localities, for which, were it not intended to operate against our religion, we should even feel grateful. In this city, for instance, it were utterly impossible for us to establish and support purely Catholic schools for the whole number of our children. We have neither the pecuniary means nor the requisite number of competent teachers. We could establish schools for a few of our children, but if withdrawn from the public schools, the great majority would grow up without any education, either religious or secular. They would be suffered to run at large in the streets, be early initiated into all the mysteries of iniquity, and become a grief to their parents, a scandal to religion, and a pest to society. For the mass of our children the only alternative is the public schools or no education except that of the streets, and the education of the streets is several degrees more injurious, in our opinion, to faith and piety, than that of the common-school room. Our children know beforehand that the common schools are under Protestant influences, and that the teachers are for the most part non-Catholic. They are therefore forewarned to distrust whatever they find in these schools, or hear said by these teachers, on the subject of religion.

Protestants flatter themselves that, if our children go to the same school with Protestant children, and associate freely with them, they will lose their attachment to the religion of their parents. In individual cases this may indeed happen; but as a general rule this early mingling of our children with those of Protestants will, we apprehend, be found to have a contrary effect. Our children, when they grow up, will have, in spite of all we can do, to live and associate more or less with Protestants; and whatever precautions we take in their childhood, some day they will have to become acquainted with them, and to learn what they have to say against Catholicity. To keep them in the faith by keeping them from all contact with heresy is entirely out of the question in a country like ours; and nothing, as far as we can discover, is gained by delaying this inevitable contact to a late period of life. Those foreigners, we have observed, who have grown up in ignorance of Protestants and Protestantism, are precisely those who, on coming here, are the most liable to fall away. An Irishman from the parts of Ireland where Protestants abound, and who has encountered them daily from his childhood up, is seldom if ever found to apostatize on coming to the United States; but, unhappily, we cannot say as much for those who come from those parts of Ireland where there are few or no Protestants. Children are while young strongly disposed to adhere to the religion of their parents; and if, before they have begun to speculate on their own account, and before they have begun to experience the perturbations of passion, they have become familiarized with Protestants, heard and answered their objections as a child may hear and answer them, there is comparatively little danger of their ever in after-life being seduced from the church. Protestantism has no novelty for them, and therefore no power to attract them.

Moreover, the impression the Catholic child gets of Protestants from his parents is seldom wholly true, for the child transfers the horror of Protestantism with which they have inspired him to Protestants personally, and fancies that they must be as deformed, as horrible, and as revolting in their ordinary appearance and in the ordinary relations of secular life as his parents have painted Protestantism itself. One day he becomes personally acquainted with Protestants, finds them not ill-looking, decidedly human in their appearance, intelligent, active, amiable, and perhaps even affectionate.

He is surprised; he sees the picture he had formed in his own mind is false, and that he has been deceived, and, as he concludes, by his parents. His confidence in their judgment is then weakened, and he is prepared to listen to what his Protestant friends have to say. Now comes the danger. He finds himself ignorant of the objections which Protestants urge against our religion, and quite unprovided with answers to them, for no one can understand the answer to an objection till he knows practically the objection itself. Now, if he had known Protestantism from his infancy, learned from early childhood these objections in the form in which children state and understand them, and been furnished, in proportion as his mind needed and could receive them, with the proper explanations and answers, he would not have been in a moment's danger. Since Catholics and Protestants must live together, this early mingling of Catholic and Protestant children at school, if proper pains be taken by Catholic parents and pastors to instruct their children, will work more good than injury to our religion. The Protestant party will lose much of their prejudice, and the Catholic party will grow up with a firm and robust faith, proof against every trial, and which no contact with heresy in after-life can shake.

Another effect will be produced, alike fatal to the hopes of non-Catholics. Their present strength against Catholics in this country to a great extent depends on the fact that the majority of Catholics are foreigners, with un-American tastes, habits, and manners. Our children, if educated in the public schools, will at a very early age become americanized, and be able to feel that they are "to the manner" both "born" and bred. They will imbibe a free and manly spirit in face of non-Catholics, and hold up their heads, and speak out in the bold and energetic tone of free-born Americans. The church will then cease to be a foreign church here; it will be nationalized, and Catholicity become an integral element in the national life. The Catholic population will assume their rightful position, and have their due moral weight. This will be a gain to the Catholic cause of no little importance, for we can assure our non-Catholic friends that their belief that to americanize is to protestantize is wholly unfounded. We do not place American nationality, in itself, above other nationalities, but it is undoubtedly the best nationality for Americans, and Catholicity will become strong here in proportion as the Cath-

olic population is thoroughly nationalized, and has none of the prejudices to encounter common to every native against foreigners.

Looking as calmly as we can on all sides of the question, we are firmly convinced that the common schools are upon the whole an advantage rather than a disadvantage to us as Catholics. Of course, they are not all we could wish, they are not what we would have if we were able to do as we would, but they are by no means as dangerous to us as non-Catholics in their anti-popery zeal persuade themselves. We are and must be, in all the relations of secular life, mixed up with Protestants, and such are the circumstances of the country that our safety consists in having our children early inured to the rough and tumble of American society as it is. Here we cannot expect them to grow up Catholics through simple social influences, or to be protected in the faith by the fostering care of the government, or by its vigilance in excluding all contact with heresy. The faith of our children must be early exercised to habits of self-defence. Catholicity here can be no hot-house plant. It is and cannot but be exposed to all weathers. But this need not encourage the hopes of non-Catholics, or discourage us; for if parents will only do their duty and pay some little attention to domestic education, and study to set a good example before their children, it will only take the deeper root and attain a hardier growth. Here, if not everywhere else, the Catholic, save in his dependence on the church and her sacraments, must learn to stand alone, and early acquire what the Germans call *Selbstständigkeit*, or a stand-up-tiveness-on-one's-own-feet. Faith and piety may be injured by too much nursing, and a Catholic people may lose its faith by the too great pains of secular society to keep them orthodox. For those who have not a vocation to the religious life, the great study should be to form a sturdy Catholic character, that may be trusted in some measure, with God's grace, to itself. They who are to live in the world, must be formed to withstand the world and to be able in whatever straits they are placed to do something to help themselves. The times when a Catholic community could be guarded by the civil power, as the shepherd guards his flock by his watch-dog from the wolves, have passed away, perhaps never to return, and the great body of Catholics everywhere, as under the pagan emperors of Rome, must now be early accustomed to feel that they are left to

the providence of God, the vigilance of their pastors, and to their own resources; and the earlier we prepare our people in this country to face the errors and dangers to which they are exposed, the better will it be for them and the better for religion. Taking this view of the subject, we are very far from regarding the common schools, even if we are obliged to avail ourselves of them, so long as they are no worse than they now are, as likely to do us any permanent injury as Catholics.

Our readers will perceive that we have not entered into the question as to the propriety, where practicable, of establishing and supporting exclusively Catholic schools for our children, for on that point we suppose there is no difference of opinion among Catholics. We have studiously avoided saying any thing of the movement of Catholics to substitute purely Catholic schools for the public schools of the country, because it is a question that belongs exclusively to the pastors of the church, and with which we as a layman have, in our judgment, no right to meddle. It is a matter of ecclesiastical administration, and ecclesiastical administration we do not regard as a proper subject of editorial comment. Where Catholic schools are practicable, judged to be so by the pastor, and required by him, they must be instituted and supported as a matter of course, and no one would rejoice more than we to see such schools established for all the children of the land. But our purpose in this article has been to consider the common school system from the point of view of non-Catholics, and to show that their hopes of its anti-Catholic operation are probably doomed to disappointment. We do not wish to recommend the common schools to Catholics,—that is not within our province; but we do wish to have Protestants understand that we do not fear those schools, though we may not prefer them. All we say is, that we think these schools, in our own city and state,—we say nothing of them elsewhere,—are far better than none, far better than any we are ourselves at present able, in a sufficient number for all our children, to institute in their place; and that, however objectionable we may feel it to be obliged to send our children to them along with Protestant children, the education acquired in them is far better than none at all, or that of the streets.

We do not, indeed, set so high a value on common school education as some do, but it will not do for Catholics to neglect it, and they must strive with all their might, either

in the public schools or in parochial schools, to have all their children receive a good common education. Common school education is the order of the day, one of the pets of the times, and Catholics have enough in this country to weigh them down in our non-Catholic society without the additional burden of being thought to oppose it. Every age has its own fashions and its own wants, and in what is not of religion and dogma, it is useless for Catholics to stand out. Our children have got to take their stand in American society with others, and it is our duty to do all in our power to enable them to do so with as little disadvantage as is possible with fidelity to our holy religion. When all others are educated, it will not do for us to suffer our children to grow up in ignorance. To the mass of our children, who will have to labor for a living, an education in our colleges and academies would be a positive disadvantage; but a plain, practical, common school education, at least in the present state of society, is well nigh indispensable. We do not ask the poor washer-woman to slave herself to death to give her son a collegiate education, which will very likely place him in a false position through life, but we do ask her to do her best to give him, either in a Catholic or a public school, a good practical, common-sense education. Leaving to the bishops and clergy to designate the schools, we would urge upon our Catholic friends the high importance of giving their children a good secular education. The times, the country, and religion alike demand it; and we would insist on it, if for no other reason, to prove to non-Catholics that the ignorance which they complain of, and which we cannot deny, in many foreign Catholics, is due, not to their religion, but to their political and social condition in their native country. But while urging secular education, we would not by any means forget religious education, without which secular education has, and can have, no value.

SICK CALLS.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1852.]

This is an American reprint of an English work by the Rev. Edward Price, formely editor, we believe, of *Dolman's Magazine.* It appears to have been suggested by a work which enjoyed some popularity a few years since, entitled *Passages from the Diary of a Physician.* It is written with more than ordinary literary taste and ability, and the several scenes it sketches, most of them undoubtedly drawn from the life, are intensely interesting. They could have been sketched only by a missionary priest, of large experience among the poor and the vicious of our modern commercial cities, although it is evident that the author has borrowed much of the grouping and coloring from his own lively imagination.

The author has laid bare the moral wounds festering in our modern overgrown cities, and perhaps has given us even too vivid a picture of the vice and immorality with which the faithful missionary necessarily becomes acquainted in the discharge of his duty. But he seems to have done it from pure and praiseworthy motives, for the purpose of showing the power of religion to heal the worst moral maladies, to triumph over the hardest hearts, and to relieve and console the most miserable of our race. He manifests great tenderness to the fallen, and suffers no moral leprosy to disgust him with a soul for whom our Lord has died; and he everywhere shows a tendency to excuse the depraved, and to find in the most abandoned some tokens of grace. He has no sourness, no harshness; but, as is invariably the case with the true priest, the deeper the wounds, the greater the sinner, the more does his heart open to him, and the warmer flows his charity, to rescue him from his degradation, to cleanse his soul, to make him whole, and prepare him for the banquet of divine love. This is as it should be.

**Sick Calls: from the Diary of a Missionary Priest.* By the Rev. Edward Price, M. A. New York: 1851.

Sinners are gained by love, and won over to our Lord, not by severity, but by the infinite tenderness of the Gospel.

Some of our occasional readers may be surprised to hear us say this, for we are supposed by not a few to have no bowels of compassion, to be dry, hard, severe, unrelenting. Perhaps we are, and whether so or not is of no importance to the public. Yet there is an obvious distinction between severity in the enunciation of principles, and harshness in their application to individuals. Principles, Christian doctrines, dogmas of faith, are not ours, they are our Master's, and are strict, unbending, immutable. When we are called upon to proclaim these, we have no option with regard to them; we have no right to harden or to soften them; we must proclaim them as they have been taught us, with unswerving and scrupulous fidelity, let them condemn whom they may. If it is our office to declare the law, we must declare it according to the mind of the Lawgiver. But in the application of the law to the condemnation of this or that individual, we must always lean to the side of mercy, and give him the benefit of every extenuating circumstance; and even when we must condemn him, we cannot be too careful to show that it is the law that condemns him, not a poor, frail mortal like himself.

As laymen and reviewers, we have nothing to do with the application of the law to individual cases; we are only permitted to defend the truth against error, to speak, under correction of our pastors, of the law, and its condemnation of those who break it. We may say, Out of the church there is no salvation, because the church has herself so defined; we may pronounce Protestantism a damnable heresy, for the church has anathematized it, and even natural reason rejects it; we may assert that no Protestant, living and dying a Protestant, can ever see God, and therefore declare all who are Protestants are out of the way of salvation, because the church says it, and we, in being received into her communion, promised to say as much. To say this, and to add that none but Catholics can, under any circumstances, be saved, is in these days regarded as harsh, even cruel, and if we do so, it is supposed by many Catholics as well as heretics, that we forget the charity of the Gospel, and neglect the mercy with which we should always temper judgment. But it should be borne in mind, that in saying this we are not judging, but simply repeating the revealed and declared judgments of God, which are not our judgments, but the

law or rule according to which we are to form our judgments. Whether the truths we repeat are harsh or not, the responsibility does not rest on us; but we know no right that any man has to suppose it possible for God to be harsh, severe, or unkind. St. Peter says expressly that there is no other name than that of Jesus under heaven given to men whereby we must be saved. Neither is there salvation in any other. God was not obliged to save any man, and all salvation is the free gift of God, for we are saved by grace. God could, without any right of complaint on our part, fix the conditions on which he would or would not save those who have sinned against him. If he has fixed those conditions, and declared that he will save none who are not joined to the communion of the church, it is not harshness, but simple charity, to tell the truth, and say distinctly and energetically, Out of the church there is no salvation. We should be wanting in charity if we did not.

The charge of severity against those who insist on the doctrine of exclusive salvation, which the church unquestionably teaches, arises from confounding the stern and unflinching statement of what the law is with its application to individuals. "Other sheep have I," says our Lord, "who are not of this fold, them also must I bring." The Lord knoweth them that are his, and we are never at liberty to say that none are elected but those already in the church. Nor are we at liberty, without supernatural revelation, to pronounce on the future fate of even those who have *apparently* died out of the Catholic communion. If they really died out of that communion, we know they are lost; but whether they did so die or not, in all ordinary cases, it is not for us to judge. We know the law, and we know it admits in this case of no exception, of no dispensation; but we do not know but this or that individual, whom we supposed obnoxious to its penalty, may not, in a way we know not, have been brought in reality into the fold before the soul was separated from the body. We may, indeed, have no reason to believe it, but, as it was possible, we cannot say that it was not so, and therefore we cannot pronounce on its doom. As long as there is life there is hope, and therefore we can never say of any living man that he will certainly go to hell; and as we know not the actual state in which any particular soul has left the body, we cannot say that any particular departed soul is damned, although we may have strong reasons for believing, and none for not

believing, it. Our judgments here must be conditional, not absolute, and we must stop with saying of the living, if they die heretics or infidels they cannot be saved, and of the dead, if they have died in heresy or infidelity they are damned.

In regard to sin of every description, in teaching, in laying down the law, we must always be most rigid, for the law knows no compromise, and the judgment is certain if the sin is incurred; and here is as far as we can go. The priest, indeed, can go further; he is appointed to judge those sinners who come to him and confess or accuse themselves of their sins. But in judging them, while he holds the law in its strictness, he takes note of all the circumstances of the acts confessed, and is careful to give the self-accused the benefit of whatever may tend to extenuate his offence. He tempers his judgment with mercy, and takes good care that he does not pronounce a heavier penalty than has been actually incurred. Moreover, knowing the frailty, the rottenness of human nature, the seductions of the world, and the temptations of Satan, he will, even when he must condemn, and it would seem even in proportion as he must condemn, melt in tenderness to the poor sinner, and clasp him to his bosom with a supernatural charity. We apprehend that confessors feel the greatest tenderness for those penitents who have had the greatest sins to confess, the deepest and most loathsome moral wounds to disclose. The penitent, all polluted with sin, who has nothing but a long catalogue of the most loathsome moral diseases to lay bare before his confessor, is the least likely to be rudely repulsed, and is the most sure of being treated with tenderness, and having the most favorable construction put upon his sins that they will bear. The tribunal of penance is established in mercy, and solely to heal the wounds of the soul, and to cleanse it from its pollutions; and God gives to his ministers the graces that fit them to make it not only effectual, but even attractive to those who need and will frequent it.

In our various degrees, we all in judging, not of sin itself, not of its inherent malignity, but of individuals, are to aim at the same supernatural charity, and to overflow with real love and tenderness towards those whom we regard as sinners. Our Lord did not refuse to eat with publicans and sinners, for he came not to call the just, but sinners to repentance. The humble publican, who smites on his heart and exclaims, "God be merciful to me a sinner!" is pre-

ferred to the proud Pharisee, who stands and enumerates his virtues, and thanks God that he is not as other men. Not always are those the world brands with infamy the most guilty before God; and who are we that we should be harsh and unrelenting to our fellow-men, however depraved they may be? Who of us has not had, and has not had every day, nay, a hundred times a day, to say, "God, be merciful to me a sinner"? We may not have fallen so low as this poor brother or sister, but dare we say we should not have fallen even lower if we had been equally tempted or equally exposed? Alas! no one can boast over another, and no one has any thing whereof to glory but the cross of Christ which redeemeth from sin. Severe, then, as we ourselves are, and must be, in the work we are permitted to perform, and perhaps in our personal disposition, for no man thoroughly knows his own heart, we like that tone of tenderness to sinners, and even aggravated sinners, which pervades this little volume. The author contrives to make us love the sinner, and ready to die for him, without making us in the least tolerant of his sin. He makes us weep with the sinner, and rejoice with him, as the waters of penance wash away his pollutions and permit us to see his soul, resplendent through the grace of the sacrament with supernatural purity and loveliness.

Yet, perhaps, the author makes a little too much of the merely human sentiments. The distinguishing mark of the disciples of Christ is love; and this love a large portion of the uncatholic world translate into philanthropy, and another portion into mere family affections, and not a few, we fear, into a lower species of love still. We have these errors to guard against. The love, which is the badge of the Christian, is not sensual love, is not merely a human sentiment, whether called philanthropy or any thing else, but charity, a supernatural love, not possible but in a heart that has been regenerated and elevated by divine grace, and which consists in loving God supremely, and our neighbor as ourselves in and for him. It presupposes faith, therefore belief of the truth, and is never found out of the church of God. The human sentiments, which are not elevated by grace, and which are purely within the natural order, are of no value in relation to our final destiny, and, even though not sinful in themselves, seldom fail, owing to our corrupt nature, to become a temptation and a snare to those who indulge them. Philanthropy, as we see it now displayed,

serves only to suggest vague and impracticable schemes of reform, and to convulse the world with rebellion and revolution, ending only in anarchy or despotism. Sentiment is almost sure, if indulged, to become lust, and to pave the way for wide-spread licentiousness and impurity. We have, therefore, to be extremely cautious, in these times, how we appeal to the natural sentiments of the human heart, and use words which the world will apply to them, though we may apply them in our own minds to truly Christian affections and virtues. Our great danger is from naturalism, and we must, therefore, be careful, in season and out of season, to insist on the supernatural affections of the Gospel.

The author, in this work, though by no means indifferent to exterior refinement and the supposed advantages of wealth and worldly cultivation, leaves an impression on the reader most favorable to the poor, and especially, Englishman as he is, to the Irish poor. In studying his sketches we feel of how little value is this world, and what pertains to it, even in relation to our positive comfort and enjoyment in this life. Faith, and piety, and trust, seem to have no little power in sustaining our physical as well as spiritual existence—a power to multiply the widow's handful of meal and cruse of oil to an abundance far more precious than the rich in general possess. How these poor, pious people live is a marvel to us; yet they do live, and often render large assistance to others of their own class. They never repine, never murmur, and seem to live constantly in the presence of God.

It is the prayers of these poor Irish, perhaps of that poor apple-woman that sits meekly and uncomplainingly day after day, in all weathers, at the corner of the street, waiting almost in vain for a customer for her scanty supply of fruit, saying as it were her beads from morning to night, that will bring down the blessings of God upon our country, and make us a Christian people. We import rare and costly merchandise from all countries, but the most precious freightage our ships bring home is these poor, pious Irish men and women, who, if they have nothing else, are rich in grace, and have learned every thing worth learning, in having learned to pray.

We glanced the other day into a Protestant newspaper, *The Christian Register*, we believe, in which the editor was contrasting the little labor and large incomes of our clergy with the great labor and small incomes of Protestant

ministers. We would recommend him to read the sketch, "A Missioner's Sunday Work," and yet it is only an ordinary Sunday's work of many a Catholic priest in our midst. The Protestant minister hardly knows the meaning of "a sick call," and rarely is he ever required or expected to visit his sick parishioners at unseasonable hours, or when fatigued by other labors, or weary with doing nothing. As for incomes, it is enough to say, that the Church of England alone has a larger revenue than the whole Catholic church throughout the world. The Protestant minister has, no doubt, to perform much hard work, and endure much wear and tear of mind and body, as well as of conscience; but it is so not because the work itself is much, but because the poor minister has to do it himself alone, without any of those gracious helps from above which render the heaviest labor light.

Our Protestant editor, in the same article, complains of our clergy because they visit their people mainly for spiritual purposes, and make more of providing for the soul than for the body. He is greatly scandalized that we have in Boston, for instance, so many poor Catholics, and that our clergy, in visiting them, look after their spiritual rather than their worldly interest. He is of opinion, that the first care of the priest should be to attend to the bodies of his people, remove their poverty, set them up, and help them to become well to do in the world, and look to their souls or spiritual interests, if at all, afterwards. He is displeased that our missionaries in China take so much pains to baptize children exposed by their parents, and near dying, instead of laboring to remove the poverty which causes the exposure. In all this we see that he is a true Protestant, and has a great concern for the body, and very little for the soul. If the body is only provided for, the soul, he seems to think, may be left to shift for itself. We wish he would tell us where our clergy are to get the means to remove all the poverty of the thousands flocking into the country, reduced to want by Protestant oppression and misrule in Ireland; and what our missionaries could do in China, where they have hardly ever been able to appear without being doomed to martyrdom, to improve the public and private economy of that over-peopled empire. But, after all, we do not remember that our Lord ever promised to remove poverty and want from the world, or that he ever gave his church a commission to make all men rich in this world's goods; we are not

aware that the Catholic clergy are under any special obligation to take care of paupers, or that they any more than Protestants can be called upon to relieve the bodily wants even of the Catholic poor. In olden times, when the public made the clergy their almoners, they took care of the poor, and they would do it now, and in this community, if it chose to entrust them with the means, and at a tithe of what it now costs. It is the duty of wealth to contribute to the wants of the poor, and the wealth of this community is in the hands of the Protestant ministers and their Protestant friends.

It is worthy of note, that, though the church has only a spiritual mission, and is charged especially only with the salvation of souls, yet in all countries where she is not oppressed or persecuted the wants of the poor are amply provided for. You will look in vain in Austria, Italy, or Spain, or even France, for such squalid poverty as meets you in London, Dublin, Glasgow, Boston, and New York. Protestants, even though attending primarily to the body, and perhaps caring for it at the expense of the soul, are responsible for the greater part of the abject poverty of the modern world. The most frightful poverty to be met with is in countries ruled by Protestants. There may be much of this poverty among the Catholic subjects of Protestant governments, and if so, it is because those governments have never given them an equal chance with their Protestant subjects. The Catholic poor in this country were made poor before they came here, and most of them by the skill and energy, in oppressing and brutifying, of your boasted Anglo-Saxon race, or that "bulwark of the Protestant religion," Great Britain. And, after all, what does Protestantism do for the poor? In Ireland and in this country it is willing to do something for poor Catholics, on condition that they consent to become Protestants—to sell their souls for a mess of pottage. But in general it has done nothing to increase the wealth or to diminish the poverty of the world. Great Britain and the United States have the appearance of being wealthy, because they have mortgaged posterity; but neither of them is wealthy enough to pay its public and private debts. Let credit be suspended, and there be no longer the means of taxing future generations for the support of the present, and let each be called upon to settle up its accounts with futurity, and they would both be found

insolvent, and Great Britain would be unable to transmit as much value to the next generation as she received from Catholic Europe. Both have borrowed more from the future than either has enhanced the capital it inherited. Your vast commerce, and your industrial establishments for the fabrication of luxuries, have done nothing to enrich you, and, in an economical point of view, have been worse than a dead loss. So much for neglecting the soul and living for the body.

But we are very free to confess that our clergy do labor for the soul rather than for the body of their flocks, and are far more attentive to their spiritual than to their bodily wants, for they are Christians, not heathens or carnal Jews, and they have a firm faith that, though a man should gain the whole world and lose his own soul, it would profit him nothing. Strange as it may seem to Protestant ministers, our clergy do not regard their ministry as a sham, and their services as useless. They believe that their ministry is from God, and that their services are really necessary in the divine economy of salvation. He who, by baptizing one exposed infant just ready to die, has secured the admission of a soul to the beatific vision of God, has thus gained for it an eternity of bliss, which infinitely outweighs all the worldly good of the whole human race from the beginning to the end of time. The loss of one soul is a greater loss than the loss of all the material wealth of the universe; and would you have our clergy devote themselves to the body at the hazard of losing the soul? Do not suppose, because you esteem the world as first, that therefore our clergy do or should.

Nevertheless, our clergy are not indifferent to the physical sufferings of their people, and do more than you can dream of to relieve and solace them. They would also thank you for what you do, if you would consent to aid them without insisting upon conditions destructive to the souls of our suffering poor. We have many children running about the streets, idle, vicious,—criminal occasionally it may be, and we are sorry it is so; but they may retain something of the true faith, and one day be brought to penitence and be saved. Were we to intrust them to your charity, whatever they might gain in worldly respectability, they would be pretty sure to lose their souls. We would rather see them bad Catholics than even good Protestants; for the bad Catholic, as long as he retains a single spark of

faith, has something to which the minister of God can appeal, has some relics of a conscience, and may one day be led to repentance and be saved; but if our children were taken from us and trained up Protestants, or as Protestants would insist on their being trained, there would be as good as no hope at all of their ever seeing God.

Here is the great reason why our clergy cannot do more to relieve the poverty from which many of their people suffer. They are themselves poor, and Protestants are not willing to aid them except on conditions that cannot be accepted. We who are Catholics have faith, and with us eternity is a reality. We must train up our children to live for God. We cannot always do it, indeed, and no training will always be sufficient; but we must do the best we can. Protestants have no faith; the world to come is to them a pleasant or an unpleasant dream, and the only reality they recognize is this world and what pertains to it. They therefore would educate, and do educate, for this world alone. They cannot come in contact with our children without exerting upon them a pestiferous influence, and hence we can hardly ever be grateful to them for their benevolent aids, their well-meant liberality. They can never consent to aid us in saving our children from the evil influences to which they are subjected, in our own way, and in accordance with our own religion; but they must get them away from us under the tuition and influence of their own ministers, who should be termed Skrälinger, or the Black Death. Hence we are frequently obliged to repulse their offers of assistance, and to prefer to see our children starve in the streets to their being relieved by Protestant liberality.

After all, it is necessary to be on our guard against the Protestant habit of coupling rags and dirt with vice. The Yankee identifies virtue with cleanliness and thrift, and wherever these are wanting he can discover nothing but the seal of eternal reprobation. He has no conception that it is possible for virtue to have an unwashed face, to dwell in a dark court and a dirty tenement, or that a man who has no capacity for rising in the world can ever get into heaven. Yet we would rather take our chance with the dwellers in these filthy courts, and dirty garrets and cellars, than with the rich whose palaces front broad and spacious streets, and who are externally so clean and neat. The pious poor are the jewels of the church; hardly shall the rich enter into

the kingdom of heaven. Moreover, we believe the most abject of our poor have even in this world more solid enjoyment, more true happiness, than the rich and the great. We would relieve actual suffering wherever we find it, but we would not make the poor rich if we could, for we do not believe that increase of riches is ever desirable. This world is but an inn; we lodge in it but for a night, and what matters the inconvenience which we may be required to put up with? If we gain heaven it is nothing; and if we fail of heaven, the memory of it will be lost in the presence of an infinitely greater calamity.

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